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### 1nc --- China Tech Good

#### US AI is unregulated--- that’s an existential risk.

George Dvorsky 10-25-2017 [A senior reporter specializing in spaceflight, space policy, and space exploration, Gizmodo, “Powerful Lobby Group Wants to Keep AI Unregulated,” https://gizmodo.com/powerful-lobby-group-wants-to-keep-ai-unregulated-1819842165//ZW]

The Information Technology Industry Council (ITI)—a Washington D.C.-based lobby group that boasts Google, Amazon, and Microsoft among its many clients—is telling governments to think twice about establishing laws to regulate AI. But given mounting safety, ethical, and social justice concerns, is that such a good idea? On Tuesday, ITI released its “AI Policy Principles,” in which the lobby group outlined “specific areas where industry, governments, and others can collaborate, as well as specific opportunities for public-private partnership.” In the new document, ITI acknowledged the need for the tech sector to promote the responsible development and use of AI, while calling upon governments to support, incentivize, and fund AI research efforts. But as for letting governments take a peek at an ITI client’s source code, or enact laws to steer the safe and ethical development of AI, that’s something it’s a bit less enthused about. “We also encourage governments to evaluate existing policy tools and use caution before adopting new laws, regulations, or taxes that may inadvertently or unnecessarily impede the responsible development and use of AI,” notes ITI in its new list of AI principles. “This extends to the foundational nature of protecting source code, proprietary algorithms, and other intellectual property. Failure to do so could present a significant cyber risk.” According to its mandate, ITI seeks to “encourage all governments around the world—including the US government—to develop policies, standards, and regulations that promote innovation and growth for the tech industry.” It represents some of the heaviest hitters in the tech sector, including Amazon, Facebook, Google, IBM, and Microsoft, while claiming to be “the global voice of the tech sector” and “a catalyst for preparing an AI world.” ITI’s document is timely given just how important AI is starting to become, both in terms of its burgeoning influence on our lives (whether it be a photo-sorting app or an algorithm that invents new medicines), and in the global economy (ITI estimates that AI will add at least $7 trillion to the global economy by 2025). But it’s also timely given the recent calls for oversight and regulation. As Bloomberg reporters Gerrit De Vynck and Ben Brody write: Big tech companies, and their software, are coming under more scrutiny in the wake of news that Russian-sponsored accounts used social networks to spread discord and try to influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Algorithms designed by Facebook, Twitter Inc. and Google have also been criticized for increasing political polarization by giving people the type of news they already agree with, creating so-called “filter bubbles.” And the concerns don’t stop there. Developers are starting to be criticized for allowing their AI systems to adopt human biases and prejudices (a recent Princeton study, for example, showed that some AI systems are sexist and racist). There’s also uncertainty about how AI will contribute to technological unemployment, automated warfare, and computer hacking. And there’s still no consensus on the specific ethical or moral codes that need to be imbued into these systems. There’s also the frightening potential, as thinkers like Elon Musk, Stephen Hawking, and others have pointed out, for something to go horribly wrong with AI. As the recent AI breakthrough by Google-owned DeepMind demonstrated, a fast takeoff event, in which AI evolves into a superintelligent form, may happen relatively quickly and without warning, thus introducing catastrophic—and possibly existential—threats. As all of this is happening, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that some concerned observers are calling for the government to step in. Musk has warned that governments need to implement regulations “before it’s too late,” and that it’s only after things get out of hand that we tend to act. Two years ago, the White House implemented a preliminary AI strategy, saying AI needs to be ethical, that it must augment, and not replace, humans, and that everyone should have a chance to participate in the development of these systems. But as for formal regulations, the White House said it’s still premature. As former US president Obama told Wired last year, “Most people aren’t spending a lot of time right now worrying about the Singularity—they are worrying about ‘Well, is my job going to be replaced by a machine?’” Patrick Lin, director of the Ethics + Emerging Sciences Group at California Polytechnic State University, says that regulating new technologies is always a delicate balancing act. “If you set regulation too early, then you may be betting on the wrong standards, and that would be terrible for commercialization, which is important,” Lin told Gizmodo. “The same problem exists with setting too many or unnecessary regulations; they can create barriers to innovation. But commercialization isn’t the only value at stake here; public safety is another value in the equation. So, if there’s little or no regulation for technologies that can have serious impact on our lives—from self-driving cars to AI systems that make criminal sentencing and bank lending decisions—then that will be bad for society. It’s a mistake to have a knee-jerk reaction either way, reflexively for or against regulation. Each technology is different and needs to be considered carefully on its own merits.” Lin says this conversation is currently happening in regards to autonomous vehicles, with one camp arguing that regulatory standards will put manufacturers on the same page about safety-critical functions (which would protect the industry from some liability), with the other camp saying we don’t know enough to start forging standards. “A middle path between no regulation and state regulation is to let industry regulate itself, which is the ITI approach,” says Lin. “But this is far from ideal as well: it’s letting the fox guard the henhouse. There’s no teeth to enforce self-regulations if a company breaks rank; there may be even less transparency than with government regulators; and many other problems.” Currently, the US has no federal agency dedicated to regulating or monitoring AI, and it’ll probably be a while before we see anything like that (if ever). In the meantime, it’ll be up to various groups, both inside and outside the government, to monitor developments in AI, such as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (to oversee development of autonomous vehicles) and the Department of Homeland Security (to monitor cybersecurity threats). Some private individuals and companies have created their own groups, such as Musk’s OpenAI initiative and Google’s DeepMind Ethics & Society group. But as Lin points out, there’s a “having your cake and eat it, too” aspect to self-regulation. “On one hand, industry (correctly) says that AI is going to be this game-changing, super-revolutionary thing, but on the other hand, they often tell us not to worry about it, that they have it handled,” he said. “Worse, because the AI industry is so fragmented and full of start-ups—or even individuals without formal education or professional training, working from their basements—you couldn’t possibly get them all on board with your self-imposed regulations, whereas government regulations can use the full force of law to achieve compliance.” Lin says that self-regulation may be better than no regulation or uninformed regulation, especially when it’s about a technology that could cause major problems for society. As examples, he points to fake news, dieselgate, biased decision systems, and so on. Sara Wachter-Boettcher, author of Technically Wrong: Sexist Apps, Biased Algorithms, and Other Threats of Toxic Tech, says she’s happy to see an acknowledgement of the problem and development of shared principles, but the underlying message to her seems to be, “trust us, we’re working on it.” “I would ask, what evidence do we have that they’ve got a handle on removing bias from AI? Why should we trust tech companies when we see examples of them embedding bias into software, or launching products with unintended consequences, every day?,” Wachter-Boettcher told Gizmodo. “I understand that it’s not as simple as lifting the curtain and letting the public look at the code, but there needs to be agreed-upon and enforced levels of transparency and accountability. While industry says it’s afraid of slowing down innovation, I think the rest of us should be a lot more worried about the real risk of flying headfirst into even more inequality, bias, and unintended harm.” In an email to Gizmodo, Jaan Tallinn, the co-founder of Skype, said “we need regulation eventually, but first we need more research into what a positive and effective regulation should look like.” And indeed, those arguing for regulations are having some difficulty articulating what actually needs regulating, and how it should be implemented and enforced. Thankfully, however, these conversations have started and the frameworks for AI regulation are starting to emerge. As Tallinn noted, we’re going to need regulations eventually. The self-serving principles set out by ITI can be seen as pre-emptive attack to delay the inevitable, and to protect its clients from what it sees as meddlesome and potentially costly intrusions. And self-serving it is; it can hardly be said, for example—and as stated in the new list of principles—that the ITI clientele could use some additional financial support from the government. As Oxford philosopher Nick Bostrom wrote last year, “Great resources are devoted to making [progress in AI] happen, with major (and growing) investments from both industry and academia in many countries.” At the same time, investments “in long-term AI safety...remains orders of magnitude less than investment in increasing AI capabilities.” That ITI did not list the funding of AI safety initiatives by industry, government, and private sources as an “AI principle” is as problematic as it is revealing. Moreover, it’s not immediately obvious that profit-driven companies with cranky shareholders in the background are in any way interested in constraints imposed by outside forces, or in voluntarily contributing to the public good. Regulations and government oversight exists in the absence of pro-social forces within the overarching capitalist framework. “We can hope that corporate self-interest will align with public interests, but that is a giant leap of faith, and many companies in ITIC don’t exactly have a great track record at winning public trust,” Lin told Gizmodo. “It’s important to remember that they’re not in the business of protecting the public or promoting democracy—their business is business. When profit motives and humanitarian motives collide, take a wild guess which one usually wins.”

#### China led AI is better.

Kai-Fu Lee and Paul Triolo 12-2017 [Dr. Kai-Fu Lee is the founder and CEO of Sinovation Ventures, and president of Sinovation Ventures Artificial Intelligence Institute, Paul Triolo is the Practice Head, Geo-technology at Eurasia Group, Ltd; Sinovation Ventures, “China embraces AI: A Close Look and A Long View,” https://www.eurasiagroup.net/files/upload/China\_Embraces\_AI.pdf//ZW]

AI policy in China Beijing’s AI policy priorities are clear. The “Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” announced by China’s State Council in July 2017, called for China to catch up on AI technology and applications by 2020, and to become a global AI innovation hub by 2030. Chinese President Xi Jinping hammered the point home in his 19th Party Congress speech in October, when he mentioned the development of advanced manufacturing and the promotion of further integration of the Internet, big data and artificial intelligence with the real-world economy. Beijing has placed huge bets on AI for a host of political and economic reasons, from improving governance capacity to improving policy development and surveillance. The plan calls for China to lead the way in developing a regulatory environment to both encourage AI development and to mitigate the potential downsides of AI. A few months after the national plan’s announcement in July, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) designated Baidu to lead the autonomous vehicle platform, Tencent for medical, Alibaba for Smart Cities, and iFlyTek for speech interfaces. These plans should be taken seriously, as the Chinese government has shown a strong track record in delivering results. For example, Beijing announced in 2010 that China would become the world’s leader in adopting high-speed rail (HSR). Today it has 60% of the world’s HSR market. In 2014, the Chinese government announced the “Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation Plan.”Today there are business 8000 incubators in China, compared to 1400 in 2014. These plans have teeth, both due to the deadlines and metrics set out at the national level, as well as the local companies that are likely to take these directions as top priorities. We can expect a similar trajectory for China’s AI policies. Historically, the Chinese government has been open-minded towards technology development. When a new technology comes out, the government will give it the benefit of doubt and let it grow, rather than stifle it with policy or endless debates. Also, the environment in China is more conducive to fast launch and iteration. There is a general belief that it is better to launch something and then get it approved later. This allows Chinese businesses to generate real data at scale, which in turn allows technology to improve over a shorter period of time, particularly once AI is introduced into the equation. For example, while in the US, truckers’ unions are petitioning the Department of Transportation to delay autonomous truck testing, in China, the Xiong’an New Area, a planned smart city development southwest of Beijing, is being designed from the ground up with full autonomy in mind. Various highway authorities are willing to develop road augmentation, special lanes, or move warehouses near highway exits, all to facilitate faster deployment of autonomous trucks. We also see major initiatives in cities, following the central government’s call to action. Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan, and Tianjin are but a few of the cities coming out with their own AI initiatives. As with past policies, much of the resources will be applied at the provincial and city government levels. The types of resources may include subsidies for top talent (especially overseas talent); guidance for top VC funds, with the government playing the role of limited partner (LP) but offering some of its upside to the general partners (GPs) of the funds; special programs for top AI companies and start-ups (free rent, subsidy for local hiring, housing and private school for top talents); and technical awards for companies and individuals. Finally, the US, EU, and China will also compete to be out in front on developing a regulatory regime around AI technologies and applications. The National Plan’s explicit recognition of the need for regulatory, legal, and ethical principles for AI development and use represents an uncommonly foresighted approach. Of course, the government’s approach to AI regulation, ethics, and economic adjustment will reflect Beijing’s broader model of governance and ideology. Given its preference for a state-centric approach to international issues, for example, it is possible China will launch an initiative via the UN to establish first an automation/AI-related “code of conduct,” or basic regulatory approach, followed by a special committee on the topic and eventually an oversight body operating within a UN framework. Such an initiative would put China at the forefront of developing a global approach to these issues. Beijing has attempted a similar approach on cybersecurity issues, which it argues have a global impact and require a global regulatory response.

#### China wins the tech race now.

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Science and technology will become the lifeblood of the Chinese economy in this decade and will remain its lifeblood in the future. That is, in part, because China has become sufficiently advanced to be able to effectively compete with the US and other technological leaders in the West. It is also the key to China’s ability to innovate and compete in the future, as it is for other advanced economies. Innovation-driven growth is also required in order for Beijing to smoothly deleverage away from its manufacturing base model of growth, which is slowly running out of steam. In the decade that has just passed, its productivity gains faltered and credit-driven investment in low return capital propped up its growth. China must address its slowing productivity gains to produce a smooth rebalancing of the economy. Productivity growth will not come from textiles, steel or the property market, and the flourishing services sector will require cutting-edge technology to remain competitive. To pull it off, China will need to acquire and deploy advanced technology quickly and efficiently throughout its economy. China is diligently preparing to assume a seemingly preordained role as the world leader in a plethora of areas. It is driven. It is focused. And it will stop at nothing to ensure that it has all the advantages it can glean from the existing world order to create a world order in its own image. Technology is absolutely critical to achieving that objective, and there is little that is more important in that regard than cutting-edge telecommunications — specifically 5G technology. The Huawei saga has served to illustrate this point. America’s issues with Huawei are as much about who has access to, and thus controls, the data of the future, as they are about superpower politics and the rule of law. Some Western intelligence sources believe the company is state-owned and has deep connections to China’s intelligence services. Its founder was an engineer with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and it is worth adding that no large Chinese company is fully independent of the government. Although China spends more than $200 billion on research (second only to the US), generates close to 30,000 PhDs in science and engineering, and leads the world in patent applications each year, its record is mixed in terms of the actual impact of innovation, as measured by the success of companies in commercializing new ideas and competing in the global market. China has some unique strengths in innovation, which includes the rapid commercialization of new ideas by virtue of the size of its consumer base. It also has the world’s most extensive manufacturing ecosystem, enabling continuous innovation in production processes that reduce costs and improve quality, and has created capacity for research with a growing number of universities and research institutions, as well as an expanding pool of talent. On the minus side of the ledger, China’s slow regulatory processes and weak intellectual property protections prevent foreign investors from wanting to bring their best and brightest researchers and innovations to the country. Completing the journey from innovation sponge (absorbing and adapting existing technology and knowledge from around the world) to global innovation leader is not just a way to signal China’s progress as an economy and society. The boost to productivity that innovation provides is critically important for sustaining China’s growth. Beijing has enacted some two dozen laws that have created a technology-siphoning machine. That apparatus maintains databases of foreign co-optees and distributes stipends, sinecures and cash to foreign donors of high-tech innovations. China has targeted all sources of American innovation, including universities, corporations and government labs, exploiting both their openness and naivete, with methods and tradecraft custom-tailored to each target. The Chinese government’s current system for processing and reverse engineering stolen designs has grown significantly larger than it was during the Cold War and has developed from a strictly military operation into a system permeating the entire Chinese government. It is an elaborate, comprehensive system for identifying foreign technologies, acquiring them by every means imaginable and converting them into weapons and competitive goods. China could not have experienced the dramatic economic transformation it has experienced in the 21st century, nor have sustained its progress as it has, without inexpensive and unrestricted access to other countries’ technology. Chinese firms have routinely become investors in American startups, particularly those working on cutting-edge technologies with potential military applications. These are companies that make rocket engines for spacecraft, sensors for autonomous navy ships and printers that make flexible screens that can be used in fighter-plane cockpits. Many of the Chinese firms are owned by state-owned companies or have direct connections to Chinese leaders. According to the US Department of Defense, Beijing actively encourages Chinese companies with close government ties to invest in American startups specializing in critical technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and robots to advance China’s military capacity, as well as its economy. US government controls intended to protect potentially critical technologies against countries like China have fallen short. It took a while, but such transactions eventually started ringing alarm bells in Washington. US lawmakers raised broad questions about the nature of China’s economic relationship with the US well before the Trump administration started applying tariffs on Chinese products, in an effort to reduce the inherent inequity in bilateral trade between the two nations. China is extremely capable and driven. When it aims to be a leader in a particular sector or acquire a certain technology, it does so with precision. There is no question that Beijing aims to be a leader in AI, semiconductors and any number of other sub-sectors of the technology-driven 21st-century economy. It has the advantage of having a lot of money to spend and plenty of people and resources to devote to the issue. Since it certainly appears that the US government will not be devoting similar resources to the tech sector any time soon, it is merely a question of time until China captures that title, too. In the battle for the future, the Chinese Communist Party understands very well what is at stake. It took the US and West too long to realize what China was doing, and by the time they did, Beijing was already approaching strongly from behind. Soon enough, the West will be looking at China in the tech space from the front window, rather than the rearview mirror.

#### Revitalization of American hegemony forces takeover of the sector.

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To “rethink the policies of the last two decades,” military coercion and engagement strategies, previously enacted by the United States, have been largely unsuccessful in deterring China’s revisionist activities and ambition to achieve great power status in the Pacific theater.2 The Biden administration’s interim national security strategy guidance, published in March of 2021, demonstrates a small step toward reinvigorating US liberal hegemony via multilateralism to combat Chinese aggression and “ensure America, not China, sets the international agenda.”3 The current US strategy places an emphasis on strengthening ties with Allied and partner nations to unite the world’s democracies for collective security, reinvesting in innovation to maintain US technological advantages, and defending democratic values at home and abroad to promote open and free societies to advance American interests. To go a step further, the United States must ground its overall approach to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with a strategy of liberal hegemony that maintains America’s status as “the world’s lone superpower” and counters Beijing’s rise in the international system by leveraging “smart power” tools—developing high-tech military concepts to dominate the information sphere and enhancing soft power efforts to competitively attract the international community to the US’ liberal values.4 This is an effective approach for two reasons: first, “power is becoming less transferable, less coercive, and less tangible;” and second, Beijing’s ability to successfully challenge US liberal hegemony lies in its employment of asymmetric tools, not in order of battle.5 “While President Xi Jinping has proclaimed “China will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion,” PRC actions display deliberate attempts to “displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region” and challenge US liberal hegemony across the international system.6 This US “smart power” approach to China focuses on reducing legacy force structure, prioritizing a smaller, more capable force, and strengthening attractiveness of US liberal hegemony to combat the multi-dimensional challenges posed by a revisionist China. Power is the ability to get others to want what you want by changing the behavior of states to support your desired outcome.7 In the past, the character of power correlated closely with capital, which funded the use of military force to coerce adversarial actors. The United States came to its current position on the back of this form of power. It has long sought military and economic preeminence to prevent the emergence of “challenger” states in the international arena.8 The invasion of Iraq and overthrow of Saddam Hussein showcased US strategy to employ military power to defeat a perceived threat to US objectives and influence in the Middle East. Currently, the US continues to flex its economic prowess by imposing several sanctions on Russia as a response to the annexation of Crimea and multiple cyberattacks on US infrastructure to cripple its economic and military capacity but has made little progress in altering the Kremlin’s aggressive behavior. As illustrated in the Russian example, this old view of power—an overwhelming emphasis on hard power to advance US interests and preserve liberal hegemony—will fail in the long run against the multi-dimensional world of today wherein “power is passing from the ‘capital-rich’ to the ‘information-rich.’”9 It is no longer enough to have a large military force or a deep pocketbook. One must be able to obtain and analyze the correct information quickly to enable rapid decision-making and generate effects that the adversary is unable to effectively respond to. A timely response to new information before one’s opponent can act gives one the strategic advantage, necessary to achieving a favorable balance of power. The ability to take action on US terms and force our adversaries to respond. Advances in technology have led to enhanced digitization, increasing the importance of organizational skills and flexibility over material capabilities.10 Information-rich power has altered the landscape of geopolitics in another way by elevating the importance of strategic narratives. “Great powers use strategic narratives to establish and maintain influence in the international system and to shape the system itself.”11 In other words, “success is the result not merely of whose army wins, but also whose story wins.”12 Vladimir Putin’s strategic narrative concerning the crisis in Ukraine in 2014 was able to weaken the US credibility and US-NATO collective efforts to effectively deter Russia’s annexation of Crimea. With the help of its state-owned media outlets, social media, and spending on international broadcasting, Russia claimed that most of the Crimean population desired reunification with Russia, appealed to USSR nostalgia by insisting that the former Soviet republics were one country with Russian ethnic groups being wrongly split across borders, and framed the US as a bully by emphasizing US unilateral action in Iraq and Afghanistan and condemning US attempts to assert its dominance over Europe and Russia.13 Moscow’s employment of identity, historical, and international narratives to justify Russian behavior in Crimea challenged US authority in the international community and undermined US sanction efforts as some NATO countries stood firmly opposed to supporting EU sanctions against Russia. Despite its military and economic prowess, the US was unable to deter Crimea’s annexation and failed to credibly influence Russia behavior. China has taken advantage of this shift in the character of power. Since 2000, China has become the second largest economy in the world, militarized islands in the South China Sea of which it has no rightful claim,14 and committed numerous cyber intrusion and theft operations against US information networks. Beijing continues aggressive and manipulative activities against its neighbors in the Indo-Pacific region that support Washington’s leadership position in the intelligence community (IC)—a conscious attempt to oppose US hegemony in pursuit of the “Chinese Dream.”15 Furthermore, China has embraced information warfare and soft power to directly counter the United States—a militarily stronger foe.16 Rather than matching US comprehensive power, the PRC has chosen to conduct asymmetric warfare to target key US vulnerabilities, counter overall American strengths, and gradually chip away at US hegemony.17 Previous US strategies have yet to adequately address this shift in the character of power. The US is still focused on capital-rich power employment. A classic example of this is Washington’s intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. America’s involvement in the Middle East to quell terrorist organizations are attempts at employing traditional power coercion through brute force. While this strategy worked in the Gulf War, the US hasn’t seen much, if any, success in employing this strategy since. Currently, US forces have been ordered to withdraw from Afghanistan after a decades-long war that has seen very little progress in employing military power to solve the complex problems of the Middle East nation, sacrificing numerous US lives in the process. Due to its inability to pivot to information-rich power employment, the US has thus far been unable to counter Chinese aggression in the information sphere and counter its efforts to influence states to legitimize Chinese leadership. The United States “crime-and-punishment” approach during the Six Party Talks—specifically, its unwillingness to hold direct talks with North Korea (DPRK), demands for unilateral concessions, and “unilateral display of muscle” by threatening military force and imposing economic sanctions on the “rogue” state—ultimately failed to compel a permanent halt in DPRK nuclear weapon ambitions.18 China’s role as host and mediator of the Six Party Talks provided it an opportunity to exploit participants’ concerns over the United States’ aggressive strategy toward DPRK. The PRC—pledging its commitment to a multilateral approach to reach a peaceful resolution—rallied participants behind less stringent actions ultimately thwarting Washington’s approach to dismantle DPRK’s nuclear program.19 As a result, the PRC was able to construct a ‘good guy’ persona to improve foreign perceptions of China, demonstrate its capability to shape global affairs, and reshape the international order to one that is responsive to China’s interests.20 On the other hand, an engagement strategy to encourage and maintain dialogue with the PRC while attempting to avoid direct confrontation with China has increased uncertainty regarding US commitment to its Allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. US failure to preempt or adequately respond to Chinese aggressive or irresponsible behavior has hindered US influence and capability in the Pacific region and worldwide. This strategy continues to allow China to exert influence over US foreign policy, weaken US credibility in the region, and freely propagate its brand of Communism globally, undermining US liberal hegemony without incurring costs. This is demonstrated by continued Chinese military aggression in the South China Sea wherein smaller countries, at times, acquiesce to Chinese demands or fail to denounce Chinese actions due to their uncertainty regarding US commitment in the region. This sows doubt across the international community regarding America’s credibility and strength to act freely and secure its interests in the region with states questioning continued alignment to the US, threatening US access and influence in the Indo-Pacific theater. Put simply, the United States is in danger of losing the information and soft power war against the PRC and with it, its superpower status. China has successfully conducted numerous cyberespionage operations, stealing information to build advanced technology and military equipment to counter US information and military advantage. Moreover, the US is failing to rapidly transition emerging technologies into the armed forces and has fallen short in discovering novel ways in which these technologies can be used for enhanced military advantage over an adversary. In 2020, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper stressed the inability of the Department of Defense (DOD) to appropriately and rapidly acquire and scale innovative technology for military employment.21 Beijing has initiated a number of efforts to continue to move China closer toward attaining a global leadership position in the IC. China’s “intelligent” approach to warfare—the militarization of enabling technologies such as cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information, big data analytics, and unmanned systems—demonstrate its efforts to prepare for the demands of future combat operations requiring “rapid processing and the fusing of information to support quick and efficient command decision-making.”22 In 2016, China launched the first space-based quantum satellite, Micius, demonstrating considerable progress in in its goal to develop unhackable global communications through entanglement-based quantum key distribution.23 Additionally, its “Three Warfare” strategy—nonkinetic measures to manipulate the behavior of states in favor of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) preferred outcomes—serves to maintain CCP legitimacy, extend Beijing’s reach, and insert China’s brand of socialism across the IC.24 China’s use of information at the political level buoy these advances in information’s operational employment. Most recently, the PRC has taken advantage of the US State Department’s delayed response to the coronavirus pandemic, its emphasis in placing the blame on China and the Chinese people for the creation and spread of COVID-19, and its failure to rapidly allocate COVID-19 resources, including providing vaccines beyond US borders. Notably, Beijing was able to quickly portray itself as a “well-organized state capable of controlling the full situation,” rapidly distribute conspiracy theories that accused the US of spreading COVID-19, pose as the defender against an American bully, and provide vaccines to countries in need before the US—all soft power tools shaping global perceptions in favor of Chinese leadership and direction concerning the pandemic.25 Every action China takes to pursue its interests weakens the legitimacy and attractiveness of US hegemonic leadership, which results in a loss in relative power. A 2020 Pew Research Center survey of 14 advanced economies, three located in the Indo-Pacific region, most people believed China handled the coronavirus better than the US and overall had unfavorable views of both the US and China.26 While limited in scope, this poll provides a glimpse of reduced attractiveness to US liberal hegemony largely influenced by its soft power deficiencies. For weak Indo-Pacific states that regularly employ hedging strategies to prevent either the US or China from dominating the region, the decreased attractiveness of a US partner may spell disaster.27 The US can reverse this potential disaster through a strategy that combines power with ideas—strength with liberal values. The United States must maximize its power relative to that of China to preserve American dominance in the international community, while reinvesting in the propagation of its liberal values28 These smart power objectives emphasize the militarization of emerging technologies to deny CCP advantages in the information domain and require the US to take the lead in strengthening the legitimacy and attraction to US liberal hegemony. To gain a clear military advantage over China, the United States needs to continue to heavily invest in the research and development of emerging information-age technologies—AI, autonomy, robotics, quantum, big data, and machine learning—and its rapid integration into all aspects of US military infrastructure to increase the effectiveness of the information collected and how it is used. Specifically, the United States needs to allocate a larger portion of defense spending to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, increase defense partnerships with Silicon Valley industries and research universities, and improve acquisition practices to facilitate and accelerate military applications of intelligent technologies. The US must invest in and further develop technologies that will enable persistent awareness of adversary actions, speed up effective decision-making, and increase lethality at a low cost and low risk to the US. Specifically, investing in quantum, AI, autonomy, and cyber technologies for offensive and defensive purposes requires further integration and cooperation between the Department of Defense and the scientific community. Increased integration and cooperation between scientific and technical entities and the DOD will assist and maintain US technical and military advantages. Information is power. These high-tech systems are a cost-effective avenue to overcome the limits of human intelligence and allow the United States to rapidly understand the environment and make decisions faster than the adversary. Moreover, a high-tech–enabled force supports rapid collection and analysis of large amounts of data, enables swift decision-making, and enhances the lethality of US military forces.29 Whereas now the US can neither effectively stop nor respond to China stealing US intellectual property via cyber channels, technology such as AI-enabled cybersecurity can be used to rapidly detect China encroachment into US systems and automatically deny its ability to steal US scientific and military data. In an environment characterized by information power, operational agility against an adversary must be met with agility at the political level. The US Department of State (DOS)—responsible for advancing American interests through diplomacy, advocacy, and assistance efforts—has fallen short in the narrative battle against its adversaries leading to an overall decline in US appeal and influence worldwide. To increase the attractiveness of US liberal hegemony, the United States needs to influence states to champion American interests and combat adversaries’ anti-US information campaign. To achieve this, the United States must craft a strategic narrative in which ‘a strong America means freedom, prosperity, and security for all,’ consistently reinforcing the story that only through US liberal hegemony can the international community achieve a peaceful end state. Knowing this, the United States must increase its emphasis on alternative instruments to comprehensively maximize power and maintain its superpower status, or risk being outpaced by its competitors. The United States must reinstate the US Information Agency to ensure that American soft power is “always on display” wherein its stated culture and liberalist values are clearly demonstrated in its policies and activities to attract states to US interests and legitimize American liberal hegemony in the world order.30 “If the state’s power seems legitimate, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow.”31 Perceptions and popularity are equally important to hard military power in influencing states’ behavior. Currently, the lack of such an agency and DOS shortfalls has resulted in the muddling of US strategic narrative and a perceived loss of credibility in American leadership—which gives China an in-road to vie for IC support and tip the balance of power in its favor. The DOD can help reclaim some of this credibility by investing more heavily in HA/DR operations in East Asia. Furthermore, a strategy of US liberal hegemony must not only work to counter Chinese advantages but credibly convince Pacific states of America’s benign character and of the detrimental impact Chinese hegemony will have on the region. This will promote hedging strategies that will, with greater probability, favor Washington as opposed to Beijing leadership. HA/DR operations are a means to amplify one’s foreign policy goals by providing goodwill and leverage. Research suggests that US aid increases support for Washington and its liberal democratic values, such as free and fair elections.32 However, in the aftermath of the Soviet-Afghan War, where the US failed to provide aid following the Soviet’s defeat by the Mujahideen, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were able to fill the void and fortify their power in the region—resulting in a hostile nation diametrically opposed to US hegemony and its liberal values. Today, the US has been in a war against terror in Afghanistan for 22 years to combat these same threats wherein US sacrifices might have been avoided with initial aid to improve relations in Afghanistan and promote its liberal values. In a similar vein, Beijing recognizes that development is an instrument of power,33 and is increasing its activities in HA/DR to gain legitimacy for Chinese global leadership. Moreover, if the United States does not consistently take a leading role in world development, China will fill this gap to weaken the credibility and influence of US liberal hegemony. Currently, delayed response times, lack of a unified US message, and ineffective coordination between USAID and the DOD has hindered US proficiency in humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts, providing adversaries an opportunity to enhance influence.34 The United States must take a commanding lead in humanitarian aid by increasing funding and military assistance to, while also providing more opportunities for interagency coordination with the US Agency of International Aid (USAID). This will enhance rapid mobility and sustainability of HA/DR efforts worldwide and adequately showcase the benefits of powerful US leadership in the international system. Assistance recipients are more likely to buy-in to the US brand of leadership when they have directly benefited from it. It is in America’s best interest to prioritize HA/DR and provide increased support to USAID to improve relations, gain access, and expand its influence across the IC. Traditionally, power is measured by states’ ability to coerce using hard power; however, the diffusion of power largely due to increased interdependence and advanced technology development has rendered these traditional sources of power less effective in achieving desired outcomes. Today, it is not enough to coerce states into accepting US liberal hegemony. The United States must also be able to credibly attract and legitimize American leadership to garner deep commitment for US liberal hegemony across the IC. America’s renewed focus on “smart power”—using hard and soft power in concert to increase the balance of power in its favor—will reassert American dominance in the international system and counter PRC efforts to revise the world order.35 A strong America is vital for a secure, prosperous, and free world.

#### Regulatory capture kills US government control of the industry.

Simon Constable 03-26-18 [Contributor to Forbes; Forbes; “Why we should not regulate the tech industry”; https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonconstable/2018/03/26/no-we-really-dont-need-government-regulation-of-the-tech-industry/?sh=29e545a4eb8d//ZW]

It's time to just say no to calls for more government regulation of the tech industry. Such requests would be laughable if they weren't so sad. The truth is that the government proved beyond reasonable doubt its inability to effectively regulate during the financial crisis. In that light, calls for the government to now impose and administer new rules on an equally complex industry seem preposterous. The desires for more regulation came last week from Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg who was responding to revelations in The Observer newspaper that data on perhaps more than 50 million of Facebook's users had been shared. Talking on CNN last week Zuckerberg said: "I actually am not sure we shouldn’t be regulated," which will no doubt be taken as we need the government to step in. Indeed that seems to be what happened when another tech titan, Apple's CEO Tim Cook, explicitly requested more government mandated rules. He said: Expect such calls to grow into a chorus before long. But just because we are likely to hear thunderous demands for Federal oversight doesn't mean that new rules from the government make any sense. Here's why: [graphic omitted] Recent history shows the incompetence of government regulators. An alphabet soup of government agencies failed to stop the financial crisis of 2007-2008 which resulted from making too many home loans to people with less than perfect credit. The organizations charged with regulation included the Securities Exchange Commission, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the state-level regulators, as well as the Federal Reserve. The latter, it should be noted, wasn't sure that there was a problem with dodgy mortgages even as late as 2007. Then chairman of the Fed, Ben Bernanke, said: We believe the effect of the troubles in the subprime sector on the broader housing market will be limited and we do not expect significant spillovers from the subprime market to the rest of the economy or to the financial system. Given what happened to the economy after that, Bernanke's statement may well go down as the definition of incorrect. It doesn't seem reasonable to expect the that the government would fare better with regulating tech than it did in finance. The private sector was way ahead of the government. Rather than the government spot the problem, it was the private sector that highlighted the burgeoning issues of mortgages turning from good to bad. Notably, investor John Paulson saw the cracks in the mortgage market clearly and then took action that made him billions of dollars in profits. He made sizable bets that the mortgage loans were indeed as dodgy as he thought. That story is ably told by Michael Lewis in his fabulous book, *The Big Short*. If you don't fancy reading it, then try watching the movie. Either the book or the film will give you an education in markets. In any event, in the case of tech, without doubt, the private sector will be far ahead of the bureaucrats. Expert regulators get hired by the regulated. If the regulators themselves were any good at what they do, then it is more than likely that they'd end up working for one of the regulated companies. Why? This happens because the private sector can and does pay far more than does the government for such expertise. The hiring companies can afford to pay fat salaries because the knowledge the former regulators bring allows the companies to run circles around the rules. Investopedia dubs the situation one of "gamekeeper turned poacher." The only caveat is that the poacher manages to give the gamekeeper the runaround while remaining within the rules of the law. In short, it makes the regulations impotent. It is part of a problem known as regulatory capture whereby the regulators listen far more to the companies/industry they are supposed to oversee rather than anyone else. For a more detailed outline of the matter see Investopedia. Regulatory capture, without doubt, can occur in the tech business just as much as it has elsewhere. Regulations help the largest companies the most. By no means least important, is the fact that government rules help to entrench the dominant companies more than they would be otherwise. Regulations, whether they be simple form-filling or more extensive, are costly to administer by the companies regulated. These costs tend to disproportionately fall on smaller firms which don't have the economies of scale associated with being a large corporation. When the so-called regulatory burden, or the dollar costs of complying with the rules, get large then some smaller companies will decide to throw in the towel and get out of the industry in question. Eventually, if regulations continue their momentous march forward from reams of paper to filing cabinets full, then the industry will solely be dominated by massive companies. In other words, more regulation leads to fewer but larger competitors. When an industry has fewer competitors, the result tends to be increased profits for the remaining companies. This is true regardless of the industry. Solutions? How should we solve the data breaches and the misuses of personal information? It is an important question. In the first instance, the U.S. does have a reasonably well-functioning court system. Maybe the infractions will result in a lawsuit so that the maligned can seek financial redress. If the data sharing wasn't significant enough to warrant a court filing, then maybe we don't need the government to step in to save the situation in the first place. Second, the market for technology services, such as social media, is highly competitive. In 2005 Facebook was a bit player in the social media industry; then second fiddle to MySpace as maestro. Now not so much as MySpace has shrunk in importance. It seems evident that either Facebook will get its act together quickly to redress the problems and gain back lost credibility with users. Failing that a new company will offer a better service to people.

#### Underregulated AI cause extinction.

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Artificial intelligence can play chess, drive a car and diagnose medical issues. Examples include Google DeepMind’s AlphaGo, Tesla’s self-driving vehicles, and IBM’s Watson. This type of artificial intelligence is referred to as Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI) – non-human systems that can perform a specific task. We encounter this type on a daily basis, and its use is growing rapidly. But while many impressive capabilities have been demonstrated, we’re also beginning to see problems. The worst case involved a self-driving test car that hit a pedestrian in March. The pedestrian died and the incident is still under investigation. The next generation of AI With the next generation of AI the stakes will almost certainly be much higher. Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) will have advanced computational powers and human level intelligence. AGI systems will be able to learn, solve problems, adapt and self-improve. They will even do tasks beyond those they were designed for. Importantly, their rate of improvement could be exponential as they become far more advanced than their human creators. The introduction of AGI could quickly bring about Artificial Super Intelligence (ASI). While fully functioning AGI systems do not yet exist, it has been estimated that they will be with us anywhere between 2029 and the end of the century. What appears almost certain is that they will arrive eventually. When they do, there is a great and natural concern that we won’t be able to control them. The risks associated with AGI There is no doubt that AGI systems could transform humanity. Some of the more powerful applications include curing disease, solving complex global challenges such as climate change and food security, and initiating a worldwide technology boom. But a failure to implement appropriate controls could lead to catastrophic consequences. Despite what we see in Hollywood movies, existential threats are not likely to involve killer robots. The problem will not be one of malevolence, but rather one of intelligence, writes MIT professor Max Tegmark in his 2017 book Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. It is here that the science of human-machine systems – known as Human Factors and Ergonomics – will come to the fore. Risks will emerge from the fact that super-intelligent systems will identify more efficient ways of doing things, concoct their own strategies for achieving goals, and even develop goals of their own. Imagine these examples: an AGI system tasked with preventing HIV decides to eradicate the problem by killing everybody who carries the disease, or one tasked with curing cancer decides to kill everybody who has any genetic predisposition for it an autonomous AGI military drone decides the only way to guarantee an enemy target is destroyed is to wipe out an entire community an environmentally protective AGI decides the only way to slow or reverse climate change is to remove technologies and humans that induce it. These scenarios raise the spectre of disparate AGI systems battling each other, none of which take human concerns as their central mandate. Various dystopian futures have been advanced, including those in which humans eventually become obsolete, with the subsequent extinction of the human race. Others have forwarded less extreme but still significant disruption, including malicious use of AGI for terrorist and cyber-attacks, the removal of the need for human work, and mass surveillance, to name only a few. So there is a need for human-centred investigations into the safest ways to design and manage AGI to minimise risks and maximise benefits. How to control AGI Controlling AGI is not as straightforward as simply applying the same kinds of controls that tend to keep humans in check. Many controls on human behaviour rely on our consciousness, our emotions, and the application of our moral values. AGIs won’t need any of these attributes to cause us harm. Current forms of control are not enough. Arguably, there are three sets of controls that require development and testing immediately: the controls required to ensure AGI system designers and developers create safe AGI systems the controls that need to be built into the AGIs themselves, such as “common sense”, morals, operating procedures, decision-rules, and so on the controls that need to be added to the broader systems in which AGI will operate, such as regulation, codes of practice, standard operating procedures, monitoring systems, and infrastructure. Human Factors and Ergonomics offers methods that can be used to identify, design and test such controls well before AGI systems arrive. For example, it’s possible to model the controls that exist in a particular system, to model the likely behaviour of AGI systems within this control structure, and identify safety risks. This will allow us to identify where new controls are required, design them, and then remodel to see if the risks are removed as a result. In addition, our models of cognition and decision making can be used to ensure AGIs behave appropriately and have humanistic values. Act now, not later This kind of research is in progress, but there is not nearly enough of it and not enough disciplines are involved. Even the high-profile tech entrepreneur Elon Musk has warned of the “existential crisis” humanity faces from advanced AI and has spoken about the need to regulate AI before it’s too late. The next decade or so represents a critical period. There is an opportunity to create safe and efficient AGI systems that can have far reaching benefits to society and humanity. At the same time, a business-as-usual approach in which we play catch-up with rapid technological advances could contribute to the extinction of the human race. The ball is in our court, but it won’t be for much longer.

### 1nc --- Nato Expansion

#### Developing a united NATO front is the US’ primary mechanism to check China rise

Lee 22 [David Lee is a consultant and author based in Beijing who focuses on energy, health, international politics and international development, 04-29-2022, 'Defensive' NATO destabilizes Pacific for U.S. hegemony, CGTN, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-04-29/-Defensive-NATO-destabilizes-Pacific-for-U-S-hegemony-19CKc8rupfW/index.html] Eric

NATO touts itself as a "defensive" alliance, but in reality, it has been destabilizing the world for Washington's pursuit of hegemony. Established in response to the Soviet Union, the bloc's mission was accomplished three decades ago and should have shut down upon the end of the Cold War. However, desperately looking for new missions, the bloc has enlarged five times since 1999, expanding its members from 16 to 30. This raised the anxiety level of Russia and has eventually led to the war in Ukraine.

Shouting peace and security, the bloc has dropped a massive amount of bombs on the soil of other countries. Under the slogan of "preventing humanitarian disasters," NATO bombed Yugoslavia for 78 continuous days, killing and injuring more than 8,000 civilians. Demanding other countries abide by international rules, the alliance blatantly intervenes into domestic affairs of sovereign states, waging wars at its will for selfish goals.

Now, the bloc is diverting attention from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific, repeatedly flexing muscles in the region over recent years. By inviting Japan to its summit, NATO, after dragging parts of Europe into a war zone, has taken a step further to mess up East Asia where no bombs have been dropped since the end of the Cold War.

In essence, NATO is a tool by Washington for hegemony. The U.S. has long regarded the growing China as its stumbling block in its pursuit of the world's only superpower. Facing China's rising influence on the global arena, Washington, apart from its individual provocations against this perceived rival, is eager to form a united front to contain the country, and NATO is an ideal mechanism for this aim.

Under the pressure of Washington, European allies repeatedly took advantage of the Ukraine crisis to hype the "China threat," deliberately linking the conflicts in Ukraine to the Taiwan question. Despite China's reiteration of its pursuit of peaceful reunification, European politicians have, on several occasions, "warned" about the possibility of China using the Ukraine issue to launch "aggression" in the Indo-Pacific. Apparently, NATO is acting in accordance with Washington's strategic calculations – after forming a united front against Russia, it is again dancing to the U.S. tune on China-related affairs.

#### NATO massively increases U.S hegemony--- that’s a force multiplier.

Thimm 18 [Dr Johannes Thimm is Senior Fellow at the research division The Americas at SWP. He has published numerous articles on US foreign policy, 4-9-2018, NATO: US Strategic Dominance and Unequal Burden-Sharing Are Two Sides of the Same Coin, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/nato-us-strategic-dominance-and-unequal-burden-sharing-are-two-sides-of-the-same-coin] Eric

NATO provides practical support and legitimacy to US supremacy

First, even if NATO is viewed in purely transactional terms, leaving aside values like solidarity among allies, it is a good deal for Washington. Americans calling for more equal burden-sharing, including Trump himself, suggest that the US supports NATO mostly for altruistic reasons. In other words that America is doing Europe a favor. But this picture is incomplete. For the US military, NATO is a force multiplier, providing legitimacy to American power. European allies are engaged in numerous missions like Afghanistan, while the United States mostly calls the shots. US bases in Europe not only protect European allies, but serve as logistics hubs to project power into the Middle East. These are assets the US military would not want to give up.

US defense policy is made strictly on US terms.

Second, the US defense budget does not depend on Europe’s military spending. It is misleading to argue that Europe must spend more so that the United States can spend less. The Pentagon’s budget is determined by Washington’s assessment of the capabilities necessary to maintain US strategic dominance – on its own, not through any alliance. When Congress adopts the annual defense budget, European expenditures play a marginal role. In 2017, President Trump increased the US defense budget, despite the fact that European states also spent more (and Russia’s spending decreased by 20 percent). According to calculations by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, US spending on NATO and the defense of Europe amounts to $30 billion, or just over 5 percent of its defense budget. Comparing that figure to the roughly $240 billion of European spending for NATO, the imbalance no longer seems so great. Given these numbers, it is also hard to argue that Europe is principally to blame for a US defense budget of around $600 billion.

Looking specifically at the cost of the US nuclear arsenal, it becomes even clearer how detached the US budget is from burden-sharing in NATO. Washington defines the US nuclear strategy with little regard for Europe’s policy priorities. Over the next thirty years (calculated from 2017), Washington plans a massive qualitative nuclear build-up, spending $400 billion on modernizing its nuclear arsenal – in addition to the costs of maintaining existing systems. This move was partly a reaction to Russian aggression in Ukraine, but above all a concession by President Obama to the Republican Congress in exchange for its approval of the 2014 New START treaty, in which the United States and Russia pledged to limit numbers of strategic nuclear warheads. If Trump were really interested in reducing costs, he would make serious efforts on arms control. Instead, he refused Russia’s offer to extend the New START treaty beyond its 2021 expiration date and increased spending on nuclear weapons by almost 20 percent. So, yes, to some extent Europe is free-riding on US security guarantees. But the reasons include the US desire for unrivalled military and nuclear capabilities, and not simply European reluctance to spend money on defense.

### 1nc --- Generic China Rise Good

#### China rise is inevitable--- it’s only a question of how the US reacts.

Mark Beeson and Corey Crawford 02-10-2022 [Mark Beeson is of the University of Technology Sydney, Ultimo, Australia, Corey Crawford is of the University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia; Chinese Political Science Review (2022), “Putting the BRI in Perspective: History, Hegemony, and Geopolitics,” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41111-022-00210-y//ZW]

For many observers outside China, especially in the US, there is no doubt that China is bent on replacing America as the dominant power in the world (Mosher 2000). Indeed, for some observers, China’s elites are following nothing less than a 100-year plan to replace the US as the world’s dominant power (Pillsbury 2015). Prominent realist scholars worry that there is a certain structurally determined inevitability about both China’s rise and the chances of a conflict between the US and the PRC as the latter increasingly seeks to assert its growing power and influence (Allison 2017). While Western IR’s collective failure to predict the end of the Cold War, the dramatic decline in inter-state wars, or recognise the importance of national strategic cultures and beliefs in shaping thinking about security, suggests that we should be very cautious about its collective epistemic authority, there is no doubt that China’s behaviour has changed. One of the most important expressions of this possibility can be seen in the sophistication of China’s political and diplomatic elites as they have come to play a more prominent part in what some IR theorists describe as ‘international society’ and the institutional architecture that constitutes it (Clark 2014). At one level, hopes and expectations about China’s leaders being ‘socialised’ into the ways of Western diplomacy have been realised: China is nothing like the disruptive, revolutionary force that it was under before Richard M. Nixon and Henry Kissinger engineered the celebrated rapprochement with the PRC (Kissinger 1994; van Ness 1970). At another level, however, it is clear that China’s foreign policy goals continue to reflect ‘national interests’ and values, especially under the increasingly coordinated and centralised leadership of Xi Jinping (Lampton 2015). Indeed, not only are Chinese policymakers still pursuing national goals, but they are doing so in ways that are also often strikingly similar to those employed by the US in an earlier era.

#### Slow economic growth is the key variable – increasing US growth makes a cling to hegemony inevitable that causes great power war

**Taliaferro, 18** – professor of political science at Tufts University (Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. et al. (2018) Is Peaceful Change in World Politics Always Desirable? A Neoclassical Realist Perspective. International Studies Review, doi: 10.1093/isr/viy023

Conflict between hegemon and challenger can take many forms, ranging in intensity from a sustained rivalry for geopolitical influence in one or more geographic regions to a major or hegemonic war. Again, we narrowly defined peaceful change as a process in which the hegemon voluntarily cedes its dominant geopolitical role to a challenger in one or more geographic regions. This may entail the hegemon withdrawing its military forces and forward bases from a region, renegotiating, or modifying alliances and economic agreements with regional states, often at the behest of the challenger. It is important to note that peaceful change might occur in one locale, while conflict might occur simultaneously in another locale. Lastly, the likelihood of either of the two outcomes—conflict and peaceful transition— depends upon the grand strategic adjustments by the hegemon as well as the challenger.

Neoclassical Realist Theory of Peaceful Change

Our neoclassical realist theory purports to explain the conditions under which a regional or global hegemon will concede some or all of the challenger’s demands without contest. Like all neoclassical realist theories, our theory assumes that all states respond to the international constraints and opportunities they face but that how they respond will be shaped by their domestic constraints (Rose 1988; Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009; Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016).

Our argument is that peaceful change is only likely in one of three circumstances: (1) when the hegemon’s foreign policy executive (FPE) has high confidence that change is inevitable because it lacks the military, political, or economic capabilities to resist it; or (2) when the political and economic costs of resisting that change are anticipated to be prohibitively high; or (3) when the FPE is domestically constrained in its ability to extract and mobilize the resources to resist the challenger. Each of these three propositions is a sufficient condition for the hegemon to accept peaceful change. They combine to make a necessary condition for peaceful change; that is, unless one or more of them is obtained, the hegemon will resist peaceful change. In this section, we unpack the logic underlying each of these propositions.

The dependent variable (DV) is the pattern of strategic adjustment by the hegemon. A hegemon has two broad strategic choices in response to a rising challenger: it can accept peaceful transition, or it can resist it.7 Resistance entails a variety of strategies, ranging from containment to preventive war. Economically, the hegemon might deny the challenger access to its markets, use sanctions, employ exchange and currency controls, and more broadly isolate the challenger from trade to undermine the economic base for its military power. Militarily, the hegemon could forge alliances with states along the challenger’s periphery, dramatically augment its own defense spending, sabotage the challenger’s weapons programs, seek to embroil the challenger’s armed forces in costly proxy conflicts, or, in the extreme, initiate a preventive war (Copeland 2000; Levy 2008, 2011).

A strategy of peaceful transition (or retrenchment) entails the strategic reorientation away from confrontation with a challenger. The hegemon, acknowledging the inevitability of the power transition, scales back its military deployments and alliance commitments, relaxes or removes economic sanctions targeting the challenger, and cedes its leadership role to the challenger in formerly contested regions (MacDonald and Parent 2011, 11–13).

The three propositions we derive from the theory specify the combinations of neoclassical realism’s systemic-level independent variables (IVs) and domestic-level intervening variables (IVVs) that increase the likelihood that a hegemon will pursue a resistance strategy or a peaceful transition strategy.

Proposition 1 (the inevitability of international change) relates directly to three IVs: the relative distribution of power, the nature of the strategic environment that a hegemon confronts in a particular region, and the degree of systemic clarity regarding threats and opportunities. Hegemons that enjoy an overall power advantage over rising challengers are unlikely to see a future power transition as inevitable. Hegemons experiencing relative decline or those that are simply at a marked disadvantage in one or more categories of power vis-à-vis a challenger, however, are more likely to conclude that a power transition is inevitable.

The second IV is the nature of the strategic environment that a hegemon confronts in a contested region. A state’s strategic environment refers to the magnitude and the imminence of the external threats and opportunities that it faces at any given time. All other things being equal, the more imminent and dangerous the threat or the more fleeting and enticing the opportunity, the more restrictive a state’s strategic environment will be. Conversely, the more remote and less intense the threat or the more enduring and less enticing the opportunity, the more permissive a state’s strategic environment will be. Restrictive and permissive strategic environments exist along a continuum (Ripsman et al. 2016, 52–53).

Regional hegemons exercise geopolitical dominance over a single region. A global hegemon, by definition, has wide interests across several regions of the globe. Consequently, they can confront different strategic environments across different regions. An increase or a decrease in a challenger’s economic, political, or military penetration of a contested region, up to and including the conquest of all or part of that region, can shift the strategic environment the hegemon faces from permissive to restrictive or vice versa (Taliaferro 2018). Where a global hegemon faces a restrictive strategic environment in a contested region, it is more likely to conclude that the competitor will challenge its leadership in the locale and that a power transition is inevitable. Conversely, where it faces a permissive strategic environment in a contested region, it is more likely to conclude that a power transition is not inevitable.

The third IV is the degree of systemic clarity regarding threats and opportunities. The degree of systemic clarity involves the signals or information that states receive from the international system or a regional sub-system. Systemic clarity has three subcomponents: (1) the extent to which external threats or opportunities can be readily identified, (2) whether the international system provides information about the time horizon in which those threats or opportunities will materialize, and (3) whether there is an “optimal” strategic response (Ripsman et al. 2016, 46–47).

The logic here is that if the hegemon judges that it has no alternatives to prevent a power transition, it would be irrational to waste resources resisting the inevitable. In general, hegemons have different strategic options for countering challengers in the short- and long-run. In the short-run, a hegmon can balance internally by increasing its armaments or externally by seeking allies. Over the longer turn, it has more options. Economic growth and emulation can redress relative decline. Nonetheless, if the hegemon’s leadership calculates that it lacks the resources for economic growth and emulation over the longer term, and they also calculate that the rising challenger’s economic growth will likely continue indefinitely, they might conclude resistance is futile. For instance, by 1901, recognizing the United States’ ascendency, Britain ceded leadership over the Western hemisphere by signing the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (Lobell 2003, 70–71). In the late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev realized that the depth of the Soviet Union’s relative economic decline made it impossible to continue competing with the United States. Gorbachev scaled back military commitments in Eastern Europe and elsewhere and began to make unilateral concessions in nuclear and conventional arms control (Brooks and Wohlforth 2000, 33).

## Block

### 2nc --- AI Impact

#### Killer drones cause global war and totalitarianism.

Alexey Turchin and David Denkenberger 05-03-2018 [Turchin is of the Science for Life Extension Foundation, Moscow, Russia, Denkenberger is of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI), Tennessee State University, Alliance to Feed the Earth in Disasters (ALLFED), Nashville, USA, AI & Society, 147-163 (2020), “Classification of global catastrophic risks connected with artificial intelligence,” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00146-018-0845-5#Abs1//ZW]

Military AI systems There are a number GCRs associated with military systems. Some potential scenarios: military robotics could become so cheap that drone swarms could cause enormous damage to the human population; a large autonomous army could attack humans because of a command error; billions of nanobots with narrow AI could be created in a terrorist attack and create a global catastrophe (Freitas 2000). In 2017, global attention was attracted to a viral video about “slaughterbots” (Oberhaus 2017), hypothetical small drones able to recognize humans and kill them with explosives. While such a scenario is unlikely to pose a GCR, a combination of cheap AI-powered drone manufacture and high-precision AI-powered targeting could convert clouds of drones into weapons of mass destruction. This could create a “drone swarms” arms race, similar to the nuclear race. Such a race might result in an accidental global war, in which two or more sides attack each other with clouds of small killer drones. It is more likely that drones of this type would contribute to global instability rather than cause a purely drone-based catastrophe. AI-controlled drones could be delivered large distances by a larger vehicle, or they could be solar powered; solar-powered airplanes already exist (Taylor 2017). Some advanced forms of air defense will limit this risk, but drones could also jump (e.g., solar charging interspersed with short flights), crawl, or even move underground like worms. There are fewer barriers to drone war escalation than to nuclear weapons. Drones could also be used anonymously, which might encourage their use under a false flag. Killer drones could also be used to suppress political dissent, perhaps creating global totalitarianism. Other risks of military AI have been previously discussed (Turchin and Denkenberger 2018a).

\*Trigger warning for this card: discussion of suicide.

#### AI would hack our CI--- and we can’t turn it off.

Alexey Turchin and David Denkenberger 05-03-2018 [Turchin is of the Science for Life Extension Foundation, Moscow, Russia, Denkenberger is of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI), Tennessee State University, Alliance to Feed the Earth in Disasters (ALLFED), Nashville, USA, AI & Society, 147-163 (2020), “Classification of global catastrophic risks connected with artificial intelligence,” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00146-018-0845-5#Abs1//ZW]

Stuxnet-style viruses hack global critical infrastructure A narrow AI virus may also affect civilian infrastructure; some, but not all ways in which this could be possible are listed below. Remember that in the case of global catastrophes, the conditions necessary for most catastrophes could exist simultaneously. Several distinctive scenarios of such a catastrophe have been suggested. For example, autopilot-controlled and hacked planes could crash into nuclear power stations. There are around 1000 nuclear facilities in the world, and thousands of large planes are in the air at every moment—most of them have computerized autopilots. Coordinated plane attacks happened in 2001 and a plane has been hacked (Futureworld 2013). Self-driving cars could hunt people, and it is projected that most new cars after 2030 will have some self-driving capabilities (Anderson 2017). Elon Musk has spoken about the risks of AI living in the Internet; it could start wars by manipulating fake news (Wootson 2017). Computer viruses could also manipulate human behavior using blackmail, as seen in fiction in an episode of Black Mirror (Watkins 2016). Another example is creating suicide ideation, e.g., the recent internet suicide game in Russia, “Blue Whale” (Mullin 2017), which allegedly killed 130 teenagers by sending them tasks of increasing complexity and finally requesting their suicide. The IoT will make home infrastructure vulnerable (Granoff 2016). Home electrical systems could have short circuits and start fires; phones could also catch fire. Other scenarios are also possible: home robots, which may become popular in the next few decades, could start to attack people; infected factories could produce toxic chemicals after being hacked by viruses. Large-scale infrastructure failure may result in the collapse of technological civilization and famine (Hanson 2008; Cole et al. 2016). As industries become increasingly computerized, they will completely depend on proper functioning of computers, while in the past they could continue without them. These industries include power generation, transport, and food production. As the trend continues, turning off computers will leave humans without food, heating, and medication. Many industries become dangerous if their facilities are not intensively maintained, including nuclear plants, spent nuclear fuel storage systems, weapons systems, and water dams. If one compares human civilization with a multicellular organism, one could see that multicellular organisms could die completely, down to the last cell, as the result of a very small intervention. As interconnectedness and computerization of the human civilization grow, we become more and more vulnerable to information-based attacks.

#### Biohacking makes multipandemics.

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Biohacking viruses Craig Venter recently presented a digital-biological converter (Boles et al. 2017), which could “print” a flu virus without human participation. The genomes of many dangerous biological viruses have been published (Enserink 2011), so such technology should be protected from unauthorized access. A biohacker could use narrow AI to calculate the most dangerous genomes, create many dangerous biological viruses, and start a multipandemic (Turchin et al. 2017). A computer virus could harm human brains via neurointerfaces (Hines 2016).

#### Slaughterbots and AI initaited doomsday strikes.

Alexey Turchin and David Denkenberger 05-03-2018 [Turchin is of the Science for Life Extension Foundation, Moscow, Russia, Denkenberger is of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI), Tennessee State University, Alliance to Feed the Earth in Disasters (ALLFED), Nashville, USA, AI & Society, 147-163 (2020), “Classification of global catastrophic risks connected with artificial intelligence,” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00146-018-0845-5#Abs1//ZW]

Slaughterbots and the dangers of a robotic army Robotic minds do not require full AGI to have some form of agency: they have goals, subgoals, and a world model, including a model of their place in the world. For example, a robotic car should predict the future situation on a road, including the consequences of its own actions. It also has a main goal—travel from A to B—which constantly results in changes to the subgoal system in the form of route creation. A combination of this type of limited intelligence with limited agency may be used to turn such systems into dangerous self-targeting weapons (Turchin and Denkenberger 2018b). Commentary on narrow AI viruses It appears that if a narrow AI virus were to affect only one of the above-listed domains, it would not result in an extinction-level catastrophe. However, it is possible that there will be many such viruses, or a multipandemic (Turchin et al. 2017), or one narrow AI that will be able to affect almost all existing computers and computerized systems. In this case, if the virus(es) were deliberately programmed to create maximum damage—which could be in a case of a military grade Narrow AI virus, like the advanced version of Stuxnet (Kushner 2013)—global catastrophe is a possible result. If the appearance of narrow AI viruses is gradual, antivirus companies may be able to prepare for them. Alternatively, humans could turn off the most vulnerable systems to avoid a global catastrophe. However, a sudden breakthrough or a synchronized surprise attack could spell doom. Failure of nuclear deterrence AI Nuclear weapons are one of the most automated weapon systems. Because they must be launched immediately, almost all decision making has been done in advance. An early warning alert starts a preprogrammed chain of events, where the high-level decision should be made in minutes, which is far from optimal for human decision-making. However, the history of nuclear near misses shows (Blair 2011) that computer mistakes have been one of the main causes, and only quick human intervention has prevented nuclear war, e.g., the actions of Stanislav Petrov in 1983 (Future of Life Institute 2016). We can imagine failure modes of accidental nuclear war resulting from failure of the nuclear weapons control system. They may be similar to the Russian “dead hand” perimeter system (Bender 2014), arising if a strategic planning AI chooses a dangerous plan to “win” a nuclear war, like a Doomsday weapon (Kahn 1959), blackmail, or a pre-emptive strike.

\* I couldn’t find the entire text for this, so I left the card as is.

#### Unethical AI development causes mindcrime---outweighs extinction

Nick **Bostrom 14**. Director, Future of Humanity Institute, Professor, Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford. 2014. Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. 1st Edition, Oxford University Press.

Mind crime Another failure mode for a project, especially a project whose interests incorporate moral considerations, is what we might refer to as mind crime. This is similar to infrastructure profusion in that it concerns a potential side effect of actions undertaken by the AI for instrumental reasons. But in mind crime, the side effect is not external to the AI; rather, it concerns what happens within the AI itself (or within the computational processes it generates). This failure mode deserves its own designation because it is easy to overlook yet potentially deeply problematic. Normally, we do not regard what is going on inside a computer as having any moral significance except insofar as it affects things outside. But a machine superintelligence could create internal processes that have moral status. For example, a very detailed simulation of some actual or hypothetical human mind might be conscious and in many ways comparable to an emulation. One can imagine scenarios in which an AI creates trillions of such conscious simulations, perhaps in order to improve its understanding of human psychology and sociology. These simulations might be placed in simulated environments and subjected to various stimuli, and their reactions studied. Once their informational usefulness has been exhausted, they might be destroyed (much as lab rats are routinely sacrificed by human scientists at the end of an experiment). If such practices were applied to beings that have high moral status—such as simulated humans or many other types of sentient mind—the outcome might be equivalent to genocide and thus extremely morally problematic. The number of victims, moreover, might be orders of magnitude larger than in any genocide in history.

#### AI risks are ignored--- overcorrect your bias to weigh AI as the greater threat--- it’s coming soon.

Alexey Turchin and David Denkenberger 05-03-2018 [Turchin is of the Science for Life Extension Foundation, Moscow, Russia, Denkenberger is of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI), Tennessee State University, Alliance to Feed the Earth in Disasters (ALLFED), Nashville, USA, AI & Society, 147-163 (2020), “Classification of global catastrophic risks connected with artificial intelligence,” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00146-018-0845-5#Abs1//ZW]

Conclusion Our analysis shows that the AI risks field is much more varied than accepted by the two main points of view: (1) AI as job-taker and (2) AI that quickly takes over the world. AI could pose a global catastrophic risk in the very early stages or at the very late stages of its evolution. No single solution can be capable of covering all risks of AI. Even if AI is banned, other global problems will arise in its absence; thus, controlling AI safety requires a complex and continuous effort. It is especially worrying that the risks of narrow AI viruses and early self-improving AI (young AI) are neglected by both camps. Such risks are nearer in time and not overshadowed by other potential risks. In addition, these risks cannot be solved by the mechanisms proposed to control more advanced AI, such as AI alignment. The risks of conflict between two benevolent AIs or halting of late-stage AI have also generally been ignored. Most of the risks discussed here could happen within a very short period of time, less than a decade, and could have very different natures. More study is needed to address these urgent risks.

### 2nc --- War Impact

#### That causes extinction

Wittner, 11 - Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York [Lawrence, November 28, Huntington News, COMMENTARY: Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?, <http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446>, accessed 7/3/16, GE]

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon.

The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.”

But need this lead to nuclear war?

Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”

Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists.

Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan.

At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might?

Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China.

But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade.

#### A refusal of the US to accommodate China’s status could go nuclear

**Onea, 14** - Tudor Onea is a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Post-doctoral Fellow with the Department of Government at Dartmouth College (“Between dominance and decline: status anxiety and great power rivalry” Review of International Studies, Volume 40 / Issue 01 / January 2014, pp 125-152

Rivalries between great powers over dominance have captured scholarly attention since the days of Thucydides. However, the bulk of studies have concentrated on shifts in capabilities, while neglecting the motives that produce such positional rivalries. The status anxiety hypothesis is an effort to address this omission, by tracing their occurrence and continuation, sometimes for decades, to the clashing status requirements of the dominant power and those of the next-in-line state. In a nutshell, status anxiety argues that the refusal of the dominant power to allow the succession of the challenger will be a fundamental cause of rivalry, worsening as the rising power threatens to overtake the current leader in additional dimensions. The purpose of this article was to formulate this hypothesis as well as subject it to preliminary testing. The findings suggest that status anxiety represented a significant influence, though not necessarily excluding additional balance of power considerations, in the foreign policy decision-making of declining dominant powers: France in the mid-eighteenth century and Britain at the turn of the twentieth century. Status anxiety thus helps account for the hostility France manifested towards Britain, and Britain towards German demands for superior status, a reaction which is more problematic to account for by theories stressing solely physical security and material gains.

A further contribution of this endeavour is that it suggests the existence of a dominant power club, distinct from the club of major or great powers, and, as such, following a different set of rules.138 The existing status literature has concentrated exclusively on the latter club, arguing persuasively that there is no impediment for granting either admission to new members or opportunities for further advancement to current ones.139 Hence, status competition in the great power club is seen as non-zero sum. But the dominant power club has a membership of one, which makes it unfeasible for the dominant power to satisfy the demands of dominant power aspirants without voluntarily surrendering its supremacy. Accordingly, status competition over the dominant position is more likely to be zero-sum and lead to rivalry.

The findings of this article are at this point only plausible, yet they highlight the need for further research covering the entire universe of dominant powers in order to determine both if intense status anxiety always prompts conflict and if reduced status anxiety or its absence lead to stability. Consequently, additional studies of the role of status for dominant powers foreign policy should be conducted, extending beyond the current en vogue concentration on the foreign policy of rising powers alone.

Indeed, dominant powers' status anxiety may be increasingly policy-relevant, if unipolarity were to erode due to a steady shrinking of distance between the US and China. This is not to suggest that Sino-American confrontation under the ominous shadow of nuclear weapons is inevitable, but to draw attention to the possible heightened risks posed by status anxiety in future decades. In the words of President Obama: ‘if other nations do not play for second place, I do not accept second-place for the United States of America’.140

#### Clinging on to the inevitable decline of Western hegemony results in Sino-American war

**Layne 18** - professor at Texas A&M University's. George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana,” 2018, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/images/ia/INTA94_1_6_249_Layne.pdf>, Accessed 6-30-22, LASA-AH)

Even as it stays within the post-1945 international order, Beijing is not doing so to preserve it. In this sense, as Martin Jacques has observed, China is playing a double game. It is operating ‘both within and outside the existing international system while at the same time, in effect, sponsoring a new China-centric international system which will exist alongside the present system and probably slowly begin to usurp it’.87 The creation of the AIIB, which Beijing intends should ultimately eclipse the IMF and World Bank, is a good example of this strategy. American scholars and policy-makers believe that a lock-in strategy can be employed to head off any Chinese attempt to create a new international order, or to create a parallel order. They believe this because they have imbued the concept of a ‘rules-based, institutionalized, liberal international order’ with a talismanic quality. In so doing they have air-brushed Great Power politics out of the picture. As they see it, rules and institutions are politically neutral and, ipso facto, beneficial for all. Hence, they can be an **effective substitute for declining hard power**. However, rather than existing separately from the balance of power, rules, norms and institutions reflect it. Hence the world is no more likely to continue upholding the Pax Americana once US power declines than Britain’s dominions and former colonies were inclined to perpetuate the empire after the Second World War. The fate of the Pax Americana, and that of the international order, **will be determined by the outcome of the Sino-American rivalry.** As the British scholar E. H. Carr observed, a rules-based international order ‘cannot be understood independently of the political foundation on which it rests and the political interests which it serves’.88 The post-Second World War interna- tional order is an American order that privileges US interests.89 Even the discourse of ‘liberal order’ cannot disguise this fact. Today, the ground is shifting beneath the Pax Americana’s foundations. Those who believe that lock-in can work view international politics as being, in essence, geopolitically antiseptic. For them, Great Power competition and conflict are transcended by international institu- tions, rules and norms. This is not how the real world works, however.90 Great Power politics is about power. Rules and institutions do not exist in a vacuum, hermetically sealed off from Great Power politics. Nor are they neutral. Rather, they reflect the distribution of power in the international system. In international politics, who rules makes the rules. In his classic study of international relations between the world wars, The Twenty years’ crisis, Carr analysed the political crisis of the 1930s caused by the breakdown of the post-First World War order symbolized by the Versailles Treaty.91 The Versailles system cracked, Carr argued, because of the widening gap between the order it represented and the actual distribution of power in Europe. Carr used the events of the 1930s to make a larger geopolitical point. International orders reflect the balance of power that exists at time of their creation. Over time, however, the relative power of states changes, and eventually the international order no longer reflects the actual distribution of power between or among the leading Great Powers. When that happens, the legitimacy of the prevailing order is called into question, and it will be challenged by the rising power(s). When the balance of power swings—or is perceived to swing—in its direction, a rising power becomes increasingly dissatisfied with the international order, and **seeks to revise it**. The challenger wants to change the rules embodied in the existing international order—rules written, of course, by the once dominant but now declining Great Power that created it. It also wants the allocation of prestige and status changed to reflect its newly acquired power. The incumbent hegemon, of course, wants to preserve the existing international order as is—an order that it midwifed to advance, and consolidate, its own interests. The E. H. Carr Moment presents the incumbent hegemon with a choice. It can dig in its heels and try to preserve the prevailing order—and its privileged position therein; or it can accede to the rising challenger’s demands for revision. If it chooses the former course of action, **it runs the risk of war with the dissatisfied challenger.** If it chooses the latter, it must come to terms with the reality of its decline, and the end of its hegemonic position. The E. H. Carr Moment is where the geopolitical rubber meets the road: the status quo power(s) must choose between accommodating or opposing the revisionist demands of the rising power(s). Liberal internationalists such as John Ikenberry argue that China will not challenge the current international order, even as the distribution of power continues to shift in its favour. This is a doubtful proposition. The geopolitical question—the E. H. Carr Moment—of our time is whether the declining hegemon in east Asia, the United States, will try to preserve a status quo that is becoming increasingly out of sync with the shifting distribution of power, or whether it can reconcile itself to a rising China’s revisionist demands that the international order in east Asia be realigned to reflect the emerging power realities. Unless the United States can adjust gracefully to this tectonic geopolitical shift, the chances of a Sino-American war are high—as they always are during power transitions.92 However, **whether change comes peacefully or violently**, the Pax Americana’s days are numbered.

#### Attempting to sustain US primacy guarantees conflict and wrecks relations

**Swaine, 15 –** senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies (Michael, “The Real Challenge in the Pacific: A Response to "How to Deter China"” Foreign Affairs, May/June, proquest)

For most of the postwar era, these perspectives coexisted relatively easily, primarily because Beijing was too weak to push its own view and was able to rise steadily within the U.S.-sponsored order. But times have changed; China has outgrown its subordinate status and now feels strong enough to press its case in the western Pacific.

This development should not be surprising to anyone who understands modern Chinese history and great-power transitions. Beijing has an ongoing incentive to work with Washington and the West to sustain continued economic growth and to address a growing array of common global and regional concerns, from pandemics to climate change to terrorism. At the same time, it understandably wishes to reduce its vulnerability to potential future threats from the United States and other nations while increasing its overall influence along its strategically important maritime periphery. As its overseas power and influence grow, its foreign interests expand, and its domestic nationalist backers become more assertive, Beijing will naturally become less willing to accept unconditionally military, political, and economic relationships and structures that it believes disproportionately and unjustly favor Western powers. And it will increasingly worry that Washington might resort to pressure or force to try to undermine Chinese security moves in the western Pacific and head off the United States' impending relative decline.

Many Chinese observers now believe that Beijing's past weakness and its need to cooperate with the United States and the West in general have made it too accommodating or passive in dealing with perceived challenges to China's vital national interests, from U.S. support for Taiwan and Asian disputants over maritime claims to close-up U.S. surveillance and other intelligence-gathering activities along the Chinese coast. The more extreme variants of this nationalist viewpoint threaten to transform China's long-standing "peaceful development" policy, which focuses on the maintenance of amicable relations with the United States and other powers, into a more hard-edged approach aimed at more actively undermining U.S. influence in Asia. The so-called bottom-line concept of Chinese President Xi Jinping's foreign policy is an apparent step in this direction, stressing in an unprecedented manner the need for China to stand resolute in managing territorial and sovereignty issues in the East China and South China Seas.

Observing these stirrings, meanwhile, many American and other foreign observers see the beginnings of a larger effort to eject the United States from Asia and eventually replace it as the regional, and possibly even global, superpower. China's greater assertiveness regarding maritime territorial disputes and U.S. and Japanese intelligence and surveillance activities along its coastline are interpreted as tests of U.S. and allied resolve, a prelude to the creation of no-go zones essential for the establishment of Chinese control over the western Pacific. In this view, the proper course of action for Washington is to decisively disabuse Beijing of its aspirations by enhancing U.S. predominance, increasing Chinese vulnerability in the western Pacific, and making clear who is boss, right up to China's 12-nautical-mile territorial waters.

The problem with this outlook- implicit in the concept of Archipelagic Defense that Krepinevich proposes-is that it misdiagnoses China's motivations and thus exacerbates, rather than mitigates, the underlying problem. Beijing's de facto attempts to limit or end U.S. predominance along its maritime periphery are motivated by uncertainty, insecurity, and opportunism rather than a grand strategic vision of Chinese predominance. Chinese leaders today are not trying to carve out an exclusionary sphere of influence, especially in hard-power terms; they are trying to reduce their considerable vulnerability and increase their political, diplomatic, and economic leverage in their own backyard. This is a much less ambitious and in many ways more understandable goal for a continental great power. It does not necessarily threaten vital U.S. or allied interests, and it can and should be met with understanding rather than defensive aggressiveness.

UNSUSTAINABLE TRENDS

Continued U.S. predominance in the western Pacific cannot be justified by the need to resist a Chinese drive to replace it, nor is it necessary in order to ensure regional (and global) order. It is inconceivable that Beijing will accept U.S. predominance in perpetuity and that it will grant the United States complete freedom of action in the Pacific and recognize its ability to prevail militarily in a potential conflict. Trying to sustain such predominance, therefore, is actually the quickest route to instability, practically guaranteeing an arms race, increased regional polarization, and reduced cooperation between Washington and Beijing on common global challenges. And even if some Chinese leaders were tempted to accept continued U.S. predominance, they would almost certainly end up meeting fierce and sustained domestic criticism for doing so as China's power grows and would likely end up reversing course to ensure their political survival.

Trying to sustain American military predominance in the region, meanwhile, will become increasingly difficult and expensive. A recent study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (which I co-authored) on the long-term security environment in Asia concluded that the United States will remain the strongest military power on a global level for many years to come. But this study also found that Washington will almost certainly confront increasingly severe economically induced limitations on its defense spending that will constrain its efforts to keep well ahead of a growing Chinese military and paramilitary presence within approximately 1,500 nautical miles of the Chinese coastline (that is, the area covered by the so-called first island chain).

The barriers to maritime predominance, however, apply to China as well as the United States. The Carnegie Endowment study also concluded that U.S. military power in Asia will almost certainly remain very strong and that even increased Chinese regional military capabilities will not offer Beijing unambiguous superiority. Any Chinese attempt to establish predominance in Asia would fail, therefore, both because it would be difficult for China to surpass the United States and because a scenario of this kind would frighten bystanders and drive them into Washington's arms.

Chinese leaders understand this and so are highly unlikely to seek predominance if they feel that they can achieve a decent amount of security in less confrontational ways. They are likely to seek some form of predominance (as opposed to acting merely opportunistically and in a more limited manner) only if Washington's words and actions convince them that even the minimal level of security they seek requires it. Unfortunately, the United States' adoption of aggressive military concepts- such as Air-Sea Battle, Offshore Control, or even Archipelagic Defense-would deny them such security and thus contribute to an ever-worsening security dilemma.

THE NEED FOR MORE STABILITY

For both the United States and China, therefore, the primary future strategic challenge is finding a way to develop a mutually beneficial means of transitioning from U.S. predominance toward a stable, more equitable balance of power in the western Pacific-one in which neither nation has the clear capacity to prevail in an armed conflict, but in which both countries believe that their vital interests can nonetheless remain secure.

This will be difficult to achieve and potentially dangerous. It will not only require a variety of crisis-management and confidence-building mechanisms, beyond what have been developed thus far in Asia, but also necessitate high levels of strategic reassurance and restraint. Many knowledgeable observers have offered recommendations designed to reduce mistrust and enhance cooperation between Washington and Beijing, involving everything from caps on U.S. and Chinese defense spending to mutual, limited concessions on Taiwan and the ongoing maritime disputes. Many of these initiatives make sense. But they fail to address the real underlying problem- namely, China's unwillingness to continue to accept a clearly subordinate military position along its maritime periphery.

To reduce the risk of conflict and enhance the opportunities for cooperation, Washington and Beijing will need to reach reliable understandings regarding the future long-term status of the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan, the management of maritime territorial disputes in the East China and South China Seas, and the scope and function of non-Chinese military activities within the first island chain (or at least within both China's and Japan's exclusive economic zones). Such understandings should almost certainly involve some credible form of neutralization of these areas as sources of growing contention or as locations from which to project U.S. or Chinese power, creating a de facto buffer zone along China's maritime periphery. Only these kinds of moves will provide the mutual strategic assurance required to maintain a stable security environment over the long term.

In the case of North and South Korea, this strategy would imply the emergence of a unified, nonaligned (or only loosely aligned) peninsula free from foreign military forces. Such an outcome would need to rest on credible security assurances by both the United States and China that a unified Korea would remain free from coercion and always open to close economic and political relations with both countries. Such assurances might involve the continuation in some form of a security relationship with Washington, although one that is greatly reduced, at least in the short to medium term. This process might also require Japan to provide security assurances to a unified Korea, at least to the extent of not acquiring nuclear weapons or some types of conventional weapons that the latter might find threatening, such as precision ballistic and cruise missile strike capabilities.

In the case of Taiwan, it would require, as a first step, a U.S.-Chinese understanding regarding restrictions on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, along with verifiable limits on relevant Chinese military production and deployments, including of ballistic missiles and strike aircraft. Beijing would also likely need to provide credible assurances that it would not use force against Taiwan in any contingency short of an outright Taiwanese declaration of de jure independence or the U.S. placement of forces on the island.

In the past, Beijing has resisted providing assurances regarding any nonuse of force toward the island, viewing guarantees of this kind as a limit on Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. However, similar to the case of the Korean Peninsula, Beijing would likely view such a shift in its stance toward Taiwan as acceptable if it were necessary to stabilize the western Pacific; Chinese leaders might also regard it as a step toward the eventual unification of the island with the mainland. In addition, Beijing would likely need to accept that such unification could occur only through a peaceful process involving the willing consent of the people of Taiwan and that it might take decades. Washington, for its part, would likely need to provide assurances to Beijing that it would neither place forces on the island nor provide any new level of defense assistance to Taipei, as long as Beijing abided by its own assurances. And both countries would need to consult closely with both Taiwan and Japan at each step of this process and provide clear and credible assurances regarding the understanding reached between them.

#### Attempting to prevent China rise causes war.

Chas W. Freeman, Jr. 01-20-10 [Charles "Chas" W. Freeman, Jr is an American retired diplomat and writer. He served in the United States Foreign Service, the State and Defense Departments in many different capacities over the course of thirty years, “China’s Challenge to American Hegemony: Remarks to the Global Strategy Forum,” https://mepc.org/speeches/chinas-challenge-american-hegemony//ZW]

Napoleon is said to have predicted that, when China woke from its slumbers, it would "astonish the world." The Little Corporal was a loquacious fellow who got much wrong but he seems to have gotten this right. In a mere three decades, China has risen from impotence and backwardness to a leading position in global affairs. This year it will become the second biggest producer of goods and services, something projected just five years ago to happen only in 2020. China is clearly on the way to regaining its historic position as the world's largest economy, displacing the United States. (Given continued rapid growth in the Chinese economy, slow growth elsewhere, and progressive revaluation of the Renminbi Yuan, this could happen much sooner than many expect.) The prospect of transcendent Chinese wealth and power, coupled with America's devaluation of its own political and economic prestige, has led to mounting speculation about China's emergence as a global hegemon to rival and, perhaps in time, surpass the United States. Not so long ago, in the Cold War, the world order was defined by the relationship between the Soviet Union and America as the overlords of rival blocs of nations. Recalling this, some pundits foresee the reemergence of a bipolar world in which the United States and China exercise joint leadership in a so-called "G-2." With the collapse of the USSR, there have been no rivals to American leadership when Washington has chosen to lead. The United States — which spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined — has enjoyed absolute military superiority in every region of the globe. Some imagine China as a "peer competitor" for global dominance. Since 1974, when Deng Xiaoping addressed the United Nations General Assembly in New York, China has been at pains to deny any possibility that it might seek such dominance. As the Chinese defense "white paper" put it last year: "*China will never seek hegemony or engage in military expansion now or in the future, no matter how developed it becomes.*" In saying this, China is inadvertently echoing the American isolationists of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The United States did not then seek to dominate or control the international state system, nor did it pursue military solutions to problems far from its shores. In time and in reaction to events, however, America came to do both. Why has China, alone among nations, felt obliged to assert that it does not aspire to regional or global hegemony? Is this simply propaganda, intended to distinguish Beijing from Brezhnev's Moscow or from the militarism of contemporary Washington? Is it a contrite acknowledgment and repudiation of imperial China's past hegemonic status in East Asia? Or is it sincere counsel to future generations of Chinese not to bully their neighbors or the world once they have the power to do so? If so, is there something unique about China that causes its leaders to believe they must make a special effort to resist deep-seated hegemonic impulses? This has become a timely question. After a couple of bad centuries, China is back. It believes, with some justification, that for most of its history it was the largest, wealthiest, best governed, and technologically most advanced society on the planet. China brims with confidence that it can regain this status, which it considers the natural order of affairs, and that it will do so in this century. Analogies to other rising powers with shallower histories — France, the United States, Germany, Japan, the USSR — are not helpful in predicting the consequences of China's rise. China has no messianic ideology to export; no doctrine of "manifest destiny" to advance; no belief in social Darwinism or imperative of territorial expansion to act upon; no cult of the warrior to animate militarism or glorify war; no exclusion from contemporary global governance to overcome; no satellite states to garrison; no overseas colonies or ideological dependencies to protect; no history of power projection or military intervention beyond its immediate frontiers; no entangling alliances or bases abroad. China has a very persuasive explanation of its national interests. It says it needs domestic tranquility and peace on its borders in order to pursue its continued modernization and economic development. It seems very comfortable with a multipolar world order, where peace and economic growth prevail. But anyone with experience of negotiating with the Chinese can attest that they are capable of both haughtiness and petulance. Some of this sort of conduct seems to have been on display at Copenhagen last month. How a still-more-powerful China conducts itself in the future will be decided in part by Chinese realities as shaped by Chinese history. But Chinese behavior will also reflect how the rest of the world, including most notably the incumbent hegemon — the United States — reacts and interacts with China as China rises. And future Chinese conduct cannot be separated from the character of China's domestic politics. An autocracy that feels free to ignore the rule of law at home is unlikely to defer to international law and procedure abroad. Whatever the meaning of China's assurances that it will not pursue hegemony or engage in military expansionism in future, we cannot be certain that it will not. There are grounds for optimism, especially with respect to China's use of military power. China's history includes examples of aggressive actions along its borders — especially in Korea and Vietnam. But overall China has been notable for its cautious, defensive, and inward-looking national security posture. The Great Wall stands as a symbol of this as does the scuttling of the Ming fleet in 1437. Despite a formidable history of innovation in military technology and warfare on a scale commensurate with its huge population and vast size, the Chinese strategic tradition stresses that weapons are inauspicious instruments to be used only when the use of force is unavoidable. The People's Republic of China has used force when measures short of war have proven inadequate to secure its borders or strategic interests (as in Korea, India, and Vietnam), but, by marked contrast with India in Goa or Indonesia in Timor-Leste, it gave diplomacy the decades needed to resolve the Hong Kong and Macau issues without bloodshed. Beijing has shown a similar preference for negotiations rather than the use of force to settle the Taiwan issue. Cross-strait tensions are lessening. It should be encouraging that China has insisted on United Nations authorization for its military activities abroad, which are directed at peacekeeping and against piracy. Still, China is modernizing its military at a peculiar moment of history. The United States inherited worldwide military superiority from the collapse of its Soviet rival. Without much discussion, it has embraced the neo-conservative agenda of sustaining this superiority at all costs. But rising Chinese defense capabilities erode American supremacy. China's new anti-carrier weapons endanger U.S. force projection capabilities in the Western Pacific; its anti-satellite programs imperil U.S. global surveillance and communication capabilities; its growing operations in cyberspace menace U.S. government operations and the economy of the American homeland alike. These are serious challenges not just to American hegemony but to core U.S. interests. They have begun to draw a response. The result is a deeply troubled Sino-American military relationship despite the diminishing prospects for war in the Taiwan Strait. China will persevere in its efforts to build a credible counter to American coercion. The United States will not soon abandon its obsession with the retention of absolute military superiority everywhere. A less hegemonic objective would allow the U.S. to accommodate a more powerful China while retaining the ability to prevail in any conflict with it. As things are, increasingly overt military confrontation between China and the United States is likely. These inherent tensions — along with those arising from the huge bilateral trade imbalance in favor of China — are why the idea of a US-China duopoly like the so-called G-2 is infeasible even if it were desirable, which it is not. Still, the world economy is about to see the displacement of the United States from its 20th Century preeminence. China will join the U.S., the EU, and Japan at the top. India, Brazil, Russia, and others in the G-20 will follow. What is in prospect is not the hegemony of one or two countries but its opposite — a multipolar balance of economic power. China, like Japan, is, of course, a country with a population vastly larger than it can prosperously support on its own resource base, large as that is. And China is late in the search for access to raw materials for its burgeoning industries. (So is India.) China has a vital interest in the perpetuation of a global economic order open to trade and investment. China is now enmeshed in multilateral organizations in which it must daily demonstrate its dedication to the sovereign equality of nations, great and small. All this enforces the respect for comity that is the essence of a "responsible stakeholder." It informed People's Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan's cautious suggestion last spring that it would be better to manage the dollar down to a sustainable international role than to have it collapse. But America is out of practice at dealing with independent power centers. For the past two decades the United States has been the undisputed global hegemon. For 40 years before that, it was the indispensable arbiter of the bloc of nations known as the "free world." American politicians are unaccustomed to formulating policy through multilateral consultations with other nations. Beijing isn't very good at this either, but seems more open to it than Washington. The United States will, as always, do what must be done, after it has exhausted all of the alternatives. But this will take time and cost the United States further prestige and influence. Meanwhile, China's global role will grow, especially if Beijing sustains the modesty and competence for which its diplomats have become known, rather than the arrogance that some of its domestic officials increasingly exemplify. The Chinese Communist Party has delivered prosperity to ordinary Chinese, which is why it enjoys their support. Eighty-six percent of Chinese think their country is on the right track. Chinese see proof of the superiority of their political-economy in the apparent effectiveness of its response to the financial crash and its aftermath. Their government's policies have so far succeeded in sustaining high rates of economic growth through programs that enhance long-term economic and intellectual competitiveness. The contrast with the muddled self-indulgence of Washington's response to the crisis, in particular, is striking. Americans have so far shrunk from the hard decisions necessary to restore fiscal integrity to their government or to reverse serious decay in their nation's human and physical infrastructure. The recession has joined foreign wars and continuing deterioration in relations with the Islamic world as a factor accelerating American decline. China seems certain to emerge from the crisis with a much larger and more competitive economy. The generation born under the single-child policy is coming of age. It is far more inclined to consumption than its frugal predecessors. A faster transition to growth driven by domestic consumption than many have thought possible seems in prospect. China's imports are now rising much more rapidly than its exports. Its balance of payments surplus, huge as it still is, fell by half in 2009. Continuing economic growth, deepened ties with Asian neighbors, the progressive internationalization of a yuan that is rising in value, all promise domestic stability and greater international stature for China in coming years. The current self-congratulatory mood in China is therefore entirely understandable. Yet it masks the underlying weakness of the Chinese political system. Government in contemporary China derives its legitimacy almost entirely from its ability to deliver continued rapid economic growth. It stands for no credible values, neither trusts nor is trusted by those it rules, suffers from a high level of corruption, and has no clear vision for self-improvement. If America's politics are widely viewed as so venal as to be dysfunctional, the Chinese system is seen as cynically manipulative and of questionable legitimacy. Without political reform, China will remain vulnerable to unrest should the economy falter. If there is no rule of law in China, Beijing's word will be doubted abroad. Despite its economic successes and growing defense capabilities, China's international influence will remain limited as long as it fails to evolve an attractive political system. It is not impossible that it may do so but there is no evidence at present to suggest that it will. A Chinese perception that the United States is attempting to leverage its military superiority to keep China down could goad Beijing into efforts to dislodge America from its position of global dominance. Given the continuing disparities in national power, the ensuing struggle would be a long one. The trigger would probably be some incident derived from U.S. military operations offshore China or from the Taiwan issue, to which Sino-American relations remain hostage. This is unlikely, but, unfortunately, it is not impossible to imagine. As I speak, for example, China is actively considering how to put effective pressure on the United States to halt arms sales to Taiwan. China wants Washington to live up to Ronald Reagan's commitment to restrain and reduce such sales in return for credible pursuit by Beijing of a peaceful settlement of its differences with Taipei. Sanctions on selected American companies — modeled on those the U.S. Congress has imposed on Chinese companies selling objectionable items to others — are apparently among the options before China's leaders. In the current economic climate, any such move by China could trigger a nasty confrontation and unleash an orgy of American protectionist retaliation that would likely set off a trade war. I do not consider such a development likely. If nothing else, however, the possible consequences of miscalculation by Beijing or Washington illustrate the global stake in continuing prudent management of the Sino-American relationship by both sides. It is important to see China as it is, not as we wish or fear it to be. In 1943, President Franklin Roosevelt declared that China "has become one of the great Democracies of the world." That was nonsense, of course. But so, I believe, are perceptions of China as an emerging anti-democratic hegemon. The more likely prospect is that China will take its place alongside the United States and others at the head of a multilateralized system of global governance. In such an oligarchic world order, China will have great prestige but no monopoly on power comparable to that which the United States has recently enjoyed. America has already lost its global political hegemony. But, for all the reasons I have mentioned, China is neither inclined nor capable of succeeding to this role. The Anglo-American financial model is much tarnished by recent events. But no alternative to it has yet emerged. It seems certain that whatever does replace it will be crafted by many hands, only some of which will be Chinese. American consumption is no longer the sole driver of the global economy. The China market has come to play an important part in sustaining world growth. But China is not the only economy that is rising. In some areas of global trade and investment, China will be a dominant factor. In others, it will not be. In the military arena, even if fiscal limitations force retrenchment, the United States will, for many years to come, remain the only power with global reach. Americans will find it difficult to adjust to a world in which we are no longer all-powerful in all spheres. But we are a flexible and resilient people who can and will accommodate change. Neither we nor the Chinese will cease to pursue our national interests as we see them. In many instances, these views will more or less coincide. On such matters, if others agree, there will be global progress. Where we disagree, we will come under pressure from others to search for common ground. Neither of us will be so powerful that we can ignore such pressure. In short, the world in future will be more "democratic" and, likely, more muddled than in the past because many countries, not just the United States or China, will share power in it. There will be ample opportunity for countries with trusted relationships with Washington and Beijing to influence how they participate in global affairs. There will be no hegemon, and there will be no "G-2."

### 2nc --- CCP Collapse Impact

#### Chinese leadership is vital to regime legitimacy – loss of it exacerbates social pressure for CCP collapse

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The need to overcome the security dilemma by reducing the fear its rise provokes in others is one of China's most complex national security challenges and the most widely cited reason for the country wanting to increase its soft power. According to Li (2009, p. 31), soft power is ‘primarily utilized to refute the “China threat” thesis, facilitate a better understanding of China's domestic socio-economic reality, and persuade the outside world to accept and support China's rise’. Deng (2009, p. 64) argues that in China the concept of soft power ‘to a large extent, means the ability to influence others in world politics with the goal of achieving great power status without sparking fully fledged traditional power politics of hostile balancing or war’. In his analysis of the concept's role in China's rise, Ding (2010, p. 266) argues that the country's soft power strategy is one of reassurance that helps ‘to deal with foreign challenges and create a friendly international environment’. Rawnsley (2012, p. 126) notes that China's soft power strategy has been prompted by the emergence of a ‘China threat’ discourse in the West and therefore China's soft power can be seen as ‘not only reactive, but defensive’. Nye also claims that its soft power strategy is intended ‘to make its hard power look less threatening to its neighbors’ and that soft power can help to reduce the effectiveness of regional coalitions that attempt to balance against China (Nye, 2011, p. 23; 2013). This kind of national security perspective helps explain why building soft power has become such an important task for the CCP. But we need to consider the possibility that domestic concerns over regime security are also driving China's soft power project.

‘Regime security’ generally refers to ‘the condition where governing elites are secure from violent challenges to their rule’ (Jackson, 2010, p. 187). In China's case, however, the insecurity of the regime is generated by the possibility not only of violent challenges, but also of ‘peaceful evolution’ (heping yanbian), which is an extremely seriously concern for the CCP, particularly following the ‘color revolutions’ that have occurred in some post-Soviet states (see Shambaugh, 2008, pp. 88–89). The ‘regime’ can be defined as ‘the small state of persons who hold the highest offices … and/or are the elite that effectively command the machinery, especially the coercive forces, of the state’ (Job, 1992, p. 15). While this article uses the term ‘regime security’ rather than ‘state security’, it should be noted that there is often no clear dividing line between the two within a ‘state-embedded polity’ (Gilley, 2006, p. 501) such as China, where there is significant penetration of the state by the CCP. Despite China's successes in dealing with many of the common sources of insecurity for developing states, such as permeability by external actors and susceptibility to armed conflict (see Ayoob, 1995, p. 15), two important sources of regime insecurity remain problematic for the authorities: lack of legitimacy and lack of national cohesion.

For a political authority such as the CCP, legitimacy is determined by the degree to which it ‘holds and exercises political power with legality, justification and consent from the standpoint of all of its citizens’ (Gilley, 2009, p. 11). In other words, the use of power must proceed according to rules, these rules are justified by widely shared beliefs and the actions of those in subordinate positions provide evidence that they consent to the power relationship (Beetham, 1991, p. 16). There has been a great deal of elite discussion of party legitimacy in China, particularly since the early 2000s; one study showed that 68 per cent of sampled Chinese journal articles about legitimacy took the view that the CCP's legitimacy was under threat, while 30 per cent claimed the party faced a legitimacy crisis (Gilley and Holbig, 2009, p. 343). A more recent study found that Chinese intellectuals are more pessimistic about regime legitimacy in China than their Western counterparts (Zeng, 2014). For the purpose of this article it is not necessary to resolve the question of whether or not the CCP currently faces a legitimacy crisis, however – only to show that the potential for the party-state to lose its legitimacy is a serious source of insecurity.

The Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, held in October 2014, provides clear evidence that senior party officials are highly concerned about the legality of CCP power. The Plenum's major focus was the need for the party to ‘rule according to the law’ (yi fa zhi guo) and pointed out that ‘good law is a prerequisite for good governance’ and that for the party to rule according to the law it must first rule according to the constitution (Xinhua, 2014). Responsibility for the justification of party power falls on the Central Propaganda Department, which utilizes a comprehensive network of institutions to attempt to reproduce the official discourse justifying CCP rule and suppress any rival discourses that might challenge it (see Edney, 2014). Lack of consent is also a problem that requires significant resources to overcome. According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in recent years the annual number of major protests in China has exceeded 100,000 (Huang, 2012). While all states use domestic force to some extent (see Buzan, 1983, p. 67), the huge investment of the Chinese authorities in the internal security apparatus, which in recent years has exceeded even China's military spending (Martina, 2014), demonstrates that the lack of consent to CCP rule is widespread enough to be a cause for serious concern.

Soft power is primarily relevant to the enhancement of regime legitimacy where a significant component of the moral justification for maintaining the current system is based on the regime's ability to improve the international status of the national unit. The international increase in positive attraction that is associated with a rise in soft power makes it easier for the regime to convince its citizens of the truth of its claim that the country's international status is improving under its leadership, where ‘status’ is defined not only in terms of material capabilities, but also in terms of social recognition. For the most part, evidence of an increase in international recognition and attraction could be used to bolster claims that the regime has successfully improved the country's international status, regardless of whether soft power is a result of attraction to political values, culture or foreign policies, or whether it is generated by the policies of the regime or sources within broader society. Some internationally attractive cultural products can also be the work of dissidents or relate to aspects of culture or values that the regime would rather suppress, however, and these sources of attraction are difficult for the authorities to exploit.

Chinese political elites feel a keen sense of obligation to restore the country's past great power status (Deng, 2008, pp. 8–9) and show its people that China is globally respected and admired (Zhang, 2012, p. 620). The leadership attempts to appease domestic nationalist audiences by gaining ‘face’ for China abroad (Gries, 2004, pp. 120–121) and the party-state has often publicized statements of support or admiration from foreign allies to demonstrate China's international status and thereby bolster its moral claim to rule (e.g. Brady, 2003, p. 228). If there is a broad-based growth in Chinese soft power, these statements are likely to become more common and more credible as the number and variety of foreign actors who are attracted to China increases. Moreover, international attraction to China's success in areas such as economic development expands the number of ‘nodes’ in networks of ‘legitimacy belief’, thereby reducing the marginal cost of persuasion and squeezing out alternative discourses that might challenge regime legitimacy (Gerschewski, 2013, pp. 26–27). This makes it easier for the CCP to claim legitimacy based on its success in moving China toward the shared goal of national ‘rejuvenation’.

Although ‘national cohesion’ is a concept that is rather nebulous and difficult to assess, the regular references to ‘cohesion’ in official CCP statements indicate that Chinese leaders are worried about it and seek to improve it (e.g. CCP Central Committee, 2011; 2013). As China has become a more plural society, generating social consensus (ningju gongshi) and unifying the people (ningju renxin) have become serious concerns for the propaganda authorities (Edney, 2014). According to propaganda chief Liu Yunshan, achieving the ‘China dream’ of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation requires cultural cohesion (Xinhua, 2013), while an early article on national cultural security published on a CCP website argues that if a country lacks cohesion – even if it is strong in terms of other forms of power – when it faces challenges such as a natural disaster or foreign invasion it will ‘collapse at the first blow’ (bu kan yi ji) (Yang, 2006). A lack of national cohesion can be a persistent problem for weak states that are unable to generate ‘a domestic political and social consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in the domestic political life of the nation’ (Buzan, 1983, p. 67).

Normally soft power refers to a country's attractiveness to foreign constituencies. To consider the possibility that it could enhance national cohesion, however, it is necessary to apply the concept to the relationship between domestic constituencies. In this sense, the soft power of the political, social and cultural core of the polity encourages domestic interest groups and individuals on the margins to want the same outcomes, such as stability and national cohesion, as the authorities at the center. Although this might seem to be a major step away from the traditional interpretation of soft power, Nye's (2011, pp. 19–20) argument that soft power is a key requirement of an effective counter-insurgency strategy and that dealing with the threat of terrorism requires the soft power of an appealing narrative that can win over mainstream society and prevent terrorists recruiting new members to their groups, highlights the concept's potential significance for state efforts to respond to domestic sources of instability. In this case, soft power involves enhancing regime security by making it less likely that domestic adversaries who pose a threat to national cohesion will be able to obtain material support from the local population, which then makes it easier for the state to deal with the security threat they pose.

The authorities in Beijing face a range of threats to national cohesion from peripheral regions, including the ongoing problem of terrorism and insurgent attacks in Xinjiang, protests and discontent in Tibet, pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong and de facto independence in Taiwan. In light of these challenges it would not be unreasonable for scholars, or even the authorities, to interpret ‘soft power’ as something that could also be applied to improve regime security by enhancing the cohesion between the political, social and cultural core of the Chinese polity and those on the margins. Indeed, in more general terms, Wang and Lu (2008, p. 427) have pointed out that Chinese interpretations of soft power include ‘the ability to generate compliance in a society by moral example and persuasion’.

#### Collapse risks Chinese lashout and global nuclear war

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Those who see China as a threat to the United States, and to the West more generally, point to its explosive growth as a source of concern. A stronger China, they argue, will be a more assertive China, which spells bad news for the United States, given the range of issues over which the two countries disagree. A wealthy, militarily strong China may no longer choose to accept the de facto independence of Taiwan, or it may compete aggressively to gain dominance over Asia, or replace American influence among the oil-rich states of the Middle East. Arguments over trade, human rights, and the environment may take a different tone when America is dealing with an adversary of equal or even greater strength. Whether because the United States and China each lead different civilizations, or simply because the rise of a competing hegemon typically creates trouble for the existing world leader, the prospect of a continued rise in China’s power unsettles many in America. 2 These fears may indeed be justified, but continued economic and military growth is not the only possible future for China. It is at least as likely that China in the coming years will fall victim to violent instability, bringing to a screeching halt its seemingly inexorable rise. Instability may come from those angry at not sharing the fruits of China's newfound prosperity, growing discrepancies of wealth in a state founded on principles of equality, mounting corruption by insensitive officials, incompetent governmental policies, and the absence of institutions to channel discontent. This anger matters because it is directed at a government whose "mandate of heaven" is increasingly shaky, since no one—including the leadership elite itself—believes in the Marxist-Leninist ideology that is trotted out to justify its rule. All of this takes place in an environment where the regime's ability to monitor and suppress antigovernment activity has never been lower. If economic growth can somehow continue its upward spiral producing enough benefits to coopt key groups, China may be able to avoid nationwide instability in the coming years. However, if as seems likely, the Chinese economy stalls and the escalating expectations of the Chinese people are no longer met, widespread civil conflict becomes all but certain. While some American policymakers would greet the prospect of a China mired in internal conflict with relief, a crippled China presents its own threats to American interests, threats that are in many ways more dire than those posed by a rising China. American and Chinese economies have become closely inter- twined with huge amounts of American investment in China and even larger Chinese purchases of American bonds. If domestic unrest undermines this relationship, any hope of China becoming prosperous would be dashed, while the American economy would be throw n into recession —or worse. China is a great power with a population of 1.3 billion people, bordering on 14 countries. Its collapse would threaten the stability of close American allies such as South Korea and Japan, create opportunities for mischief by Russia and North Korea, and produce a humanitarian catastrophe unprecedented in world history. Should China choose to stave off internal unrest through aggressive actions against Taiwan, prospects for a Sino-American military confrontation become all too real. Precisely because China needs good relations with its neighbors and the United States to continue on its path of economic growth, there is reason to hope that the Chinese leadership would not deliberately opt for bellicose policies. If China is wracked with instability, however, Chinese leaders may not be able to control what happens within and outside their borders, endangering key American concerns. Understanding the consequences of a failing China for the United States re- quires first grasping why a stable China is so important to American concerns. As will be seen, China plays a central role in American economic and strategic interests. Why China, despite its seeming prosperity and progress, may fall victim to civil unrest is then examined. Unlike Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Mexico, China forces us to confront what the collapse of a great power would be like. Far from a welcome occurrence, the implications of such an event are potentially catastrophic for America, China's Asian neighbors, and the world community. American Interests in China The United States cares about what happens in China, because America's prosperity and well-being rests on China remaining stable. China is the second largest trading partner of the United States (after Canada ), a relationship whose disruption would be disastrous for both countries. The low cost of Chinese exports has kept inflation down in the United States, while delighting consumers with S40 DVD players and S20 digital cameras. These benefits, while highly visible, pale in comparison to the critical role played by Chinese purchases of American securities. China holds over one trillion dollars in foreign reserves, one of the largest holders of such reserves in the world. Because China exports so much and imports so little, it accumulates huge amounts of dollars. This would normally cause the Chinese currency (yuan) to gain in value, thus reducing its exports and its mammoth reserves. To preserve its critical export sector, however, China has not allowed the yuan to float freely and instead has kept its value relatively constant by buying dollars to the tune of S20 billion per month, ensuring that its reserves will continue to grow. Approximately 707c of these reserves are in U.S. dollars, with the great majority in U.S. treasury bonds, widely seen as the most secure investment one can make, since they are backed in full by the American government. A major reason why interest rates in the United States have been kept low is because China buys so many of these bonds. These low interest rates are central to the health of the American economy, fostering economic expansion and high home prices. The housing market is especially critical, as it has been the major engine of growth for the American economy over the past several years, as homeowners (many of whom have saved little) borrow against the ever rising values of their houses, stimulating the economy with their robust consumer spending. If China stops buying American treasury bonds or dramatically slows down their purchase, American interest rates would need to increase in order to attract other buyers, making business expansion more costly , houses much more expensive, and dramatically cutting consumer spending.' China displayed its economic clout the day after the Democrats won control over both houses of Congress in November 2006, when the head of China's central bank declared that the Bank would diversify more of its reserves into nondollar currencies. This prompted an immediate worldwide sell-off of American dollars, which dramatically cut the dollar's value. If such a seemingly benign announcement could produce this effect, one shudders to think of the impact of a major Chinese sell-off of American bonds on the United States.4 Some have taken solace in the view that Chinese self-interest would prevent Beijing from acting in ways that would harm the American economy. If, for example, China halted its purchase of American securities, China too would suffer as the value of the bonds in its possession would also decrease. If China is convulsed with domestic disorder, however, it would be unable to purchase the American bonds, plunging the U.S. economy into crisis. An unstable China also presents major strategic concerns for the United States. Since the death of Mao in 1976, China has largely cooperated with the United States on key foreign policy goals. China has been a prime player in talks with North Korea, striving to contain the damage done by Pyongyang’s development of nuclear weapons. In part because of China’s concerns about its own Islamic minority, Beijing has worked with Washington after 9/11 to confront terrorism. China has become a major international player in the United Nations, contributing more troops to peacekeeping missions around the world than any other Security Council member. 5 With Washington’s endorsement, China joined the World Trade Organization, where it is expected to play a major role in lowering tariffs and establishing rules for free trade that the world (and it) will follow. To be sure, the United States and China do not agree on everything. The United States is concerned about China's lack of democracy, overlooking of human rights abuses in Darfur and elsewhere, border disputes with its neighbors, close ties with Iran, and continuing claims to Taiwan. Nevertheless, in a world increasingly divided between those fostering terror and instability and those seeking to maintain order and enhance prosperity, China clearly belongs in the latter camp, much to America's relief. If China is beset by internal disorder, however, there is no telling what kind of regime might emerge in its wake. The brutal civil war in China in the late 1940s gave birth to an equally brutal government that made life miserable for its neighbors and America for decades. A twenty-first-century civil war could well bring about the emergence of a hostile, expansionist China that, armed with nuclear weapons and a strong economy, posed an even greater threat to American interests and world stability than its Maoist predecessor. A strong China is necessary to preserve Asian stability, a vital interest of the United States. The prosperity of Asian nations is directly linked to the surging Chinese economy. In the 1990s, Asian nations produced goods largely for non-Asian countries, particularly the United States. By 2005, more than half of all regional exports were to other states in the region, with China the most likely destination. China is the number one trading partner of such Asian powerhouses as South Korea and Japan, both of which now provide more direct investment to China (over S5 billion per y ear) than even the United States.6 Moreover, China has emerged as the major player in Asian multilateral organizations, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). None of these organizations could meet their goals of fostering economic and political interdependence without the active cooperation of China. Insofar as economic interdependence and international institutions promote peace and security, the continued economic growth and stability of China is essential for Asia. The importance of a stable China to American strategic interests is best seen by considering what might happen if China unraveled. One of the first consequences would be millions of refugees pouring from China’s borders, unsettling its neighbors. The stability of key American allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would be severely tested as they try to cope with this massive human flow along with the economic shockwaves of China's dissolution. Nor would the United States be immune, as mam Chinese may take advantage of corrupt officials or professional human smugglers ("snakeheads') to make their way to America's shores. North Korea, unpredictable under normal circumstances, may flex its military muscle along its borders with China and South Korea, with dreadful results. Ethnic minorities in provinces such as Tibet and Xinjiang might seize the moment to attempt to break away from Beijing's domination, fostering even greater instability. China's control of its more than 200 nuclear weapons, usually very secure, may be compromised, with the arms eventually falling into unknown hands. The territorial disputes that China has with Russia, Vietnam, India, and others could well degenerate into armed warfare as China loses control over its own military forces and its neighbors seek to take advantage of its internal strife. As Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping remarked (following the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations), the collapse of Chinese rule would have terrible effects that would go far beyond China's borders: "And if a civil war broke out, with blood flowing like a river, what 'human rights' would there be? If civil war broke out in China, with each faction dominating a region, production declining, transportation disrupted and not millions or tens of millions but hundreds of millions of refugees fleeing the country, it is the Asia-Pacific region, which is at present the most promising in the world, that would be the first affected. And that would lead to disaster on a world scale."9 While Deng may have had reason to exaggerate the effects of the toppling of the Chinese regime, his concerns ring true. American relations with China would be severely damaged in the wake of Chinese unrest. The Chinese regime might single out the United States as an enemy in order to stifle civil strife by fostering anti-American nationalism. If China violently suppressed protests, as it did during the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations, the American Congress might retaliate with economic sanctions, further escalating tensions between China and the United States. Especially if China takes actions against groups favored by the United States, such as Chi- nese Christians, the American leadership is likely to react harshly against Beijing. Chinese leaders already worry about the United States exploiting internal unrest to remove them from power. Actual American support of insurgent groups even if it is confined to expressions of sympathy, could be taken as a sign that Washington had joined with the rebels, throwing Sino-American relations into crisis. China would very quickly turn from an erstwhile ally into a superpower adversary. The deterioration of the American relationship with China would be especially dangerous regarding Taiwan. Under the best of circumstances, Taiwan presents a flash point in the Chinese-American relationship. China's claims that Taiwan is a renegade province belonging to the People's Republic fly in the face of America's commitment to protect Taiwan, a democratic and prosperous ally. So long as Taiwan does not declare its independence, the United States and China can agree to disagree about Taiwan's future, but should internal unrest engulf China, this uneasy and informal accommodation could unravel. If China falls victim to widespread instability, the pressure to act against Taiwan would be enormous. It would give China the excuse to impose martial law, improving its abilities to suppress any budding revolt. China's claims to Taiwan enjoy near unanimous approval among the Chinese people. Acting against Taiwan would enable the Chinese leadership to fan the flames of nationalism, one of the few means at its disposal to rally support for an otherwise illegitimate regime." A Sino-Taiwanese confrontation could also come about inadvertently if the Chinese leadership decided to provoke a crisis over Taiwan only to find itself at war as popular emotions prevented a peaceful resolution of the crisis. If a Taiwanese leader decided to exploit Chinese unrest by declaring independence, the Chinese government might have no choice but to launch an attack. As the political scientist Susan Shirk argues, no Chinese regime can stand aside and allow Taiwan to announce its independence without going to war if it expects to survive in power.12 Whether through miscalculation or brinksmanship, war with Taiwan producing a Sino-American confrontation could well be the unintended out- come of Chinese civil conflict. China is well prepared to take forceful action against Taiwan if it decides to do so. China has been constantly upgrading its air and sea capabilities for a possible invasion across the Straits of Taiwan. 13 If China chooses not to invade, it could launch the hundreds of ballistic missiles deployed on its coast against Taiwan or it could blockade its two principal ports. Given that Taiwan is critically dependent on foreign trade (75% of its GDP) and imports of fuel for energy consumption (95% of its energy needs come from outside the country), either of these actions would cripple the island state. 14 It is difficult to see the United States remaining indifferent to a brutal assault against one of its allies. Perhaps most worrisome, we simply do not know all of the effects that the collapse of China would bring. The prospect of civil unrest in China threatens an existing great power poised perhaps to become the major power of the twenty-first century. The impact of civil conflict in China cannot be isolated to one or a handful of consequences. As seen in the French Revolution of 1789– 1799 and the Russian Civil War of 1918– 1920, great powers do not suffer civil violence quietly, or alone. Given China’s central role in the world economy, enormous population, nuclear arsenal, and growing international influence, the unraveling of China cannot help but be shattering for the world. Change can be beneficial, and the weakening of a prospective superpower competitor would be celebrated in some American quarters. Nevertheless, an uncontrolled, cataclysmic transformation in China would threaten American interests as much as, if not more than, the purposeful designs of Maoist China a generation ago.

### 2nc --- China Wins the Tech Race

#### China is winning the tech race--- patents, exports, and GDP prove.

Joseph M. Parent and Paul K. MacDonald 2018 [Paul K. MacDonald is an American political scientist and a Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, Joseph M. Parent is associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, Twilight of the Titans, Conclusion, “Retrenchment as Reloading,” https://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/2092847//ZW]

Scholars have offered conflicting assessments about the trajectory of American power. Some contend that China’s rise is inexorable and that the United States is already in decline. “There is abundant evidence that American global hegemony is steadily eroding,” Martin Jacques observes, adding, “The rise of China will change the world in the most profound ways.” 18 Arvind Subramanian concludes, “The economic dominance of China relative to the United States” is “imminent” and will be “broad-based.” 19 Others argue that China’s ascendance is fragile and that America’s exceptional features will insulate it from decline. “China is rising, but it is not catching up,” Michael Beckley maintains, in large part because “trends favor continued U.S. dominance.” 20 Joseph Nye similarly argues, “China is nowhere near close to the United States,” warning that “the greatest danger we have is overestimating China.” 21 Politicians echo this skepticism. In a 2014 speech at West Point, President Barack Obama declared, “America has rarely been stronger relative to the rest of the world. Those who argue otherwise—who suggest that America is in decline, or has seen its global leadership slip away—are either misreading history or engaged in partisan politics.” 22 There are many complex issues bound up in this debate. Scholars differ on what metrics to use, what timeframes to examine, and what comparisons to make. We follow the method that yielded the most commonsense cases: lasting ordinal transitions involving relative shares of great power gross domestic product (GDP). Using this approach, the United States is on pace to enter acute relative decline sometime in the next decade. 23 To be perfectly clear, this prediction depends on a number of factors that are hard to predict. Extrapolating out from present trends is notoriously unreliable, and much depends on the baseline year one chooses to begin with. There will be shocks and surprises, and it is impossible to know their frequency, magnitude, or direction. Yet using our terminology, the United States is likely to face a decline that is small or medium in magnitude. This is good news for the United States and for China, since it affords both powers the time and space to manage the impending transition. It deserves emphasis that China is no world-beater, the United States is no weakling, and American decline is likely modest. As always, much depends on the measures used. Power is an intricate concept and sensitive to context. Every measure of power has its drawbacks, and we already detailed many of the fl aws of using GDP in chapter 3. We agree that GDP trends mask a great deal of nuance, cross-national GDP fi gures are imprecise, and China’s fi gures are more suspect than most. Yet GDP is determinate and correlates with a number of compelling metrics, many of which suggest that China is indisputably gaining ground on the United States. Over the past decade, the United States has experienced a decline in global share of high technology exports, trademark applications, market capitalizations of its publicly traded companies, and renewable energy production. Meanwhile, China has gained relative to the United States in terms of patent applications, high technology exports, and information and communication technology service exports. 24 Even when it comes to GDP per capita, which many claim provides “a much more robust indicator of national power,” China is gaining ground. 25 China’s GDP per capita has tripled over the past decade, and the U.S. advantage has declined as a result. Naturally, these are not the only indicators one could point to, and economic measures may lose traction on the political consequences of China’s rise. Yet experts come to similar conclusions: Thomas Christensen finds China’s rise very real, though the United States retains a commanding lead on many measures, and Jonathan Kirshner sees American economic advantages fading. 26 Even U.S. policymakers, who reject the term decline, nevertheless acknowledge that the distribution of international power is shifting. In his West Point speech, President Obama observed, “The world is changing with accelerating speed. This presents new opportunities, but also new dangers.” 27 Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton conceded, “The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics. . . . Harnessing Asia’s growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests.” 28 Whether one prefers the term “rising power” or “emerging power,” the implication is the same: the geopolitical landscape is shifting, and U.S. policymakers must plan accordingly.

#### China wins the tech race now.

Jie Lu 10-05-2021 [Head of Investments China; Robeco; “China: navigating the push towards technology leadership”; https://www.robeco.com/us/insights/2021/10/china-navigating-the-push-towards-technology-leadership.html//ZW]

Research and development (R&D) statistics illustrate this ambition. Supported by higher economic growth, China is actually expected to take global R&D leadership this year, and outspend the US for the very first time.1 China now leads the pack in many areas, such as artificial intelligence (AI), 5G telecommunication networks, ultra-high voltage electricity networks or high-speed rail. While China’s technology push is hardly news, rising tensions with the West, in particular with the US, have put it under the spotlight While China’s technology push is hardly news, rising tensions with the West, in particular with the US, have put it under the spotlight. Over the past few years, Chinese officials have increased their emphasis on the need to become less dependent on foreign technology. Some have even theorized a so-called ‘technology decoupling’, advocating self-sufficiency in a number of critical industries. However, one key consideration to bear in mind is that China’s technology push amid rising tensions with the US does not necessarily herald a full economic decoupling, nor an era of deglobalization, as some have argued.2 For now, US restrictions on exports to China issued in 2020 remain essentially focused on a few select technologies, where non-US alternatives are difficult to find. Meanwhile, China's main policy goal remains to improve the country’s manufacturing capability to produce higher value-added goods and services, and keep the economic growth engine roaring. Policy makers acknowledge that this will be impossible without importing advanced technologies from the US, Europe, Japan, or South Korea. Figure 1: MIC 2025’s ten strategic industries [graphic omitted] Source: China State Council, MERICS, Robeco, September 2021. China’s technology ambitions were formally articulated in 2015 with the ‘Made in China 2025’ (MIC 2025) initiative, a ten-year comprehensive blueprint aiming to modernize further the country’s industrial base. MIC 2025 identifies ten strategic sectors, including aerospace equipment, medical devices, or high-tech ships, in which China intends to excel and secure a leading position. Focus on a few selected technologies Even under the MIC 2025 umbrella, the designated ten core industries are clearly not all being pursued with the same intensity. In recent years, China has been prioritizing efforts in a small number of emerging technologies, including AI, semiconductors, robotics, and new energy vehicles (NEVs), 3 with colossal efforts being deployed from a human and a financial perspective. Figure 2: Top 20 countries in AI paper output 1997-2017 [graphic omitted] Source: China Institute for Science and Technology Policy, July 2018, “China AI Development Report 2018”, Tsinghua University. AI, for instance, is perhaps the area in which China has achieved the most spectacular results and secured a clear leading position at global level.4 The Chinese AI-related ecosystem benefits from various supporting factors, including the country’s gigantic market size which provided a unique opportunity to assemble large datasets, and a long-standing friendly policy environment. AI is perhaps the area in which China has achieved the most spectacular results and secured a clear leading position at global level China seems therefore poised to become a leader in AI-empowered businesses, like speech and image recognition applications. At global level, the main AI services providers remain large US technology giants, but Chinese firms are catching up fast. China already employs the world’s largest cohort, by far, of AI professionals, with over 12,000 AI jobs in 2019, versus roughly 7,500 for the US.5 Another area where strong progress has been made NEVs. China has the world’s largest fleet of NEVs in circulation, far ahead of Europe and the US, as well as the world’s largest battery-charging network. And although the country’s NEV car registrations were overtaken by European ones last year, it remains one of the most dynamic markets, largely dominated by local manufacturers. Figure 3: Market share of top five battery makers [graphic omitted] Source: SNE Research, March 2021. China has also managed to secure a leading position in various areas of the NEV supply chain. This is especially the case for electric battery production, where the largest Chinese manufacturers have emerged as global leaders along with their South Korean and Japanese competitors. Altogether, China accounts for over 70% of global battery cell production capacity. 6 Three investment themes China’s technology push is offering opportunities in many industries, but finding these is not always straightforward. Not all initiatives have lived up to expectations, so far, and political will does not warrant success. Yet that does not mean opportunities in areas where results have been mixed are entirely absent, nor that policy success will necessarily lead to attractive returns for investors. From this perspective, we have identified three major investment themes worth considering: the relentless rise of NEVs, the advent of ‘industry 4.0’ in China, and an increased focus on the localization of supply chains. Given the bright prospects these three trends offer, we believe this is where some of the most interesting opportunities are to be found.

#### China is winning---outpacing the US in all major areas.

Graham Allison and Eric Schmidt 12-07-21 [Mr. Allison, a professor of government at Harvard, is author of “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?” (2017). Mr. Schmidt was CEO of Google, 2001-11 and executive chairman of Google and its successor, Alphabet Inc., 2011-17 and is a co-author of “The Age of AI: And Our Human Future,” (2021); Wall Street Journal; “China will soon lead the US in tech”; https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/china-will-soon-lead-the-us-in-tech-global-leader-semiconductors-5g-wireless-green-energy-11638915759//ZW]

Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns announced in October that the agency is establishing two new major “mission centers,” one focusing on China and the other on frontier technologies. This action reflects his judgment that China is the “most important geopolitical threat we face in the 21st century” and that the “main arena for competition and rivalry” between China and the U.S. will be advanced technologies. The question Americans should be asking is: Could China win the technology race? A new report on the “Great Technological Rivalry” from Harvard’s Belfer Center answers: Yes. The report isn’t alarmist but nonetheless concludes that China has made such extraordinary leaps that it is now a full-spectrum peer competitor. In each of the foundational technologies of the 21st century—artificial intelligence, semiconductors, 5G wireless, quantum information science, biotechnology and green energy—China could soon be the global leader. In some areas, it is already No. 1. [graphic ommited] Last year China produced 50% of the world’s computers and mobile phones; the U.S. produced only 6%. China produces 70 solar panels for each one produced in the U.S., sells four times the number of electric vehicles, and has nine times as many 5G base stations, with network speeds five times as fast as American equivalents. In the advanced technology likely to have the greatest effect on economics and security in the coming decade—artificial intelligence—China is ahead of the U.S. in crucial areas. A spring 2021 report from the National Security Commission on AI warned that China is poised to overtake the U.S. as the global leader in AI by 2030. U.S.-born students are earning roughly as many doctorates each year in AI-related fields as in 1990, while China is on track to graduate twice as many science, technology engineering and mathematics Ph.D.s as the U.S. by 2025. The Harvard report adds that China now clearly tops the U.S. in practical AI applications, including facial recognition, voice recognition and fintech. The U.S. still has a dominant position in the semiconductor industry, which it has held for almost half a century. But China may soon catch up in two important arenas: semiconductor fabrication and chip design. China’s production of semiconductors has surpassed America’s, with its share of global production rising to 15% from less than 1% in 1990, while the U.S. share has fallen from 37% to 12%. In 5G, the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Board reports that China is on track to replicate the economic and military advantages America gained from being the global leader in 4G. China has installed 950,000 base stations to America’s 100,000. By the end of last year, 150 million Chinese were using 5G mobile phones with average speeds of 300 megabits a second, while only six million Americans had access to 5G with speeds of 60 megabits a second. America’s 5G service providers have put more focus on advertising their capabilities than on building infrastructure. The Chinese Communist Party has made no secret of its ambitions: China intends to become the global leader in the technologies that will shape the decades ahead. The party’s 2013 economic reform plan highlighted technological innovation as the way to avoid the trap of getting stuck as a middle-income country. The celebrated “Made in China 2025” program aims to dominate domestic production of 10 emerging technologies, including 5G, AI and electric vehicles. China also plans to extend its lead in robotics to sustain its position as the manufacturing workshop of the world. In May, Xi Jinping clearly stated his judgment that “technological innovation has become the main battleground of the global playing field, and competition for tech dominance will grow unprecedentedly fierce.” It is striking how successful China has been in meeting its ambitious technology targets. In sum, although the U.S. remains the global leader in many important races, including aeronautics, medicine and nanotechnology, China has emerged as a serious competitor. Fortunately, Americans are beginning to wake up to this reality. In June the Senate passed the Innovation and Competition Act with bipartisan support, authorizing $250 billion of investment in science and technology over the next five years. Unfortunately, that legislation has stalled in the House and faces an uncertain future as part of the annual defense bill. More recent congressional spending proposals, such as the $1.2 trillion infrastructure bill and the $1.7 trillion social-spending package, have included investments in research and development in areas like green technologies and energy storage. While these investments are greatly needed, it will take more attention and investment in strategic technologies to compete with China. Unless the U.S. can organize a national response analogous to the mobilization that created the technologies that won World War II, China could soon dominate the technologies of the future and the opportunities they will create.

#### China’s winning

**Layne 18** - professor at Texas A&M University's. George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana,” 2018, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/images/ia/INTA94_1_6_249_Layne.pdf>, Accessed 6-30-22, LASA-AH)

American primacists have advanced a number of clever but unconvincing arguments in an attempt to downplay the significance of the ongoing economic power shift from America to China. For example, some primacists assert that per capita GDP is a better yardstick of national power than aggregate GDP; that newly developed metrics of national power have diminished the importance of GDP as a measure of a state’s economic power; that China is far behind the United States in advanced technology; and that China is incapable of doing innovation.35 This last claim is ubiquitous among primacists.36 It is, however, undermined by recent developments. For example, in September 2016 China began operating the world’s largest radio telescope, which is intended to project China’s ambitions deep into the universe, and bring back the kind of dramatic discoveries that win honours such as Nobel Prizes.37 In August 2016 China launched the world’s first quantum satellite, which could lead ‘to new, completely different methods for transmitting information’.38 In another example of how China is catching up with the United States in innovation and technology, in June 2016 a Chinese computer (using made-in-China microprocessors) topped the ranking of the world’s fastest supercomputers.39 In July 2017 China’s State Council announced an ambitious plan to sprint to the front of the pack in artificial intelligence (AI), including both military and civilian applications.40 Indeed, The Economist recently observed that already ‘China could be a close second to America—and **perhaps even ahead of it**—in some areas of AI’.41 And China is moving to the forefront in green technologies (solar panels and wind-generated power) and in electric cars.42

#### Even with new budget increases--- China still wins the tech race.

Townshend and Crabtree 22 [Mr. Townshend is a senior fellow for Indo-Pacific security at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Crabtree is executive director of the Asia office of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 6-15-2022, Opinion, NYT, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/15/opinion/international-world/us-military-china-asia.html] Eric

China has [systematically tracked](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/20/china-warns-of-serious-consequences-after-tracking-us-warship) U.S. warships in the region, its air force has staged intensifying incursions into [Taiwanese](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/31/taiwan-scrambles-jets-after-china-makes-largest-incursion-into-air-defence-zone-since-january) and [Japanese](https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3164803/chinese-russian-warplanes-force-japan-scramble-its-fighters) airspace, and its [coast guard routinely harasses Philippine,](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-complains-chinese-fishing-ban-harassment-sea-2022-05-31/) [Malaysian and Indonesian vessels](https://amti.csis.org/nervous-energy-china-targets-new-indonesian-malaysian-drilling/). In recent weeks, Chinese fighter pilots have [repeatedly buzzed](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/06/statement-from-the-canadian-armed-forces.html) Canadian military aircraft on a U.N.-sanctioned operation — sometimes [raising their middle fingers](https://www.newsweek.com/china-fighter-pilots-middle-finger-canada-air-force-1712310) at the Canadians.

As China’s armed forces grow in strength, sophistication and confidence, U.S.-led military deterrence in the Indo-Pacific is losing its bite.

Take the United States’ military presence in the region. It has about 55,000 military personnel in Japan and 28,000 in South Korea. Several thousand more are deployed across Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Guam. This posture has barely changed since the 1950s. But plans to reinvigorate the U.S. presence have been stymied by [inadequate budgets, competing priorities and a lack of consensus](https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/asia-pacific-regional-security-assessment-2022/aprsa-chapter-1) in Washington on how to deal with China.

The Pentagon has [increased investments](https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/pentagons-largest-ever-rdte-budget-request-reflects-ai-prioritization/) in cutting-edge technologies like artificial intelligence, and cyber- and space-based systems to prepare for a possible high-tech conflict with China in the 2030s. But the balance of power is likely to shift decidedly in China’s favor by the time they are deployed unless the United States brings new resources to the table soon.

President Biden this year submitted the [largest defense budget ever in dollar terms](https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/28/biden-requests-largest-defense-budget-00020859), but much of the increase will be swallowed up by skyrocketing inflation. Mr. Biden, like former President Donald Trump, is thus [falling short](https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/asia-pacific-regional-security-assessment-2022/aprsa-chapter-1) of a target of [3 percent to 5 percent](https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2017/06/13/dod-needs-3-5-percent-annual-growth-through-2023-top-officials-say/) real annual budget growth, a [bipartisan goal](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf) set even before the Ukraine war and often cited as the minimum the Pentagon needs in today’s era of great-power competition.

While the U.S. military is globally dispersed, China can concentrate its forces on winning a future conflict in its own neighborhood. It now has the capability. China has the [world’s largest navy and Asia’s biggest air force](https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF) and an [imposing arsenal](https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/) of missiles designed to deter the United States from projecting military power into the Western Pacific in a crisis. China’s third and most advanced aircraft carrier is [nearing completion](https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2022/06/06/see-satellite-images-of-chinas-new-aircraft-carrier/), and other [new hardware](https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/05/24/photos-show-china-has-fielded-another-semi-submersible-transport-ship/) is being developed or is already in service.

Beijing is also raising alarm with its readiness to project that strength.

While much attention is focused on [its behavior toward Taiwan](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/03/world/asia/china-taiwan-flights-airspace.html), China is [building and militarizing artificial islands](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/03/world/asia/swarms-ships-south-china-sea.html) in the South China Sea. It also [broke ground](https://edition.cnn.com/2022/06/09/asia/china-cambodia-naval-base-military-intl-hnk/index.html) on an expanded [naval port](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/06/06/cambodia-china-navy-base-ream/) in Cambodia last week, which may one day provide its first military foothold in another Asian country. A [security agreement](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/20/the-deal-that-shocked-the-world-inside-the-china-solomons-security-pact) with the Solomon Islands could lead to something similar, and Beijing is [aggressively courting](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/01/china-influence-pacific-deal-wang/) other Pacific nations.

America’s military position in Asia, by contrast, has been [hampered](https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/averting-crisis-american-strategy-military-spending-and-collective-defence-in-the-indo-pacific) by decades of preoccupation with Middle East conflicts. The war in Ukraine has morphed into a long-term [$54 billion](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/05/20/upshot/ukraine-us-aid-size.html) commitment and forced Mr. Biden to delay and redraft his administration’s [National Defense Strategy](https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/03/russia-ukraine-defense-strategy-pengtagon-00013449) and [National Security Strategy](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-03/putin-s-war-forces-biden-to-rewrite-security-plan-nod-to-europe?sref=B3uFyqJT) — critical documents that lay out global priorities and resource needs — as officials grapple with how to manage China and Russia at the same time.

Mr. Biden’s team ended the lengthy and costly U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, but that [has not freed up](https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/asia-pacific-regional-security-assessment-2022/aprsa-chapter-1) many resources for the Indo-Pacific. Washington must not lose sight of the fact that China is a far greater security threat than Russia, now and in the long term.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said “the Indo-Pacific is at the heart of American grand strategy” during [a speech last week](https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3059852/remarks-at-the-shangri-la-dialogue-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-a/) at the Shangri-La Dialogue defense summit in Singapore, but he offered little in the way of new resources or commitments.

To turn things around, the United States must prioritize the threat from China, reinforce its military strength in Asia and provide Australia, Japan and India more sophisticated military and technological capabilities to bolster a strategy of collective defense.

#### AI and Biotech

Ghlionn 22 [John Mac Ghlionn is a researcher and essayist. His work has been published by the New York Post, The Sydney Morning Herald, Newsweek, National Review, and The Spectator US, among others. He covers psychology and social relations, and has a keen interest in social dysfunction and media manipulation, 6-10-2022, Has China Already Won?, theepochtimes, https://www.theepochtimes.com/has-china-already-won\_4522279.html] Eric

In all five sectors, as I demonstrate below, China is already ahead.

Let’s start with AI. As the NCSC researchers noted, China already possesses “the might, talent, and ambition” to win the AI arms race.

Nicolas Chaillan, who left his role as the U.S. Air Force’s first chief software officer in October 2021, [certainly agrees](https://gizmodo.com/former-senior-pentagon-official-says-china-is-kicking-o-1847838903). Frustrated by the U.S. military’s lack of digital progress, he [believes that China has already won](https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/time-say-goodbye-nicolas-m-chaillan/?src=aff-lilpar&veh=aff_src.aff-lilpar_c.partners_pkw.10078_plc.Skimbit%20Ltd._pcrid.449670_learning&trk=aff_src.aff-lilpar_c.partners_pkw.10078_plc.Skimbit%20Ltd._pcrid.449670_learning&clickid=VkzXlU2OMxyIUh4UCrRRW3yQUkBXJvTTg3EPws0&mcid=6851962469594763264&irgwc=1) the AI race, blaming “stale” [technology](https://www.theepochtimes.com/t-technology) and bureaucratic red tape for the lack of innovation in the United States.

In an interview with Verdict, Michael Orme, senior analyst at GlobalData and a China specialist, echoed Chaillan’s concerns. Orme [suggested that Beijing](https://www.verdict.co.uk/pentagon-officers-says-china-is-overtaking-the-us-on-ai-o/) has already “leveraged its wealth of data and the surveillance state to gain AI supremacy.”

The two men appear to be correct. In 2021, China [overtook the United States](https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Datawatch/China-overtakes-US-in-AI-research) in AI journal citations. And for those who say citations aren’t everything, I agree. However, citations shouldn’t be overlooked.

Then there’s quantum development, an area China is [set to dominate](https://www.newscientist.com/article/2282961-china-beats-google-to-claim-the-worlds-most-powerful-quantum-computer/). If China does achieve quantum supremacy, which looks increasingly likely, then the CCP will have the power to [inflict further damage](https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/94493-china-has-stolen-the-personal-data-of-80-of-american-adults) on U.S. national security. In July 2021, a Chinese research team built the world’s most powerful quantum computer. In this game of high-tech chess, their creation, which [surpassed Google’s 2019 creation](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1666-5), gives China the “[quantum advantage](https://cosmosmagazine.com/science/china-demonstrates-most-powerful-quantum-computer/).” More worryingly, with such advances, China is looking set to create the world’s first [unhackable internet communications network](https://futurism.com/chinas-new-quantum-communication-network-will-be-unhackable).

Furthermore, according to a report [published by Booz Allen](https://www.boozallen.com/expertise/analytics/quantum-computing/chinese-cyber-threats-in-the-quantum-era.html), a global leader in cyber solutions, China’s quantum developments will “eventually undermine all popular current public-key encryption methods, and plausibly boost the speed and power of artificial intelligence.”

The Booz Allen researchers said that by the end of the decade, “Chinese threat groups will likely collect data that enables quantum simulators to discover new economically valuable materials, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals.”

“Most of quantum computing’s potential lies more than a decade in the future—but risk management must start now,” the researchers said.

The United States, the CCP’s No. 1 enemy, should take note.

The third key sector is biotechnology. As a report published by [Insider states](https://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-biotech-surge-history-implications-and-future-2021-9), Chinese biotech companies are among the most powerful in the world. The Chinese biotech industry has a global footprint stretching from [Uganda](https://www.africanews.com/2020/12/09/uganda-authorizes-chinese-nationals-to-import-covid-19-vaccine-for-own-use/) to the United States. In August 2021, the Chinese company [BeiGene announced plans](https://www.biospace.com/article/beigene-builds-new-site-in-new-jersey-expects-to-hire-hundreds-morphosys-continues-boston-expansion/#:~:text=China%2Dbased%20BeiGene%20is%20building,for%20different%20kinds%20of%20cancer.) to build a 42-acre research and development center in New Jersey.

Rather alarmingly, according to a [New York Times report](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/22/us/politics/china-genetic-data-collection.html), the Chinese regime is currently “collecting medical, health and genetic data around the world,” using “the intersection of technology and genetic and biological research as an area of competition and espionage.”

China has repeatedly [emphasized the importance](https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/08/chinas-military-pursuing-biotech/159167/) of biology in future warfare. According [to He Fuchu](https://web.archive.org/web/20190813042422/http:/www.81.cn/jwgz/2015-10/06/content_6709533.htm), a military medical scientist, the Chinese are busy working on “new brain-control weapons and equipment that interfere with and control human consciousness,” all in the hope of making “unmanned warfare possible.”

The fourth key sector involves semiconductors. For the uninitiated, without semiconductors, using smartphones, laptops, washing machines, and refrigerators simply [wouldn’t be possible](https://www.hitachi-hightech.com/global/products/device/semiconductor/life.html#:~:text=CPUs%20that%20operate%20personal%20computers,LED%20bulbs%20also%20use%20semiconductors.&text=In%20this%20way%2C%20semiconductors%20help%20us%20to%20live%20comfortable%20lives.). Essentially, semiconductors are the [brains of electronic devices](https://www.semiconductors.org/semiconductors-101/what-is-a-semiconductor/). Until recently, the United States fully controlled the supply of these “brains.”

Today, however, China is on the ascendancy. Last year alone, the number of Chinese semiconductor firms [tripled](https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-war/article/3136660/new-chinese-semiconductor-firms-have-tripled-2021-beijing-and). The metaverse, the next step in the evolution of the internet, will [rely heavily on semiconductors](https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/2021/08/10/what-is-the-metaverse/), hence China’s desire to become a [dominant force](https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202111/1238160.shtml).

The final sector involves autonomous systems, such as self-driving cars and surveillance drones. Baidu, China’s equivalent to Google, is [leading the self-driving race](https://techwireasia.com/2021/08/baidu-leads-the-self-driving-race-with-an-ai-packed-robocar/). Last year, the Chinese company launched the [first-ever paid driverless taxi service](https://techwireasia.com/2021/05/baidu-rolls-out-chinas-first-paid-driverless-taxi-service/).

In the United States, meanwhile, self-driving vehicles [are decades away](https://www.wsj.com/articles/self-driving-cars-could-be-decades-away-no-matter-what-elon-musk-said-11622865615) from becoming a reality. China is also [leading the way](https://supchina.com/2021/06/18/all-the-drone-companies-in-china-a-guide-to-the-22-top-players-in-the-chinese-uav-industry/) in the manufacturing and sales of surveillance drones; the United States is one of [its biggest customers](https://www.axios.com/federal-law-enforcement-china-drone-4b33aca2-b6f5-43d0-8d36-be1d447af1a0.html). If this isn’t worrying enough, China recently created an autonomous weapon that, [according to reports](https://futurism.com/the-byte/china-weapon-satellites-explode), “uses explosives to destroy enemy satellites.” As tensions heat up between China and the United States, one shouldn’t be surprised if U.S. satellites become a primary target.

### 2nc --- AT: China Won’t Regulate

#### The US can’t regulate---but China will.

Will Oremus 07-28-21 [technology news analyisis writer; The Washington Post; https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/07/28/technology-202-china-is-doing-what-us-cant-seem-regulate-its-tech-giants///ZW]

While a slow-burning movement to rein in the U.S. tech industry plods through a gridlocked Congress and various agencies, China’s one-party government is acting swiftly — and harshly — to rein in its own tech titans. This month alone, the country has instituted sweeping new protections for gig workers; imposed new interoperability requirements for online platforms; driven out cryptocurrency exchanges; barred its leading ride-hailing app from app stores; and essentially banned the entire industry of for-profit online tutoring services. Antitrust investigations and penalties have already targeted digital giants Alibaba and Tencent, among others, in recent months. The shakeout continued Tuesday as Tencent’s WeChat, China’s dominant social and messaging platform, stopped registering new users, saying it needs to upgrade certain security systems to comply with unspecified “laws and regulations.” The company expects registrations to resume in early August. The WeChat news comes a day after Chinese regulators issued tough new worker protection rules for food delivery services, including industry leader Meituan, and weeks after ride-hailing giant Didi was removed from app stores as part of a cybersecurity investigation, widely viewed as punishment for the company going public in the United States. The government’s hard line has sent Chinese tech stocks plummeting and rippled across the financial world. Shares of Chinese companies listed in the United States this week saw their steepest two-day drop since the 2008 financial crisis, according to BBC News. Some observers see the moves as part of a political power play against an industry that has grown too wealthy, powerful and independent for the comfort of President Xi Jinping’s regime. In a Substack newsletter, economics commentator Noah Smith argued that it represents a broader shift in national priorities from consumer-facing online platforms and apps to harder, more cutting-edge tech, such as artificial intelligence and chip-making, that supports the country’s geopolitical objectives. There may be truth to both views. But there’s another way of looking at these developments, in which China’s goals for its tech industry are not so different from those of its Western counterparts. It just has fewer checks and restraints on the use of state power to achieve them. [graphic omitted] Rui Ma, an investor and analyst of China’s tech industry and founder of Tech Buzz China, the country isn’t “smashing its tech industry,” as Smith put it. Rather, the crackdown shows that China’s government harbors many of the same concerns as tech critics in the United States and the European Union, and is intent on constructing the ground rules for an ever more digital economy. Protections for gig workers in China, for example, followed years of reports of such workers being overworked, underpaid and abused by unaccountable management algorithms. The tightening of data security laws, focusing on firms with a significant presence outside China, mirrors U.S. fears about data privacy and spying, notably by Chinese firms such as Huawei and ByteDance. The antitrust push draws on the arguments advanced by U.S. Federal Trade Commission Chair Lina Khan and others that dominant digital platforms lend themselves to new forms of monopolization and anticompetitive behavior. “The headlines are virtually the same as what I read in the U.S.,” Rui said. One big difference: Tech regulation in China faces fewer political hurdles than it does in the United States, where a gridlocked two-party Congress and intense lobbying by Silicon Valley firms have so far thwarted meaningful legislation. Despite broad agreement that tech giants are too powerful, both major U.S. parties are divided on how to address issues of competition, consumer protection and online speech. Of course, China’s approach comes with its own big downsides: The lack of democratic process and transparent debate means its regulations can come across as arbitrary, vindictive and unpredictable — traits that tend to spook investors and risk chilling innovation. There is one argument against U.S. regulation, however, that might be crumbling before our eyes: the specter of global domination by an unfettered Chinese Internet sector. In congressional hearings and media interviews, U.S. tech executives have repeatedly warned that onerous regulations, including new antitrust and privacy laws, would hamper their ability to compete with China’s tech gladiators on the world stage. The implication, often unspoken but sometimes explicit, was that China understood that having powerful tech giants was in its national interest, and wouldn’t dare sacrifice that power in the name of values such as privacy, competition or consumer protection. China does see value in its tech giants competing globally, Rui said, and the current regulatory wave is not a sign that it wants to destroy the industry’s ambitions abroad. But it does signal an abrupt end to the country’s hands-off approach to the tech sector, and demonstrates a new willingness to impose its own priorities — even at the cost of their profitability and international standing. There’s been a narrative for years that the United States, the E.U. and China are competing in global “races” in realms such as artificial intelligence; Rui suggests China sees itself as racing to establish a world-class regulatory regime to guide the sector’s future. “China wants to be world-leading in regulations,” Rui said. “They don’t just want to follow the E.U. and the U.S.” From its censorship of the Internet to its surveillance of vulnerable groups, many aspects of the Chinese government’s approach to are cautionary tales for the West. But its aggressive stance toward anticompetitive practices, speculative and carbon-intensive cryptocurrencies, and gig worker exploitation aren’t necessarily the destructive moves they might seem to U.S. observers and investors. On the contrary, they may be laying the foundation for a more sustainable and vibrant Chinese Internet sector in the decades to come.

#### China regulates tech now.

Kai von Carnap and Valarie Tan 12-21-21 [Kai von Carnap is an analyst an MERICS in Berlin. His research focuses on technological trends and digital developments in China, with an expertise in cryptocurrencies and Blockchain technology; Valarie Tan is an analyst at MERICS. Her research focuses on Chinese elites and global entrepreneurs, societal and media debates, as well as political communication; The Diplomat; “Tech Regulation in China Brings in Sweeping Changes”; https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/tech-regulation-in-china-brings-in-sweeping-changes///ZW]

When Jack Ma, the billionaire founder of internet giant Alibaba, told China’s financial elites on October 24, 2020 that their incompetence had created a severely underdeveloped financial system and insinuated that his fintech may be the cure, his words marked the moment when Beijing shifted its relations to big tech giants from toleration to confrontation. Ma was perhaps unaware that the same day saw the launch of “Operation Cyber Sword,” a wide-ranging campaign involving 14 ministries and agencies aimed at reigning in China’s tech sector. The regulatory actors were given six tasks: regulating live-commerce platforms, cracking down on unfair competition in online markets, strengthening the supervision of internet advertising, centralizing control of online sales, and ending illegal animal and plant trade on e-commerce platforms. What has followed over the ensuing 12 months is an unprecedented and ongoing regulatory onslaught. Hundreds of companies have been fined north of $3 billion, apps have been taken off stores, and Jack Ma – until then China’s richest man – inexplicably went missing for three months. The Chinese government was sending a message. As the People’s Daily put it: “There was never such as thing as Ma’s era, just an era that Ma happened to live in.” China’s Cyber Sword is being wielded not just at individual companies or apps but at entire industries and ecosystems. A whole range of antitrust guidelines and rules have been introduced and applied to e-commerce platforms, social media providers, and live-streaming services. Behind the regulatory onslaught is a paradigmic shift, the result of long-term preparation by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) leader Xi Jinping. Xi declared 2021 to be the beginning of the “New Development Stage” for China. The CCP has fulfilled the promise of former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping – achieving a “moderately prosperous society” through market reforms, partial opening and liberalization and other means over the past 40 years. The new goal set by Xi for “New China” is to become a “Modern Socialist Country” by 2049. Exact benchmarks to achieve that goal are not set in stone. What is clear thus far are the core elements of Xi’s vision – namely technological self-sufficiency, a closely steered government economy, and China’s ambition to become a technology superpower. The strict regulation of big tech companies we are witnessing at the moment is therefore not the genuine focus of policymakers, but merely the first, immediate result of implementing the larger national vision over the next 30 years. This vision was gradually introduced in recent years in the form of new institutions with a rapidly expanded legal framework. Bolstered with fresh manpower resources, enforcers are empowered to test these new institutional powers. The State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), for example, was only founded in 2018. Aimed at market regulation, it enforces the Anti-Unfair Competition Law that has been in effect since 2019. The SAMR has successfully investigated more than 3,000 cases of unfair competition and collected 206 million renminbi (RMB) in fines in the first half of 2021. It has also made use of the new E-Commerce Law, effective since 2019, and the recently updated Anti-Monopoly Law. Meanwhile, China’s new cyber watchdog, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) found in 2014, has focused on implementing the 2017 Cyber Security Law and the 2021 Data Security Law. It found more than 100 apps in violation of collecting users’ personal information and ordered Didi, China’s biggest ride-hailing app, to be taken off app stores. Didi and other Chinese tech behemoths saw exponential growth in the last decade attributed, in part, to an absence of regulatory oversight. To drive sales and revenue, companies engaged in business models that came with a host of financial risks and “regulatory problems.” Now the government is keen to tackle those issues in the name of safeguarding consumer rights against freewheeling businesses. A clean-up of unfair business practices is long overdue. As a result, China’s internet sector, once the hotbed of tech innovations, is now forced to undergo profound changes. Eighty percent of misleading advertisements to third party webpages, a vital source of income for many apps and websites, have been taken down. Financial pressure aside, restructuring businesses to comply with the rules has also resulted in lay-offs not just in ad sales, but in gaming and private tutoring, the other two sectors hardest hit by the regulations. Foreign firms operating in China have not been spared. Caving to regulatory pressure as new data and privacy laws came into effect , Microsoft’s LinkedIn pulled its social media services in the country and Yahoo bowed out of China, both citing the “challenging environment” as reason. Further adjustments lie ahead in 2022, not least because of the planned three-year clean-up program for algorithms. A fresh suite of draft regulations overseeing cross-border data transfer, and amendments for tighter enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law only adds to the uncertainty and pressure looming for firms to comply and conform to Xi Jinping’s “New China.”

#### Massive regulations from the government ensure no regulatory capture.

The Economist 09-11-21 [“China has become a laboratory for the regulation of digital technology”; https://www.economist.com/china/2021/09/11/china-has-become-a-laboratory-for-the-regulation-of-digital-technology//ZW]

With foreign competitors such as Facebook and Google blocked, domestic tech giants have for two decades dominated the Chinese market. The Communist Party has kept a firm grip on politics, but the tech firms have had considerable leeway in their business activities. “It was a Wild West within an authoritarian system,” says Martin Chorzempa of the Peterson Institute, an American think-tank. Now the Communist Party is reminding internet billionaires who is boss. President Xi Jinping has authorised an extraordinary crackdown. Last year the planned ipo of Ant Group, a giant internet finance company, was halted at the last moment. In July, two days after Didi, a ride-hailing firm, went public in New York, China’s internet regulator ordered it to stop signing up new users, and forced its apps off mobile stores. The city of Beijing on September 6th denied reports that it is considering taking Didi under state control. Video-game companies are being pushed into scanning their users’ faces to help enforce a ban on children playing online games for more than three hours a week. The crackdown has shifted the balance, says Mr Chorzempa. Now, “technocrats, who have been frustrated for years that companies ignore proper, sensible regulations, are empowered.” The party is pushing for more than superficial change. It is using a suite of new laws and regulations to force tech firms to alter both their behaviour and their products. The aim is to control what Chinese people see and do online. The new rules will require tech firms to write code for their platforms so that they promote content that the government likes, and inhibit what it does not. This is likely to be more efficient than the whack-a-mole approach of enforcing the party’s will case by case, and plausible at a scale that the labour-intensive approach of trying to control technological systems directly would not be. In the past month alone Chinese lawmakers have finalised at least four new laws and regulations which, as they go into effect over the next three months, will have the potential to reshape the Chinese internet. Technology regulations in other countries and regions, such as Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (gdpr), mostly require companies to obtain their customers’ consent for the specific processing of their data. China’s new rules are much stricter and more wide-ranging. Tech firms will be expected to protect national security and public order, says Nicolas Bahmanyar, a data-privacy consultant with Leaf, a law firm in Beijing. “A little banner is not going to cut it,” he adds. A Personal Information Protection Law (pipl), China’s first privacy law, comes into effect on November 1st. Years in the making, it is much shorter and less detailed than gdpr, which inspired it, laying out principles that are both broad and intentionally vague. Details and future reinterpretations are to be dealt with by regulations particular to certain industries or technologies. This, says Mr Bahmanyar, allows regulation to keep pace with fast-changing technology. It also gives the government leeway to enforce vague rules as it sees fit. Didi was hit by rules brought in to govern companies whose digital services are seen as critical infrastructure. These were rewritten to cover foreign listings just as the firm was attempting to go public. Not all new laws will worry investors as much as the ones used to clobber Didi. Some deal with problems that affect the West, too. One forthcoming set of regulations published in draft on August 27th by the Cyberspace Administration of China (cac) looks to set the rules for the use of recommendation algorithms. This is the sort of software that companies like Amazon and Alibaba use to recommend products based on a customer’s shopping history, or that short-video apps like TikTok use to work out what viewers like in order to give them more of it. The draft regulations require, for instance, that companies expose the keywords with which they have labelled their users, and allow users to delete them. This, in principle, will mean that internet users in China will no longer be dogged by advertisements for the refrigerator that a recommendation algorithm has decided they might like to buy. Writing algorithms which lead users to “addiction or high-value consumption” would also be banned. Algorithms which dispatch workers, such as Didi’s driver-management system, must “ensure workers’ rights and interests”. The regulations read like an attempt to fix the problems griped about by consumers everywhere. They also require firms that deploy recommendation algorithms to “uphold mainstream values” and to “vigorously disseminate positive energy”. Such algorithms must not be used to “engage in activities harming national security” or to upset the economic or social order. As such, their aim seems to be to withhold algorithmic juice from any content that does not make the government look good. Kendra Schaefer of Trivium, a consultancy in Beijing, has written that the publication of these new algorithm regulations marks the moment when Chinese tech laws have gone beyond those in Europe (in America, only California has such rules). Data-protection experts say many of these changes will be beneficial. Chinese internet users are constantly assailed by spam messages and phone calls. An app developed by the ministry of public security, which promises to screen fraudulent calls and messages, has become one of the most downloaded in China since it was released in March. The Chinese press is full of stories about people’s personal data being stolen. In 2016 Xu Yuyu, a prospective student, died of a heart attack after transferring her life savings to fraudsters who used personal data purchased on the black market to trick her into thinking they represented her university. Protecting people from such predations will burnish the party’s reputation for standing up for the little guy. The new rules give citizens more rights against companies than people in any other country. But they give Chinese internet users precisely no privacy rights enforceable against the state. Indeed, says Sajai Singh of J. Sagar Associates, a law firm in Bangalore, the creation of a single common standard for the treatment of data in China will make it easier for the state to spy on citizens. Mr Chorzempa says rewriting the law to make firms rewrite software is a sea change. Once they start feeling they can intervene “at this level and granularity, what else will they do?” he asks.

#### China will continue to regulate emerging tech.

Dr. Sara Hsu 11-01-21 [Adjunct Fellow, Trade 'n Technology Program; ICAS; “China’s Regulatory Clampdown on Big Tech”; https://chinaus-icas.org/research/chinas-regulatory-clampdown-on-big-tech///ZW]

China has initiated a Regulatory Five-Year Plan which states China will “actively promote legislation in important areas such as national security, technological innovation, public health, culture and education, ethnic religion, biosecurity, ecological civilization, risk prevention, anti-monopoly, and foreign-related rule of law.” The plan aims to enhance law enforcement and ensure that administrative agencies serve the people. However, to the extent that the Regulatory Five-Year Plan dictates guidance by ideology, it is somewhat unclear how these new regulations and enforcement thereof will be carried out. The first point commits to the “in-depth study and implementation of Xi Jinping’s thoughts on the rule of law,” which refers to Xi Jinping’s writings and speeches that mention the topic. This was laid out at the first Central Conference on Work Related to Law-Based Governance in November 2020, where President Xi emphasized the need to focus on the people, to uphold Constitution-based governance, and to commit to the socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics. While the new plan appears to aim at making government more efficient and create a fair and stable business environment, it is not clear how Communist ideology will impact the types of rules to be created and enforced. Like Xi Jinping, the party is a living, breathing entity that takes a different view of how a government should be run compared to its Western counterparts. This is evidenced in the types of new technology regulations that China has recently laid out, particularly regulations that attempt to curb social behavior. Therefore, while we can expect that China will increase the number and enforcement of regulations, particularly in the tech sector, we do not know exactly what types of regulations will become a focus in the near future. We can only speculate that China will follow its current trajectory of tech-related regulations, implementing new rules that effectively reduce the power of its home-grown Big Tech firms. China also tends to favor domestic over international investors, and the concern that China has been seeking to crack down on the VIE structure has led the U.S. SEC to warn American investors over the riskiness of investing in Chinese stocks. In addition, while China has committed to expanding innovation, we now know as a result of these new regulations that innovations must have their own built-in guardrails. In other words, innovations must be mindful of following ever-evolving Communist Party dictum and best practices. Innovations should serve the people and the Party when everything is taken into consideration. What precisely that means is unclear but is likely to become somewhat more intelligible over time. So, what can one expect for the future? More regulations—especially rules that coincide with high-level political objectives and directives over time as well as those that reduce socioeconomic instability. We also expect more enforcement of existing regulations across industries and more activity by SAMR on anti-monopoly activity. The swathe of new regulations and the Regulatory Five-Year Plan are a call to arms by Chinese regulators. As such, U.S. investors should study these regulatory plans carefully to reduce uncertainty.

### 2nc --- Tech Race

#### The tech race is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Heather Roff 12-29-2015 [Senior Research Analyst at The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. Fellow at Brookings Institution and Associate Fellow at University of Cambridge Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, The Duck of Minerva, “The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of High Tech War,” http://www.duckofminerva.com/2015/12/the-self-fulfilling-prophecy-of-high-tech-war.html//ZW]

In fall of 2014, former Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced his plan to maintain US superiority against rising powers (i.e. Russia and China). His claim was that the US cannot lose its technological edge – and thus superiority – against a modernizing Russia and a rapidly militarizing China. To ensure this edge, he called for the “third Offset Strategy.” The previous two offset strategies were premised on Cold War rivalry and the belief that one can outspend the other through arms races. The first offset desired to gain dominance over Soviet Russia’s feared advantage in manpower and technological prowess. The US sought to deter the Soviets from engaging in a nuclear war. Aside from building up vast arrays of nuclear weapons, both at the tactical and strategic size, as well as creating and detonating thermonuclear weapons, and detonating nuclear weapons in space, both sides amazingly did not engage in direct hostilities. I do not know if the offset strategy had anything to do with this or not, but one could certainly argue that it increased the likelihood of a nuclear confrontation, given that we know during one of the most tense foreign policy situations in history – the Cuban Missile Crisis – four (yes four) nuclear weapons were detonated during the crisis. What is more, we also know that the US and the Soviets continually engaged in proxy wars. The second offset sought ways to fight against a numerically superior force; the results were increases in sensor technologies, command and control technologies, stealth technology, precision-guided munitions, lasers and unmanned vehicles. In an attempt at both creating defensive capacities domestically, and generating new technologies to fight the war in Vietnam, the US amassed the ability to wage network centric warfare. While the capability was not fully realized until Gulf War I, the legwork for much of the technology development was carried out during the 1970s. After Gulf War I, the US technological dominance was not missed by other powers. To counter the offset, these powers began rethinking ways to deny US maneuverability and access. It is this fear, of anti-access area-denial – that has given rise to the third offset. In Hagel’s estimation, the US requires a: “New Long-Range Research and Development Planning Program that will help identify, develop, and field breakthroughs in the most cutting-edge technologies and systems – especially from the fields of robotics, autonomous systems, miniaturization, big data, and advanced manufacturing, including 3D printing.” To lead the charge, Hagel appointed Undersecretary of Defense, Bob Work. Work, a former Colonel in the Marine Corps, is a tall and imposing man. He brooks no nonsense, and is forthright in his estimation that Russia and China pose the biggest threats to US security. Speaking this past November at the Halifax International Security Forum, Work stated “great power competition has returned.” He argued that the US must utilize a “strong but balanced” approach to these near competitors. Aside from wondering how an “offset strategy,” premised on the notion that one is technologically superior can work with a “balanced” approach, Work’s plan to pursue the third offset through autonomous technologies, artificial intelligence, robotics and big data was a bit of a mystery until earlier this month when he gave a speech at the Center for New American Security (where he was briefly CEO). There he stated that the Defense Department is seeking $12 to 15 billion in its 2017 budget to advance these technologies and to “kick the crap out of people who grew up in the iWorld under an authoritarian reign.” $15 billion. To get a handle on what this figure means, we should put it into perspective. The overall defense budget is somewhere on the order of $550 billion (excluding contingency and a black budget). Thus the third offset doesn’t really seem that large. However, compare this to NASA’s entire budget, which is somewhere in the $17 billion ballpark. Or think of it relationally to other state’s military budgets. Adjusted for inflation, Canada spends roughly $16 billion on its entire military force, and this was when conservative Stephen Harper was in power. Thus the US is getting ready to spend the same amount on autonomous weapons, artificial intelligence, robotics and other high tech weapons as Canada spends on all of its weapons, personnel, and logistics combined. It is thus clear that such a dramatic increase in research and development for Offset3 will change the character of future war. But what of the assumptions of this strategy? To begin, one might want to wonder whether preparing for near-peer conflict is the best strategy going forward, given that we know that non-international armed conflict and hybrid war is the new normal. Preparing for a war that is unlikely to play out on a formalized decision tree is unhelpful at best, and how these near-peers might test this technology is open to question (given that many of these conflicts are operationally inappropriate for such weapons). Another thought might be that relying on tactical approaches—due to the thinking that technology will solve the problem—will fail to address the need for strategic thinking. Technology is not “the” answer. Technology and technological development can only aid one in obtaining one’s predetermined goals. If one does not have a clear end point in mind, then one cannot know which technologies to develop. What is more, claiming that the US must “offset” a rising China and a modernizing Russia is not a strategy. It is a countermeasure. Finally, the assumptions driving the DoD, and particularly Work, are still mired in a Cold War perspective. Work has mentioned the “AirLand Battle 2.0”, without really explaining how this is different than the Air Land Battle 1.0 (which can be found in US Army Field Manual 100-5 from 1976). If we are to think that the AirLand Battle 2.0 is qualitatively different than its Cold War predecessor, I’d like to know how. For instance, Work describes how warfare will be “hybrid” and “asymmetric” and that we need to learn how to fight and win in these environments, but then he falls back on a strategic mindset that is not strategic. AirLand Battle 1.0 was a doctrine about how to fight. It was an operational and tactical handbook. It was not a strategic perspective. As Romjue points out in 1984: “FM 100-5 adds precision to earlier statements of the AirLand Battle concept. It is explicit about the intent of U.S. Army doctrine, and it conveys a vigorous offensive spirit. AirLand Battle doctrine “is based on securing or retaining the initiative and exercising it aggressively to defeat the enemy. . . . Army units will. . . . attack the enemy in depth with fire and maneuver and synchronize all efforts to attain the objective.” it also notes that “our operations must be rapid, unpredictable, violent, and disorienting to the enemy.’” So where does this leave us in 2016 and beyond? First, it is beyond unhelpful to revisit the well of “offset strategies” and Cold War doctrine. As Khong rightly noted over 20 years ago, analogizing current foreign policy situations is not very helpful. Likewise thinking that what worked in 1959 or in 1972 will not work now. Second, the types of technologies that the DoD is pursuing are qualitatively different than their predecessors. This is not to say that they are more or less dangerous. It is to say that what Work and his colleagues are after is the ability of nonhuman agents to make decisions on and in the battlespace. Autonomous technologies are not, as I’ve argued elsewhere, “smarter smart bombs.” In other words, they are not precision-guided munitions; rather they are “deciding munitions.” Where a human being decides a particular target and launches munitions to that target, an autonomous weapon or an artificial intelligence, would be the entity deciding. Whichever munitions it launches is beside the point. In the end, it appears that the US fear of losing its technological edge to near-peer competitor nations is a self-fulfilling prophecy. That is, the more it pursues this particular offset, the greater the chances that all sides will simultaneously benefit from these advances. Creating stronger AI is not like building thermonuclear warheads. The materials are easy to come by, the knowledge is readily available, and the commercial sector is driving the way. Moreover, if we are to abide by the same doctrinal insights from forty plus years ago without questioning their applicability or appropriateness, then perhaps we should also embrace some of the other gems of the day, like building fallout shelters, smoking on air planes and shooting student protesters who question war.

### 2nc --- Regulatory Capture

#### Private companies develop unregulated AI.

Nicola Perrin and Danil Mikhailov 11-03-2017 [Nicola Perrin is head of Understanding Patient Data, an initiative that supports better conversations about the uses of health information and Danil Mikhailov is head of digital strategy at Wellcome, The Guardian, “Why we can’t leave AI in the hands of Big Tech,” https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/nov/03/why-we-cant-leave-ai-in-the-hands-of-big-tech//ZW]

Fresh breakthroughs in artificial intelligence come thick and fast these days. Last month, Google’s DeepMind revealed its latest Go-playing AI which mastered the ancient game from scratch in a mere 70 hours. AI can spot cancer in medical scans better than humans, meaning radiotherapy can be targeted in minutes, not hours. We may soon use the technology to design new drugs, or repurpose existing ones to treat other, neglected, diseases. But as we begin to realise these opportunities, the potential risks increase: that AI will proliferate, uncontrolled and unregulated, in the hands of a few increasingly powerful technology firms, at the expense of jobs, equality and privacy. Already, mistakes over the sharing of patient records between DeepMind and the Royal Free Hospital in London have raised public concerns about technology firms being involved in digital healthcare. As the Guardian reported this week, the danger of a public backlash to AI, similar to that seen with the introduction of genetically modified crops, is very real. There are similarities – the concern about unforeseen consequences, the complexity of the new technology, the need for public engagement and, above all, the role of industry. With GM crops, businesses initially reaped the benefits, while society bore the risks and the same may well apply to AI. But there are also significant differences. The barriers to introducing AI are much lower than for GM crops, where trials must be approved, as must the sale of seeds and products. Online, there are no borders, and national regulation is either non-existent or difficult to enforce. So the real worry about a public backlash is that the response will not be widespread regulation of the whole marketplace, but instead a clampdown on the use of AI in the public sector. Private companies will continue to use AI, unregulated, to improve the targeting of products. But in the public sector where there could be life-changing benefits, over-regulation will mean the opportunities will be lost. That is not to say that AI should be allowed to spread uncontrolled in the NHS. But it does emphasise why it’s so important to get this right. AI can only be introduced successfully in the NHS if the public, patients and healthcare professionals have confidence in the system, including clear oversight and accountability. Transparency is essential, and so too is a meaningful conversation with the public – something that was lacking with the failed care.data programme and the DeepMind partnership with the Royal Free. Having an early discussion about the value of data, and finding a way for the NHS to realise that value when using services based on algorithms requiring patient data, is crucial. Finally, the implications for the patient and clinician, and issues of fair access and benefit, must be fully addressed. While there is a risk that a GM-style backlash could prevent the appropriate application of AI in healthcare, we should not give up hope. As the Information Commissioner has recently emphasised, it does not need to be a choice between privacy or innovation. The example of embryo research and the recent approval of mitochondrial donation – so-called “three parent babies” – shows that the UK has learnt from the mistakes of GM crops. New technologies can be introduced with public confidence if done carefully, with clear oversight, a robust regulatory framework, wide-reaching debate about the ethical and social implications, and, above all, meaningful public consultation. We must follow the same approach with AI, to ensure that, ultimately, it is the patient who wins the game.

### 2nc --- Regs Key/AT: AI Impact

#### Over 100 scientists say we need proper regulations.

George Dvorsky 01-14-15 [Writing for Gizmodo, Gizmodo, “Prominent Scientists Sign Letter Warning About AI Risks,” https://gizmodo.com/prominent-scientists-sign-letter-of-warning-about-ai-ri-1679487924//ZW]

Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, and many other prominent figures have signed an open letter pushing for responsible AI oversight in order to mitigate risks and ensure the "societal benefit" of the technology. The open letter was put together by the Future of Life Institute, a group mobilized by Skype co-founder Jaan Tallinn, MIT's Max Tegmark, Harvard's Viktoriya Krakovna, Boston University's Meia Chita-Tegmark, and UC Santa Cruz professor Anthony Aguirre. Its scientific advisory board boasts such figures as Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, Sir Martin Rees, George Church, and Nick Bostrom. The signatories of the open letter are not calling for a ban on AI research and development. Rather, they're calling for responsible oversight to ensure that it works with humanity's best interests in mind. They write: There is now a broad consensus that AI research is progressing steadily, and that its impact on society is likely to increase. The potential benefits are huge, since everything that civilization has to offer is a product of human intelligence; we cannot predict what we might achieve when this intelligence is magnified by the tools AI may provide, but the eradication of disease and poverty are not unfathomable. Because of the great potential of AI, it is important to research how to reap its benefits while avoiding potential pitfalls. Consequently, the authors say we need to "focus research not only on making AI more capable, but also on maximizing the societal benefit of AI." They have compiled a research priorities document which gives many examples of research directions that could contribute to the realization of these goals. "In summary," the authors write, "we believe that research on how to make AI systems robust and beneficial is both important and timely, and that there are concrete research directions that can be pursued today." Since the open letter was posted a few days ago, hundreds of people (myself included) have put their names on the list. I took a screen grab to show some of the more prominent signatories: You can add your name to the list here.

### 2nc --- China LIO Good

#### China leadership is key to global governance, peace keeping, and development---overcomes current UN flaws

Schwoob 18 — Marie-Helene Schwoob is Advisor to the Executive Secretary of the UNCCD. Marie-Hélène Schwoob, et al. THE UNITED NATIONS OF CHINA: A VISION OF THE WORLD ORDER. “Chinese views on the global agenda for development “ European Council on Foreign Relations, 2018. JSTOR, [http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21647. Accessed 5 Jul. 2022](http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21647.%20Accessed%205%20Jul.%202022). WMK

Over the past few years, the position of China on the international stage has gradually evolved, following its rise as an economic power, visible in its rapidly increasing trade and investment flows. China’s evolving role has also had implications for its place in global governance, through a greater involvement in activities ranging from United Nations peacekeeping operations (China is by far the biggest contributor of personnel, with more than 3,000 troops and police committed) to contributions to development funds (Xi Jinping pledged $2 billion in support for the development of poor countries at the Sustainable Development Summit in 2015). Numerous Chinese scholars have started to rethink China’s role and consider new strategies that would help the country offer alternative models for international cooperation and governance for development. Cui Wenxing, a post-doctoral fellow at Fudan University, writes that there have been three main stages of evolution in China’s development policy. Firstly, under Mao, when the country’s south-south cooperation was essentially based on political considerations (such as providing assistance to socialist countries).[20] Secondly, after the reform and opening up, when China shifted its focus essentially to economic cooperation with other countries (in all directions), and, finally, the acceleration of the “going out” movement (走出去 zouchuqu) in the 21st century, when south-south cooperation became a way for China to encourage its enterprises to go abroad and to take part in global development.[21] Cui believes that both the “going out” movement and China’s development agenda provided opportunities for Chinese enterprises for more economic cooperation (for instance, via low interest loans provided to Chinese enterprises in developing countries). For Xu Qiyuan, associate research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Sun Jingying, postdoctoral fellow at Beijing University, even if “it is clear that China is still a developing country”, its role has evolved from that of recipient country to one of donor country, and China has become an important partner of international development agencies.[22] China’s role in the development of south-south cooperation has been increasing tremendously. The time has come, say these authors, for China to build a “new global partnership for development” (建新型全球发展伙伴关系 jian xinxing quanqiu fazhan huoban guanxi), arguing that this new approach should put aside political issues but focus partnerships on pragmatic interests.[23] Chinese criticism of the UN development agenda Chinese scholars point to the imperfections of the development framework that the United Nations has promoted since its foundation in 1945. Some Chinese scholars, such as Xu and Sun, recognise that the UN’s development framework managed to gradually mobilise the international community, that it has achieved some level of agreement on key concepts relating to development (such as environmental issues, climate change, or sustainable development goals), and that it has contributed to the formulation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, several problems remain in the view of these authors. Among other issues, they note that the MDGs have had mixed results, such as uneven progress geographically, and areas of development lagging behind, such as universal access to primary education, maternal healthcare, and environmental sustainability. In addition, they believe that the development framework has sometimes focused too much on political issues – for instance, the controversial conditions attached to aid, which relate to governance, transparency, and human rights. In their view these issues should be separated from a country’s development goals. In particular, Xu and Sun argue that donor countries often link environmental aspects of sustainable development to political aspects that oppose the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”, a phrase which is important to developing countries. Developed countries (“traditional aid countries”) indeed usually put emphasis on a “universal” principle of environmental responsibility, resulting in environmental sustainability goals being placed at the forefront of priorities.[24] In addition, for Cui, the “shock therapy” of the World Bank has had significant downsides, by forcing countries to adopt austerity policies and to engage in market liberalisation over short periods of time, instead of progressively changing policies based on long-term research and experimentation.[25] China’s development agenda and the UN In the view of Xu, Sun, and Cui, China has implemented a successful economic development model and it has performed well in its progress towards the MDGs, all of which (in their view) relate to Deng Xiaoping’s development paradigm “crossing the river by feeling the stones” (摸着石头过河 mozhe shitou guohe), which provided a smoother alternative to the shock therapy of the World Bank.[26] However, the author/authors believes that there is a role for China to play in redefining a more balanced global partnership for development, that would better reflect the rise of south-south cooperation and the growing role of emerging economies.[27] Xu, Sun, and Cao Jiahan (assistant research fellow at the Research Institute of Comparative Politics and Public Policy) recognise that the new role that China could play at the global level should take into account organisations which already exist, such as the development agencies of traditional aid countries or the UN agencies in charge of implementing the 2030 Development Agenda. For them, connecting Chinese development initiatives to the agenda of these organisations could indeed help increase trust in these initiatives. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in particular, has recently raised some concerns in the international community, in Western countries in particular. For Cao, connecting the BRI agenda to the United Nations’ 2030 Development Agenda could be a way to “increase trust and dispel doubts” ( 增信释疑 zengxin shiyi) and to exert greater international influence, as the BRI represents “an attempt by China to explore a new model of international cooperation for development and global governance”. [28]

#### Only inclusion of China into the world order solves every global threat---its cooperate or die

Tiberghien 22 — Yves Tiberghien, Danielle Luo, Panthea Pourmalek, "Existential Gap: Digital/AI Acceleration and the Missing Global Governance Capacity," Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2-14-2022, https://www.cigionline.org/articles/existential-gap-digitalai-acceleration-and-the-missing-global-governance-capacity/, accessed 7-7-2022 WMK

We are facing an ever-growing gap between the phenomenal acceleration of technology and of connectivity, and the human capacity to manage these trends. The gap is well-documented in the fields of finance, climate change, pandemics and nuclear risks. But the contrast between the exponential growth of disruptive technology and the lacklustre supply of governance mechanisms is starkest in the fields of digital governance and artificial intelligence (AI).

That gap becomes existential when we consider the likely future development of artificial general intelligence (AGI) (Ord 2020) or superintelligence (Bostrom 2015) that can be misaligned with human values or even the goal of ensuring the continuity of human existence. This question of the governance of life with AI may be the most essential question of our time (Tegmark 2017), but you would not know it from the current output of global governance in this field. Summarizing the judgement of many scientists in the field, Toby Ord argues that unaligned AGI is actually the number-one global existential risk for humanity, with a 10 percent chance of human extinction within 100 years. The prophesized existential threats posed by extreme and accelerated technological advancement and expansion have never been as close to reality as they are now. As noted by Yuval Noah Harari and Daniel Kahneman (2021) in a recent conversation, the task of taming and governing the digital/AI revolution is daunting. Humanity may have no slack for a mistake this time around, given the existential consequences of such a mistake.

Today, we already benefit from tremendous digital or AI innovations in e-commerce, social media and communication, home management, work, health care, education, transportation, and entertainment (West and Allen 2020). We can foresee that AI-driven algorithms may soon be able to correct human judgement flaws (or noise) caused by fatigue, irregularity, emotions and other weaknesses, afflictions that can generate variation in decisions by up to 50 percent (Kahneman, Sibony and Sunstein 2021). Within two decades, we can envisage a world with generalized deep learning and virtual reality, computer vision, contactless love, fully autonomous vehicles in most advanced and emerging economies, autonomous weapons in militaries and a dream of plenitude (Lee and Chen 2021).

Yet, today, we witness tremendous havoc created by the explosion of social anger, exacerbated by sophisticated social media algorithms, deep polarization, the return of tribal politics, the loss of agreed truths and the spread of misinformation and dangerous conspiracies, the loss of privacy, the rise of massive and uber-powerful tech companies, and massive job displacement and inequality (Bartlett 2018). Influence operations by foreign states have also amplified such social anger and polarization in many democracies, adding a degree of external threat and urgency. We also live with a world of security-driven digital decoupling between the United States and China (Ma 2021). In other words, the digital revolution is moving faster than the human capacity to cope with it, embed it within a public good-oriented framework and steer its disruptive power toward a non-destructive direction.

The problem is visible at the national level but particularly salient at the global level. Digital/data governance is fragmenting among at least four poles: a US model with maximum innovation and limited regulation; an EU model with a strong regulatory balance; an India model with an emphasis on digital sovereignty and infant industry protection (applicable to other developing countries); and a Chinese model with both rapid innovation, strong state control and surveillance. Our global governance capacity is affected by multiple splits: a US-EU split over privacy, tax and anti-monopoly regulations; an India-West split over data ownership and first-mover advantage; and, worst of all, a potential digital cold war between the United States (and its allies) and China. In response to this dire need for governance, Rohinton P. Medhora and Taylor Owen (2020) have proposed a need for a new fundamental effort at coordinated governance — or a “digital Bretton Woods.” While fundamental international conditions and global distribution of power today differ drastically from the Bretton Woods era, a high-stake and fragmented digital world is in dire need of such renewed cooperative spirit.

Recognizing the gap in digital governance, we ask the following questions: What is the scale of the gap in governance relative to requirements needed to keep the digital economy afloat? And what could be a pathway forward in the context of the growing securitization and increasing divides?

It is urgent to raise a sense of awareness, mobilize all social and public actors around this urgent dilemma and catalyze a multi-level effort to address this conundrum. We argue that no global, regional or national institution alone will be able to deliver the right governance capacity. Instead, we recommend a highly reactive, innovative and competitive model of networked governance that operates at multiple levels with key nodes and catalysts.

Governance innovation must keep pace with technological innovation. Given how far the digital cold war has already proceeded and the currently low capacity to cooperate between the United States and China, part of the solution will need to involve clubs and alliances of countries and non-state actors. At the same time, some level of global coordination and basic rules for global co-existence are crucial for success in managing this existential threat. The Group of Twenty (G20) is one critical venue for such work, even though it has not delivered so far.

#### Exclusion of China causes backlash which escalates to great power war and turns every benefit from the LIO---Ikenberry is garbage

Shidore 21 — Sarang Shidore is Director of Studies at the Quincy Institute. His areas of research and analysis are geopolitical risk, grand strategy, and energy/climate security, with a special emphasis on Asia Sarang Shidore, "Calling 'liberal internationalism' what it is: American primacy," Responsible Statecraft, August 4, 2021, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/08/04/calling-liberal-internationalism-what-it-is-american-primacy/, accessed 7-7-2022, WMK

The authors argue instead for “liberal internationalism,” better characterized as primacy, or armed global dominance, of the liberal variety. However, liberal primacy, a major influence in Washington for decades, is itself partly responsible for the crises of the current world order and is now enhancing risks of great power conflict. Moreover, liberal primacy marginalizes alternative and quite different versions of internationalism, including those well within the American tradition, which have much to contribute to achieve a world of security and prosperity.

Deudney and Ikenberry’s main arguments are as follows: The restraint camp remains hostage to its critique of the American “blunder” in Iraq. It is moreover incoherent due to its dissimilar factions of libertarians, balance-of-power realists, and progressives, and thereby offers only a negative agenda for shaping the future world order. Restrainers purportedly provide no solutions to problems generated due to industrialization and high interdependence, such as inequality and climate change. Moreover, they resist defending and promoting democracy in a world threatened by a rising and authoritarian China. “Liberal internationalism” with its focus on democracy promotion, institutions, and regulated capitalism is the only model that can solve the world’s problems.

Let us put aside for a moment the authors’ misrepresentation of positions of restrainers more generally, and those of the Quincy Institute specifically. Let us also acknowledge the positive aspects of the broader liberal project, which do not contradict a grand strategy of restraint (and which the Quincy Institute supports.) Individualism and democracy are welcome antidotes to social and political repression, diversity mostly enriches societies, institutions help solve problems, and versions of capitalism have proven superior to communism. Liberal primacists’ prioritization of collective action problems such as climate change is also on the mark. But a closer examination reveals that some of these supposed achievements are more rhetorical than real.

Liberal primacy’s stress on democracy would be credible — if only its deeds matched the claims. Washington is tough, even militant, on violations of rights by its geopolitical adversaries, with sanctions and harsh rhetoric routinely employed as a tool. Liberal primacists indeed seem to be concerned with the fate of democracy in what they call the “core” — a reference to European allies. But when it comes to U.S. allies and partners in the Global South, they rarely go beyond nudges and occasional slaps on the wrist.

Objective observers can conclude that, outside of the Atlantic area, democracy and human rights are only of marginal importance in the liberal primacy project, except when they can act as force-multipliers in the great power competition framework. Restrainers on the other hand genuinely support democracy by directing the United States to perfect its own model at home so that it can lead by example. Restrainers also have a well-founded suspicion of the true motives of Washington’s actions (or any power that claims to be acting out of altruism) and, in general, hold a pessimistic view of achieving changes in the domestic politics of other societies through coercive measures.

Deudney and Ikenberry greatly stress liberal primacy to achieve global economic equity and avert environmental catastrophe. However, under liberal primacy’s long innings in Washington, these challenges have only multiplied at home and abroad. The United States, under the major influence of primacists of all shades, did not by itself create all these problems. But its disproportionate power and wealth means that it is more responsible than any other single actor. Moreover, when liberal and other primacists make extraordinary claims of global leadership and explicitly seek to preserve unipolarity, they should also accept a corresponding level of responsibility for all that has gone wrong under their watch.

Liberalism is also by no means necessarily tied to U.S. primacy. The work of scholars such as Stephen Wertheim (a co-founder of the Quincy Institute) and Michael Kazin has cogently highlighted a very different American internationalism in the pre-WW II era that opposed primacy in the long national tradition (notwithstanding a few exceptions) of staying away from foreign wars and advocating diplomacy to resolve disputes in extra-hemispheric conflicts. Nowhere do Deudney and Ikenberry seriously engage the core argument of restrainers of armed dominance detracting from domestic priorities and raising risks of regional and global conflict.

Liberal primacists have belatedly come around to reducing (though not eliminating) the U.S. military footprint in the Middle East. But, as Quincy Institute president Andrew Bacevich has laid out, few lessons appear to have been learned from the Iraq war, which was not so much a “blunder” as a flagrant violation of international law and American values. Nearly two decades after that fateful step, primacists (liberal and otherwise) show little desire for accountability from actors who supported and executed this war ridden with illegal actions, a reluctance that severely undermines their justifications for prosecuting violations of other states.

It is on China, however, that liberal primacists flirt with the greatest danger to the international order. A rising China is framed as a threat, predominantly due to its authoritarian system as also its recent actions in the region. Domestic and foreign policies of most states are indeed linked, but they may manifest in apparently inconsistent ways. For example, powerful, authoritarian states may not necessarily seek global conquest or even dominance (for example, China in the 15th century) just as major democratic states may disavow global hegemony (the United States itself from the late 19th century until World War II). Democratic powers may also empower tyranny, as was seen with Israel’s export of the cyber-weapon Pegasus to several authoritarian governments recently. Liberal primacy has a deterministic, inflated view of Chinese power and threat and little space for the major uncertainty in Chinese capabilities and intentions two or three decades in the future.

Whereas Washington is stepping up on framing China in stark cold war-type language, much of the world, including many U.S. partners, has a much more nuanced viewpoint of the competition. The reluctance of Southeast Asia or treaty ally South Korea to join the U.S.-led Quad and the general lack of support across much of the world for the monochromatic view of China’s Belt and Road Initiative as an exploitative debt trap are two examples. Prominent Southeast Asian voices in particular are increasingly worried at the turn liberal primacists’ China strategy is taking.

Whittling away at the time-tested One-China policy, over-militarization of relations with the Quad states, and aggressive, publicly announced military FONOPs close to the Chinese coast are only some of the ways in which liberal and other primacists are helping raise risks of great power conflict. China is not an existential threat to the United States. This is not to say that China’s excessive claims in the South China Sea, coercive pressure on U.S. partners including Taiwan and India, exploitative deep-sea fishing, cyber-attacks on the homeland, and certain trade practices should not be of major concern. But it takes two hands to clap. When it comes to China, liberal primacy’s reign in Washington feels as escalatory as the Trump era.

Liberal primacy is also less than international, with its continuing Euro- and Global North-centric tendencies. Alternative internationalisms include those from the Global South, where most of humanity lives. Southern internationalism matters to the U.S. national interest because, in an increasingly multipolar world, regional and middle powers have enhanced autonomy and capability to exercise veto power if their views of the world order are not taken into account.

As seen from the South, spreading democracy, managing interdependence, and containing the rise of China — Deudney and Ikenberry’s principal problematiques — is a part-erroneous, part-limited list. A view from Johannesburg, Dhaka, or Jakarta might argue that achieving domestic stability, economic “catch-up” with the wealthy world, and avoiding another militarized great power competition are more pressing concerns (along with those of climate change and pandemics, correctly identified by Deudney and Ikenberry). Moreover, U.S. interventionism and coercive strategies of extraterritorial sanctions (often backed by liberal primacists) might be seen as equally or more threatening than the rise of China. In general, Southern internationalism stresses sovereignty, solidarity, and a search for compromise rather than coercion in great power disputes.

Southern internationalism has led to many initiatives of varying success – from decolonization itself, to Afro-Asian frameworks such as Bandung, the push for a New International Economic Order, Tricontinentalism, and the Nonaligned Movement. More recent examples include the Like-Minded Developing Countries coalition in global climate negotiations. While some practitioners of Southern internationalism were domestic autocrats, paradoxically, their banding together also enabled a somewhat more democratic world order by placing limits on the extent of bipolarity or unipolarity. Liberal primacists, either largely ignore or oppose other internationalisms, domestic and foreign, thereby revealing their own paradox – while democracy is backed at home, a diversity of ideologies across states is distinctly unwelcome.

Deudney and Ikenberry are correct in that there are differences among restrainers. But coming from advocates of the “Roosevelt School” this is downright bizarre if not a sign of amnesia. FDR’s multi-decade imprint owed largely to his phenomenal success at crafting a diverse coalition at home to address the central challenges of his time. Building – and sustaining – such coalitions signifies maturity, not incoherence.

Restraint is a grand strategy comprised of first and foremost disavowing armed global primacy and stressing diplomacy for conflict reduction and management. This, by itself, is an enormous task that, if achieved, would be a major accomplishment and greatly diminish risk of a great power war. But beyond this common agenda, the young coalition will naturally engage deeply with itself over time as it grows. Indeed, primacists of the liberal and non-liberal variety who have been at this for much longer than restrainers, are themselves characterized by differences. The Quincy Institute, for its part, has laid out positive agendas for achieving peaceful co-existence in East Asia (including its maritime domain), South Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. These involve reversing armed global dominance, stressing diplomacy and institutions, letting regional players lead in solving their problems, abandoning coercive attempts to spread American political values, and energetically constructing confidence-building measures with major powers China and Russia.

In sum, liberal primacy, at best, is mostly a status-quoist ideology that is likely to only compound emerging global challenges. At worst, it is a thin veneer over a deeper intent of perpetuating unipolarity for its own sake. Either way, it is an outmoded approach to our time of uncertainty, increasing multipolarity, and a planetary crisis. Restraint may be, as Deudney and Ikenberry state, a “radical challenge to the main course of American foreign policy.” But it is exactly the corrective we need to American grand strategy that can pave the way for a more secure and prosperous world order.

### 2nc --- China Tech Good

#### China tech prompts a shift to renewables.

The Global Times 07-29-21 [“Living in China’s technological miracle: CPC’s innovation-driven strategy powers xiaokang society”; https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202107/1230033.shtml//ZW]

**Editor's Note:** On July 1, China declared it had reached its first centenary development goal - building a moderately prosperous society, or xiaokang, in all respects and is marching confidently toward the second centenary goal of building China into a great modern socialist nation. To decipher what that means in the context of where China is now and where it's heading, the Global Times is publishing a series of multimedia productions about achievements under the xiaokang goal in various aspects. This piece focuses on technological miracles that have changed people's lives. If China were able to build a time machine and send one of its 1.4 billion citizens back to the late 1970s, the person would be stuck in a kerosene lamp-powered life without any electronics. Communication with family and friends would rely on mail carriers. Long-distance travel would mean standing in slow-moving trains for hours or days. Grocery shopping would require different stamps for different items. Those are just several aspects of what the life of an ordinary Chinese person looked like before China embarked on what has been an unparalleled journey to building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, or xiaokang - the 2,500-year old concept that was revived by late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in 1979 to describe China's goal of modernization. China might not be able to build a time machine. However, the changes brought about by the country's achievement in science and technology for ordinary Chinese people over the past four decades or so are just as magical as they are miraculous. Thanks to technological breakthroughs in various areas, kerosene lamps have been replaced with smart lights controlled by voice command or even the sole presence of a person and powered by greener energies. Mail carriers have been replaced with 5G-powered equipment ensuring that family and friends are just a button away. Old slow trains have been replaced with ultra-fast high-speed rail. And to buy groceries, you might just need to scan your face, if you have to show up at all. Over the past four decades, life in most countries around the world has been changed by advances in science and technology, but none could possibly match the pace or the extent of the change in Chinese life. What China has achieved in terms of scientific and technological advances is nothing short of a miracle. It's hard to pinpoint China's scientific and technological advances as it leads in countless areas from renewable energy to 5G network, and high-speed rail to artificial intelligence (AI), and has numerous world-leading companies. **Miraculous advances** Several statistics may put things into perspective. China's annual research and development (R&D) spending grew 169 times over from around 14.3 billion yuan ($2.21 billion) at the beginning of the 1990s to 2.44 trillion yuan in 2020. Based on exchange rate conversion, China's total R&D expenditures overtook Japan's in 2013, becoming the world's second after the US. [graphic omitted] China saw its patent applications flourishing from zero case prior to 1985 to 68,720 filings in 2020, having led the world in the number of patent filings since 2011 and overtaking the US in 2019. China has also surpassed the US in terms of the number of academic research papers in 2016. The profound progress in China's scientific and technological capabilities is an integral part of China's xiaokang goal, which contains a sweeping set of targets including economic growth, poverty alleviation, as well as technological innovation. At the centennial of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on July 1, Xi Jinping, Chinese president and general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, declared the completion of the goal and called for further building up of the country's strength in science and technology. Technological innovation and independence have been included as a core part of the CPC's next centennial goal of building China into a modern socialist power by 2050. And with the CPC's firm leadership, innovation-driven strategies, and unique institutional strength, China is well-positioned to become a technological superpower along the journey to socialist modernization, analysts have said. "The institutional advantage of socialism with Chinese characteristics, as reflected in the CPC's centralized and unified leadership, is also a key factor that drives the nation to concentrate its efforts on major tasks in order to make breakthroughs in areas that are closely related to national security and core competitiveness," Sun Fuquan, vice-president of the Beijing-based Chinese Academy of Science and Technology for Development, affiliated with the Ministry of Science and Technology, told the Global Times. Some current global technological leaders, most notably the US, have been increasingly nervous about China's technological rise and have even moved to contain China's rise. However, just as technological advancements under the xiaokang goal were aimed primarily at improving the livelihood of the Chinese people, China's pursuit of further scientific and technological advances are also aimed at further improving the lives of the Chinese people, analysts have said. To understand where China is headed in terms of how future technologies could change lives, it's noteworthy to look back at how China's achievements over the past several decades completely changed the most basic aspects of life that many have taken for granted. Kerosene lamp to green brightnessWith China's electricity market design highlighting a wide-reaching network of ultra-high voltage (UHV) transmission lines and a gradual shift toward renewable energy, the country's rise as the world's second-largest economy has been well underpinned by its miraculous advance in terms of power, experts have said. Such a miracle apparently overshadows the US, which is still being haunted by blackouts, as slow UHV progress versus an over-reliance on non-renewable energy fundamentally challenges the stability of the US power supply. Recollecting herself as a young woman in her mid-20s when the xiaokang goal began, a 65-year-old retiree from East China's Anhui Province surname Xing told the Global Times that a typical nightlife scene then was family members sitting around a kerosene lamp. Later on, during the early days when electric lights became initially available, kerosene lamps, candles, and flashlights remained viable alternatives. Over four decades on, she now takes the brightness of bulbs as a guarantee wherever she might be and she even has a handful of color-changing lighting devices that react to her touch and could be synced to music. She said she's now gotten accustomed to the company of a wide array of home appliances and electronics gadgets. As the country continued to gain economic momentum over the years, its electricity consumption has soared amid the influx of various digital gadgets into Chinese households. Last year, the country's power consumption grew by 3.1 percent from the previous year to 7.51 trillion kilowatt hours, official data showed. Back in 1979, China only consumed 276.2 billion kilowatt hours, media reports said. [graphic omitted]Behind the vicissitudes of life is the country's electricity revolution that has rendered different sources of power an increasingly important part of its technological rise. With a national network of UHV transmission lines in place that transmit energy over a long distance, linking far-flung interior regions with abundant solar, wind, hydro, and nuclear power to energy-thirsty coastal regions, China has taken the global lead in enabling efficient, cost effective, and environmentally friendly power transmission. The transition underway toward renewable energy, notably solar and wind power, is considered as the cornerstone of the Chinese economy's aim to hit peak emission by 2030 before becoming carbon neutral by 2060. By comparison, the US, a major global energy producer and consumer, has made slow progress in building a powerful national electricity grid, although a UHV transmission superstructure is widely seen as a solution to the aging transmission infrastructure that ~~cripples~~ [weakens] the nation. **Mail carriers to 5G network** Another high-profile technological miracle is the giant leap China has taken in eventually establishing itself as a world leader in 5G, to the extent of unnerving the US which has gone to extreme lengths to sanction Chinese 5G equipment vendors, notably Huawei, industry watchers have said, attributing the feat to the country's continued, forward-looking commitments to updating its telecom infrastructure. The eagerness for the arrival of mail carriers to make a delayed connection with your friends or family members, and the excitement of making a call on a public rotary dial telephone, among the common things in the earlier decades were only emblems pictured in some TV episodes or movies of that era. With a 1 billion-strong population of internet users, the country is now acknowledged as the global paradise for mobile communications where tech-savvy users with at least one smartphone are now deeply immersed in a mobile internet-linked world: Real-time video calls or conferences, geographically unbound mobile payments, shopping, food ordering, and taxi-hailing, among other activities that are all powered by the country's almighty mobile network. By the end of 2020, China's mobile phone subscribers had reached 1.59 billion. In stark contrast, there were only 3,000 subscribers in 1988 when China ushered in the era of mobile communications for the first time.[graphic omitted] By the end of 2020, a total of 989 million users in China were enjoying fast connectivity speeds and a rich variety of internet content by surfing on the web. In stark contrast, only 620,000 people could have access to the internet in 1997, the first year that marked China's entrance into the age of the internet. With internet-related industries taking a huge step, the country has rolled out 916,000 5G base stations, accounting for 70 percent of the world's total, and it's now home to over 365 million 5G-connected devices, making up 80 percent of the world's total, according to latest official data. The country's rise as a global leader in the 5G era, with domestic heavyweights including Huawei sitting atop the world's 5G-related patents, has unnerved the US in particular. Feeling frequently on edge over the past few years, the US government has gone to desperate lengths to add a rising number of Chinese entities and businesses to its export control and sanction lists. China, for its part, has been pushing even harder into a head start in next-generation wireless communication. In a fresh sign, Shanghai, where its Pudong New Area has recently been declared to be built into a pioneer area for socialist modernization in the coming decades, on July 21 unveiled a plan for the development of strategic, emerging industries during the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-25). The development plan prioritizes breakthroughs in 6G core technologies and the active participation in 6G standardization competitions. **Isolation to high-speed travel** In yet another instance of China's miraculous rise in the tech world, high-speed rail (HSR) technology and bullet trains are now almost instantly labeled Chinese made, although it is actually China's fast-paced and impressive progress in HSR technology that makes many forget that the first HSR system began operations in Japan. The country's focus on sharpening its edge in higher-end manufacturing arguably makes the case for the HSR miracle, observers have said. Riding on an ultra-fast, comfortable HSR from Shanghai to Beijing, Liu, a frequent traveler, booked a food delivery via his smartphone one hour before the train stopped for a few minutes at the station in Ji'nan, capital of East China's Shandong Province. Receiving a freshly made rice and meat set meal from a restaurant outside the train carriage, Liu told the Global Times how he marveled at the drastic changes of train technologies and services. He still recalls the scene a decade ago when standing in the train for a whole night, enduring its slow movement, and felt his feet completely go numb on reaching the destination.[graphic omitted]Now the Beijing-Shanghai HSR, one of China's busiest and fastest rail lines, carried 1.35 billion passengers during its first decade of operation, running a distance equivalent to approximately 40,000 revolutions around the globe. It takes only four and a half hours between the two major cities, compared with nearly 17 hours in the 1980s on the green-skinned train. By the end of 2020, the country had more than 37,900 kilometers of HSR lines in service, the longest in the world, according to China State Railway Group, the country's railway operator. Marked as a historical breakthrough, the HSR demonstrated to the world the country's growing technology prowess by mastering technology in its own hands that was once held by Japan, Germany, and France, as well as its increasing prosperity as the world's second-largest economy. Not stopping its pursuit for more advanced HSR technologies, China is among the first in the world to introduce new technology such as autonomous train operation, as evidenced in the high-speed railway line connecting Beijing and Zhangjiakou, the cities to co-host the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics. With a maximum design speed of 350 kilometers per hour (kph), the trains can automatically start and stop, run between stations, open and close doors, as well as handle emergencies, marking the first time China will have had autonomous high-speed trains. To seek higher speed on land, China's self-developed high-speed maglev transportation system running at a speed of 600 kph debuted in Qingdao, East China's Shandong Province, on July 20, which symbolized a cutting-edge scientific and technological achievement in the field of rail transit. **Stamps to facial scan** China's spectacular march in artificial intelligence over the past decade is surely another miracle that can't be overlooked when gauging the country's technological revolution at a much later stage of its xiaokang adventure, as the economy's transition toward being innovation-oriented has prioritized AI, alongside big data and cloud computing, among other emerging technologies, to power the economic growth. As a consequence of the country's stunning leap toward being a trendsetter in AI, face recognition-enabled ticket checking machines have been deployed in a growing number of railway stations across the country. Face recognition clocking in machines are also becoming commonplace in the country.[graphic omitted] Thanks to broad-base applications of AI technology into everyday life and the workplace, these technological advancements helped in the quick and effective tracing of virus infections, with the country ahead of other major economies in emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic. In a sign of the country's fabulous stride from a manufacturing hub to a global technology power into the future, China holds 389,571 out of over 520,000 AI patent applications globally over the past decade, according to findings in a report by the Tsinghua University Artificial Intelligence Research Institute earlier this year. The four Chinese AI heavyweights - Megvii, SenseTime Group, YITU Technology, and CloudWalk - have also in recent years bagged numerous world-class AI-related awards, notably in image recognition and algorithm terms. The country has achieved a transition in AI technologies development from a focus on basic research to the enabling of its application into specific industries to AI functioning as infrastructure, Sun Jian, chief scientist of Megvii, said at the AI firm's tech open day in Beijing in mid-July. As part of efforts to close China's gap with the US in the AI ecosystem, Megvii has unveiled its proprietary open-source deep learning framework, MegEngine, as a new, promising alternative to Google's TensorFlow and Facebook-backed PyTorch. **Maps to navigation satellites** Last but not the least, a number of milestones China has hit in the aerospace spotlight the country's enviable miracle in space technology, backed by efforts of several generations of China's space industry experts to turn the country into a space power. An autonomous driving car packed with vegetables, fruits, and fresh seafood was driving to a residential area in Beijing's Shunyi district in July 2020 when the coronavirus epidemic put many people to stay at home. By receiving the signal of BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), the driverless car could adjust its route in real time operation while being guaranteed to stay on the right track. [graphic omitted] It was just one of various scenarios that the Chinese home-grown navigation system was applied to in quotidian life. With the last BDS satellite successfully sent into space in June 2020, it marked the completion of the country's domestically developed BeiDou constellation. The satellite system has now become part of usual technological advances in China in the space area; however, it was hard to imagine how Chinese pioneers overcame difficulties in extreme conditions to undertake "mission impossible" back in the 1970s. With the familiar melody of "Dongfanghong", a Chinese song that pays tribute to Chairman Mao, broadcasting from space, China's first man-made satellite Dongfanghong-1 was successfully launched in 1970. The launch was via China's own booster - Long March 1 rocket, making China the fifth nation to put a spacecraft into orbit using its own rocket. By that moment, China had proved to the world that it could realize what other foreign countries could. China's aerospace development started late from a low point, but has achieved outstanding progress in a short period of time. Through the efforts and contributions of several generations of people engaging in the aerospace cause, China has caught up with the world's other aerospace powers. Following successful tests of its first atomic bomb and hydrogen bomb in the 1960s, and the Dongfanghong-1 satellite, China opened a new chapter in space exploration, sending hundreds of self-developed spacecrafts including man-made satellites, crewed spacecrafts, and space probes. The space industry has produced a remarkable score over the past two years characterized by the nation's first independent Mars mission and the Chang'e 5 mission that retrieved rock and soil samples from the moon. The latest advance came as China sent three taikonauts into orbit in June via the Shenzhou-12 spaceship, the first of four crewed space flights to complete the country's space station by the end of 2022.

### 2nc --- AT: Not Zero-Sum

#### Yes zero-sum--- investors will only fund one countries start-ups.

Jillian D’Onfro 05-25-2018 [Jillian D’Onfro was a technology reporter for CNBC.com, CNBC, “Silicon Valley investors explain why they’re afraid of China,” Graphics omitted, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/25/why-silicon-valley-investors-are-scared-of-china.html//ZW]

Silicon Valley investors are worried that China’s tech sector will eat their lunch. The idea came up at a Bay Area debate earlier this week when Sequoia Capital venture partner Mike Vernal posited that China will soon overtake the U.S. in areas like artificial intelligence and autonomous vehicles. “The Chinese government and the Chinese tech leaders are marching in lockstep towards innovation,” he said on stage at an event hosted by The Churchill Club. “So I think there’s a real risk that in three to five years’ time, we wake up and realize that China is far ahead of the U.S. and Silicon Valley.”The four other investors on stage — David Cowan from Bessemer, Sarah Guo from Greylock, Nicole Quinn from Lightspeed and Tomasz Tunguz from Redpoint — largely agreed with Vernal’s prediction. In China, the government is eager to clear hurdles for self-driving cars, data sharing, or factory automation, while start-ups in the U.S. get caught up in regulation, Vernal said. Not only is the Chinese government more aligned with the country’s tech sector, but start-ups there have access to much larger data sets to train their AI algorithms, due to both the size of the population and fewer concerns or regulations around privacy, added Tunguz. Each investor had to present two technology trends that they thought would take off in three to five years and this was one of Vernal’s pitches: The only investor who didn’t agree with Vernal’s prediction was Cowan, who argued that technology isn’t a winner-take-all situation and that innovation in China will benefit economies and consumers everywhere. Guo rebuffed that notion. “Technology overall is not a zero-sum game, but for any of the companies we invest in, sometimes it is,” she said. Chinese start-ups relating to artificial intelligence are already attracting more funding: They received 48 percent of global AI funding versus 38 percent in the U.S., according to CB Insights. One way that Silicon Valley could maintain its status as a global innovation hub is to continue to make it a place where people from all around the world want to work, Guo added. ‘Wide-eyed optimism about China’ Several of the VCs brought up their opposition to President Donald Trump’s immigration reform plans, which could cause a brain drain in Silicon Valley. “This is not a criticism about China — it’s wide-eyed optimism about China,” Vernal said. “It’s more of a criticism of the U.S. I am deeply patriotic ... but I fear that China will become a more forward-leaning society and we descend into bickering and complacency.”Sequoia is arguably Silicon Valley’s most successful venture capital firm, having invested in giants like Apple, Google, Oracle, YouTube and Yahoo over its nearly five decades. Vernal joined in 2016 from Facebook, where he spent more than eight years, most recently leading its search group. In the early days of Facebook, the company resented the fast imitation of social network knockoffs in Russia and China, he says, but now it’s looking with envy at China’s extremely popular WeChat messaging app. “Today, if you look at WhatsApp or Messenger, both of them pale in comparison to WeChat, which is just a force to be beheld in China,” he said. “In many ways, the Messenger and WhatsApp teams wish they had something as influential, and powerful, and ubiquitous as WeChat.” Another Sequoia partner, Mike Moritz, recently came under fire for an opinion piece comparing Silicon Valley’s work ethic unfavorably to China’s, where he says tech employees often work 10 hour days, six days a week. Critics called his take tone deaf, and said it glorified unhealthy work practices. Here’s the full list of the top tech trends that the VCs presented at the event: [graphic omitted]

\*the site is private? so I couldn’t access, this is that card:

#### China will win the race – it’s zero sum – the AI lead snowballs

DSI 18, Data Science Insights is an online publication about Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Computing, “America is Roadkill on China’s Path to Artificial Intelligence Dominance”, https://datascientistinsights.com/2018/02/18/america-is-roadkill-on-chinas-path-to-artificial-intelligence-dominance/

**America is Roadkill on China’s Path to Artificial Intelligence Dominance** “That’s a dead armadillo,” I said pointing with my finger as my arm hung out the car door window. Back in the day, my dad would take our family on vacation drives along iconic Route 66. We drove for hours during the day, stopping at bizarre roadside attractions, and sleeping the night in one of those TeePee motels. Every summer it was the same drive. The same attractions. Same lodging. The only thing that changed was the kind of roadkill, lifeless flattened animal bodies, that my sister and I would try to identify as we motored along. As much as they were all different, they were all the same. Their tiny bodies were slower to move than the massive cars and trucks plowing along the highway. They never had a chance. America faces a similar challenge in our desire to navigate across the competitive roadscapes leading towards an artificially intelligent driven world. As a country, America stands at the slide of a heavily travelled global AI highway, tepidly stepping out into strategic traffic and then back onto the tactical breakdown lane. Back to a slow pace and a safer place. All the while, massive AI achievements are zipping by from other countries with amazing speed. Pushing us further back onto the side of the road. Keeping us from make our move. Giving us a false sense of safety. All the while keeping us from a lumbering move that would most likely have us end up like the dead armadillo of my childhood day. America is dangerously lagging other parts of the world when it comes to treating AI as a strategic asset. For example, China seeks to dominate the global AI industry. We do not. They are treating development of AI as an arms race, building massive government supported industries that drive toward their strategic endgame – own AI, around the world, and have the resources to support it. We have no stated strategy. To support their strategic goals, to win the inevitable **zero sum** competitive games with America, China has release a national AI development strategy. This set of capabilities, partners, and alliances that will guide their goals to develop a China-centric $23B AI industry by 2020 and a $59B industry by 2025. Local and state governments are also supporting this strategy, creating educational and delivery alliance partners. China’s 1.4 billion population is a data gold mine for building AI. For China, this is national strategic initiative. **A Pax Americana of Asia AI.** We don’t have one. They do. That’s an America problem. A strategic problem. Lack of a national strategic program is important because AI is a unique strategic resource. It is not like oil, water, or food. Traditional strategic resources do not beget more of those resource. Having a reserve of oil does not in itself generate more oil. These resources are finite and consumed. AI is different. AI produces more AI. AI is an exothermic resource, generating more than it consumes. It produces more knowledge, more insights, more advantages for the user. Having a strategic AI lead means one can produce more AI in the future, faster than those that don’t have it or are just starting. John Boyd, a United States Air Force Colonel, studies the tactical effects of strategically out thinking your enemy. He determined that **when one operates at a faster tempo or rhythm than the adversary, you will win and they lose in a zero sum competitive game. AI is a catalyst for faster tempos and rhythms.** But unlike other processes, like the OODA that Boyd studied, AI exponentially improves its results with each cycle, each evolution. This limits effective counter attacks, limits effective transformations that could equalize future competitive engagements. He who owns AI, owns the world.

### 2nc --- Generic China Heg Inevitable

#### As American heg declines China rises.

Makhura Benjamin Rapanyane 03-31-2020 [Master of Arts Candidate in International Politics at University of Limpopo, Journal of Public Affairs Volume 21, Issue 1, “The new world [dis] order in the complexity of America’s hegemonic decline and the configuration of new power patterns,” https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2114//ZW]

2.3 Symptoms of USA hegemonic decline: A critical analysis of the emergence of BRICS, EU and the nuclear weaponry headache The contemporary time is characterized by the rise of China in the international system. Based on Waldron (2005), The Asian tiger (China)'s military and economic advancement are transforming the entire structure of the international politics and economics. As such, its vast economic expansion and rapid infrastructural establishments are both provenance of Western and Japanese concerns. Thus, this is mainly led by the Chinese quest for natural resources and mineral resources and also their policy of no strings attached positioning on their financial aid (Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2012). The Pentagon had also recognized China as the only country in the world to be able to challenge the US hegemony in the international system (Chen & Feffer, 2009, p. 48). The ensuing reasons behind these are: in 2015, China introduced the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to counter the US engagement in monopolizing the global lending system through the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Elsinga, 2015; Shangai, 2014). China had also demonstrated its interest in overtaking and exercising dominion over global connections by erecting the “New Silk Road” which runs between Western Europe and Asia with maritime and continental routes (Monteleone, 2018). These maritime routes are used by China to explore the world to significant markets like Greece's Piraeus and Gwadar's Pakistan and they are also used for the organization- facilitation between the peripheries and the core world (Komlosy, 2016). In spite of the attempts to establish and sustain “Eurasian Economic Union” by Russia, this will still be beneficial to China as Russia has welcomed with both hands, Chinese investment and loans in mining, pipelines as well as transport infrastructure (Kenton, 2018). China has also invaded the international areas of healthcare, medicine, life art, tourism and cooking (Komlosy, 2016). One important point to add is China's rise with manufacturing Multinational Corporations (MNCs) which often outperform USA MNCs is another problem to consider (Griffiths & Luciani, 2011; Knight, 2014). Projections show that the Asian tiger is anticipated to overtake the USA economically by 2041 (Knight, 2014). Despite the role of China in being the leading figure in the discussion of the challenging the USA hegemony, the BRICS countries at large are also engaged in efforts of countering the USA dominance of international finance. Relevant example include that they were able to launch a New Development Bank (NDB) in 2017. This has another important emerging power pattern found in BRICS, particularly as it relates to the International finance (Ernstzen, 2015). This emerging international economic Power Pattern had also invested heavily in the property investment esp. in the former industrialized countries (Komlosy, 2016). BRICS is also anticipated to overtake and out-perform the combination of the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, France, Italy and Japan by at least the late 2030s (Kim, 2010). A number of trade agreements have also been established in Latin America to counter the US hegemony over trade such as the Bolivian Alternative of Americas (ALBA) to counter USA's hegemony over the Caribbean and Latin America's perpetuated trade hegemony (Fox, 2019). Equally important is the EU, which instituted the Euro to counter the dollar (Lioudis, 2018). This has encouraged organizations such as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to attempt to substitute the US Dollar with EU's Euro (Knight, 2014). Knight (2014) further argues that the emergence of competing blocs in the international system has led to the establishments of EU and the schemes of Regional Integration (RI) in Europe. Thus, this contributes immensely to trade weakening between USA and Europe, which results in the weakening of the US dollar too. Besides the EU, the tactical Nuclear Weapons inclination depicted by North Korea, Russia, Pakistan and Israel worries USA because they are attested to have a lot of nuclear weapons and may continually develop more if they are not monitored and if they are serious about overthrowing USA's hegemony. The actual reality is that more Nuclear warheads are possessed by Russia now more than the USA and this has placed the USA on a security risk (Lockie, 2016). In the year 2014, 8,000 nuclear weapons were recorded by Russia with only 7,300 recorded by the USA (Nersisyan, 2016).

#### China rise is inevitable--- it’s only a question of how the US reacts.

Mark Beeson and Corey Crawford 02-10-2022 [Mark Beeson is of the University of Technology Sydney, Ultimo, Australia, Corey Crawford is of the University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia; Chinese Political Science Review (2022), “Putting the BRI in Perspective: History, Hegemony, and Geopolitics,” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41111-022-00210-y//ZW]

For many observers outside China, especially in the US, there is no doubt that China is bent on replacing America as the dominant power in the world (Mosher 2000). Indeed, for some observers, China’s elites are following nothing less than a 100-year plan to replace the US as the world’s dominant power (Pillsbury 2015). Prominent realist scholars worry that there is a certain structurally determined inevitability about both China’s rise and the chances of a conflict between the US and the PRC as the latter increasingly seeks to assert its growing power and influence (Allison 2017). While Western IR’s collective failure to predict the end of the Cold War, the dramatic decline in inter-state wars, or recognise the importance of national strategic cultures and beliefs in shaping thinking about security, suggests that we should be very cautious about its collective epistemic authority, there is no doubt that China’s behaviour has changed. One of the most important expressions of this possibility can be seen in the sophistication of China’s political and diplomatic elites as they have come to play a more prominent part in what some IR theorists describe as ‘international society’ and the institutional architecture that constitutes it (Clark 2014). At one level, hopes and expectations about China’s leaders being ‘socialised’ into the ways of Western diplomacy have been realised: China is nothing like the disruptive, revolutionary force that it was under before Richard M. Nixon and Henry Kissinger engineered the celebrated rapprochement with the PRC (Kissinger 1994; van Ness 1970). At another level, however, it is clear that China’s foreign policy goals continue to reflect ‘national interests’ and values, especially under the increasingly coordinated and centralised leadership of Xi Jinping (Lampton 2015). Indeed, not only are Chinese policymakers still pursuing national goals, but they are doing so in ways that are also often strikingly similar to those employed by the US in an earlier era.

#### Increasing competition with China increases the risk of war – rivalry ends only with one side acceding to the leadership of the other

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In sum, the rivalry between China and the United States will likely continue until one country concludes that it cannot win the competition and accedes to the leadership of the other. Another possibility is that one side concludes that the other side has lost the ability to compete or no longer threatens the other. This has historically been the norm for rivalries that evade or survive decisive combat, and there is little reason to expect the current U.S.-China rivalry to end differently.69 Sino-U.S. strategic competition is here to stay, and it could last many years, potentially even decades.

Aggressive Competitive Approaches Are Counterproductive

If rivalry is unavoidable, should the United States adopt a posture of aggressive competition or even war? John Mearsheimer has argued that “war with China is inevitable” and recommended a strategy of containment accordingly. He has acknowledged that such a strategy would result in an aggravation of security competition dynamics but stated that this is an unavoidable “self-fulfilling prophecy.”70 Some political leaders and analysts have similarly argued that competition is unavoidable and advocated for punishing measures designed to humiliate or weaken China.71

As Mearsheimer’s invocation of terms that evoke the Cold War “containment” strategy suggests, the advocacy of aggressive competitive strategies mistakenly assumes that all rivalries share the same levels of hostility and threat. In reality, not all rivalries are alike. Those rivalries that carry high levels of hostility, threat, and competition tend to feature high risks of conflict. The last major strategic rivalry that the United States faced, with the Soviet Union, was an example of this hostile, dangerous variation. Although in the Cold War the U.S. and Soviet militaries did not clash in a large-scale war, they frequently fought proxy conflicts around the world. The two countries also developed massive nuclear arsenals as part of a larger competition for influence and status in Europe and elsewhere, greatly adding to a sense of mutual vulnerability, threat, and hostility.

The U.S.-China rivalry lacks a great deal of the ideological dogma that helped make the Cold War a zero-sum contest. The rivalry retains the democratic-authoritarian cleavage of its predecessor but lacks the Manichean quality of a showdown between good and evil that suffused the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. While Washington and Beijing compete for international audiences, so far the competition is much more muted and is centered on various aspects of an international order to which both states remain largely committed. China’s economy is also far more integrated with the U.S. economy (and, again, vice versa) than was ever the case in the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War. Economic interdependence can be a powerful constraint and is an unusually distinctive characteristic of the current Sino-U.S. rivalry, even though the possibility of more acrimonious trade relations looms and there remains the risk that competition will trump interdependence or worsen the rivalry as both sides attempt to produce the same types of goods.72 Both countries have also seen large exchanges of people and culture, another important difference from the Cold War. And unlike the Soviet Union, China has shown a much greater willingness to cooperate with the United States on shared challenges, such as climate change, disaster relief, and maritime piracy.

These differences suggest that the U.S. rivalry with China has the potential to remain at a less dangerous, violent level than was the case with the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Policies that aim to replicate Cold War strategies thus are not appropriate because they assume a higher level of enmity, threat, and competition than what currently exists. Indeed, policies that focus on containing or subverting the adversary, or that aim to mobilize the public against China, risk driving the rivalry to resemble the more antagonistic, dangerous variety of the Cold War. Similarly, actions that unnecessarily antagonize China by suggesting it is a country that cannot be trusted or with which cooperation is pointless carry the same perils. The current rivalry, troublesome as it is, could be made much worse by aggravating perceptions of hostility and threat. Because the potential for crisis and conflict increase when bilateral relations become characterized by high degrees of enmity, threat, and competition, confrontational Cold War–style policies are likely to exacerbate the rivalry and elevate the risk of war.

#### China rise and US decline is inevitable but clinging to the squo causes a violent transition

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China’s new assertiveness and the sudden inward turn of the United States are a function of causes located in both the second and third images. The key second- image variable is nationalism, which combines with the power trajectories (a third-image variable) of both China and the United States to define how their relationship will unfold in the coming years. The interaction between nationalism and power trajectory produces entirely different foreign policy orientations in ris- ing and declining powers—the former embraces an outward-looking, extroverted foreign policy of expansion, while the latter adopts an inward-looking, intro- verted foreign policy of restraint and retrenchment.

Why the focus on nationalism? Nationalism provides a natural complement to structural realist theory; it is rightly viewed as realism’s domestic-level counter- part.3 The constant struggle among nations over issues of power, security, and prestige that animates realism is in no small part a consequence of nationalism, which ‘fuels interstate rivalry and by its sharp delineation of in- and out-groups, abets status rivalry, accentuates stereotyping, and deepens and perpetuates per- ceived grievances.’4 This seems obvious enough.

Thus, a rising power—especially late in its development when its economic and military power begin to approach that of the top dog in the system—becomes more assertive in pressing its status claims and grievances. This cannot help but foment domestic nationalism, as the public becomes either: (i) frustrated that the established powers are treating the country with disrespect by denying it the global influence it deserves or (ii) emboldened by concessions granted by the established powers that allow expansion to proceed unabated. Moreover, leaders of rising powers often whip up domestic nationalism to back their expansionist policies and/or to divert the public’s dissatisfaction with the pace of internal reforms and economic progress.

Less intuitively, nationalism can also support a policy of hegemonic retrenchment—redeploying military forces offshore, demanding that allies pay more for their defense, and reassessing trade agreements through a mercantilist lens with the aim of achieving favorable trade balances. Because of the redistribu- tion of power, the costs to the declining hegemon of managing the international system increase relative to its capacity to pay. The problem becomes, as Walter Lippmann characterized it, the balancing of commitments and resources.5 An important means of bringing costs and resources into balance is to reduce over- seas commitments—that is, political, economic, or military retrenchment—either by passing the ‘balancing’ buck to one’s allies (insisting on greater burden-sharing within the alliance), by unilaterally abandoning commitments, by seeking rap- prochement with less threatening, secondary rivals, by attempting to appease the rising power, or by some combination thereof.6 All of these policies fit within the larger context of global retreat—of a weary titan coming home. The natural com- plement to this grand strategy is a xenophobic nationalism rooted in the rallying cry of ‘we must do more for ourselves and less for others, who should learn to take care of themselves and solve their own problems’—the opposite, it should be noted, of ‘the proper maxim of an unchallenged number one’: ‘Do good for others in order to do well for yourself.’7

Most important, the resurgent nationalisms of the rising challenger and the declining hegemon are entirely compatible with a future relationship character- ized by peace and harmony. Obviously, the two nationalisms pose no inherent conflict of interests: China currently wants more global influence; the United States wants less. Hence, there is good reason to expect a soft landing as the world moves from unipolarity to bipolarity. Indeed, the future may well resemble President Xi Jinping’s proposal for a ‘new type of great power relations’ (xinxing daguo guanxi), the idea that China and the United States should share global leadership as equals and break a historical pattern of inevitable confrontation between rising and established powers.8 There is room in Asia for two great powers to coexist and cooperate, in Xi’s opinion, as long as they treat each other as equals.9

#### China rise is inevitable---nationalist pressure and decline of the LIO---could also be China is revisionist card

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Emerging powers are expected to be outward-looking, to show competitive inter- national faces, to expand when and where they can. Throughout history, it has been a commonly held belief that demographic and economic growth must, like an irresistible law of nature, lead to territorial growth and the enhancement of the country’s political influence in other regions. Self-interest obliges leaders of rising states to take advantage of opportunities to augment their countries influence, power, and status, but not recklessly. In other words, rational leaders will try to avoid expansion and imperial ambitions that risk triggering the formation of powerful counter-coalitions.

Nevertheless, resistance to its prestige and status demands—that is, pushback by the existing Great Powers—is fully anticipated and expected. A rising power demands its rightful place in the sun knowing that the established Great Powers who created the existing order are unlikely to concede the prestige, territory, and privileges they enjoy under the current system. Hence, rising powers are often portrayed as troublesome states—as revisionist challengers seeking to expand their political and military influence by hook or by crook at the expense of the old guard. Just as the need to expand appears to be in logic of a nation’s develop- ment, the impulse to oppose such expansion appears to be in the logic of a hegemon’s decline. These two logics combine to drive a narrative of encirclement within the emerging power—one in which the older and stronger nation(s) seek to stranle the new and rising one before it is too late. All this is fertile soil for the growth within the rising power of a powerful brand of nationalism that looks outward.

This is not to suggest that emerging powers are wholly distracted by external opportunities. Like all states, rising powers are Janus-faced, looking inward as well as outward. After all, sudden and dramatic national growth induces massive social and political dislocations. As a nation grows, therefore, it becomes increas- ingly essential for its rulers to continuously mediate between their national soci- eties and the international economy—to recalibrate periodically the balance between citizens, states, and markets as they simultaneously encourage stable and sustained growth.

Within rising powers, outward-looking nationalism is a natural response to the country’s exalted growth and the national pride and patriotism that it inspires among its citizens. That said, there are two other more devious and less straight- forward ways that outward-looking nationalism can arise (or rather, be whipped up by elites) and be used for domestic purposes. First, consistent with the diversionary theory of war, it redirects the public’s attention from internal troubles and the regime’s failures—in China’s case, official corruption, lack of political reform, pollution, youth unemployment, and a woefully inefficient capital market due to stalled reforms that would transform China’s dominant state-owned banks into commercial banks—to external opportunities and to enemies (an out-group), real or imagined, who are preventing the emerging power from harvesting those benefits. Second, as Jack Snyder argued, nationalism centered on (imperial) expansion—whether territorial, economic, political, or any combination there- of—may arise as a rationalization ‘for the interests of groups that derive parochial benefits from expansion, from military preparations associated with expansion, or from the domestic political climate brought about by intense international competition’.33

Consistent with this logic, many observers believe that, since 2010, Beijing has been pursuing its territorial ambitions more aggressively. China seeks to assert territorial sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction over the bulk of the South China Seas—between roughly 62% and 90% of this sea. Combined, Chinese territorial and maritime demands stretch more than 800 nautical miles from the Chinese island province of Hainan and encompass islands, rocks, reefs, and waters claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. Moreover, China has created more than 3200 acres of territory between 2013 and 2015— acreage that amounts to nearly 17 times more land creation in two years than all of the other claimant states combined in the past forty years.34 China’s ability to station its missiles, fighter jets, and strategic bombers on these artificial islands makes them tantamount to a fleet of ‘unsinkable aircraft carriers’.35 In the East China Seas, China has repeatedly prompted ‘incidents’ in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. As a result, Sino-Japanese distrust has reached new heights, reflecting the insecurities felt by both countries as they contemplate their respective positions in Asia. China is also expanding its influence in the areas of global finance, trade, and aid. As the United States under Donald Trump retreats from globalization, especially from international trade agreements that fail to deliver short-term US trade surpluses, China has dedicated itself to the opposite strategy: making long- term investments with the aim of supplanting the United States as the world’s dominant power.36 Key to this plan is China’s new ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategy. Launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013 to improve links between Beijing and its neighbors within Eurasia, the ‘Belt and Road’ strategy will make it possible for China to become the economic center of all of Eurasia. This is no fantasy. Witness the Chinese government’s January 2017 launch of a rail freight service between China and London. Traversing Asia and Europe, the Beijing–London rail link, the first of its kind, is just one of China’s growing portfolio of rail con- nections. There are presently 39 lines that connect 12 European cities with 16 Chinese cities.37

For maritime transport, China is developing new seaports in the Indian Ocean and has purchased the port of Piraeus in Greece, which it is expanding to serve as the hub of a transport network of China-built rail lines reaching from Greece into Hungary and then throughout Europe. This maritime trade route is being pro- tected by China’s fast-expanding blue-water navy, new air and naval bases built on reefs in the South China Sea, and China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti, which guards the Red Sea and Suez routes to the Piraeus. Moreover, this vast continent-wide construction venture is being financed mainly by loans from China to other countries—loans that will bind recipient countries to China for a generation. Through these infrastructure projects and the construction of an alternative global architecture, most notably in the area of global finance and credit with the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China—like the United States in the years after World War II—is spinning its economic power into a global web of finance, construction, and trade, making it possible for China to become the economic center of all Eurasia.38

Explanations of China’s new assertiveness have focused on both international structure and China’s domestic politics, that is, on both third-image and second- image causes. Regarding international structure, pundits claim that, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Chinese leaders perceived a dramatic shift in the global balance of power—an unprecedented transfer of power and wealth from West to East and South.39 The perceived decline of American power and onset of a more multipolar world, so the argument goes, have emboldened Chinese leaders to be ‘more confident in ignoring Deng Xiaoping’s longtime axiom not to treat the United States as an adversary, and in challenging the United States on China’s interests’.40 Here, China’s new assertiveness is consistent with the classical realist principle that nations expand their political interests abroad when their relative power increases. Or as Robert Gilpin explains the dynamic correlation between power and the national interest: ‘The Realist law of uneven growth implies that as the power of a group or state increases, that group or state will be tempted to try to increase its control over the environment. In order to increase its own secur- ity, it will try to expand its political, economic, and territorial control, it will try to change the international system in accordance with its particular set of inter- ests.’41 In this view, China’s new assertiveness is a predictable consequence of its changed (more exalted) position within the international system.

Relatedly, Suisheng Zhao argues that China’s post-2008 ‘strident turn’ is explained by the convergence of Chinese state nationalism and popular national- ism calling for a more muscular Chinese foreign policy: ‘Enjoying an inflated sense of empowerment supported by its new quotient of wealth and military capacities, and terrified of an uncertain future due to increasing social, economic and political tensions at home, the communist state has become more willing to play to the popular nationalist gallery in pursuing the so-called core national interests.’42 Such popular nationalism in China is very much a product of the country’s historical legacy ‘of a long and glorious past, unjust treatment at the hands of foreigners from 1840 to 1949 (and beyond), a desire to regain interna- tional respect and equality, an imperative for territorial reunification, and a wish to reaffirm their collective greatness as a people and nation’.43 A shared sense of shame and humiliation with respect to China’s experience of having been a play- ground of foreign (Western and Japanese) intervention and encroachment is particularly a potent driver of Chinese nationalism and its current behavior.44 Indeed, shame has been a stimulant, a call to action, for generations of Chinese leaders and intellectuals. Though it may sound odd to most Western ears, feeling shame was (and remains) the path to escape the bitter reality of China’s humiliat- ing past. ‘To feel shame is to approach courage,’ reads an inscription in the Temple of Tranquil Seas in Nanjing, where China signed one of its most unequal treaties with a foreign power. China ‘carries the self-image of a “victim nation,” albeit a nation with aspirations finally on a path toward greatness restored. This victim complex, coupled with China’s aspirations and growing power, creates a sense of entitlement—a combination that makes Beijing prickly in its dealing with the United States’ and its neighbors.45

We see this cantankerous and touchy mood not only in Beijing’s increasingly tough diplomacy but in the violent demonstrations over the past several years staged by Chinese nationalists against Japanese companies with operations in China, causing some of those companies to relocate to Vietnam. Today, more than ever, Chinese public displays of nationalism and outrage—whether set off by perceived unfair treatment by the West, US–South Korea naval exercises, or insults from the Japanese—appear genuine rather than manufactured. Moreover, whereas nationalism was traditionally confined primarily to young Chinese and to some soldiers in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), it has spread to Chinese businesspeople, academics, and elite politicians.46 This diffusion of Chinese nationalism is the product of China’s rise and its domestic political system becom- ing more participative, with different factions fighting among each other, and China’s public sphere growing more dynamic, fueled by the Internet and social media. ‘Beyond the party’s control,’ notes Jayshree Bajoria, ‘the emergence of the Internet in the last two decades has given nationalists more power to vent their anger after particular incidents. It has also brought the huge Chinese diaspora in places like Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Europe, and North America, into closer contact with those residing within China’s borders’, facilitating the contin- uous flow and escalation of nationalist rhetoric and propaganda.47 And because social media can be used to organize large-scale, nationalist protests in Beijing and other cities against foreign governments, the continued expansion of informa- tion technologies throughout the population promises to accentuate the role of nationalism in Chinese policymaking; it also threatens to raise Chinese national- ism to dangerous and unstable levels of hypernationalism.48

Given China’s determination to avenge its past, there is every reason to expect that Chinese nationalism will continue to grow in lockstep with the country’s increased power. This phenomenon is already evident among Chinese policy- makers, military officials, and average citizens. The consensus is that China must eventually become more internationally assertive to the point where it, like the United States, is willing to intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries to protect its far-flung interests abroad.49 Moreover, some suggest that the goal of global dominance lies at the core of China’s journey from humiliation to rejuve- nation. The notion of national rejuvenation, according to the conservative Chinese analyst Yan Xuetong, ‘conjures “the psychological power” associated with China’s rise “to its former world status”. The concept assumes both that China is recovering its natural position and that this means being the “number one nation in the world”‘.50

### 2nc --- Economy China Heg Inevitable

#### High economy makes China global leader for norms.

Ralph Jennings 01-04-2022 [Writing for VOA, Voice of America, “China’s Economy Could Overtake US Economy by 2030,” https://www.voanews.com/a/chinas-economy-could-overtake-us-economy-by-2030/6380892.html//ZW]

SAN FRANCISCO — China’s economy will increasingly rely on state investment, high-tech development and domestic consumption – with less input from its past staple of export manufacturing – as it stands to overtake the United States in the coming decade, analysts predict. China’s GDP should grow 5.7% per year through 2025 and then 4.7% annually until 2030, British consultancy Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) forecasts. Its forecast says that China, now the world’s second-largest economy, would overtake the No. 1-ranked U.S. economy by 2030. Credit insurance firm Euler Hermes made a similar forecast. Chinese leaders have pushed over the past decade to rely more on value-added services over traditional factory exports, state media have said. The Sino-U.S. trade dispute and early 2020 workplace closures due to COVID-19 have added pressure on manufacturing. Reducing factory output in China, foreign multinationals have been expanding outside China, targeting places such as Vietnam to avoid rising wages and environmental compliance costs. By offshoring in multiple countries they hope to head off any repeat of China's early 2020 COVID-19 lockdowns that shut down factories. China’s economy totaled $15.92 trillion in 2020, and market research firm IHS Markit estimates that it reached $18 trillion last year on export manufacturing growth and capital for new projects. The U.S. economy reached about $23 trillion last year, the market research firm said. **State investment** The country that’s already known for fast economic growth over the past 20 years would see the state take more control over key sectors after intervening in several, including the internet, in 2021, economists expect. “Beijing has the funds and the unfettered domestic political power to use China’s large public treasury to make strategic investments in the service of the leadership’s national and global objectives,” said Denny Roy, senior fellow at the East-West Center think tank in Honolulu. China scored 2.98 in 2018, up from 2.45 eight years earlier and approaching about three times the world average, on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development policy forum’s Direct Control Over Enterprises index. That means the government’s direct control over enterprises “well exceeded the open economy average” and “reflects China’s increasing emphasis on the role of the state in the economy under Xi Jinping,” the think tank Atlantic Council says in its October report China Pathfinder: Annual Scorecard . **Growth in tech hardware** Chinese leaders will probably prioritize tech, especially hardware that does not require constant innovation, as a growth engine, economists say. State intervention in the internet sector won't hobble expansion in semiconductors and infrastructure software, said Zennon Kapron, founder and director of the Shanghai-based financial industry research firm Kapronasia. “If the country does become self-sufficient in terms of technology and then is able to sell and export those products and services that are based on the technology, then that would be a huge bump to its economy, because [that] is a key driver certainly of the U.S. GDP now,” Kapron said. The U.S. economy will keep growing but without spurts through 2030, Kapron predicts. China has a “huge base of engineers,” albeit less creativity than it needs to foster the “zany ideas” that drive development of new technology, said Douglas McWilliams, founder and executive deputy chairman of CEBR. **Consumer spending** Domestic spending has driven most of China’s economic growth before 2021 as the country reduced its exposure to the world in view of the Sino-U.S. trade dispute, McKinsey & Co. says in its China consumer report 2021. Supply chains have “matured and localized, and its innovation capabilities were enhanced” in turn, McKinsey & Co says. That trend is likely to continue despite hits to income under lockdowns during the first year of COVID-19, analysts say. China’s population exceeds that of the United States by 3.5 times, though American consumers are wealthier on average. “In the past five years, domestic consumption has … become a more significant growth driver as China’s domestic consumer market has grown dramatically in size,” said Rajiv Biswas, Asia-Pacific chief economist with IHS Markit. Beijing’s leadership “aims to create more than 11 million new urban jobs and expand domestic demand and effective investment,” the official Xinhua News Agency said in mid-2021. Those measures, it said, “are expected to put the economy firmly back to pre-pandemic vibrancy.” **What if China overtakes US economy?** Status as the world’s largest economy does not confer any automatic advantages over others, economists said, but countries dependent on the Chinese economy would take note. “There is no gold medal or anything like that,” CEBR’s McWilliams told VOA. “But when you’ve got more money to spend, you do have the ability to influence things, and China will have that ability to influence things.” China would be better placed, he said, to advance its Belt and Road Initiative, a 9-year-old effort aimed at building land and sea trade routes through Asia, Europe and Africa in the form of infrastructure projects and investments. Officials in Beijing are already leveraging their economy in disputes with other countries, said Roy of the East-West Center. China vies with four Southeast Asian governments over maritime sovereignty, contests a group of islets with Japan and has gotten into territorial standoffs with India since 2017. “The result of that expectation (China surpassing the United States economically) has been a bolder PRC (People's Republic of China) foreign policy that seeks to settle regional disputes in China’s favor and to de-legitimize U.S. regional and global leadership under the assumption that China is destined to set the new rules of international relations,” Roy said.

#### A hegemonic transition’s inevitable – US retrenchment and Chinese economic growth make a soft landing likely

**Schweller, 18** - Randall Schweller is Professor of Political Science and a Social and Behavioral Sciences Joan N. Huber Faculty Fellow, The Ohio State University (“Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US–China Relations” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, 23–48 doi: 10.1093/cjip/poy003

China’s new assertiveness and the sudden inward turn of the United States are a function of causes located in both the second and third images. The key secondimage variable is nationalism, which combines with the power trajectories (a third-image variable) of both China and the United States to define how their relationship will unfold in the coming years. The interaction between nationalism and power trajectory produces entirely different foreign policy orientations in rising and declining powers—the former embraces an outward-looking, extroverted foreign policy of expansion, while the latter adopts an inward-looking, introverted foreign policy of restraint and retrenchment.

Why the focus on nationalism? Nationalism provides a natural complement to structural realist theory; it is rightly viewed as realism’s domestic-level counterpart.3 The constant struggle among nations over issues of power, security, and prestige that animates realism is in no small part a consequence of nationalism, which ‘fuels interstate rivalry and by its sharp delineation of in- and out-groups, abets status rivalry, accentuates stereotyping, and deepens and perpetuates perceived grievances.’4 This seems obvious enough.

Thus, a rising power—especially late in its development when its economic and military power begin to approach that of the top dog in the system—becomes more assertive in pressing its status claims and grievances. This cannot help but foment domestic nationalism, as the public becomes either: (i) frustrated that the established powers are treating the country with disrespect by denying it the global influence it deserves or (ii) emboldened by concessions granted by the established powers that allow expansion to proceed unabated. Moreover, leaders of rising powers often whip up domestic nationalism to back their expansionist policies and/or to divert the public’s dissatisfaction with the pace of internal reforms and economic progress.

Less intuitively, nationalism can also support a policy of hegemonic retrenchment—redeploying military forces offshore, demanding that allies pay more for their defense, and reassessing trade agreements through a mercantilist lens with the aim of achieving favorable trade balances. Because of the redistribution of power, the costs to the declining hegemon of managing the international system increase relative to its capacity to pay. The problem becomes, as Walter Lippmann characterized it, the balancing of commitments and resources.5 An important means of bringing costs and resources into balance is to reduce overseas commitments—that is, political, economic, or military retrenchment—either by passing the ‘balancing’ buck to one’s allies (insisting on greater burden-sharing within the alliance), by unilaterally abandoning commitments, by seeking rapprochement with less threatening, secondary rivals, by attempting to appease the rising power, or by some combination thereof.6 All of these policies fit within the larger context of global retreat—of a weary titan coming home. The natural complement to this grand strategy is a xenophobic nationalism rooted in the rallying cry of ‘we must do more for ourselves and less for others, who should learn to take care of themselves and solve their own problems’—the opposite, it should be noted, of ‘the proper maxim of an unchallenged number one’: ‘Do good for others in order to do well for yourself.’7

Most important, the resurgent nationalisms of the rising challenger and the declining hegemon are entirely compatible with a future relationship characterized by peace and harmony. Obviously, the two nationalisms pose no inherent conflict of interests: China currently wants more global influence; the United States wants less. Hence, there is good reason to expect a soft landing as the world moves from unipolarity to bipolarity. Indeed, the future may well resemble President Xi Jinping’s proposal for a ‘new type of great power relations’ (xinxing daguo guanxi), the idea that China and the United States should share global leadership as equals and break a historical pattern of inevitable confrontation between rising and established powers.8 There is room in Asia for two great powers to coexist and cooperate, in Xi’s opinion, as long as they treat each other as equals.9

If China continues to grow economically and militarily, then, like every other rising power in history, it will surely seek to expand its influence in the AsiaPacific region and throughout the globe. The question remains, how should Washington respond? Operating within an emerging bipolar world, Washington should adopt a grand strategy of offshore balancing: redeploying its military forces ‘offshore’ and passing the ‘balancing’ buck to regional powers in Asia. If China eventually makes a bid for regional hegemony, the United States should wait and see if its regional allies can contain it. If and only if such containment fails, then the United States will be required to deploy enough firepower to the region to restore a stable balance. The aim is to remain offshore as long as possible, while recognizing that it may become necessary for US forces to come back over the horizon. If that happens, however, Washington’s Asia-Pacific allies should still do much of the heavy lifting.10

#### Pax Americana declines inevitably – structural economic factors guarantee weakness – it’s only a question of the transition

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American decline redux Today the military, economic, institutional and ideational pillars that have supported the Pax Americana are being challenged by China. This raises two fundamental and intimately connected questions: if China surpasses, equals or even approximates the United States in these dimensions of power, can the Pax Americana endure? And, if it cannot, what will replace it? Posing these questions raises the contentious issue—contentious at least in the US—of whether American power is, in fact, declining. During his abortive 2012 run for the Republican presi- dential nomination, Jon Huntsman—President Obama’s Ambassador to China, and now President Trump’s Ambassador to Russia—succinctly expressed the prevailing view of the US foreign policy establishment when he said: ‘Decline is un-American.’ Leading US security studies experts agree. These primacists argue that the extent of China’s rise—and hence of America’s decline—are, like prema- ture reports of Mark Twain’s death, greatly exaggerated. Primacists believe the international system is still unipolar, and that US power will keep it that way for a long time to come. **This claim is increasingly dubious**. Indeed, the case made by the ‘declinists’ of the 1980s—notably Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, David Calleo and Samuel P. Huntington—looks stronger every day.23 Contrary to the portrayal of their argument by many of their critics, the 1980s declinists did not claim either that America’s post-Second World War power advantages had already dissipated, or that the United States was on the brink of a rapid, catastrophic decline. Rather, they pointed to domestic and international economic drivers that, over time, would cause **American economic power to diminish relatively**, thereby shifting the balance of power. In essence, the declinists believed that the United States was experiencing a slow—‘termite-like’—decline caused by fundamental structural weaknesses in the American economy that were gradually nibbling at its founda- tions.24 Kennedy himself was explicitly looking ahead to the effects this termite decline would have on the US world role in the early twenty-first century. As he wrote: The task facing American statesmen over the next decades ... is to recognize that **broad trends are under way**, and that there is a need to ‘manage’ affairs so that the relative erosion of the United States’ position takes place slowly and smoothly, and is **not accelerated by policies which bring merely short-term advantage but longer-term disadvantage**.25 The unwinding of the Pax Americana Decline may be ‘un-American’, but that does not mean it isn’t happening. Ameri- ca’s ‘unipolar moment’ has turned out to be rather—well, momentary.26 The Great Recession that began in 2007–2008 did not end America’s unipolar ascen- dancy. It did, however, focus attention on, and accelerate, the ebbing of American power—the evidence of which has cumulated rapidly over the ensuing ten years. This slippage of US dominance is chipping away at each of the four pillars on which the Pax Americana was erected: military power; economic power; institu- tions; and soft power. As these pillars erode, it becomes increasingly doubtful that the Pax Americana can endure. China’s challenge to American military power Until now the dominant view within the US foreign policy establishment has been that military strength is the one area in which America’s advantage is insur- mountable (at least within any meaningful time-frame). American military power is considered by US policy-makers and many security studies scholars to be the geopolitical trump card—no pun intended—that will ensure continuing American dominance even if China closes the economic and technological gaps separating it from the United States.27 However, some within the foreign policy establish- ment are beginning to question this viewpoint. Important recent studies of the Sino-American military balance suggest that some analysts are taking a fresh look at the question of how long it will take China to catch up with the US militarily. China and the United States face different grand strategic challenges. As self- styled global hegemon, America must be able project decisive military power to the three regions it considers vital to both its security and its prosperity: Europe, the Middle East and east Asia. In contrast, China’s strategic goals, at least for now, are more limited. China aims at dominating its own geographic backyard: that is, it seeks regional hegemony in east and south-east Asia, which have become the focal points of Sino-American geopolitical competition. Even if China is not at present able to mount a global challenge to the US, there is evidence that it is beginning to draw level with the United States in regional military power in east Asia. In a recent report on the Sino-American military balance, the RAND Corporation refers to the ‘receding frontier of US military dominance’ in east Asia.28 According to RAND, the trend lines in the Sino-American military rivalry in east Asia **are not favourable for the United States**: ‘Although China has not closed the gap with the United States, it has narrowed it—and it has done so quite rapidly. Even for many of the contributors to this report, who track military developments in Asia on an ongoing basis, the speed of change ... was striking.’29 In a recent book, Roger Cliff, an east Asian security expert at RAND, says that by 2020 China’s military establishment will be almost on **an equal footing** with America’s with respect to doctrine, equipment, personnel and training (though still lagging behind in organizational structure, logistics and organizational culture). Consequently, he predicts that by 2020 American military dominance in east Asia will be significantly eroded.30 He predicts that the 2020s will witness a power transition in east Asia and that at this point **China will be able to challenge the regional status quo**.31

#### Economic Power – all data points towards CCP overhaul

**Layne 18** - professor at Texas A&M University's. George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana,” 2018, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/images/ia/INTA94_1_6_249_Layne.pdf>, Accessed 6-30-22, LASA-AH)

American economic decline and the impairment of US economic hegemony During the past decade, signs of waning US economic power—and China’s growing economic muscle—have become too numerous to ignore. Since the onset of the Great Recession, China has successively taken top position in the world in exports (passing Germany); in trade (passing the United States); and in manufacturing (claiming a title the United States had held for a century). In 2014 the World Bank made the stunning announcement that China had vaulted past the United States to become the world’s largest economy (measured by purchasing power parity (PPP);32 and in the early to mid-2020s China is predicted to overtake the United States in GDP measured by market exchange rate.33 These shifts in the relative economic power of China and the United States **have enormous economic and geopolitical implications**. Indeed, in July 2017 Christine Lagarde, managing director of the IMF, stated that in ten years’ time the organization’s headquar- ters—which are required by its by-laws to be located in its member country with the largest economy—could be in Beijing.34 Taken together, these indicators **paint a clear picture of relative economic decline.**

#### Economic heg is key to allied relations

**Layne 18** - professor at Texas A&M University's. George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana,” 2018, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/images/ia/INTA94_1_6_249_Layne.pdf>, Accessed 6-30-22, LASA-AH)

Washington’s inability to persuade Berlin to adopt a policy of economic stimulus highlighted America’s flagging ability to act as the leader of the interna- tional economy. The then Treasury Secretary Jack Lew implicitly admitted this at the October 2015 IMF–World Bank biannual meetings when, echoing President Obama, he stated that the United States could not be the ‘sole engine’ of global growth. And the Trump administration, although it has complained loudly that Germany exports too much and imports too little, has like its predecessor been unable to push or persuade Berlin into reducing its trade surplus while simultane- ously increasing its consumption. Even as the US ability to manage the international economy is decreasing, China’s growing economic clout has profound implications for the Sino-American strategic balance. For example, the Obama administration’s ‘pivot’ to Asia was intended to reassure the nations of east and south-east Asia that the United States would use its military power to offset China’s growing economic influence in the region. As Jeffrey Bader, the Obama administration’s National Security Council director for Asia, put it: China’s emergence, China’s rise, is the focus of attention not only of the United States but among all countries in the region. **None of them wants to have hostile or adversarial relations with China**. At the same time, none wants to be dominated by China. The countries in the region welcome the US presence as, if you will, a kind of balance against China.47 However, the outlook for this ‘balancing’ strategy is clouded. Doubtless, Bader was correct: regional states do not want to be forced to choose between aligning either with China or with the United States. But economic trends suggest that they will be inexorably drawn into Beijing’s geopolitical orbit by the **overpow- ering magnetic pull of the Chinese economy**. The lessening of America’s regional economic influence, and the corresponding jump in that of China, have been dramatic. In 1993 China accounted for only 2 per cent of ASEAN’s trade in goods, and the United States accounted for 18 per cent. By 2013, however, the American share of ASEAN trade in goods had shrunk to 8.2 per cent while China’s had skyrocketed to 14 per cent.48 Growing economic dependence on China is reflected in geopolitical alignments. Since 2016, Malaysia, Cambodia, Myanmar and the Philippines have all tilted away from the United States and towards China. Even Australia, long a staunch US ally, is debating the merits of taking a more equidistant political stance between Washington and Beijing because of its economic dependence on China. In the coming years these trends are likely to continue, and China will be able to leverage its economic power to enhance its geopolitical position in east and south-east Asia—and diminish that of the United States.

#### China’s rapidly surpassing the US economy -- it's poised to set the new rules of IR

**Jennings 22** - English news from the Voice of America (Ralph, “China’s Economy Could Overtake US Economy by 2030,” *Voice of America*, 1-4-22, <https://www.voanews.com/a/chinas-economy-could-overtake-us-economy-by-2030/6380892.html>, Accessed 7-1-22, LASA-AH)

China’s economy will increasingly rely on state investment, high-tech development and domestic consumption – with less input from its past staple of export manufacturing – as it stands to **overtake the United States** in the coming decade, analysts predict. China’s GDP should grow 5.7% per year through 2025 and then 4.7% annually until 2030, British consultancy Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) forecasts. Its forecast says that China, now the world’s second-largest economy, would **overtake the No. 1-ranked U.S. economy by 2030.** Credit insurance firm Euler Hermes made a similar forecast. Chinese leaders have pushed over the past decade to rely more on value-added services over traditional factory exports, state media have said. The Sino-U.S. trade dispute and early 2020 workplace closures due to COVID-19 have added pressure on manufacturing. Reducing factory output in China, foreign multinationals have been expanding outside China, targeting places such as Vietnam to avoid rising wages and environmental compliance costs. By offshoring in multiple countries they hope to head off any repeat of China's early 2020 COVID-19 lockdowns that shut down factories. China’s economy totaled $15.92 trillion in 2020, and market research firm IHS Markit estimates that it reached $18 trillion last year on export manufacturing growth and capital for new projects. The U.S. economy reached about $23 trillion last year, the market research firm said. State investment The country that’s already known for fast economic growth over the past 20 years would see the state take more control over key sectors after intervening in several, including the internet, in 2021, economists expect. “Beijing has the funds and the unfettered domestic political power to use China’s large public treasury to make strategic investments in the service of the leadership’s national and global objectives,” said Denny Roy, senior fellow at the East-West Center think tank in Honolulu. China scored 2.98 in 2018, up from 2.45 eight years earlier and approaching about three times the world average, on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development policy forum’s Direct Control Over Enterprises index. That means the government’s direct control over enterprises “well exceeded the open economy average” and “reflects China’s increasing emphasis on the role of the state in the economy under Xi Jinping,” the think tank Atlantic Council says in its October report China Pathfinder: Annual Scorecard . Growth in tech hardware Chinese leaders will probably prioritize tech, especially hardware that does not require constant innovation, as a growth engine, economists say. State intervention in the internet sector won't ~~hobble~~ [inhibit] expansion in semiconductors and infrastructure software, said Zennon Kapron, founder and director of the Shanghai-based financial industry research firm Kapronasia. “If the country does become self-sufficient in terms of technology and then is able to sell and export those products and services that are based on the technology, then that would be a huge bump to its economy, because [that] is a key driver certainly of the U.S. GDP now,” Kapron said. The U.S. economy will keep growing but without spurts through 2030, Kapron predicts. China has a “huge base of engineers,” albeit less creativity than it needs to foster the “zany ideas” that drive development of new technology, said Douglas McWilliams, founder and executive deputy chairman of CEBR. Consumer spending Domestic spending has driven most of China’s economic growth before 2021 as the country reduced its exposure to the world in view of the Sino-U.S. trade dispute, McKinsey & Co. says in its China consumer report 2021. Supply chains have “matured and localized, and its innovation capabilities were enhanced” in turn, McKinsey & Co says. That trend is likely to continue despite hits to income under lockdowns during the first year of COVID-19, analysts say. China’s population exceeds that of the United States by 3.5 times, though American consumers are wealthier on average. “In the past five years, domestic consumption has … become a more significant growth driver as China’s domestic consumer market has grown dramatically in size,” said Rajiv Biswas, Asia-Pacific chief economist with IHS Markit. Beijing’s leadership “aims to create more than 11 million new urban jobs and expand domestic demand and effective investment,” the official Xinhua News Agency said in mid-2021. Those measures, it said, “are expected to put the economy firmly back to pre-pandemic vibrancy.” **What if China overtakes US economy?** Status as the world’s largest economy does not confer any automatic advantages over others, economists said, but countries dependent on the Chinese economy would take note. “There is no gold medal or anything like that,” CEBR’s McWilliams told VOA. “But when you’ve got more money to spend, you do have the ability to influence things, and China will have that ability to influence things.” China would be better placed, he said, to advance its Belt and Road Initiative, a 9-year-old effort aimed at building land and sea trade routes through Asia, Europe and Africa in the form of infrastructure projects and investments. Officials in Beijing are already leveraging their economy in disputes with other countries, said Roy of the East-West Center. China vies with four Southeast Asian governments over maritime sovereignty, contests a group of islets with Japan and has gotten into territorial standoffs with India since 2017. “The result of that expectation (China surpassing the United States economically) has been a bolder PRC (People's Republic of China) foreign policy that seeks to settle regional disputes in China’s favor and to **de-legitimize U.S. regional and global leadership** under the assumption that China is destined to set the new rules of international relations,” Roy said.

#### US economic weakness and Chinese economic growth is driving US retrenchment

**Layne, 18** – Christopher Layne is University Distinguished Professor of International Affairs, and, Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security, at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (“The US–Chinese power shift

and the end of the Pax Americana” International Affairs 94: 1 (2018) 89–111; doi: 10.1093/ia/iix249 **LRBIO = Liberal Rules Based International Order; italics in original**

During the past decade, signs of waning US economic power—and China’s growing economic muscle—have become too numerous to ignore. Since the onset of the Great Recession, China has successively taken top position in the world in exports (passing Germany); in trade (passing the United States); and in manufacturing (claiming a title the United States had held for a century). In 2014 the World Bank made the stunning announcement that China had vaulted past the United States to become the world’s largest economy (measured by purchasing power parity (PPP);32 and in the early to mid-2020s China is predicted to overtake the United States in GDP measured by market exchange rate.33 These shifts in the relative economic power of China and the United States have enormous economic and geopolitical implications. Indeed, in July 2017 Christine Lagarde, managing director of the IMF, stated that in ten years’ time the organization’s headquarters—which are required by its by-laws to be located in its member country with the largest economy—could be in Beijing.34 Taken together, these indicators paint a clear picture of *relative* economic decline.

American primacists have advanced a number of clever but unconvincing arguments in an attempt to downplay the significance of the ongoing economic power shift from America to China. For example, some primacists assert that per capita GDP is a better yardstick of national power than aggregate GDP; that newly developed metrics of national power have diminished the importance of GDP as a measure of a state’s economic power; that China is far behind the United States in advanced technology; and that China is incapable of doing innovation.35

This last claim is ubiquitous among primacists.36 It is, however, undermined by recent developments. For example, in September 2016 China began operating the world’s largest radio telescope, which is intended to project China’s ambitions deep into the universe, and bring back the kind of dramatic discoveries that win honours such as Nobel Prizes.37 In August 2016 China launched the world’s first quantum satellite, which could lead ‘to new, completely different methods for transmitting information’.38 In another example of how China is catching up with the United States in innovation and technology, in June 2016 a Chinese computer (using made-in-China microprocessors) topped the ranking of the world’s fastest supercomputers.39 In July 2017 China’s State Council announced an ambitious plan to sprint to the front of the pack in artificial intelligence (AI), including both military and civilian applications.40 Indeed, The Economist recently observed that already ‘China could be a close second to America—and perhaps even ahead of it—in some areas of AI’.41 And China is moving to the forefront in green technologies (solar panels and wind-generated power) and in electric cars.42

The waning of US economic dominance may not be obvious to primacists, but it is perfectly apparent to many observers in the real world.43 The weakening of US relative economic power, which became unmistakably clear during the Great Recession, has undercut the Pax Americana both by compromising the United States’ ability to manage the international economy and by shifting the Sino-American geopolitical balance in east Asia.

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#### It’s reverse causal – increased economic growth staves off US retrenchment

**MacDonald and Parent, 18 –** Paul MacDonald is Associate Professor in Political Science at Wellesley College. Joseph M. Parent is associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame (Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment, conclusion)

Unless trends in relative power reverse, however, our theory suggests the incoming administration will find it difficult to abandon retrenchment. Given the sluggish performance of the American economy relative to its rivals, continued deficits, and concerns about the national debt, there will be limits on the ability of the incoming administration to ramp up defense spending. Already, there have been clashes between deficit and defense hawks in Congress over the size and method of funding Trump's proposed defense increases.53 The continued increase of Chinese economic influence and military capacity in Asia presents analogous geopolitical constraints on U.S. policy in that region. Despite tough talk on the campaign trail, the real- ity is that any lasting solution to the North Korean nuclear program, mari- time disputes in the South China Sea, or the status of Taiwan will require some accommodation of Chinese interests. More broadly, efforts to remake failed states or underwrite stability in regions such as the Middle East are likely to be met with skepticism. There is little enthusiasm within either Congress or the public to undertake such ambitious projects, and it seems likely that the favored counterterrorism instruments will remain the familiar ones: standoff airpower, assistance to local allies, the selective use of special operations forces, and regional diplomacy. Given the limits on America's resources, time, and attention, the new administration will prob- ably imitate the old, seeking to keep existing wars contained, while looking to fight them on the cheap.

#### Economy

Raymond 22 [Art Raymond covers the technology sector and innovation industries for the Utah InDepth team. He studied journalism at the University of Utah and is an award-winning writer on his second tour with the Deseret News, having previously covered state and local politics. He spends as much time as possible enjoying Utah’s amazing outdoor spaces, 6-8-2022, As China verges on becoming the premier global economy, how do U.S. businesses survive?, Deseret News, https://www.deseret.com/2022/6/8/23153757/china-will-be-worlds-largest-economy-are-u-s-businesses-ready-strategies-politics-human-rights] Eric

“China is now the world’s largest economy.”

How far away are we from that headline?

Experts have pegged the date as arriving in the next 10 years or so, and the likely dethroning of the U.S. economy, which has held the global top spot since the late 19th century, will mark a seismic shift of power that’s been decades in the making.

But what steps can U.S. businesses and public policymakers take right now, as China elevates both its internal repression and external aggression, to stay viable in a fast-changing world?

Addressing those issues and providing insight and tactical guidance is at the heart of Thursday’s China Challenge Summit, presented by World Trade Center Utah and Utah Valley University.

Organizers are billing the daylong event as an “unprecedented gathering of the nation’s top geopolitical thinkers, policymakers and business executives to provide U.S. businesses, government leaders and civil society with a deeper understanding” of the most critical issues, including:

China’s geopolitical strategy and U.S. foreign policy toward China.

China’s economic, trade, business and foreign policies.

How U.S. businesses and policymakers should respond to these challenges.

The extensive list of speakers and presenters include Jon Huntsman,Jr. former Utah governor and U.S. ambassador to China and Russia; Nicholas Burns, current U.S. ambassador to China; former deputy national security adviser Matt Pottinger; Glenn Tiffert, research fellow at the Hoover Institution; Lingling Wei, chief China correspondent at The Wall Street Journal; Mary Lovely, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics; Damien Ma, managing director at the Paulson Institute; Miles Hansen, president and CEO of World Trade Center Utah; Astrid Tuminez, president of Utah Valley University; and many more.

How fast has China been able to assemble this new economic might?

In 1960, China’s gross domestic product was about 11% of the U.S. GDP and now that figure is hovering at about 70%. China has been the biggest global exporter since 2009 and, in 2013, surpassed the U.S. to become the world’s largest trading country.

Hansen said that in virtually every business sector, in Utah and across the country, China has become recognized as the No. 1 challenge on a wide variety of issues. And, thanks to a growing disregard by nationalist nations for global trade and cooperation rules established after World War II, countries like China and Russia have opted, instead, to “crash through the rules” to achieve their objectives.

“For the past 40 years, there’s been the belief in the U.S. that as we worked hard to help China develop its economy it would lead to a moderation of China’s domestic policy, increased respect for human rights, improved foreign policy ... and free and fair markets,” Hansen said. “But over the past decade, really, what we’ve seen is … that is simply not happening.

“What we have seen is China becoming more repressive, more regressive. What they’re really working to do is make the world dependent on China ... while also making itself independent from the rest of the world.”

The last few decades have also seen a rising power and fiscal imbalance between the U.S. and China as the country of 1.4 billion continues to grow and solidify its economic might.

A [recent analysis](https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/great-economic-rivalry-china-vs-us) from Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs included these findings:

China’s sustained “miracle economic growth” over the past four decades at an average rate four times that of the U.S., which has redefined the global economic order.

When measured by the traditional yardstick — market exchange rate — since 2000, China’s GDP has soared from $1.2 trillion to $17.7 trillion. On the current trajectory, it will overtake the U.S. within a decade. By the yardstick both the CIA and the IMF judge to be the best metric for comparing national economies — purchasing power parity — China has already surpassed the U.S. to become the world’s largest economy.

China has established itself as the most essential link in the world’s critical global supply chains.

China has replaced the U.S. as the primary engine of global economic growth. Since the 2008 financial crisis, one-third of all growth in the world’s GDP has occurred in just one country: China.

In 2020, China supplanted the U.S. as the home to the largest number of the most valuable global companies on Fortune’s Global 500 for the first time. It has also rivaled the U.S. as the leading country in attracting foreign investment and is neck and neck with the U.S. in gross R&D investments.

#### Economic leadership is key to hegemony and influence

Bradt 22 [George Bradt is a senior contributor at Forbes who focuses on executive onboarding and leading through points of inflection, 6-7-2022, Why Economic Self-Sufficiency Is Imperative In The Coming US-China Reset, Per Ram Charan, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgebradt/2022/06/07/why-economic-self-sufficiency-is-imperative-in-the-coming-us-china-reset-per-ram-charan/] Eric

The Charan doctrine is that the rivalry between national spheres of influence is a three-legged stool made up of political, military and economic strengths. Like a three-legged stool, the legs are interdependent. Without relative economic strength, the sphere’s political and military strength will decay over time. As the autocracies’ relative economic strength increases, so will their political and military strength.

Just as no nation can compete over time with another nation on which it is dependent for military resources, no nation or sphere can compete effectively with its rival who controls its supply chain and accumulates trillions of trade surplus and hard dollar currency.

#### American economic bullying decks instead of helps them.

Jiayao 22 [Li Jiayao, 06-2-2022, American rules backed up by coercive diplomacy, arbitrary bullying, , http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2022-06/29/content\_10167444.htm] Eric

Not long ago, the US Secretary of State Blinken delivered a speech on China policy that highlighted the so-called “China threats”, smeared China’s domestic and foreign policies, and once again accused it of “coercive diplomacy”. Yet this label is best pinned on the US itself.

In practicing its “coercive diplomacy”, the US leverages its superiority in the economic, military and other sectors to force other countries to meet its demands and change their way of action, all for the purpose of achieving its own strategic goals and maintaining its hegemony through improper means.

For many years, America has made no secret of its “coercive diplomacy”. In fact, it even takes pride in it, which is why it never hesitates to blatantly and arbitrarily bully other countries for its own interests, either through the threat of force or political isolation, economic sanction or technological blockade. Washington acclaimed its success in overthrowing the military regime of Haiti in 1994 as an example of American “coercive diplomacy”, and allocated about 30.3 billion U.S. dollar in the additional defense budget of 2003 for executing “coercive diplomacy”.

Being a master of “coercive diplomacy”, the US is not fastidious about who it coerces – whether it’s big or small, nearby or distant, a friend or a foe. The international community has suffered a great deal from it. The US has blockaded and sanctioned Cuba for more than half a century, and its sanctions on Iran have lasted more than 40 years. Countries like Venezuela and Syria are also victims of its long-term sanctions. At the same time, Washington doesn’t hesitate to stab its so-called allies, like the EU and Japan, in the back either – which is not uncommon. Sometimes beating about the bushes, sometimes cutting right to the chase, the US has at its disposal numerous tricks to force its allies to adjust their stance and serve America’s interests. Barbara Wesel, a commentator for Deutsche Welle, said European countries have to pay a high political price in order to keep up the alliance with the US.

With regard to international affairs, the US has consistently put domestic law above international law and abused illegal unilateral sanctions and long-term jurisdiction, while its attitude toward international rules is rather selective, only using those in its favor while discarding those that are not. To maintain its hegemony, the US has formed “cliques” for bloc politics, instigated hostility between regional groups, and forced other countries and international organizations to “pick sides”. From the EU-US Dialogue to the AUKUS trilateral security partnership, from the Quad mechanism to Five Eyes, the US is holding up all kinds of banners of “partnership” while what it’s doing is creating division, egging confrontation, and benefiting itself at others’ expense. Its sustained attack on regional cooperation architecture under the outdated Cold War mentality has seriously undermined regional prosperity and stability.

The US plays the same game of threat and extortion with international organizations, either tearing up treaties or backing out of the organizations to serve its political agenda. For a long time, it takes the podium of the UN as its private turf and uses it to pressure other UN members; it took issue with the WHO to shirk responsibility for losing control of the pandemic; it withdrew from WHO and stopped exporting vital materials when the world was at a critical juncture of the anti-virus war, seriously threatening global public health and security…

The international community has long realized who is coercing the whole world and destroying global peace and stability. The country that attempts to topple other countries and wreck up the world through coercion, sanction and bullying will end up hurting itself.

#### China’s geoeconomics strategies are more expansive than the U.S

Jennings 22 [Ralph Jennings has covered news in China, Taiwan and Southeast Asia for the past 14 years at VOA, 1-4-2022, China’s Economy Could Overtake US Economy by 2030, VOA, https://www.voanews.com/a/chinas-economy-could-overtake-us-economy-by-2030/6380892.html] Eric

SAN FRANCISCO —

China’s economy will increasingly rely on state investment, high-tech development and domestic consumption – with less input from its past staple of export manufacturing – as it stands to overtake the United States in the coming decade, analysts predict.

China’s GDP should grow 5.7% per year through 2025 and then 4.7% annually until 2030, British consultancy [Centre for Economics and Business Research](https://cebr.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/WELT-2022.pdf%5d) (CEBR) forecasts. Its forecast says that China, now the world’s second-largest economy, would overtake the No. 1-ranked U.S. economy by 2030. Credit insurance firm Euler Hermes made a similar forecast.

Chinese leaders have pushed over the past decade to rely more on value-added services over traditional factory [exports, state media have said](https://www.voanews.com/a/china-weak-economy-/3152312.html). The Sino-U.S. trade dispute and early 2020 workplace closures due to COVID-19 have added pressure on manufacturing.

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State investment

The country that’s already known for fast economic growth over the past 20 years would see the state take more control over key sectors after intervening in several, including the internet, in 2021, economists expect.

“Beijing has the funds and the unfettered domestic political power to use China’s large public treasury to make strategic investments in the service of the leadership’s national and global objectives,” said Denny Roy, senior fellow at the East-West Center think tank in Honolulu.

China scored 2.98 in 2018, up from 2.45 eight years earlier and approaching about three times the world average, on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development policy forum’s Direct Control Over Enterprises index.

That means the government’s direct control over enterprises “well exceeded the open economy average” and “reflects China’s increasing emphasis on the role of the state in the economy under Xi Jinping,” the think tank[Atlantic Council](https://chinapathfinder.org/china-pathfinder-annual-scorecard/) says in its October report China Pathfinder: Annual Scorecard .

Growth in tech hardware

Chinese leaders will probably prioritize tech, especially hardware that does not require constant innovation, as a growth engine, economists say.

State intervention in the internet sector won't hobble expansion in semiconductors and infrastructure software, said Zennon Kapron, founder and director of the Shanghai-based financial industry research firm Kapronasia.

“If the country does become self-sufficient in terms of technology and then is able to sell and export those products and services that are based on the technology, then that would be a huge bump to its economy, because [that] is a key driver certainly of the U.S. GDP now,” Kapron said.

The U.S. economy will keep growing but without spurts through 2030, Kapron predicts.

China has a “huge base of engineers,” albeit less creativity than it needs to foster the “zany ideas” that drive development of new technology, said Douglas McWilliams, founder and executive deputy chairman of CEBR.

Consumer spending

Domestic spending has driven most of China’s economic growth before 2021 as the country reduced its exposure to the world in view of the Sino-U.S. trade dispute, [McKinsey & Co. says](https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/china/china%20still%20the%20worlds%20growth%20engine%20after%20covid%2019/mckinsey%20china%20consumer%20report%202021.pdf) in its China consumer report 2021. Supply chains have “matured and localized, and its innovation capabilities were enhanced” in turn, McKinsey & Co says.

That trend is likely to continue despite hits to income under lockdowns during the first year of COVID-19, analysts say. China’s population exceeds that of the United States by 3.5 times, though American consumers are wealthier on average.

“In the past five years, domestic consumption has … become a more significant growth driver as China’s domestic consumer market has grown dramatically in size,” said Rajiv Biswas, Asia-Pacific chief economist with IHS Markit.

Beijing’s leadership “aims to create more than 11 million new urban jobs and expand domestic demand and effective investment,” the official [Xinhua News Agency said](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-07/15/c_1310062812.htm) in mid-2021. Those measures, it said, “are expected to put the economy firmly back to pre-pandemic vibrancy.”

What if China overtakes US economy?

Status as the world’s largest economy does not confer any automatic advantages over others, economists said, but countries dependent on the Chinese economy would take note.

“There is no gold medal or anything like that,” CEBR’s McWilliams told VOA. “But when you’ve got more money to spend, you do have the ability to influence things, and China will have that ability to influence things.”

China would be better placed, he said, to advance its Belt and Road Initiative, a 9-year-old effort aimed at building land and sea trade routes through Asia, Europe and Africa in the form of infrastructure projects and investments.

Officials in Beijing are already leveraging their economy in disputes with other countries, said Roy of the East-West Center. China vies with four Southeast Asian governments over maritime sovereignty, contests a group of islets with Japan and has gotten into territorial standoffs with India since 2017.

“The result of that expectation (China surpassing the United States economically) has been a bolder PRC (People's Republic of China) foreign policy that seeks to settle regional disputes in China’s favor and to de-legitimize U.S. regional and global leadership under the assumption that China is destined to set the new rules of international relations,” Roy said.

### 2nc --- Military China Heg

#### Beijing outpaces the US military.

Robert Burns 11-01-21 [Writing for Associated Press, Nomaan Merchant of AP contributed, Associated Press, “Pentagon rattled by Chinese military push on multiple fronts,” https://apnews.com/article/technology-china-asia-united-states-beijing-aea288656fab23253ee0397dc21ba68a//ZW]

WASHINGTON (AP) — China’s growing military muscle and its drive to end American predominance in the Asia-Pacific is rattling the U.S. defense establishment. American officials see trouble quickly accumulating on multiple fronts — Beijing’s expanding nuclear arsenal, its advances in space, cyber and missile technologies, and threats to Taiwan. “The pace at which China is moving is stunning,” says Gen. John Hyten, the No. 2-ranking U.S. military officer, who previously commanded U.S. nuclear forces and oversaw Air Force space operations. At stake is a potential shift in the global balance of power that has favored the United States for decades. A realignment more favorable to China does not pose a direct threat to the United States but could complicate U.S. alliances in Asia. New signs of how the Pentagon intends to deal with the China challenge may emerge in coming weeks from Biden administration policy reviews on nuclear weapons, global troop basing and overall defense strategy. For now, officials marvel at how Beijing is marshaling the resources, technology and political will to make rapid gains — so rapid that the Biden administration is attempting to reorient all aspects of U.S. foreign and defense policy. The latest example of surprising speed was China’s test of a hypersonic weapon capable of partially orbiting Earth before reentering the atmosphere and gliding on a maneuverable path to its target. The weapon system’s design is meant to evade U.S. missile defenses, and although Beijing insisted it was testing a reusable space vehicle, not a missile, the test appeared to have startled U.S. officials. Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the test was “very close” to being a Sputnik moment, akin to the 1957 launching by the Soviet Union of the world’s first space satellite, which caught the world by surprise and fed fears the United States had fallen behind technologically. What followed was a nuclear arms and space race that ultimately bankrupted the Soviet Union. Milley and other U.S. officials have declined to discuss details of the Chinese test, saying they are secret. He called it “very concerning” for the United States but added that problems posed by China’s military modernization run far deeper. “That’s just one weapon system,” he said in a Bloomberg Television interview. “The Chinese military capabilities are much greater than that. They’re expanding rapidly in space, in cyber and then in the traditional domains of land, sea and air.” On the nuclear front, private satellite imagery in recent months has revealed large additions of launch silos that suggest the possibility that China plans to increase its fleet of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs. Hans Kristensen, a nuclear weapons expert at the Federation of American Scientists, says China appears to have about 250 ICBM silos under construction, which he says is more than 10 times the number in operation today. The U.S. military, by comparison, has 400 active ICBM silos and 50 in reserve. Pentagon officials and defense hawks on Capitol Hill point to China’s modernization as a key justification for rebuilding the U.S. nuclear arsenal, a project expected to cost more than $1 billion over 30 years, including sustainment costs. Fiona Cunningham, an assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and a specialist in Chinese military strategy, says a key driver of Beijing’s nuclear push is its concerns about U.S. intentions. “I don’t think China’s nuclear modernization is giving it a capability to pre-emptively strike the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and that was a really important generator of competition during the Cold War,” Cunningham said in an online forum sponsored by Georgetown University. “But what it does do is to limit the effectiveness of U.S. attempts to pre-emptively strike the Chinese arsenal.” Some analysts fear Washington will worry its way into an arms race with Beijing, frustrated at being unable to draw the Chinese into security talks. Congress also is increasingly focused on China and supports a spending boost for space and cyber operations and hypersonic technologies. There is a push, for example, to put money in the next defense budget to arm guided-missile submarines with hypersonic weapons, a plan initiated by the Trump administration. For decades, the United States tracked China’s increased defense investment and worried that Beijing was aiming to become a global power. But for at least the last 20 years, Washington was focused more on countering al-Qaida and other terrorist threats in Iraq and Afghanistan. That began to change during the Trump administration, which in 2018 formally elevated China to the top of the list of defense priorities, along with Russia, replacing terrorism as the No. 1 threat. For now, Russia remains a bigger strategic threat to the United States because its nuclear arsenal far outnumbers China’s. But Milley and others say Beijing is a bigger long-term worry because its economic strength far exceeds that of Russia, and it is rapidly pouring resources into military modernization. At the current pace of China’s military investment and achievement, Beijing “will surpass Russia and the United States” in overall military power in coming years “if we don’t do something to change it,” said Hyten, who is retiring in November after two years as vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “It will happen.” The Biden administration says it is determined to compete effectively with China, banking on a network of allies in Asia and beyond that are a potential source of strength that Beijing cannot match. That was central to the reasoning behind a Biden decision to share highly sensitive nuclear propulsion technologies with Australia, enabling it to acquire a fleet of conventionally armed submarines to counter China. Although this was a boost for Australia, it was a devastating blow to Washington’s oldest ally, France, which saw its $66 billion submarine sale to Australia scuttled in the process. Taiwan is another big worry. Senior U.S. military officers have been warning this year that China is probably accelerating its timetable for capturing control of Taiwan, the island democracy widely seen as the most likely trigger for a potentially catastrophic U.S.-China war. The United States has long pledged to help Taiwan defend itself, but it has deliberately left unclear how far it would go in response to a Chinese attack. President Joe Biden appeared to abandon that ambiguity when he said Oct. 21 that America would come to Taiwan’s defense if it were attacked by China. “We have a commitment to do that,” Biden said. The White House later said he was not changing U.S. policy, which does not support Taiwanese independence but is committed to providing defensive arms.

#### Chinese military dominates US--- but overtake is peaceful.

David Brown 12-21-2021 [Writing for BBC, BBC News, “Why China could win the new global arms race,” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-59600475//ZW]

China is building up its armed forces at a rapid pace. Its advances in missile technology, nuclear weapons and artificial intelligence have triggered serious concern among many Western observers, who believe a profound shift in the global balance of military power is under way. President Xi Jinping has ordered China's armed forces to modernise by 2035. They should, he says, become a "world-class" military power, capable of "fighting and winning wars" by 2049. It is a huge undertaking, but the country is on target. Spending big China has been criticised by some international experts for a "lack of transparency" over how much it spends on defence, and an "inconsistent reporting of figures". Beijing does publish official spending data, but Western estimates of China's financial support for its armed forces are often significantly higher. It is widely believed that China currently spends more on its armed forces than any country except the US. The growth of China's military budget has outpaced its overall economic growth for at least a decade, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Boosting the nuclear stockpile In November, the US Department of Defense predicted that China was set to quadruple its nuclear stockpile by the end of the current decade. China, it said, "likely intends to have at least 1,000 warheads by 2030". Chinese state media called the claim "wild and biased speculation", adding that nuclear forces were kept at a "minimum level". However, experts at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, who publish annual assessments of global stockpiles, say China has been increasing the number of its warheads over recent years. China is still a long way short of the US stockpile of 5,550 warheads, but its nuclear build-up is being seen as one of the biggest threats to Western military supremacy. "China's nuclear weapons are the most important issue," according to Veerle Nouwens, of the Royal United Services institute in London. "There is a huge lack of trust on both sides and dialogue is nowhere near the level needed. There are big risks and the off-ramps are difficult to see." Hypersonic future Hypersonic missiles travel at more than five times the speed of sound. They are not as fast as intercontinental ballistic missiles, but they are so difficult to detect in flight that they may render some air defences useless. "The Chinese understand that they are a long way behind, so they are trying to make big breakthroughs to leap-frog other powers," according to Dr Zeno Leoni, of King's College London. "Developing hypersonic missiles is one of the ways they're trying to do this." China has denied testing hypersonic missiles, but Western experts believe that two rocket launches last summer indicate that its military is well on the way to acquiring them. It's unclear exactly what systems China may be developing. There are two main types: Hypersonic glide missiles stay within the Earth's atmosphere Fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS) fly in low orbit before accelerating towards a target It is possible that China may have succeeded in combining the two systems, firing a hypersonic missile from an FOBS manoeuvrable spacecraft. Dr Leoni says that while hypersonic missiles may not - on their own - be a game-changer, they will make some targets highly vulnerable to attack. "Hypersonic missiles make aircraft carriers in particular much more difficult to defend," he says. However, he also suggests that that the threat from Chinese hypersonic missiles may have been overstated by some Western officials, who are keen to make as strong a case as possible for the financing of military space technology. "The threat is real. Yet, it is possible that this is being exaggerated." Artificial intelligence and cyber-attacks China is now fully committed to developing "intelligentised" warfare, or future military methods based on disruptive technologies - especially artificial intelligence, according to the US Department of Defense. China's Academy of Military Science has been given a mandate to make sure that this happens, through "civil-military fusion", in other words joining up Chinese private sector technology companies with the country's defence industries. Reports suggest that China may already be using artificial intelligence in military robotics and missile guidance systems, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned naval vessels. China has already conducted large-scale cyber-operations abroad, according to a recent expert assessment. In July the UK, US and EU accused China of carrying out a major cyber-attack targeting Microsoft Exchange servers. It is believed that the attack affected at least 30,000 organisations globally and aimed to enable large-scale espionage, including the acquisition of personal information and intellectual property. The world's largest, but not most powerful, navy China has overtaken the US to become the largest navy in the world - but experts point out that a simple comparison of ship numbers leaves out numerous factors which determine a navy's capabilities. But, they say, an examination of the trends can be useful. For now, the US maintains a strong lead in many naval capabilities, with 11 aircraft carriers to China's two, and more nuclear-powered submarines, cruisers and destroyers - or larger warships. But China is expected to expand its navy much further. Former People's Liberation Army Senior Colonel Zhou Bo, of Tsinghua University in Beijing, says he believes it is "critically important" for China to strengthen its navy to counter the sea-based threats which it faces. In particular, he says: "The most outstanding problem we face is what we perceive to be American provocation in China's waters." The US Navy predicts that between 2020 and 2040, the total number of Chinese navy ships will increase by nearly 40%. Uncertain future Is China moving away from non-confrontation towards a more threatening stance? For now, the Chinese approach is still "win without fighting", says Dr Leoni, although he adds that it could change this strategy some time in the future. "Becoming a fully modernised naval power could be one tipping point." But Senior Colonel Zhou insists that Western fears are unfounded. "China has no intention of policing the world, unlike the United States," he says. "Even if China becomes much stronger one day, it will maintain its basic policies." China has not fought a war since 1979, when it went into battle with Vietnam, so much of its military capabilities are completely untested. Many in both the West and in China will hope it stays that way.

#### China will be able to challenge the US military by 2020

**Layne, 18** – Christopher Layne is University Distinguished Professor of International Affairs, and, Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security, at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (“The US–Chinese power shift

and the end of the Pax Americana” International Affairs 94: 1 (2018) 89–111; doi: 10.1093/ia/iix249 **LRBIO = Liberal Rules Based International Order**

In a recent report on the Sino-American military balance, the RAND Corporation refers to the ‘receding frontier of US military dominance’ in east Asia.28 According to RAND, the trend lines in the Sino-American military rivalry in east Asia are not favourable for the United States: ‘Although China has not closed the gap with the United States, it has narrowed it—and it has done so quite rapidly. Even for many of the contributors to this report, who track military developments in Asia on an ongoing basis, the speed of change … was striking.’29 In a recent book, Roger Cliff, an east Asian security expert at RAND, says that by 2020 China’s military establishment will be almost on an equal footing with America’s with respect to doctrine, equipment, personnel and training (though still lagging behind in organizational structure, logistics and organizational culture). Consequently, he predicts that by 2020 American military dominance in east Asia will be significantly eroded.30 He predicts that the 2020s will witness a power transition in east Asia and that at this point China will be able to challenge the regional status quo.31

#### A focus on hard power just increases the risk of conflict – the US can’t prevent the collapse of the rest of its power

**Freeman, 17** - Senior Fellow, the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University (Chas, “Reimagining Great Power Relations” 3/9, <http://watson.brown.edu/files/watson/imce/people/fellows/freeman/ReimaginingGreatPowerRelations.pdf>

International reactions to the election of Donald Trump have catalyzed a far swifter collapse of the American-led world order than anyone could have imagined. Interactions between great and middle-ranking powers are undergoing rapid evolution. The political, economic, and military interests and influence of the United States still span the globe, as does American popular culture. Nations and non-state actors in every region continue to worry about American policies, activism, or passivity on matters of concern to them. In short, the United States is still the planet’s only all-around world power. But the clout that status confers is not what it used to be.

The only other polity with the potential to rival America’s worldwide influence at present is the European Union (EU). It has the money but lacks the ambition or political and military cohesion to exert decisive influence beyond its periphery. Until “Brexit,” the EU included two former world powers, Britain and France. Now only France -- which retains a sphere of influence in Africa and overseas territories in the Caribbean, Indian Ocean, and Polynesia – can bring a global perspective to EU councils.

China and Japan have great worldwide economic influence but little political appeal and negligible ability to project conventional military power to regions remote from them. Russia has a nuclear arsenal that can devastate every corner of the globe. It has again become a major actor in the Middle East, but otherwise lacks economic, political, or cultural reach much beyond the confines of the former Soviet Union. Brazil and India dream of global roles but exercise little influence beyond their immediate regions and the parts of Africa that are closest to them.

The Trump administration’s rejection of multilateralism marks a major step back from international leadership by the United States. It signals that America no longer seeks to make and interpret the rules that govern the world’s political, economic, and military interactions. Instead, Washington will seek unilateral advantage through piecemeal bilateral deals. This pivot away from preeminence has created a geopolitical and geoeconomic power vacuum into which other great powers are being drawn. Responsibility for the maintenance of global political, economic, and military order is everywhere devolving to the regional level.

Meanwhile, the United States is increasingly isolated on transnational issues. Official American antipathy to science on climate change and similar issues has discredited the United States as a participant in setting polices that address them. And Washington’s escalating disdain for the United Nations and international law has delegitimized its role as the “world policeman.” The uncertainties inherent in this situation are everywhere accelerating the formation of regional groupings. But, despite some stirring by China, there is as yet no credible successor to the United States as a global order-setter.

The U.S. armed forces remain the only military establishment with global power projection capabilities and experience in managing multinational coalitions. Generals and admirals bestride the highly militarized foreign policy apparatus of the United States government. This caps a longstanding trend. Americans so thoroughly identify “power” as exclusively military in nature that it has been necessary to invent an academic concept of “soft power” to embrace measures short of war like diplomacy.

But global military primacy no longer translates into political leadership at either the global or regional levels. It doesn’t even guarantee dominance in the world's regions.

Recent American military interventions abroad have consistently evoked resistance that has frustrated the achievement of their goals. Unless tied to clearly attainable political objectives, the use of force can accomplish little other than the slaughter of foreigners and the destruction of their artifacts. This generates more blowback than security.

As American influence has receded, regional great powers like China, India, Iran, and Russia have begun to consolidate regional state systems centered on themselves. This process was underway even before “America first” impaired U.S. leadership by making American indifference to the interests and concerns of other countries officially explicit. America has now chosen publicly to redefine itself internationally as the foreign relations equivalent of a sociopath – a country indifferent to the rules, the consequences for others of its ignoring them, and the 1 reliability of its word. No nation can now comfortably entrust its prosperity or security to Washington, no matter how militarily powerful it perceives America to be.

In the United States, there has been a clear drift toward the view that outcomes, not due process, are the sole criteria of justice. Procedures – that is, judicial decisions, elections, or actions by legislatures – no longer confer legitimacy. The growing American impatience with institutions and processes is reflected in the economic nationalism and transactionalism that now guide U.S. policy. Washington now reserves the right to pick and choose which decisions by international tribunals like the World Trade Organization (WTO) it will follow or ignore.

The idea that previously agreed arrangements can be abandoned or renegotiated at will has succeeded the principle of “PACTA SUNT SERVANDA” (“agreements must be kept”). The result is greatly reduced confidence not only in the reliability of American commitments but also in the durability of the international understandings that have constituted the status quo. In the security arena, this trend is especially pronounced with respect to arms control arrangements. As an example,, Russia has cited American scofflaw behavior to justify its own delinquencies in Ukraine and with respect to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

When a hegemon fails to pay attention to the opinions of its allies, dependencies, and client states or to show its adversaries that it can be counted upon to play by the rules it insists they follow, it conjures up its own antibodies. In the absence of empathy, there can be no mutual reliance or collective security. Without confidence in the reliability of protectors or allies, nations must be ready to defend themselves by themselves at any moment. If covenants are readily dishonored, the law offers no assurance of safety. Only credible military deterrence can protect against attack.

The post-Cold War era began in 1990 when the international community came together to affirm that the new order should not allow large states to use force to annex smaller, weaker neighbors, as Iraq attempted to do with Kuwait. But the opening years of the 21st century have taught small and medium-sized nations a different lesson. They have learned that to preclude threats to their independence and territorial integrity from great powers they must either accommodate them, seek the protection of alliances with others, or possess the capacity to inflict severe injury on any potential attacker, no matter how militarily powerful.

They have learned that there is no longer any security to be found in the United Nations Charter or its decision-making processes. International law and vetoes in the U.N. Security Council did not protect Serbia from great power intervention to detach Kosovo from it. Nor did opposition in the Security Council prevent the coercive separation of Crimea from Ukraine. No one even bothers to mention international law in discussions of Syria, where external interventions to produce regime change have been unabashedly overt. The old rules no longer provide security. They are increasingly ignored.

An Indian general remarked after the 1990-91 Gulf War that its lesson was clear. To be secure from attack by the United States one must possess a nuclear deterrent. (Pakistan would no doubt say the same thing about India, as would some in Iraq and Iran about Israel.) Lacking nuclear weapons, Iraq and Libya saw their governments overthrown and their leaders brutally murdered. Nuclear-armed North Korea – by any measure, a far more dangerous regime – has so far been spared foreign attack. It is telling that every non-nuclear weapons state now allegedly attempting to develop such weapons and related delivery systems (including north Korea) is said to be doing so to deter an attack by the United States. Not one appears to be motivated by a desire to deter China, Europe's nuclear powers, India, Japan, Pakistan, or Russia.

Across the globe, the lessened security that results from the erosion of rule-bound order has been compounded by hysteria over attacks by terrorists. The spread of Islamophobia has paved the way for the revival of other forms of xenophobia, like racism and anti-Semitism. Illiberalism looks like the wave of the future. We are witnessing the consolidation of national security-obsessed garrison states.

Some sub-global powers -- like Iran, Turkey, Russia, and China -- are demanding deference to their power by the countries in their “near abroad” or “near seas.” They thus negate the near-universal sphere of influence that America asserted during the so-called “unipolar moment” of worldwide U.S. hegemony that followed the Cold War. They are imposing their own military precautionary zones (“cordons sanitaires”) to manage and reduce external threats from other powers. This pushback is resented by the United States, which – with no sense of irony, given its own insistence on exclusive control of the Americas – charges them with attempts to project illegitimate "spheres of influence" beyond their borders.

By disavowing longstanding U.S. commitments, the Trump administration has inadvertently confirmed foreign doubts about American reliability. Efforts to allay these concerns have garnered little credence. The ebb of U.S. influence is forcing countries previously dependent on Washington’s protection to make unwelcome choices between diversifying their international relationships, decoupling their foreign policies from America's, forming their own ententes and coalitions to buttress deterrence, or accommodating more powerful neighbors. Whatever mix of actions they choose, they also boost spending to build more impressive armed forces.

Almost all countries still under U.S. protection continue to affirm their alliance with the United States even as they ramp up a capacity to go it alone. Arms races are becoming the norm in most regions of the world. Global military expenditures grew by fifty percent from 2001 to 2015.

Not long ago, geopolitics was largely explicable in bipolar terms of US-Soviet rivalry. After a unipolar moment, the political and economic orders have gone fractal – understandable only in terms of evolving complexities at the regional or sub-regional level. Intra-regional rivalries now fuel huge purchases by middle-ranking powers of state-of-the-art weaponry produced by the great powers. No one should confuse increased weapons purchases with a deepening of alliance commitments.

So, for example, Saudi Arabia’s arms purchases have tripled in the past five years. Trends in other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member countries are similar. At the same time, the Gulf Arabs are reaching out to China, the EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, and Turkey and convening pan-Muslim coalitions against Islamist terrorism and Iran. They have undertaken unprecedentedly unilateral and aggressive military interventions in places like Libya, Syria, and Yemen. As they have done so, the countries of the Fertile Crescent – Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria – have drawn ever closer to Iran. Iraqi Kurdistan has become a de facto Turkish dependency. Before a Western-supported coup ousted Ukraine’s elected president , that country wobbled 2 between East and West but was on its way into the Russian embrace. The Philippines has distanced it from the United States and bundled with China. So has Thailand. Myanmar and Vietnam, by contrast, are seeking partners to balance China. The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have doubled down on their reliance on NATO, which they joined in 2004 to secure their independence from Russia. Cuba and Venezuela look to Russia and China for support against ongoing American policies of regime change.

Meanwhile, international governance of trade and investment continues to devolve to the regional level and configure itself to supply chains. Examples include new trade pacts, like the RCEP, the Pacific Alliance, and the Eurasian Economic Union; preexisting blocs like the 3 4 5 GCC, Mercosur, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; as well as well-established 6 7 8 confederations like the 27-member post-Brexit EU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) . Each of these groupings has one or two heavyweight members at 9 its core, constituting a natural leadership.

Where such regional arrangements have been implemented, rules are made and enforced without much, if any, reference to external powers. Thus, the EU has had no role to speak of in shaping relations between Canada, Mexico, and the United States under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Conversely, the United States has had very little say in decisions made in Brussels on rules for trade and investment in the EU and its associated economies. Given the Trump administration’s aversion to multilateralism, the United States will have no say at all in the standard-setting that will take place in either the RCEP or the 65-country pan-Eurasian economic community that is beginning to emerge from China’s “belt and road” initiative. Regionalism limits the reach of great powers. Bilateralism limits it even more.

The decentralization of authority over global economic, political, and defense issues represents a net loss of influence by the U.S. and other great powers over the evolution of the international state system. But it presents both a challenge and an opportunity for middle-ranking powers. On the one hand, as U.S. and EU influence atrophies, they have an expanding role in international rule-making. On the other, they are now subject to pressure from neighboring great powers that is unmoderated by any global rules.

Take Mexico as an example. This is a proud nation of nearly 130 million people, the world’s 13th largest country geographically and its 11th most populous. It has the world’s 11th largest economy. By every measure, Mexico is a middle-ranking power. As such, even if it were not a member of NAFTA and the Pacific Alliance, it would have a significant voice in the G-20, the WTO, the United Nations, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Asia-Pacific.

Interdependence has mitigated but not erased historic Mexican resentment of domineering American behavior. Mexicans have not forgotten that the United States invaded their country and annexed 55 percent of its territory in 1846 - 1848. But, since the entry into force of NAFTA in January 1994, Mexico’s economy has become almost fully integrated with the American economy through complex supply chains. Eighty percent of Mexican exports now go to the U.S. Mexico has become the United States’ second largest export market and its third largest trading partner (after China and Canada). It has also quietly transformed itself into a reliably pro-American bulwark against influences from extra-hemispheric powers like Russia and China. It has proven the efficacy of economic opening and reform and has become an influential advocate of liberal economics as opposed to the perennial statism and mercantilism of most other Latin American nations.

Now Mexico is faced with demands from the Trump administration to cooperate in dismantling its interdependence with the United States. At the same time, the U.S. president is denigrating Mexicans, proposing to wall them out, and threatening to deport masses of undocumented migrants and alleged criminals to Mexico, whether they are Mexican or not and whether Mexico has any legal reason to accept them or not. Not surprisingly, Mexican opinion is now hostile to the United States. Mexico’s government has little leeway for compromise. Surrender to American demands is not an option. But Mexico currently has little leverage over Washington.

So Mexico faces highly unwelcome choices. It can bargain as best it can on its own, risking its prosperity and stability on what is almost certainly a bad bet. It can seek leverage over the United States by suspending cooperation against transit by illegal migrants and the supply of narcotics to American addicts. It can make common cause against the United States by forming a global united front with other economies targeted by the Trump administration for their bilateral trade surpluses, like China, Germany, Japan, and south Korea. It can adopt Cuban-style defiance of Washington’s efforts to bring it to heel, allying itself with extra-hemispheric powers like China and/or Russia or Iran. Or it could choose some mixture of all of these options. It is too early to predict what course Mexican-American relations will take in the age of Trump. They will be affected by many factors, including the state of relations between the United States and other great powers – especially China and Russia.

Mexico is far from the only middle-ranking power now of necessity maneuvering between the world’s great powers. Ukraine has yet to find its place between Russia, the EU, and the United States. Turkey has distanced itself from the EU and America and formed an entente (limited partnership for limited purposes) with Russia. Iran has reached out to India as well as Russia in order to counter the United States and the Gulf Arabs. Saudi Arabia – once exclusively attached to the United States – is actively courting China, India, Indonesia, Japan, and Russia. Pakistan is seeking to avoid having to choose between Saudi Arabia and Iran. At the same time, it has accepted the task of coordinating the activities of a pan-Islamic military alliance that implicitly counters both Iran and an ever more assertively Islamophobic India. To reduce dependence on the United States and the GCC, Egypt is courting cooperation with Iran, Russia, and Turkey. Old global alignments are everywhere giving way to more complex patterns.

Despite an unprecedented degree of interdependence between them, relations between the great powers are also in motion. Brazil, China, the EU, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States are each one another’s largest or second largest trading partners and sources of foreign direct investment. They are linked to each other in global supply chains, which tend to converge in and between large economies. All are members of the Bretton Woods legacy institutions – the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and WTO. These institutions earlier accommodated the rise of Japan. More recently, they have lagged in reflecting the rapidly increasing weight of other non-Western economies in world trade and finance.

The formation of the “BRICS” group was a collective effort by Brazil, Russia, India, and China (soon joined by South Africa) to develop institutions to reflect the current distribution of global commercial and financial power and contemporary governance requirements. When Bretton Woods took place the world had just been crushed by World War II. America dominated the world economy, justifying its preeminent role in global governance. Recent shifts in economic balances of power have not been reflected in legacy institutions. Washington remains the nominal leader in them but finds itself increasingly sidelined as others feel obliged to work around it. The Trump administration’s skepticism about the value of the international economic institutions that earlier generations of Americans created has accelerated the diminishment of U.S. managerial control over the global economy.

Similar erosion of U.S. primacy is evident in international politics. China, India, and Russia have met annually since 2002 to discuss how to establish a multipolar world order in which U.S. unilateralism cannot hold sway. Antagonism between the world’s greatest powers is growing. With the United States pushing back against Russia in the West and China in the East, the two are being nudged together to counter America.

To offset Sino-Russian partnership, Japan seeks rapprochement with India and Russia, leavening its longstanding exclusive reliance on the United States. China, Europe, Russia, and the United States are also courting India, which is, as always, playing hard to get. Meanwhile, China is reaching out to Europe and the EU is attempting to work with it to fill the leadership vacuum in the Asia-Pacific created by the sudden U.S. abandonment of the economic leg of its “pivot to Asia.” No region is immune from realignment in its international relationships. Brazil’s membership in the BRICS group symbolizes its cultivation of relationships with emerging powers to balance those it has with the United States and middle-ranking powers in the Western Hemisphere.

As a consequence of these trends, we are now well into a world of many competing power centers and regional balances. Long-term vision and short-term diplomatic agility are at a premium. Neither is anywhere evident. In their absence, territorial disputes rooted in World War II and Cold War troop movements and lines of control, arms races (nuclear as well as conventional), shifting balances of prestige, and the reduced moderating effect of international organizations are helping to escalate alienation and tension between the great powers.

The stakes are high. Trade wars that could wreck the global economy and degrade the prosperity of all are now all too easy to imagine. Armed conflict could break out at any time along the unsettled borders between China and India and China and Japan. The U.S. and Chinese navies are maneuvering against each other in the South China Sea. The two countries appear to be headed for a military confrontation over Taiwan. The Peloponnesian War and World War I remind us that squabbles between lesser powers can drag their patrons into existential strife despite their better judgment.

Notwithstanding ample opportunity to do so, the U.S., EU, and Russia failed to craft a cooperative post-Cold War order to regulate their interaction in Europe. There is no agreement on where NATO ends and Russia begins. We now face the possibility that it will take an armed face-down to define a dividing line between them.

All great powers now share an avowed interest in containing Islamist terrorism and remediating its causes. Escalating antipathies born of territorial disputes and Chinese and Russian opposition to U.S. primacy prevent cooperation to this end. The politically expedient demonization of strategic rivals in democracies like the United States inhibits cooperation even where specific interests nearly completely coincide. The same factors diminish the likelihood of cooperation on other matters where interests substantially overlap -- like Syria and Korea.

Meanwhile, U.S. deployments of ballistic missile defenses and the increasing lethality of American nuclear warheads have convinced both Russia and China that Washington is reaching for the ability to decapitate them in a first strike. Russia and the United States are in a nuclear arms race again. China seems to have been provoked to develop a second-strike capability that, like Russia’s, will be able to annihilate, not just maim America. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has moved its “Doomsday Clock” the closest to midnight since 1954.

The risks the world now faces were not (and are not) inevitable. They are the product of lapses of statesmanship and failures to consider how others see and react to us. The setbacks to America’s ability to shape the international environment to its advantage are not the result of declining capacity on its part. They are the consequence of a failure to adapt to new realities and shifting power balances. Raging against change will not halt it. Pulling down the frameworks and trashing the rules on which North American and global prosperity were built is far more likely to prove counterproductive than empowering. Buying more military hardware will not remedy the national strategy deficit. Gutting the foreign affairs agencies and doubling down on diplomacy-free foreign policy will deepen it.

### 2nc --- Dollar China Heg Inevitable

#### Global patterns prove – Dollar hegemony is zeroed

Nunes 4-12 [Maria Claudia Nunes serves as a volunteer researcher at the Nucleus of Conjunctural Assessment (NAC), as technology specialist at the Naval War School (EGN) in Brazil, and a Political Science Professor’s Assistant in University of São Paulo, 4-12-2022, A Slow Erosion: The Uncertain Future of the Dollar, Geopolitics, https://thegeopolitics.com/a-slow-erosion-the-uncertain-future-of-the-dollar/] Eric

In other words, the economic challenges posed by various countries during the last decade, such as the creation of the BRICS bank, are a reaction to poor American economic policy. Currency depreciation as a result of Quantitative Easing did not result in large inflation within the United States due to the dollar status as the international trade currency as it exported its [inflation to other countries](https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=313027093103006079096093087111068095029078064077029082029098016075115111102016003103006022018042109022044119093025083097024106006076043087080124005122018118081024061030047104069031092081123026120069113006125072112099022106101077120127097067003126003&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE). The cascading effect from this exportation created a cycle of escape from the dollar as many central banks sought different currencies with a higher yield as well as started to accumulate gold as a method of preventing these inflationary shocks created by American policies. In fact, according to a report by World Gold Council, gold purchase by a diverse group of central banks [increased 82%](https://www.gold.org/goldhub/research/gold-demand-trends/gold-demand-trends-full-year-2021) last year pushing the total global purchases of the asset to a new 30-year-high; as well as the IMF noting that in the same year, the amount of dollars utilized as reserve currency has reached a [new low of merely 59%](https://blogs.imf.org/2021/05/05/us-dollar-share-of-global-foreign-exchange-reserves-drops-to-25-year-low/).

Twinned Acceleration

The trend had already existed for almost three decades at the very least, however, two factors have accelerated this trend: technological innovation and geopolitical transformations.

Since the start of the 21st century, the growth in digital technologies have irrevocably changed the financial landscape forever. While cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin have been the most well-known part of this change, a rather significant driver is the rise of electronic platforms that enabled have automated financial markets and liquidity management as well as allowed the creation and growth of [real time payment systems](https://www.paymentsjournal.com/real-time-payments-everything-you-need-to-know/). These electronic systems have greatly lowered the costs of setting up trading posts for different currency pairs and lowered transactional savings that existed by using the dollar instead of local currency pairs. Economically speaking, both lower costs and high inflation export from the United States nudged many countries in the developing world to look into other currencies as part of their diversified reserves along with gold.

Geopolitical actions are another driver in this trend, the constant weaponization of the global economic system by the United States has caused a few countries to look towards alternative payment arrangements in order to continue to trade with sanctioned countries. Both Russia and China have already created alternative payment systems ranging from local equivalents of the SWIFT such as the CIPS and the SFPS to a local Russian card transaction system called MIR to substitute both American-owned Visa and Mastercard. This is not to mention the existence of INSTEX that was originally created by one of United States’ allies, the European Union, as a way to bypass sanctions on Iran. In other words, the reckless use of sanctions by the United States has shown to the world that it cannot trust a financial system that expects national interests to be ignored in favor of a global interest, which had been currently closely aligned with American corporate interests.

### 2nc --- Space China Heg Inevitable

#### Space

Minter 22 [Adam Minter is a columnist at Bloomberg Opinion where he writes about China, technology, and the environment, 6-29-2022, Will China Overtake US on Mars Missions? It’s Up to NASA, Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-06-29/china-is-quickly-challenging-us-on-mars-exploration] Eric

In 2033, a U.S. spacecraft will return to Earth carrying the second cache of rocks ever collected from the surface of Mars. The first cache? It will have been collected by China two years earlier, in 2031, according to plans [released](https://spacenews.com/china-aims-to-bring-mars-samples-to-earth-2-years-before-nasa-esa-mission/) last week by one of China's top space scientists.

Of course, there's no guarantee that either mission will succeed. But China's impressive recent successes operating on and above the Moon and Mars give the country a better chance at lapping NASA and its partners.

The news may cause alarm among Americans accustomed to being first in space for more than a half-century. This is no Sputnik moment, however, and there is no reason to panic.

A mission to bring back the samples is an impressive technological achievement. But the future of Mars exploration isn't sample returns; it's discovering past life on Mars. For now, the US is better positioned to accomplish that goal.

In 1993, NASA initiated the [Mars Exploration Program](https://mars.nasa.gov/), or MEP, a long-term initiative to [explore](https://mars.nasa.gov/#mars_exploration_program/1) Martian geology, climate and the possibility of past life, while laying a foundation for human exploration. Over the next three decades, NASA launched orbiters and rovers revealing ancient river and lake beds, as well as mineral evidence of a wet and warm Martian past. These discoveries heightened interest in seeking out evidence for past Martian life, and launching additional probes to find it.

Unfortunately, the scientific instruments necessary to prove that life once existed on Mars are simply [too large and complex](https://mars.nasa.gov/news/8863/searching-for-life-in-nasas-perseverance-mars-samples/) to transport to the planet’s surface. To make that kind of history-altering discovery, pieces of Mars must be brought back to Earth. That's a complex endeavor.

For example, [one early NASA concept](https://trs.jpl.nasa.gov/bitstream/handle/2014/16893/99-0303.pdf?sequence=1) had two rovers landing on Mars, collecting samples and then launching them into orbit, where a third vehicle would rendezvous with them and dispatch them back to Earth. That mission would've started launching in 2003 and returned samples in 2008. Instead it was canceled over cost and difficulty.

Twenty years ago, there was little competition for the U.S. in space. The Russian program was in terminal decline, and China was [just starting](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus/eng/xw/t34741.htm) to launch humans into space.

But despite a late start, China's leadership was [determined to catch up](https://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/22/world/heading-for-the-stars-and-wondering-if-china-might-reach-them-first.html). It's an ambition inspired by the belief that the country's economic and military future will, in part, be determined by its space capabilities.

During the early 2000s, the Chinese announced an ambitious program of lunar exploration, a future space station and, tentatively, a Mars program. In each case, they have followed through and achieved successes, including lunar rovers, a Mars orbiter and rover, and a small but functional space station that could [have Earth orbit to itself if the US doesn't replace the aging International Space Station](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-02-02/as-the-iss-decays-bring-on-the-private-space-stations) by the end of the decade.

That would be a public-relations and technical triumph for the Chinese. But if it doesn't happen, China remains keen to find another high-profile way to surpass the US in space.

Until recently, Mars was not an obvious place to do it. In 2012, after a [recommendation from the National Academy of Sciences](https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/13117/vision-and-voyages-for-planetary-science-in-the-decade-2013-2022), NASA [began work](https://spacenews.com/mars-planning-group-endorses-sample-return/) on new concepts for sample-return missions. Like earlier ones, these required multiple spacecraft, starting with a rover to collect samples from a region of Mars that shows promise as a repository of past life.

Rather than wait for the full mission to be designed and built, NASA landed the Mars Perseverance rover near a dried-up Martian river delta in 2021. The rover contains 43 tubes for soil and rock samples that — scientists hope — will eventually be returned to Earth after they're dropped somewhere on the Martian surface, to be picked up later by another rover. This retrieval rover, in turn, will deliver them to a rocket (which also needs to be landed on Mars) that will fly them to a spacecraft that will ferry them to Earth.

For now, the only part of this return mission that exists is the [Perseverance](https://mars.nasa.gov/mars2020/) rover, which is [currently seeking promising samples for eventual return to Earth](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-01543-z).

The other parts of the mission, estimated to cost around $5 billion, have yet to be funded or built. They're also delayed: In March, NASA [postponed](https://www.space.com/perseverance-mars-sample-return-delay-2033) the return to 2033, from 2031, in part to provide time to simplify the complicated mission.

That's China's opening. Its scientists believe they can beat the US back to Earth by leveraging technologies used on China's recent lunar sample return, and Mars rover and orbiter missions.

As outlined in a [presentation](https://twitter.com/YuqiiQian/status/1538712547875991552?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1538712547875991552%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fspacenews.com%2Fchina-aims-to-bring-mars-samples-to-earth-2-years-before-nasa-esa-mission%2F) given last week by the chief designer of China's current Mars rover, it's a simpler mission than NASA's. Most notably, it doesn't include rovers that can sample different sites over a large geographic area. Instead, the mission appears to be designed to land, grab samples (potentially using a four-legged robot), and get them back to China.

If China can pull it off, it's a tremendous technical accomplishment, and the samples will be of considerable scientific interest. With a little luck, they may even contain the evidence of life that US scientists hope to discover with their own samples.

### 2nc --- Ukraine China Heg Inevitable

#### Ukraine

El- Shinawy 22 [Marwa El- Shinawy is the Assistant Professor at the International American University for Specialized Studies, 3-29-2022, Opinion, Daily News Egypt, https://dailynewsegypt.com/2022/03/01/opinion-putin-puts-an-end-to-us-hegemony/] Eric

The Ukrainian crisis is showing day after day the weakness of the current US administration headed by Biden in a way that confirms that the era of American hegemony is about to end. President Biden may have made many heroic statements ahead of the military operation in Ukraine, but as soon as Putin decided to opt for a military solution to get to the negotiating table, Biden withdrew from the battle, shamelessly failing the Ukrainian president. The situation provoked the world’s ridicule and the astonishment of the Ukrainian president, who did not have sufficient ability or experience to properly assess the political situation.

President Biden has managed the Ukraine crisis in the worst possible way, showing the whole world that he can deter Russia when the actual truth is certainly the opposite. The United States may have the ability to project its power anywhere in the world, but when dealing with another great power’s sphere of influence, its deterrence capacity is greatly diminished.

This is not the first time that the weakness of the United States against Russia has been shown. The reluctance of the United States to take a hostile decision toward Russia appeared before in 2014 when Putin annexed Crimea during the Obama administration. At the time, many scathing criticisms of the Obama administration were directed, but he was able to sidestep the situation and show the United States as a powerful hegemon, but reluctant to interfere in matters of Russian national security.

But this time the matter is very different. The United States pushed Ukraine to provoke Russia, despite knowing that its ability to protect Ukraine is very limited for multiple reasons. First, Ukraine does little to benefit US interests. And secondly, the United States cannot deter Russia in its sphere of influence. Third, the long and costly wars of the twenty-first century in Afghanistan and Iraq have drained popular support for US-led military interventions abroad. More importantly, NATO forces and the European Union will not play an important role other than imposing sanctions and travel bans, as the European market is highly dependent on Russian natural gas. Add to all of the above internal American problems such as inflation, the immigrant crisis, and rising nationalism.

For all these reasons, politicians from both the Republican and Democratic parties leveled sharp criticism that amounted to mocking Biden’s contradictory actions that undermine the hegemony of the United States in the international arena. For example, JD Vance, a candidate for the US Senate, said in a statement on Twitter, “the foreign policy establishment that led Ukraine directly into the slaughterhouse deserves nothing but scorn.”

Also, in another statement, Kevin McCarthy and GOP leaders said: “Sadly, President Biden consistently chose appeasement and his tough talk on Russia was never followed by strong action. Republican Senator Lindsay Graham, speaking about Biden, also said in the same vein” You said a couple of years ago that Putin did not want you to win because you’re the only person that could go toe-to-toe with him. Well right now, Mr. President, you’re playing footsie with Putin. He’s walking all over you.”

All those involved in political action in the United States know very well that the threat to engage in war with great powers such as Russia will cost a heavy price that the United States cannot afford now despite its undeniable strength. Accordingly, after years of deep political divisions over foreign policy and the role of the United States in the world, no one in power has suggested the option of war. Instead, Putin’s military operation in Ukraine revealed a rare point of consensus between Democrats and Republicans as everyone criticized the Biden administration’s escalation of events, rejecting the idea that the United States would go to war to stop him. Some want tougher sanctions and say they should have been imposed before the invasion as a deterrent, others question why the US should be involved at all, and everyone agrees it’s Biden’s fault.

This apparent decline of US hegemony has profound repercussions as it urges many other great powers to move forward. Today, questions abound about how China will deal with Taiwan, Japan, etc., and issues related to its regional interests. Although the United States may still possess the hegemonic power, it no longer can unilaterally deter or enforce the actions of other great powers. Russia’s involvement in the Syrian civil war, the Iranian nuclear program, and aggression in the Arctic all clearly show that the Russians no longer believe that the United States is fully capable of containing or deterring their actions. Recent years have shown that other major powers are testing how far the United States will go to maintain its position in the system, and if the United States is perceived be weak to or unwilling, the great powers will assert their presence. Certainly, Ukraine is the latest example of Russia’s ability to limit American hegemony.

### 2nc --- Polarization China Heg Inevitable

#### Lack of Democracy– destroys functionality at home which signals to our allies a lack of trustworthiness – that’s Fukuyama AND

Xiang 22 (Dr. Lu Xiang is the Director for Research at the Hong Kong-based Chinese Institute of Hong Kong, an affiliate of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Dr. Lu was previously a senior researcher at the Institute of American Studies and the Institute of World Economics and Politics at CASS. From 2012-2013, Dr. Lu was a visiting fellow at CSIS. His research focuses on national strategic communications, world and US politics, Chinese foreign policy, and Hong Kong-related issues, 1-5-2022, "One year after Capitol riot, is the world entering a ‘post American era’?," Global Times, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202201/1245186.shtml)//eli

"We are now living in an age when American dominance is coming to an end, and its security guarantees are losing credibility," writes an article on Russian media RT on the first anniversary of the January 6 Capitol riot in the US. Even if we can't predict exactly when we will enter a "post-American era," the decline of the US will definitely be the general trend. Just a prelude The results of a recent poll from The Washington Post and the University of Maryland are alarming: 34 percent of Americans believe violence against the government is sometimes justified. That's quite a disturbing sign for Washington's domestic affairs. It's unimaginable to think that even half of these people might really take violent actions. In this sense, the Capitol riot might be just a prelude. At the end of June last year, a special committee was established to investigate the "facts, circumstances and causes" of the Capitol riot. However, after more than half a year, no result has come out amid the endless bipartisan tug of war. The attack on the US Capitol and the aftermath reflect growing division in the US. There are also divergent views on the riot in both the Democratic and Republican Parties. For example, Nikki Haley, a member of the Republican Party, has been openly critical of the Capitol riot. It is afraid that there are even more Republicans supporting the Capitol riot in their hearts. Therefore, it's not surprising that the investigation of the incident faces obstacles. According to a new poll from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, nearly one-third of Americans doubt that Joe Biden's victory in the 2020 presidential election was legitimate. As midterm elections approach in late 2022, accusations of electoral fraud and violence are likely to resurge in every state, especially in some of those in the Midwestern and Southern US. And when election results are disputed, it is anticipated that violence may also increase. A divided US Coincidentally, The Wall Street Journal and The Hill respectively published articles on Monday with titles that began with the phrase "to save America." One title read "To Save America, the GOP First Has to Save Itself," the other reading "To save America, we need a council of presidents." There is a severe division within the US. Some people think that political polarization cannot be resolved and can only be controlled. But the US has no effective measures for control at all. Take the pandemic fight as an example. It's fair to say that the federal government has "lied flat" and did nothing to stop the spreading. Biden recently told the nation's governors that there is no federal solution to the pandemic and the next steps in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic had to be taken at the state level. But in fact, many things still need to be done under the leadership of the federal government. The US federal government now appears to be an old man in his twilight years. It looks quite exhausted and helpless to achieve its goals. The US' inaction in both internal affairs and diplomacy is a pretty terrible thing. If I were an American, I would feel that this is a rather depressing time. The root cause for various problems in the US is the contradiction between different social classes. But with the meddling of US politicians, the contradiction has been turned into a bipartisan issue. Under the so-called political correctness, the class contradiction has been converted into other inexplicable controversies. For instance, can Americans own guns? Should people be vaccinated or wear masks? Behind these controversies are the hardships of the people and their discontent. Both the middle class and the grassroots communities feel increasingly hopeless. Their discontent, as a result, will accumulate, further creating more turmoil in the US. The 'post-American era' The US now is no longer capable of dominating the world due to its internal systemic festering. There was a period of time after the Cold War when the US felt as if it was invincible. Indeed, it did have the capability to fight anyone it wanted then. But this is no longer the unipolar era that the US has enjoyed for the past few decades. Americans may also know in their hearts that that time is gone, as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened their confidence. Moreover, there are still two countries that have the absolute ability to protect their own sovereignty: China and Russia. In Washington's strategic view, any country other than the US should not have sovereignty. In other words, the US can theoretically eradicate any person or government that it wants. But Beijing and Moscow have made the US lose the ability to do so, as both are engaging in more cooperation to maintain stability in the world. The end of US hegemony is also proven by the fact that the days when the US could easily bring other countries to their knees by using the stick of sanctions are gone. For example, Washington has been trying to suppress 5G technology from Chinese tech giant Huawei. It did manage to make Huawei lose some of its smartphone business. However, Huawei was not "ended" by the US, and without the former, the latter's 5G technology development is still lagging behind. The US seemed to believe that it could do anything if it was able to control Huawei. But the reality is that it has neither received any substantial benefit nor caused much damage to China. Instead, the country has set a bad example to the world and lost its credibility. Judging from the current global situation, it looks that the US is in gradual decline. But such a trend could be slowed if young, strong politicians come to the stage with the right policies. The US is now like a patient suffering from a chronic disease lying in a hospital bed and barely able to open their eyes. The future of the US depends on a renewal of the "youth" of US politics. If nothing changes, the US will continue to project that it can't open its eyes in the face of difficulties. Even though the two-party system has been working well for almost 100 years in the US, there are still some undercurrents. Democratic and Republican Parties can now barely maintain the two-partite system. It seems that US politics is a matter of coordination between two groups of people, but in reality, it is much more complicated since the spectrum within both parties is complex. For example, the left-wing of the Democratic Party, including the young Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (also known by her initials AOC), holds opinions that are completely different than those of traditional Democrats. If we really enter the "post-American era" one day, I think it will be a better time for consultation, and the world will become a more democratic place. We can't predict when that time will come, but we can be prepared for that day.

### 2nc --- International Institutions Prefer China

#### Institutional Frameworks – IMF and UN are shifting towards China AND AIIB

**Layne 18** - professor at Texas A&M University's. George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana,” 2018, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/images/ia/INTA94_1_6_249_Layne.pdf>, Accessed 6-30-22, LASA-AH)

The institutional challenge to the Pax Americana Not only is the Pax Americana being whittled away by constraints on Washing- ton’s ability to continue playing its role as the manager of the global economy, and by China’s ever-increasing economic dominance of its region; even more strik- ingly, the institutional framework is being challenged. An important indicator of the Pax Americana’s erosion is the weakening of its legacy institutions amid calls, magnified by the Great Recession, for a major overhaul of the international institutional order. Examples include demands that the IMF and World Bank be reformed to give China (and other key emerging market economies) greater voting power, and a (so far unsuccessful) push to expand the membership of the UN Security Council by adding, among others, Brazil and India. Another indicator of the shifting global balance occurred in November 2008 when the G8 global economic summit was transformed into the G20 by the addition of China and other emerging market states including India, Indonesia and South Africa. The G20’s creation as the new focal point for coordinating international economic policy was a response to the insistence of China, and the other major emerging market states, that they be given a greater voice in interna- tional economic affairs. Implicitly, the G20’s emergence confirmed three trends. **First**, the necessity of conceding power to the emerging market states—especially China—confirmed that **America’s relative power is declining**. **Second**, the G20’s empowerment underscored the shift in power from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia. Whereas only one Asian nation (Japan) had been a G8 member, the G20 has six members from the region: Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea. Finally, the G20’s emergence as the central organ of international economic management demonstrated that—as a result of the Great Recession— the prestige and authority of the United States and Europe as stewards of the international economy had slipped dramatically.49 The past decade or so also has seen the creation of new institutions that poten- tially could constitute a parallel—‘shadow’—international order outside the framework of the Pax Americana. The most important of these may be the Beijing- backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Other examples include the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organiza- tion, the Eurasian Economic Union and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). The staying power and impact of these institutions are uncertain; but at the very **least they are important symbolically.** They underscore the decline of the American-designed post-Second World War international order, and the rise of new powers such as China and India—and the resurgence of old ones such as Russia—demanding recognition of their status and prestige, and a concomitant voice in the management of the international system.

### 2nc --- Transition Peaceful/Voluntary Abdication

#### The aff’s boost to US material power doesn’t overcome the political problem of voluntary abdication

**Schweller, 18** - Randall Schweller is Professor of Political Science and a Social and Behavioral Sciences Joan N. Huber Faculty Fellow, The Ohio State University (“Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US–China Relations” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, 23–48 doi: 10.1093/cjip/poy003

Given the tendency for declining powers, especially those under conditions of low vulnerability, to reduce peripheral commitments and look inward, a few wonder that American citizens, after decades of political consensus, are now questioning their country’s grand strategy of deep engagement with the rest of the world. And, to the shock and dismay of the mainstream media, they elected a President who, in his 2017 inauguration speech, emphasized his winning campaign slogan: ‘From this day forward, it’s going to be only America first. America first. Every decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign affairs will be made to benefit American workers and American families.’55

While there is no Trump Doctrine as of yet, the tone is unmistakably one of global retreat or, more accurately, a retreat from globalism. On his third day in office, he withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a 12-nation trade deal designed by the United States as a counterweight to a rising China. In June, he announced that he would pull the United States out of the Paris Agreement on climate change, following through with a key campaign promise. Trump also announced that he intends to withdraw the United States from UNESCO; he abandoned United Nations talks on migration; and he threatened to terminate the 2015 Iran nuclear deal if Congress and US allies fail to amend the agreement in significant ways; he wants to fix or rip up the free-trade agreement with South Korea (known as Korus) and NAFTA—casting both pacts as failures for the United States. Trump has proposed reducing US contributions to the United Nations by 40%, and pressured the General Assembly to cut six hundred million dollars from its peacekeeping budget. His 2018 budget proposes a 42% cut in foreign assistance, or $11.5 billion, and reduces American funding for development projects, such as those financed by the World Bank.56 Of NATO, Trump said that he would ‘certainly look at’ pulling the United States out of the international security alliance, because it is ‘obsolete’ and ‘is costing us a fortune.’57

To be sure, there has been something of a ‘bonfire of many of the established concepts of American grand strategy’ since Trump was elected. Some observers, like Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations and a former State Department official during the George W. Bush administration, claim that the Trump administration is engaged in an ‘abdication’ of US global leadership— not because of any loss of military or economic power that forced America to retrench from its global commitments but rather because the administration ‘chose to walk away from many of the institutions, frameworks,’ and to ‘introduce questions into alliances that have really formed or informed American foreign policy now for nearly three quarters of a century’.58

#### Chinese leadership gives it a stake in Asian stability – it means the transition is peaceful

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On the other hand, if China behaves as a legitimate system operator, then squeezing out the United States becomes an attainable goal. It would do so by providing hegemonic services to the East Asian community better and cheaper than the United States does. Such services include protecting and assisting in the clarification of regional property rights, as well as the creation of impartial, credible and competent institutions to foster the development of shared resources. It may also imply backstopping the United States to ensure that critical East Asian imports—for example, Saudi and Iranian oil—continues to flow to the region, even if the United States fails to provide security services in the Middle East.

China is well placed to play this role. The country specializes in providing manufactures and services of good quality much cheaper than do the western powers. Playing regional hegemon would simply be an extension of existing commercial strategy to the diplomatic sphere. And China has huge advantages, because an authoritarian regime with ample financial resources can move more quickly and decisively than the protracted and mushy process that characterizes democracy.

Furthermore, China is local in East Asia. The United States is not. Consider that not many people know that the United States actually has two border disputes with Canada. The only way the United States cannot resolve these disputes is with force, even though it could easily defeat Canada in a war. Were the United States to try, Canada would immediately look for allies, and among these would be China. Thus, the United States threat of force would bring China into regional North American disputes. Trust in United States intentions around the world would also be undermined. If the United States is willing to seize Canadian territory by force, what might it do in the Middle East? Might the United States decide to take over, say, Bahrain? The hegemon, in some cases, cannot even threaten force even if it could easily win a fight.

China faces the same logic. If the country threatens it neighbors, as it has, then the United States is sucked into intra-Asian disputes and China’s wider intentions in places like South and East Asia come into question. An aggressive China in the South China Sea paints China as a general threat to the region.

However, if China is providing the public service of policing in East Asia, then the United States will feel comfortable leaving. The voting public in democracies traditionally dislikes spending money on the military in remote parts of the world. They would rather spend it on healthcare and pensions at home. If the United States public feels the country can afford to spend less in Asia—because China is doing a better job than the United States could—then the United States will withdraw. For China, the challenge is not defeating the United States, it is allowing the United States to leave. This is a process of displacement, not confrontation. China allows the United States to withdraw by providing hegemonic services to the region better and cheaper than the United States. It’s that simple.

History tells us that assuming hegemony does not imply war. The United States displaced Great Britain as the global hegemon sometime between the two world wars. Nevertheless, the United States and Britain have been the closest of allies for now two hundred years. Hegemony was passed without conflict, indeed, in some cases at the behest of Britain as the declining power. That is China’s model for East Asia. China becomes influential and respected not because it can beat up the kids on the playground, but because the kids on the playground trust China implicitly to protect personal and property rights and permit fair play. They turn to China for leadership, protection, financial support and organizational guidance. China could be proud of itself for providing these services. That is the true path to hegemony.

#### A transition is inevitable – the sole factor that will determine hegemonic war is whether the US chooses to relinquish power

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and the end of the Pax Americana” International Affairs 94: 1 (2018) 89–111; doi: 10.1093/ia/iix249 **LRBIO = Liberal Rules Based International Order**

When the balance of power swings—or is perceived to swing—in its direction, a rising power becomes increasingly dissatisfied with the international order, and seeks to revise it. The challenger wants to change the rules embodied in the existing international order—rules written, of course, by the once dominant but now declining Great Power that created it. It also wants the allocation of prestige and status changed to reflect its newly acquired power. The incumbent hegemon, of course, wants to preserve the existing international order as is—an order that it midwifed to advance, and consolidate, its own interests. The E. H. Carr Moment presents the incumbent hegemon with a choice. It can dig in its heels and try to preserve the prevailing order—and its privileged position therein; or it can accede to the rising challenger’s demands for revision. If it chooses the former course of action, it runs the risk of war with the dissatisfied challenger. If it chooses the latter, it must come to terms with the reality of its decline, and the end of its hegemonic position.

The E. H. Carr Moment is where the geopolitical rubber meets the road: the status quo power(s) must choose between accommodating or opposing the revisionist demands of the rising power(s). Liberal internationalists such as John Ikenberry argue that China will not challenge the current international order, even as the distribution of power continues to shift in its favour. This is a doubtful proposition. The geopolitical question—the E. H. Carr Moment—of our time is whether the declining hegemon in east Asia, the United States, will try to preserve a status quo that is becoming increasingly out of sync with the shifting distribution of power, or whether it can reconcile itself to a rising China’s revisionist demands that the international order in east Asia be realigned to reflect the emerging power realities. Unless the United States can adjust gracefully to this tectonic geopolitical shift, the chances of a Sino-American war are high—as they always are during power transitions.92 However, whether change comes peacefully or violently, the Pax Americana’s days are numbered.

#### Decline is inevitable - the transition is only violent if the US rejects retrenchment

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We predict the rejection of retrenchment would result in foreign policy crises of escalating frequency and severity. Rising powers or regional aggressors would be more likely to call the United States' bluff, and deterring these adversaries would require greater commitments of resources and more dramatic demonstrations of resolve. Foreign interventions would be more likely to turn into quagmires, as American ambitions escalate and local opposition hardens. The gap between foreign commitments and available resources would widen, requiring growing deficits and crash rearmament programs rather than steady budgets and sensible reforms. The evidence suggests that declining powers throughout history have tried to avoid this dismal fate, but that they are not always able to do so. Minor disputes can spiral into major confrontations; domestic rancor can get out of hand; leaders can make poor decisions; things fall apart. Whether cur- rent U.S. policymakers will dodge these dangers depends on how well they learn the lessons of retrenchment.

#### Limited conventional power ensures a stable peaceful rise

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Third, we identified signs of a possible “Third Way.” It is similar to the type of global hegemony defined and practised by the Dutch from the late 16th to the mid-18th centuries. It would be a global hegemony solely focused on trade and financial concerns, without the interference of violent conflicts or impositions of political and ideological norms and values. From the Dutch-style vantage point, a Chinese hegemon would be relatively neutral in terms of ideology, partially uninvolved in the management of the international state system, and mostly interested in profit-maximisation, without the use (or threat) of military actions. In sum, calm and stable political, economic, and security environments are welcome news to Chinese strategists in the short and medium run. Why is that the case? Ideologically speaking, China cannot be a benevolent hegemon, and militarily and politically speaking, it **lacks the type of conventional power** and reputation for exerting the kind of global influence necessary to manage the international state and market systems. Regarding ideology, Yan Xuetong argues, for example, that China will have to go beyond the current trajectory of “combin[ing] Marxism with Chinese traditional values” and instead “shape the international order by combining some Chinese traditional values with selected liberalist values (…) [which] could be acceptable to most countries because of their universality” (Yan, 2018, p. 1). It is difficult to define China's future hegemonic role and its general systemic behaviour accurately. However, as this article argued, the “Third Hegemonic Way” or Dutch-style hegemony is highly instructive in this context. Accordingly, this third alternative proposition adds to the current debate and inventory of plausible explanation of China's peaceful or violent rise as either a benevolent or potentially coercive hegemon. We argued that Dutch-style hegemony might be the **most viable way** for China to proceed in its global hegemonic ascendancy. Although China has registered a substantial economic and financial growth since 1989, its population still possesses, relative to other global great powers, **lower per capita income** and relatively small purchasing power. In this vein, the relatively inexpensive labour cost and its mainly export-oriented economy still figure as China's main engine of economic and financial growth. Further, China's national market remains quite small in terms of per capita purchasing power. Hence, it needs peaceful, stable, and relatively prosperous international economic and state systems to continue to thrive and to grow. We project that **China's leadership will make sure to keep it that way.**

#### Beijing Consensus ensure a peaceful rise – China seeks status not to undue basic Westphalia principles

**Danner and Martin 19** - Research Associate at the Miami-Florida Jean Monnet European Center of Excellence, Florida International University (FIU), USA, and Honorary Research Fellow at the East Asia Security Centre, Bond University, Australia, Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics & International Relations at Florida International University (Lukas K. and Félix E., “China's hegemonic intentions and trajectory: Will it opt for benevolent, coercive, or Dutch-style hegemony?,” *Wiley Online Library*, 4-18-19, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/app5.273>, Accessed 7-1-22, LASA-AH)

Also, China's incomplete and **unbalanced power inventory** renders it too weak militarily as a near-hegemon to compete aggressively against the United States. Further, China would be considerably less competitive if it has to face a potential military alliance among the United States, Western Europe, India, and possibly Russia. In summary, China must remain commercially active and **militarily peaceful** on the bases of its economic prowess and its conventional military competitive disadvantage 13 vis-à-vis the United States and its potential allies. Hence, Dutch-style hegemony is a perfect fit for China's immediate and mid-range future. Accordingly, the study concludes that, although it is exceedingly difficult to predict with a high degree of certainty which way China will go in the future, Dutch-style hegemony is the most plausible explanation of China's direction and role in the international system. However, plausibility does not mean certainty; thus, we are mindful of conflicting evidence that simultaneously points to either China's peaceful (benevolent intentions) or violent rise (coercive intentions). Despite the evidence supporting all three possible future trajectories, the Third Way or the Dutch style is more congruent with China's international behaviour since 2001. China does not truly challenge the existing order in terms of political values, ideological norms, or regime types. The “Beijing Consensus” promotes trading with any country, **irrespective to the political system**, that is, governments raging from liberal democracies, such as the United States, to staunch totalitarian dictatorships such as Cuba, North Korea, and Venezuela. China's focus is **on sovereignty and not on regime type**. As Suisheng Zhao argues, China is in fact “[e]**mbracing the Westphalian principles** of state sovereignty, (…) while adapting to the liberal norms of globalization, China is (…) dissatisfied not with the fundamental rules of the order but its status in the hierarchy of the order” (2018, p. 643).

#### No violent conflict

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The episode discussed above is instructive for present United States–Chinese relations and economic rivalry. Because they are competing for global hegemony, they must be careful about whom they trade with and how this may or may not undercut the political and strategic interests of the other. It is mainly the case with China who chooses to ignore U.S. sanctions against some rogue states such as Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela. In terms of present general probability, it does not seem likely that China will take over the leadership of the U.S.-instituted liberal economic and political global order as the Americans did from the British in the early 20th century. Notwithstanding, much of China's hegemonic trajectory could also depend on how it will develop internally in terms of its economy and politics. In this sense, for example, Shambaugh (2016) argues in his China's Future for reforms of the Chinese party-state to softer authoritarianism. Further, it seems **unlikely that China will institute its leadership and global hegemony via violent conflict**, much like Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Imperial Japan. Instead, as expounded above, the Dutch-style (or “Third Way”) global hegemony appears to be a more likely trajectory. Provided, of course, China remains to exhibit strictly trade-oriented, politically neutral, and self-interested pecuniary intentions in the next decade.

#### China transition is peaceful – they uphold economic norms AND are culturally against imperialism

**Layne 18** - professor at Texas A&M University's. George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana,” 2018, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/images/ia/INTA94_1_6_249_Layne.pdf>, Accessed 6-30-22, LASA-AH)

What will happen to the international order as China continues to rise, and America’s relative power continues to decline? As Yogi Berra, the greatest of all American philosophers (immortalized in baseball’s Hall of Fame), said: ‘Making predictions is hard. Especially about the future.’ However, one thing seems pretty certain: China is not on the verge of either of ruling the world, or becoming a global hegemon comparable to the United States after the Second World War; not yet, anyway. Thus, for the next several decades (at least) it will be **neither China’s world nor America’s**: international leadership will be contested.81 During this period, China can be expected to act pretty much as one would expect any Great Power to act while making the shift from rising to risen: it will use its newfound power to seek a much greater voice in managing—and shaping—the interna- tional order, and its underlying norms. For example, China will want others to acknowledge its ‘core interests’, including respect for its territorial integrity and its sovereignty. Beijing has expanded the geographic scope of its core interests beyond Tibet and Taiwan to include the South and East China Seas and Xinjiang. And, reflecting its insistence that states should refrain from intervening in others’ internal affairs, preservation of its political, economic and social systems also has been defined as a core interest.82 During the period of contested international leadership there is unlikely to be wholesale abandonment of the post-1945 international institutions. For example, as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Beijing is an acknowledged part of the Great Power club. Similarly, we should not expect to see a dramatic overhaul of the international economic system. As the world’s top-ranking exporter and trading state, China benefits hugely from economic openness. However, the state plays a much greater role in China’s economy than it does in the United States and Europe. Beijing will want rules that protect its semi- mercantilist economic policies and also ensure that **its state-owned industries are not disadvantaged**. Beijing will continue pressing for an even greater voice, both for itself and for the developing world, in institutions such as the IMF and World Bank (unless or until they are superseded by new ‘made in China’ institutions). In this respect, China will position itself as the developing world’s champion—a role for which it is well suited. Like many nations in the developing world— but unlike the United States—China has been a victim of western Great Power policies of imperialism and colonialism. As such, China has a claim to prominence in constructing a new international order that reflects the values of the developing world rather than those of the United States and the West.83

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#### US retrenchment prevents war from status competition and gives China a peaceful stake in the current order

**Ward, 17** - Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University (Steven, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, p. 217-218

The former approach is one that few policymakers and scholars openly promote.23 If the United States is interested in avoiding the creation of a deeply revisionist, anti-Western China, it needs to accommodate China’s status claims. Since these likely include the right to a sphere of influence in East Asia, accommodation would likely have to involve a reduction of the American military presence and American influence in that region. This does not mean conceding global leadership to China. Rather, the aim would be to acknowledge that China, as a great power, deserves the same rights that the United States does in world politics – including the right to manage East Asia and the South China Sea the way that the United States manages Latin America and the Caribbean.

This approach carries with it great risks and costs as well.What would be the effect on navigation and trade through the South China Sea? Would important American allies like Japan and South Korea turn into Beijing’s vassals? What if an American withdrawal from East Asia produces a regional arms race? And what if China grows more ambitious rather than more satisfied as the United States withdraws overseas?

But accommodation/retrenchment also has some important advantages. Foremost among them is that it avoids antagonizing Beijing: it is premised upon the idea that, all else equal, accommodation is preferable to denial because denial activates forces that empower hardliners. Accommodation holds out the possibility of empowering moderates and facilitating China’s integration within a reformed version of the liberal international order that has served its economic interests well. Another advantage is that accommodation/ retrenchment is cheaper than any approach involving containment. Retrenchment would reduce American military expenditures while simultaneously creating incentives for other regional powers to bear a greater share of their defense burdens. The United States could return to an offshore balancing posture, which would allow it to redeploy to the region only if China tried to overthrow the new version of the status quo order by, say launching a war in East Asia. But by not signaling status denial, Washington would short circuit one of the major causes of radical revisionist challenges in history, thereby reducing the likelihood that active onshore balancing would be necessary.

#### Decline in US material power reduces the risk of war with China

**White, 17** – Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University in Canberra, Australia, (Hugh, “Without America”, Quaterly Essay 68, November, https://www.quarterlyessay.com.au/essay/2017/11/without-america/extract

For almost a decade now, the world’s two most powerful countries have been competing over which of them will dominate the world’s most important and dynamic region. America has been trying to remain East Asia’s primary power, and China has been trying to replace it. Their contest is playing out over trade deals and infrastructure plans, in the diplomacy of multilateral meetings, and above all through military gamesmanship in regional hotspots like the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Korean Peninsula. But all these are really just symptoms of their underlying rivalry.

How the contest will proceed – whether peacefully or violently, quickly or slowly – is still uncertain, but the most likely outcome is now becoming clear. America will lose, and China will win. America will cease to play a major strategic role in Asia, and China will take its place as the dominant power. War remains possible, especially with someone like Donald Trump in the Oval Office. But the risk of war recedes as it becomes clearer that the odds are against America, and as people in Washington come to understand that their nation cannot defend its leadership in Asia by fighting an unwinnable war with China. The probability therefore grows that America will peacefully, and perhaps even willingly, withdraw. Indeed, this is already happening, and Asia is changing as a result. The old US-led order is passing, and a new China-led order is taking its place.

This is not what anyone expected. Seven years ago, in Quarterly Essay 39, I argued that as power shifted from Washington to Beijing, and as China’s ambitions for leadership in Asia grew, America faced a contest in Asia which it would be unable to win outright. Its best option, therefore, would be to negotiate a new regional order, retaining a lesser but still substantial strategic role in Asia which would balance China’s power, limit its influence and prevent East Asia falling under Chinese hegemony.

Many people disagreed. They argued that America’s power would remain so much greater than China’s that it was unnecessary for America to make any such concessions. By holding firm, it could face down China, convince it to back off and leave American leadership in Asia unchallenged once more.

Alas, my critics and I were both wrong. We were slow to see the growing rivalry between America and China, and we didn’t recognise, or permit ourselves to acknowledge, how serious the rivalry has become, and how badly it has been going for America. That is because we all underestimated China’s power and resolve, and overestimated America’s. Not only is America failing to remain the dominant power, it is failing to retain any substantial strategic role at all. Many expected that China would falter before it grew strong enough to challenge America on anything like equal terms. Instead, China has kept growing stronger, economically, militarily and diplomatically, and America’s resolve has weakened. Now it is China that is facing down America. That was the clear message of Xi Jinping’s remarkable assertion of China’s status and power at the Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, in October 2017. The contest is indeed unequal, but not in the way we thought. So we find ourselves in a new Asia, and we do not like it. But that’s the hand history is dealing us, and we must make the best of it.

#### Retrenchment is structurally inevitable

Schweller 18 — Randall Schweller is Professor of Political Science and a Social and Behavioral Sciences Joan N. Huber Faculty Fellow, The Ohio State University. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, 23–48 doi: 10.1093/cjip/poy003 Advance Access Publication Date: 8 February 2018 WMK

Then came the global financial and economic crisis of 2007–2008. The world no longer seemed unipolar as far as the eye could see. The Great Recession— coupled with the rise of China, India, and a resurgent Russia—cast doubts on the state of American relative power that found official expression in the US National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2025 and Global Trends 2030 reports.72 It has become commonplace to claim that the unipolar era is over or fast winding down. Predictions of continuing unipolarity have been superseded by premonitions of American decline and emerging multipolarity.73 Indeed, a February 2016 Gallop poll found Americans evenly split when asked if the United States is No. 1 in the world militarily, with 49% saying ‘yes’ and 49% saying ‘no’. The poll also showed that half of Americans see the United States as one of several leading mili- tary powers.74 This widely held perception of coming structural change largely explains the appeal of Donald Trump’s ‘American First’ doctrine. Simply put, the American era is over, and Washington must devise a new grand strategy to deal with the new situation.75 Realism, which the American body politic has sup- ported for decades, offers just such a strategy.76

An Inward-Looking Nationalism Takes Root

The public rightly sees emerging multipolarity as a more competitive realm than the unipolar world that the United States has enjoyed since 1991. The people see America’s dismal record in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya and understand that the United States has no vital interests at stake in the places it has chosen to intervene, let alone the capacity—military or otherwise—to fix the problems afflicting those countries.77 A majority of Americans now say that the United States should be less engaged in world affairs and, for the first time in recorded history, believe that their country has a declining influence on what is happening around the globe. Americans are rejecting hard power and high politics; in their eyes, history is shaped more by networks of peoples spontaneously gathering in squares than by the military capabilities of powerful states.78 An April 2016 Pew poll found that 57% of Americans agree that the United States should ‘deal with its own problems and let others deal with theirs the best they can’.79

#### The US must transition to offshore balancing to ensure primacy and a stable balance of power

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A ‘flatter’ international structure compels the United States to play a less central role in providing functional services—generating public goods, stabilizing mar- kets, and promoting cooperation. Pax Americana—the integrated militarized sys- tem of alliances and economic relationships that institutionalized American leadership of the non-Communist world—is coming to a close. Global leadership is costly; it means asking your citizens to pay for others’ well-being, to send young soldiers to die in faraway places. So far, China has shown little interest in replacing the United States as a kind of chairman of planet Earth, in the words of Daniel Russel, an American diplomat who served as the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 2013 to 2017; the Chinese display ‘no intention of emulating the U.S. as a provider of global goods or as an arbiter who teases out universal principles and common rules’.88 As it enters this new leaderless age, Washington must devise a grand strategy that properly deals with the new situation, one that fundamentally alters America’s role in the new world.89

Realists have proposed just such a change in American grand strategy—a foreign policy approach that essentially falls under the rubric of ‘offshore balancing’. Under this grand strategy, the United States would no longer attempt to police the planet. Instead, Washington would encourage other countries to take the lead in checking rising powers in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf, interven- ing itself only when absolutely necessary to preserve the regional balance of power. Calibrating its military posture according to the distribution of power in the three key regions, the United States would allow regional forces to be its first line of defense in the event that a potential regional hegemon emerges. This means, as Barry Posen maintains, ‘demobiliz[ing] most U.S. Army troops based abroad’ and closing most US bases across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East— about 800 of them in more than 70 countries.90

By passing the costs to more threatened allies, offshore balancing aims to pre- serve US primacy far into the future and safeguard liberty at home. As John Glaser points out, ‘A globe-straddling forward-deployed military presence is a costly burden that elevates peripheral interests to the level of vital ones, takes on security responsibilities that can and should be fulfilled by other states, and pro- duces negative unintended consequences for U.S. interests.’91 The trick, however, is implementing a retrenchment strategy—that is, how to wean the world off of American power while avoiding a hard landing (e.g. regional arms races and intense security dilemmas). Even with the most skilled leadership, we should expect a very bumpy ride.

We see this happening already. Trump’s visit to Asia created unease among allies about the role the United States will play in the Asia-Pacific region. Seeking Beijing’s help to deal with North Korea, President Trump failed to press China on its military buildup in the South China Sea, reinforcing the perception that America is beginning to retreat from the region and, quite understandably, fueling Japan’s underlying fear of abandonment. Tokyo now strongly suspects that the United States may make some kind of deal with China that could put Japan at a disadvantage.

As Japan and China recognize the altered dynamics around the Pacific Rim, some observers believe that they may inch toward a possible reconciliation. Such a Sino-Japanese rapprochement is unlikely, however, given their long-standing historical enmity. Negative attitudes toward Japan are widespread among main- land Chinese. According to a recent Pew survey, less than 10% of Chinese think that Japan can be trusted—and the feeling is mutual. Young Chinese, who did not personally experience the war, express surprisingly vehement anti-Japanese feelings—sentiments that are due in no small part to state propaganda and patri- otic education in schools that make criticism of Japan politically correct.92 Moreover, the Chinese see themselves as the natural hegemon, and in their— worldview, the Japanese should be subordinate to them—in other words, Chinese elites refuse to accept Japan’s legitimacy as a major Asian state. Neither Shinzo Abe nor his successors will tolerate such a future for Japan, which is why Japan is offering maritime and development assistance to countries like Vietnam and the Philippines. Ultimately, however, China’s rise and America’s retreat to a more offshore posture will force into existence a military alliance between Japan and India (and, perhaps, Russia as well) to restore a regional balance of power to counter growing Chinese power.

In conclusion, the key to managing the future of US–Chinese strategic rivalry is prudence and perspective. Short of a military confrontation on the Chinese lit- toral with the United States and its allies, China is unlikely to avail itself of the elements of its A2/AD capabilities that could be deployed to materially block free- dom of navigation and overflight operations (e.g. sinking vessels or shooting down aircraft). Recognizing this fact, US leaders would be wise to heed the nonin- terventionist vision of US foreign policy espoused by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams and, accordingly, not go ‘abroad in search of monsters to destroy’.93 Remaining alert to possible security threats emanating from China’s East and South China Seas policies, Washington must place such threats in per- spective. As Benjamin Herscovitch puts it, ‘no armies are being launched into bat- tle, no civilians are being slaughtered, and no cities are being reduced to rubble’.94 A balanced threat assessment of an outward-looking China suggests that it poses only a modest danger to American vital interests. If prudence prevails on both sides, a stable regional balance of power will emerge among the local states—one nested within an even more stable Sino-American bipolar system that, unlike its US–Soviet predecessor, is not rooted in a zero-sum battle between the totalist ideological tenets of Marxism-Leninism and Western-style democratic capitalism.

#### Trying to maintain the US LED order fails and ensures extinction. China can be integrated into the world order BUT only if the US takes a step back

Zelikow 22 — Philip Zelikow Professor of History at the University of Virginia. A former U.S. diplomat and Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission, he has worked for five presidential administrations., “The Hollow Order,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 22 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-06-21/hollow-order-international-system, accessed 7-1-2022, WMK

It may be easy, and perhaps natural, for the would-be architects of the new system to organize it around Washington. But that would be a mistake. The enemies of this new order, united by their resentment of the United States, will seek to discredit it as just another effort to dominate global affairs. For this new order to be viable, it must be conceived in such a way that the charge is false.

The new order must also be decentralized to be effective; the resources and wisdom needed to solve many vexing problems are not concentrated in the United States. For instance, on the enormous issue of defining rules for a digitized world, Washington has been confused and passive, despite—or perhaps because of—its dominance in such commerce. It is the European Union that has led the way. The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, its Digital Services Act, and its Digital Markets Act created the standards that influence most of the world, including the Americas. Decentralized leadership has also proved critical to responding to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. The nucleus of the emerging pro-Ukraine coalition, for instance, is not just the United States but the entire G-7, including the European Commission. South Korea and Australia should be invited to join this coalition as well.

Yet a revised system of world order shouldn’t be limited to the United States and its traditional allies. It must be open to any countries that can and will help attain its common objectives. India should have a place at any symbolic high table, for example, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. But India’s leaders are still making their choices about their will and capacity to work on common problems. Even China should be welcome at the table. After much internal debate in the early 1990s, China’s leaders chose to play a major and often constructive role in the global commonwealth system that emerged after the end of the Cold War. In 2005, Zoellick famously urged Beijing to become a “responsible stakeholder.” As late as 2017, Kurt Campbell, who now leads Asia policy for the Biden White House, thought this invitation was a wise move.

But Zoellick’s words were a challenge, one that Beijing is failing to meet. China’s partnership with Putin—whom Xi described to the Russian press as “my best and bosom friend”—is the opposite of responsible. Instead, it shows that China and Russia lead a primarily Eurasian grouping of dangerous states, including the likes of Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan. Their loose confederation has its cross-purposes and is united mainly by hostility toward the United States. But it is building tighter links, better divisions of labor, and more effective coordination than existed among the Axis powers before or during World War II.

For these and other reasons, pessimists believe China is irredeemably hostile. They argue that China has written off the United States as a country determined to resist China’s rise and that Chinese leaders may feel they have little to lose by embracing confrontation. In this pessimistic view, China is trying to shift from the post–Cold War era’s emphasis on global interdependence toward a Chinese grand strategy of Eurasian dominance and growing national self-sufficiency. China’s leaders are now using the pandemic to keep a chokehold on international travel and strengthen domestic surveillance.

That does seem to be China’s current plan. But it is unclear whether this plan will work. It rests on unproven social, political, and economic premises that are starting to deeply disturb parts of Chinese society essential to its past and future success—such as the many residents of Shanghai who have been trapped during the city’s draconian recent lockdown.

Chinese leaders may also have noticed that, in backing the Putin regime, they have tethered themselves to an adventurist Russian government that, for 30 years, has treated its neighbors much as Japan treated China between 1915 and 1945. For instance, Putin insists that Russia is not invading Ukraine. There is no war, he declared; there is only a “special military operation.” Many Chinese people will recall that, from 1937 to 1941, Japan insisted that it, too, was not invading China. There was no war, the Japanese said; there was merely a “China incident.”

Throughout the years of Japanese aggression, the United States defended China’s territorial integrity. Even amid times of misjudgment and weakness, Washington maintained that stance, refusing in November 1941 to make a deal with Japan at China’s expense. Ten days later, Japan went to war against the United States. As they watch what is happening in 2022, Chinese leaders can still reflect on this past and consider what decisions to make.

If Beijing charts a new course, it would not be the first time it has chosen to change. But if China does rejoin a system of world order, it should be a new one. The old system has fractured and must be remade. Facing tragic realities, the citizens of the free world must rebuild a global order that is practical enough to address the most vital common problems, even if it cannot and does not promise progress on all the values and concerns people face. This system will be far more effective if the world’s most populous country joins it, and China faces another time of choosing. Regardless of China’s participation, responsible actors must begin the hard, substantive work of protecting the planet from war, climate, economic, and health risks. The time for rhetoric and posturing is over.

#### Chinese led order is key to prevent great power war---transition is possible and peaceful ONLY if there is not US backlash

Manning 22 — Robert A. Manning, a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and its New American Engagement Initiative. “Locking China Out of the Global Order Could Backfire” Foreign Policy. May 9th, 2022. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/09/china-global-order-decoupling-xi-beijing-reforms/> WMK

Both Russia’s scorched-earth invasion of Ukraine and the swift fury of the U.S. and European Union-led global response seem to have come as a shock to Beijing. China’s ambiguous stance—clearly anti-American but not explicitly pro-Russian or anti-Ukrainian—in part comes because the West’s surprisingly strong response has frustrated Chinese ambitions.

It may not have fully sunk in yet in Beijing, but the resurgence of an economic and strategically unified West, and the risk of the financial and political liability of protecting a dependent, wrecked petrostate, should lead Chinese President Xi Jinping to see the wisdom of cooperating with the global economic order, albeit with a larger Chinese voice and modest distancing from its partner in Moscow. Despite its echoing of Russian disinformation, Beijing has cautiously cut off Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank loans and trade financing to Moscow, and China’s state-run Sinopec halted gas and petrochemical projects in Russia. With $3 trillion in mostly dollar and euro assets and watching the United States disappear Russian Central Bank assets overnight, Beijing’s caution is understandable.

But would the United States accept inclusion of a more cooperative China if Beijing changed course and used it leverage to help resolve the Ukraine question? Given relentless U.S. indictment of Chinese behavior on Ukraine, even before China has taken any actual moves to aid Moscow, Xi could be forgiven for thinking that the answer is: probably not.

I’ve never quite understood the endgame of the many efforts to forge common cause solely with democracies on global trade, technology, and all things digital. I thought the point was to position the United States to shape global rules and standards—which means accepting major authoritarian economies in that order, lest a dangerous race to the bottom from a fragmented order of competing rules and standards ensues.

The unified public and private sector sanctions placed on Russia underscore the imperative of reaching consensus on rules and standards with allies and like-minded partners to the degree possible. It’s a smart U.S. starting point, a force multiplier for U.S. leverage. And in strategic areas of supply chain security and technology like 5G, it can be a viable end goal. But what jumped out at me watching U.S. President Joe Biden’s Summit for Democracy last December was the question of whether this is viewed as an end in itself across the board. If the United States can, for example, reach a consensus with the EU and Japan on World Trade Organization (WTO) reform or standards for artificial intelligence, shouldn’t this provide leverage to negotiate with China, Russia, and others to shape global norms?

Instead, the opposite appears more the conventional wisdom. In February, when asked about consulting with the region on the recently released U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Kritenbrink said emphatically, “There is currently no intention to engage the People’s Republic of China on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.”

This is not a one-off aberration but tracks with the responses I get when I ask senior administration officials, “Won’t this lead to a more dangerous, divided world? So why not test China’s intentions at the negotiating table?” The response, as one official put it, was, “Yeah, we assume China won’t change.” Richard Fontaine, the CEO of the Center for a New American Security, seemed to embrace this assumption in a recent essay in Foreign Affairs, writing, “The aim of U.S. policy toward China should be to ensure that Beijing is either unwilling or unable to overturn the regional and global order.” That assumes China seeks not just to tilt rules in its direction but overturn the order on which its economy depends.

Yet China is hardly impervious to change. Aside from 12 major (and dozens of minor) dynasties over the past 4,000 years, since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power in 1949, there have been no shortages of major shifts. There was Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward, a catastrophic collectivization campaign launched in 1958 that led to some 30 million Chinese starving to death. That was preceded by Mao’s “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom” campaign to encourage diverse, new thinking—but then Mao cut the flowers with an anti-rightist campaign against those who spoke out.

In 1966, to reassert control over what he feared was a bureaucratizing CCP government, Mao started the disastrous Cultural Revolution, empowering Chinese youth (so-called Red Guards) to attack the CCP bureaucracy, institutions, and intellectuals. Nearly 2 million people were killed and millions imprisoned or tortured, disrupting a generation and setting China back. The led to the reform period. After Mao had a stroke in 1972, Deng Xiaoping gradually took the reins of power, following internal CCP struggles against Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, and the “Gang of Four.” Market-oriented reforms took off, first with incremental experiments and then writ large, with Deng proclaiming, “To get rich is glorious.” Collective leadership followed, implementing change, until Xi’s rise and his “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” undoing some market reforms and Deng’s restrained foreign policy. The reactionary trend of policy under Xi is, in fact, a sign that China is capable of change—in both directions.

But even a post-Xi leadership is unlikely to see any incentive to change if it believes the United States has no interest in seeing it or in reaching accommodations with China in a viable international order. Despite the wild political roller coaster of CCP rule, much of the deluge of commentary by the post-engagement commentariat seems to view the party as a monolithic, relentless force. There may be some truth in Xi’s own inflexibility. Though he has eliminated many rivals, Xi has his share of enemies and, as noted above, a CCP history of course changes. There are hints of discontent: Recent extraordinary articles by a Central Committee member and a leading party school official, respectively, praising Deng’s reforms and not mentioning Xi were widely discussed in China.

If the United States wants an international order, rather than, as Princeton University’s Aaron Friedberg recently proposed, a “partial liberal order,” it has to offer states such as China some stake in that order. The logic of “democracies only” could lead to a bifurcated or maybe trifurcated world (the EU has a different philosophy on regulation) with dueling trade rules and tech standards.

### 2nc --- AT: Cling to Heg/Transition Wars

#### Cling to hegemony isn’t inevitable – we have the newest, most comprehensive research

**MacDonald and Parent, 18 –** Paul MacDonald is Associate Professor in Political Science at Wellesley College. Joseph M. Parent is associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame (Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment, p. 2-3

In this book, we argue that the conventional wisdom is wrong. Specifically, we make three main arguments. First, relative decline causes prompt, proportionate retrenchment because states seek strategic solvency. The international system is a competitive place, and great powers did not get to the top by being imprudent, irrational, or irresponsible. When their fortunes ebb, states tend to retain the virtues that made them great. In the face of decline, great powers have a good sense of their relative capability and tend not to give away more than they must. Expanding or maintaining grand strategic ambitions during decline incurs unsustainable burdens and incites unwinnable fights, so the faster states fall, the more they retrench. Great powers may choose to retrench in other circumstances as well, but they have an overriding incentive to do so when confronted by relative decline.

Second, the depth of relative decline shapes not only how much a state retrenches, but also which policies it adopts. The world is complex and cut- throat; leaders cannot glibly pull a policy off the shelf and expect desired outcomes. Because international politics is a self-help system, great powers prefer policies that rely less on the actions of allies and adversaries. For lack of a better term, we refer to these as domestic policies, which include reducing spending, restructuring forces, and reforming institutions—all to reallocate resources for more efficient uses. But international policies may also help, and they include redeploying forces, defusing flashpoints, and redistributing burdens—all to avoid costly conflicts and reinforce core strong- points. The faster and deeper states fall, the more they are willing to rely on others to cushion their fall. Retrenchment is not a weapon but an arsenal that can be used in different amounts and combinations depending on con- ditions and the enemies faced.

Third, after depth, structural conditions are the most important factors shaping how great powers respond to relative decline. Four conditions catalyze the incentives for declining states to retrench. One is the declining state's rank. States in the top rungs of the great power hierarchy have more resources and margin for error than those lower down, so there is less urgency for them to retrench. Another is the availability of allies. Where states can shift burdens to capable regional powers with similar preferences, retrenchment is less risky and difficult. Yet another is the interdependence of commitments. When states perceive commitments in one place as tightly linked to commitments elsewhere, pulling back becomes harder and less likely. The last catalyst is the calculus of conquest. If aggression pays, then retrenchment does not, and great powers will be loath to do it. The world is not just complex and cutthroat, it is also dynamic. No set of conditions is everlasting, and leaders must change with the times.

Empirically, this work aims to add value by being the first to study systematically all modern shifts in the great power pecking order. We find sixteen cases of relative decline since 1870, when reliable data for the great powers become available, and compare them to their non-declining counterparts across a variety of measures. To preview the findings, retrenchment is by far the most common response to relative decline, and declining powers behave differently from non-declining powers. States in decline are more likely to cut the size of their military forces and budgets and in extreme cases are more likely to form alliances. This does not, however, make them ripe for exploitation; declining states perform comparatively well in militarized disputes. Our headline finding, however, is that states that retrench recover their prior rank with some regularity, but those that fail to retrench never do. These results challenge theories of grand strategy and war, offer guidance to policymakers, and indicate overlooked paths to peace.

#### The US is turning inward now – that avoids a hard landing

**Schweller, 18** - Randall Schweller is Professor of Political Science and a Social and Behavioral Sciences Joan N. Huber Faculty Fellow, The Ohio State University (“Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US–China Relations” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, 23–48 doi: 10.1093/cjip/poy003

By passing the costs to more threatened allies, offshore balancing aims to preserve US primacy far into the future and safeguard liberty at home. As John Glaser points out, ‘A globe-straddling forward-deployed military presence is a costly burden that elevates peripheral interests to the level of vital ones, takes on security responsibilities that can and should be fulfilled by other states, and produces negative unintended consequences for U.S. interests.’91 The trick, however, is implementing a retrenchment strategy—that is, how to wean the world off of American power while avoiding a hard landing (e.g. regional arms races and intense security dilemmas). Even with the most skilled leadership, we should expect a very bumpy ride.

We see this happening already. Trump’s visit to Asia created unease among allies about the role the United States will play in the Asia-Pacific region. Seeking Beijing’s help to deal with North Korea, President Trump failed to press China on its military buildup in the South China Sea, reinforcing the perception that America is beginning to retreat from the region and, quite understandably, fueling Japan’s underlying fear of abandonment. Tokyo now strongly suspects that the United States may make some kind of deal with China that could put Japan at a disadvantage.

### 2nc --- AT: Offensive Realism

#### Realism is broadly wrong – oversimplifies and doesn’t assume Chinese politics

**Kuhn 21** – undergraduate student at Goethe University studying International Relations (Frank, “Offensive Realism and the Rise of China: A Useful Framework for Analysis?,” *E-International Relations*, 7-9-21, <https://www.e-ir.info/2021/07/09/offensive-realism-and-the-rise-of-china-a-useful-framework-for-analysis/>, Accessed 7-1-22, LASA-AH)

A comprehensive analytical framework found wanting In addition to the empirical and theoretical issues presented above, offensive realism precludes two important levels of analysis when used as a tool for studying the rise of China. In his influential book Man, State, and War, Waltz (1954) conceived of three “images” of international relations: individuals, the state, and the international system. Now, offensive realism is a **structural theory**. It holds that state behaviour is determined by the anarchic structure of the international system. Individual leaders and domestic politics are excluded from consideration—offensive realism is an oversimplification of reality. As a consequence, the theory will be of limited utility when personal beliefs or domestic politics are the predominant variables which shape a state’s foreign policy (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 10). When it comes to China, reasonable evidence suggests that individuals and their ideas may indeed dominate the decision-making process. Chinese foreign policy has always been shaped by its supreme leader’s personal ideas. Although it is true that the leader’s role has become less significant from Mao Zedong to Hu Jintao (Nathan and Scobell, 2014, pp. 37–38), there can be no doubt that the rise of Xi Jinping, China’s supreme leader since 2012, has reversed this trend. “Xi Jinping thought” has been included in the Chinese Communist Party’s constitution in the 19th National Congress in October 2017 (Corre, 2018). And after an unprecedented centralisation of power, Xi holds more sway than any other Chinese leader since Mao. He has quelled dissenting voices, removed the term limit for his office as president and established a personality cult that bears resemblance to authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin in Russia or even Kim Jong Un in North Korea. Hence, a sound understanding of Xi is of much greater significance than it has been for any of his immediate predecessors (Wasserstrom, 2021). Xi’s rise to power has been accompanied by what is described as an increasingly assertive Chinese foreign policy. This was first noted in 2009 by various Chinese and foreign pundits (Friedberg, 2014, p. 133), and has culminated in an unparalleled Chinese diplomatic offensive in 2020. The Chinese Communist Party tightened its grip on Hong Kong and passed a controversial national security law that has effectively terminated the principle of “one country, two systems.” Chinese soldiers started a deadly brawl on the disputed border with India. The Chinese military repeatedly probed Taiwan’s air defences and increased its patrols around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, which are claimed by both China and Japan. Likewise, maritime presence in the South China Sea was intensified. Domestically, Beijing stepped up its clampdown against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang in what many have described as an attempt of cultural genocide. Finally, the Australian government’s request for an independent investigation into the roots of the COVID-19 pandemic was met with harsh trade sanctions and cyberattacks, and Chinese diplomats started using very belligerent language (Campbell and Rapp-Hooper, 2020). What may account for this dramatic change of direction in the PRC’s foreign policy? Campbell and Rapp-Hooper (2020) have suggested that both Xi’s belief that the time to restore China’s historical might has arrived and this consolidation of power likely played a key role, while staunch nationalism may have served as a catalyst. H. R. McMaster (2020), former White House national security adviser, has similarly argued that the Chinese leadership is under the impression that its window of opportunity to accomplish the “China dream” is narrowing. He has also emphasised the importance of history when it comes to understanding China. Small and Jaishankar (2020) have put forward four conceivable explanations for the PRC’s new assertiveness. These theories hold that weaknesses in the rest of the world, an internalisation of the Chinese leaders’ own success, a reaction to current challenges posed by the pandemic or internal and external insecurity could be the reason of China’s diplomatic offensive. To date, there is **no systemic analysis** which would attribute Beijing’s newest assertiveness to specific determinants on the individual, domestic or structural level. However, Liao (2016) has employed a classical levels of analysis approach to make sense of China’s assertiveness after 2009. According to his assessment, prevalent structural and domestic explanations are not supported by empirical evidence and thus fail to offer a plausible explanation. Most importantly, there was no correlation in time between adjustments of international or domestic preconditions and China’s increased assertiveness. Thus, the analysis suggests that the perceptions and ideas of China’s elite and the state leader’s preferences are the most convincing explanation for the changes in Chinese foreign policy (Liao, 2016, pp. 831–833). It is true that China’s new assertiveness could also be part of a larger plan to achieve the PRC’s strategic objectives, as Friedberg (2014, pp. 143–146) has argued. In addition, the leadership argument is almost impossible to refute (Liao, 2016, p. 829). But regardless of that, the evidence presented above strongly suggests that a single-level perspective as offensive realism may be **too parsimonious** when it comes to the analysis of the rise of China. In fact, even Mearsheimer has dedicated one section of his chapter on China’s rise to “hypernationalism,” which he expects to exacerbate the US-Chinese security competition—whilst maintaining that realist logic will remain the key factor (Mearsheimer, 2014, pp. 399–403). In this regard, realism appears to be not just a theory, but also an ideology, as McFaul has so aptly noted: Realism is devised as a descriptive and a prescriptive theory; states ought to follow its lessons in order to be successful in international affairs. Yet, this would seem to **undercut the core argument of realism**—namely that leaders and their beliefs are irrelevant (McFaul, 2020, p. 113).

#### Offensive realism looks purely at military capabilities – ignores economic concerns

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Mearsheimer’s Unduly Focus on Military Capabilities The third and final reason why offensive realism would seem to be of rather limited utility in the analysis of the rise of China is the theory’s unduly focus on military capabilities. Mearsheimer grasps at the concept of power only in a very narrow sense—**states’ capabilities are measured in purely military terms** (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 363). Although military potential is certainly easy to estimate, this view disregards other ways to wield power and coerce one’s adversaries—for instance by means of economic warfare (Toft, 2005, p. 384). In the context of US-China relations, an **unabating focus on military force appears problematic**; Mearsheimer’s anticipated security competition may actually play out in the economic arena, not in the military domain. Indeed, a tech competition between China and the United States is already well underway. Especially under Donald Trump’s four-year tenure as United States president, previously uncontroversial economic cooperation has been increasingly considered through the lens of national security. This has led to a significant reappraisal of US-China relations; the United States believes that it is losing its competitive technological and military edge due to close commercial ties with the PRC (Foot and King, 2019, p. 47). Looking more closely at the rhetoric of the Trump administration, it appears that both economic and civil society ties have been successfully securitised (Abb, 2020). That is, a reference object—i.e. economic relations with the PRC—has been defined as an existential security threat that warrants emergency measures outside the scope of normal political procedures (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde, 1998, pp. 23–26). One of the most apparent examples for this securitisation seems to be the 2017 US National Security Strategy because it frames economic security explicitly as a national security issue (United States, 2017, p. 17). The Trump administration has acted accordingly. It imposed tough sanctions on the Chinese tech giant Huawei, cutting the company off from technology manufactured in the United States, including microprocessors (Abb, 2020, p. 2). After that, in summer 2020, politicians in Washington discussed whether or not TikTok—a social network owned by a Chinese company which is especially popular among young teenagers—could pose a threat to national security (Schuman, 2020). Some have even suggested that the White House should declare a national emergency and invoke the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) if the ownership company ByteDance is not willing to sell its service to a non-Chinese enterprise (Thompson, 2020). Subsequently, the People’s Republic of China placed TikTok’s recommendation algorithm on its export control list (Mozur, Zhong and McCabe, 2020). As the Biden administration is reviewing Trump’s China policy, the tech war is currently on hold—at least with regard to TikTok (Kruppa and Sevastopulo, 2021). But given that Joe Biden (2020) has also embraced technological competition with China, it seems reasonable to assume that the arms race for high-tech superiority is here to stay. Other trends, for example the transition toward renewable energy, would also suggest that control over technology and intellectual property rights will **become increasingly more important** (Overland, 2019, p. 38).

### 2nc --- AT: Offensive Realism Mearsheimer

#### Mearsheimer’s guilty of selection bias AND doesn’t assume empirical evidence

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The Foundation for Offensive Realism appears doubtful. The fundamental assumption of Mearsheimer’s offensive realism is a bold one. He portrays great powers as revisionist predators in pursuit of survival. The ultimate goal for any powerful state is to attain regional hegemony—that is, being the strongest nation in its part of the world. In addition, great powers also want to make sure there are no contenders dominating other regions (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 363). This image is both persuasive and parsimonious, but **not backed by empirical evidence.** In fact, rising states do not always seem to employ aggressive strategies toward their declining competitors. Rather, history suggests that rising states even **cooperate with their declining peers**. Although Wilhelmine Germany competed with Great Britain for maritime primacy, it also provided Austria-Hungary with diplomatic and military support in the years before 1914. Both the United States and the rising Soviet Union attempted to support a weakening United Kingdom after the end of World War II. Eventually, Britain received remarkable economic, military and diplomatic assistance from the United States (Shifrinson, 2020, pp. 176–177). But the Soviet Union was also eager to cooperate with the UK; it even explored the feasibility of a formal military alliance with Britain in early 1947—more than one year before the United States started to discuss a similar proposal (Shifrinson, 2018, p. 90). Similarly, a large body of literature on power transitions apparently calls into question Mearsheimer’s offensive realist worldview, since there appears to be only **a weak link** between power shifts and the outbreak of war (Shifrinson, 2020, p. 180). For example, Lebow and Valentino (2009) not only found that power transitions are fairly uncommon, but also that power shifts are usually the effect of armed conflicts—**not their cause**. Great powers traditionally eschew making war against their peers. Instead, they prefer to attack smaller states or **gravely declining nations**. It is true that these smaller wars have repeatedly escalated in ways that dragged other great powers into the conflict as well (Lebow and Valentino, 2009, p. 406). But these conflicts—inadvertent escalations, so to speak—differ considerably from the intense security competition which Mearsheimer is anticipating. Most importantly, there is even research indicating that dominant military powers are **more likely than rising states to start major conflict,** provided that they are apprehensive about their loss of status (Copeland, 2000, p. 3). In sum, empirical evidence suggests that rising states adopt much more nuanced strategies than offensive realism would predict. This seems to hold true even for great powers with revisionist propensities (Shifrinson, 2018, p. 181). One possible explanation for this divergence between reality and what offensive realism teaches could be case selection. Indeed, Mearsheimer’s case studies have been **suspected of selection bias** by various scholars (Snyder, 2002, p. 161; Toft, 2005, pp. 395–396). It is also worth noting that—at odds with Mearsheimer’s predictions—NATO has yet to collapse (Kaplan, 2011). Neither has Germany acquired nuclear weapons, nor is there a vicious great power competition in Europe (Toft, 2005, p. 396). In other words: Mearsheimer has been off the mark by **a great margin.** Given the rather weak empirical basis and the theory’s debatable predictive ability, it would seem reasonable to assume that offensive realism is **not particularly useful when it comes to the analysis of the rise of China.** In fact, the People’s Republic of China does not seem to harbour expansionist proclivities. It is true that China’s territorial claims—e.g. Taiwan or large swaths of the South China Sea—are substantial. In addition, Chinese efforts to build artificial islands in the South China Sea have been widely regarded as expansionist and aggressive by China’s neighbours. However, Chinese territorial claims are all firmly rooted in **historical possession or exploration,** not in offensive realist thinking (Nathan and Scobell, 2014, p. 21; Yergin, 2020). Besides that, theoretical insights from balance of power theory would also cast doubt on offensive realism’s core tenet, as Shifrinson (2020) has noted. If rising powers were to engage in all-out predation on their declining peers, they may expedite the formation of a sizable counterbalancing coalition. In multipolar systems, a rising power may also need assistance from other nations in its proximity to offset challengers. All-out predation on declining countries would seem to foreclose future cooperation with other states and thus appears strategically unwise (Shifrinson, 2020, pp. 181–183). For these reasons, rising states would seem to pursue more nuanced strategies toward their declining peers. More to the point, one would expect rising powers to follow either predatory or supportive strategies in varying intensities—depending on the decliner’s strategic value and military posture, respectively (Shifrinson, 2018, chap. 2). Since China faces several challengers in its neighbourhood with both India and Japan, and the United States is likely to retain a robust military posture for the foreseeable future, it appears probable that **China will exercise restraint**—or, in fact, may even want to cooperate with the United States (Shifrinson, 2020, p. 199).

### 2nc --- AT: Hostile China

#### Their read of Chinese motives is speculation without evidence

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Regardless of its motives, China’s more recent, escalatory behavior has contributed significantly to the buildup in tensions in the disputed SCS and ECS areas. Beijing has refused to specify the precise nature of its claims both to individual land features and to the waters within the nine-dashed line in the SCS, and it has rejected the above-mentioned tribunal ruling (asserting that certain exceptions to such a ruling under UNCLOS Article 298 apply). Further, China seemed to assert the legal right of an archipelagic nation to draw boundary lines between the Paracel and perhaps the Spratly Islands in order to establish interior territorial waters, created sizable artificial islands with dual civilian-military facilities in the Spratlys, and regularly deployed a significant number of vessels and some aircraft near and sometimes into the territorial space of the S/D Islands. Due to all of this, many observers understandably assume the worst-case for China’s motives, ascribing them to the much larger, more aggressive and confrontational strategic motives outlined above.

This interpretation is purely speculative, however, and is certainly not confirmed by any authoritative Chinese statements or documents. In fact, China’s actions and statements can be most logically explained by the above interactive dynamic, which centers first and foremost on the maritime disputes themselves. Indeed, when measured against the metric of a supposed direct challenge to the U.S. position in Asia, Beijing’s actions seem cautious, even timid. It generally avoids the use of warships to assert its claims, has given assurances that it does not intend to militarize the Spratly Islands, and has certainly not attempted to seize land features held by other claimants to assure its control of the area. Moreover, Beijing continues to insist that it is dedicated to a peaceful, negotiated solution of the disputes and supports the peaceful objectives of the 2002 declaration. In general, it is attempting to increase its influence in both seas without increasing the chance of armed conflict with the United States.

This could all change, of course, as China’s power in the area increases, and those in and out of the Trump camp who call for a zero-sum confrontation with Beijing over the maritime disputes assert that it certainly will, because China’s caution thus far conceals its “real” expansionist and aggressive motives. Again, this is pure speculation, but of a dangerous sort, since if accepted as a basis for U.S. policy it would basically lock in a zero-sum interpretation of every assertive Chinese action, thereby justifying an equally zero-sum U.S. move in response. And of course, such actions would indeed cause Beijing to eventually adopt precisely the threatening motives that some observers insist (incorrectly) are already present.

Unfortunately, this type of overt and adversarial strategic competition is given significant impetus by the writings of the international media; the public interpretations of hardline pundits and “experts” in the United States, China, and other countries; and even some government officials on all sides. These sources already to a great extent seem to interpret every U.S. and Chinese statement and action of possible relevance to the disputed maritime areas as part of a titanic Sino-U.S. struggle for strategic dominance in Asia, thus pushing the two countries toward confrontation.

Beyond basing itself on a purely speculative and dangerous set of assumptions about Chinese motives, a zero-sum, confrontational argument calling for a doubling down of U.S. capabilities in the Western Pacific also employs another highly dubious (at best) set of assumptions regarding American and Chinese defense spending relevant to Asia. Barring an unlikely near-total collapse of the Chinese economy and/or a major surge in the overall U.S. GDP, Washington will not possess the capacity to greatly exceed the kind of military and economic capabilities that China will be able to bring to bear in its nearby maritime areas over the coming years. In fact, projections by scholars at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and other reputable sources predict a much more likely movement toward parity between U.S. and Chinese capabilities in that region, in other words, a de facto strategic equilibrium.

#### Respect is the key variable – US accommodation is vital to preventing a violent transition

**Biba, 17** - Institute for Political Science, Goethe University Frankfurt (Sebastian, “It’s status, stupid: explaining the underlying core problem in US–China Relations” Global Affairs, 2017 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2016.1276077>

Behind such behaviour, however, is a much more profound mechanism, namely, a gradually intensifying status rivalry between the United States and China. Status refers to an actor’s specific rank within a social hierarchy. Status is of intrinsic value for a state because, generally speaking, the higher its rank, the more privileges a state can enjoy. As a result, states tend to seek a high status, just as they require this status to be recognized by others. However, not every state can have a high status, because then none does (Larson, Paul, & Wohlforth, 2014, pp. 7–9). Transferred onto the current US– China relationship, the situation, roughly speaking, is as follows: The US status, both globally and in the Asia-Pacific, remains relatively higher than China’s. Also, the United States wants to defend and bolster this status. Meanwhile, China seeks a higher status increasingly on par with the United States in many issue-areas and wants the United States to respect this claim. The problem with this status competition between the United States and China is twofold, though: First, it underlies, and in fact nourishes, many other grave concerns prevalent in US–China relations. Second, if not mitigated, it has huge potential to end up in serious conflict.

The long shadow of power transition

While status is an ideational concept and highly subjective, some key attributes that serve as the basis for status are material, since some of the same resources that guarantee power also relate to status (Larson et al., 2014, pp. 8, 13). Currently, the United States still retains its role as the world’s number-one power, both economically and militarily. In 2016, the US nominal GDP still accounted for 24.7% of the world economy (Statistics Times, 2016), while its military expenditure amounted to a massive 36% of global spending (SIPRI, 2016, p. 2). What is more, the United States is unwilling to voluntarily leave its top position to anybody else. Tellingly, Ashley Tellis writes that “[p]reserving American preeminence and by extension the current global system itself, accordingly, remains the central task for U.S. policymakers today” (Tellis, 2013, p. 110). At the same time, China has already made enormous progress since the beginning of its reform and opening period in 1978 and within less than four decades has catapulted itself into the second-biggest economy in the world (standing at 15.1% of global GDP at nominal) (Statistics Times, 2016) and trails only the United States in terms of military expenditure (13% of global spending) (SIPRI, 2016, p. 2). Significantly, when measured in real purchasing-power terms, China overtook the United States as the world’s leading economy in late 2014 (Arends, 2014).

In the past, when incumbent great powers like the United States were confronted with other rapidly emerging great powers like China, this has often – albeit not always – led to terrible wars, as the newcomers could not, or did not intend to, be integrated into the existing international order. Power transition theory (see Organski & Kugler, 1981) has made it its business to explain the occurrence, or absence, of major war between a dominant great power and one of its rising challengers. In doing so, the theory walks on two legs. First is the power dimension, which likewise functions as the theory’s necessary condition. The power dimension looks at whether the rising state has reached parity with (80% is seen as sufficient) or even overtaken the dominant state in terms of national power. While it can be somewhat tiresome to calculate one’s way through the various ways to measure national power and predict when exactly the stage of parity, or overtaking, is reached, China is without doubt currently the most powerful and most serious challenger of the United States.

The more interesting aspect about power transition theory, however, is its second leg, that is, its sufficient condition determining the war-proneness of a transition. This second dimension of the theory is interested in the degree of (dis)satisfaction of the rising challenger primarily with its status in the international order as well as with the benefits to be derived for itself from this order. Simply put, if the challenger is satisfied with its status in the existing order, that is, the status quo, war will be avoided; however, if the challenger is dissatisfied, the revisionist challenger will seek to topple the existing order and war will be the outcome. So, the critical question is how (dis)- satisfied is China with its current status in the international system, which is largely shaped by the United States.

China’s status seeking

To begin with, the Chinese are a highly status-conscious nation. In fact, “Chinese officials and analysts alike have, since the mid-1990s, evoked ‘international status’ as if it were the most desirable value, the one that leads to power, security, and respect” (Deng, 2008, p. 8). This has primarily to do with the fact that China used to be, or at least perceived itself to be, what is nowadays called a great power, or even a superpower, throughout most of its long history. Not only did the Chinese regard their “Middle Kingdom” as the centre of the civilized world, whereas all others were seen as “barbarians” to various degrees. Especially during the Han, Tang and late Ming/early Qing dynasties, the Chinese also claim to have wielded substantial global influence, as China then was a “highly advanced, culturally sophisticated, technologically developed society that contributed significantly to the global economy and [therefore] was internationally revered and respected” (Medeiros, 2009, p. 8).

The period of decline from the First Opium War in 1839 to the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, during which China became semi-colonized and which the Chinese refer to as the “century of humiliation” at the hands of Western and Japanese intervention and imperialism, is widely considered in China as a “historical mistake” to be corrected (Yan, 2001, p. 33). As Yan Xuetong has put it:

[T]he Chinese regard their rise as regaining China’s lost international status rather than as obtaining something new. This psychological feeling results in the Chinese being continuously dissatisfied […] until China resumes its superpower status. (Yan, 2001, p. 34)

On its path to (re)gain greater international status, China has already made noticeable headway and achieved some remarkable successes. In particular, China became a veto-wielding permanent UN Security Council member in 1971, thus taking an important first step out of international isolation in the aftermath of China’s Great Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s. After subsequent membership in the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1980, another milestone was China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, after 15 years of protracted negotiations. Moreover, while not in the club of the G7/G8, China surely has become a very prominent player in the G20 after this grouping gained traction in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007/2008. As a result, China is now a member of (almost) all key international, including many regional, organizations and an actor firmly established in the global governance system. No issue of global concern, from nuclear proliferation to climate change, can any longer be successfully tackled without China’s active and positive participation. Besides, China’s economic success has long promoted discussions about a new Chinese development model (“Beijing Consensus”) possibly outstripping the predominant US variant (“Washington Consensus”). The establishment of hundreds of Confucius Institutes since 2004 has spread enhanced knowledge about Chinese culture around the entire globe. Finally, the Chinese were able to fulfil a dream when hosting the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing.

Nonetheless, Beijing remains dissatisfied, and increasingly so. While China has not yet shown the intention of toppling the existing international order but has rather sought to integrate itself with it, at least to a certain degree (see Li, 2011), it still perceives this order to be largely dominated by the West (read: by the United States) and its own seeking for a higher status disrespected by Washington. In the Chinese official discourse, this becomes obvious, for example, in that China keeps calling for the “democratization of international relations”, meaning that non-Western powers, above all China, should be given a bigger say and thus a higher status in the existing global order. While the democratization of international relations is a long-standing Chinese claim, it has not lost any of its fervour. In June 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for “jointly promot[ing] more balanced international relations [and] advanc[ing] reform in global governance in keeping with new changes in the relative strengths of international forces” (Xinhua, 2014).

### 2nc --- No Impact to Revisionism

#### No impact to Chinese revisionism – it will err towards negotiation, not force

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China’s acknowledgement of the external meaning of territorial integrity is a contested topic. The cynical view holds that a predominant China will try to expand and redraw political borders because rising states are revisionist and territorial expansion is par for the course. Such behavior would clearly undermine the territorial integrity norm. But I contend that although China will increasingly insist on a hegemonic relationship with its neighbors, it will do so with an eye on preserving the territorial integrity of states. It might press its current territorial claims, but it would not strip states of their sovereignty and transform them into Chinese possessions.

My position is built on two related arguments. First, China’s territorial disputes are not based on claims over other sovereign states, in total, nor are the disputes over key sections of their landmass. There are important disputes to be sure, such as with India, but these do not lay claim to vital sections of the Indian state. More importantly, the trend has been toward reconciliation rather than escalation.66 Indeed, China has shown a proclivity toward negotiation, especially when it is strong. One might challenge my argument by pointing to Taiwan and arguing that China’s territorial claim threatens the very existence of a sovereign state. But in this case China actually invokes territorial integrity and treats Taiwan as an internal matter. Since it has never recognized the sovereignty of Taiwan, its claim is framed as a matter of sovereignty—an intrastate rather than an interstate issue. Overall, the real flashpoints in Chinese territorial disputes are maritime in nature, pitting it against its neighbors over control of sea-lanes and various uninhabited islands like the Spratlys or the Senkakus/Diaoyus. These contests are long running, their rightful ownership is debated, and increased assertiveness over them is unlikely to challenge the territorial integrity norm.

#### Chinese revisionism won’t undermine territorial sovereignty

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The rise of China has generated a veritable cottage industry of articles and books, and portents and predictions. Will China be content with current international order, or, like many past rising states, aim to revise it? My analysis is guided by the Sandholtz and Stiles cycle model.58 International rule structures are built on power and the appeal to precedent and normative tradition. In imagining a future where China is hegemonic I have sidestepped questions about what disputes may occur along the way, but I can speculate on how a preeminent China would influence the normative order. I argue that it will aim to modify the international order but, importantly, it will not attempt to redraw borders. It will not be revisionist in a territorial sense. I arrive at this conclusion by examining its current preferences with respect to self-determination and territorial integrity, and I contend that these preferences should endure in a time of Chinese hegemony.

With respect to self-determination, Chinese policy has shown a more limited support for minority nations. China recognizes secession when it is consensual, but when the national government in a secessionist crisis denies the aspiring group, China argues that sovereignty should be respected and that the outcome of the struggle should be resolved internally, without interference from the international community.59 Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Liu Jianchao, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, commented:

China always believes that a plan acceptable to both Serbia and Kosovo through negotiations is the best way to resolve this issue. The unilateral move taken by Kosovo will lead to a series of consequences. China is deeply worried about its severe and negative impact on peace and stability of the Balkan region and the goal of establishing a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo. China calls upon Serbia and Kosovo to continue negotiations for a proper resolution within the framework of the international law and work together to safeguard peace and stability of the Balkan region.60

China criticized the United States for recognizing Kosovo and pointed out the danger of precedent setting. Furthermore, China took a similar position on the recent secession of South Sudan; recognition required a formally consensual divorce from greater Sudan.

China’s more austere interpretation of self-determination is motivated, in part, by its domestic concerns over fragmentation. Complete acceptance of self-determination presents a problem for multinational states. China recognizes the rights of stateless nations in the limited sense that they should have greater autonomy. And since 1958 China has recognized five autonomous regions: Ningxia, Tibet, Guangxi, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia. The state, however, draws a line with respect to full independence. Despite the periodic conflicts in Tibet and Xinjiang and the international criticism China has received in its handling of those affairs, and despite the potential war that could arise over the Taiwan question, China adamantly defines these issues as internal problems, and it repeatedly invokes the norm of territorial integrity when doing so.

For China there are precedent-setting concerns when recognizing breakaway regions in the absence of government consent, and these concerns are apparent in both the political and popular rhetoric regarding domestic and foreign secessionist movements. One of the arguments for denying Taiwanese independence is to prevent domino effects, since independence there would embolden “the determination of Tibetan, Uighur, and Mongolian separatists.”61 According to Robert Art, “allowing Taiwan to become independent would set a disastrous precedent.”62 In a 2006 speech, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Jia Qinglin stated, “we will never tolerate Taiwan Independence. We will unswervingly oppose and curb secessionist forces and their activities.”63 These domestic concerns are visible in public opinion. A recent article in the China Post stated that “Southern Sudan’s nearly certain secession from the Arab-dominated north is likely to set a dangerous precedent in an Arab world looking increasingly fractured along sectarian and ethnic lines.”64

Overall, in a time of Chinese hegemony the recognition of new states would be pinned to state consent and therefore less frequent. China currently interprets the norm in a more constrained manner, and there is little indication that the government has internalized the norm in any meaningful way. In addition, it has frequently disagreed with the United States, and other Western powers, over cases like Kosovo. The norm of self-determination should endure under a preeminent China, but it would be more constrained.

#### Even if they’re revisionist, they’re ‘reformist’ not ‘revolutionary’---attempting to contain them causes revolutionary backlash to the LIO which turns the ADV

Kim and Kim 22 — Sung-han Kim a Graduate School of International Studies, Korea University, Seoul, Republic of Korea & Sanghoon Kim b Center for Maritime Security, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, Seoul, Republic of Korea (2022) China’s contestation of the liberal international order, The Pacific Review, DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2063367 WMK

Despite conventional wisdom that the AIIB represents a challenge to the liberal international order and Chinese ambitions to establish a Sinocentric international order, the AIIB is an example of contested multilateralism. Specifically, it is a strategy of competitive regime creation to better reflect the interests of China in the multilateral development sector without challenging the constitutional structure and the fundamental institutions of the liberal international order. In fact, the AIIB has been working collaboratively with parallel institutions within the regime complex such as the World Bank, the IMF, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the ADB. In assessing whether the AIIB signifies deconcentration and delegitimation of the U.S.-led liberal order, it is too early to tell whether the AIIB will evolve into a multilateral development bank that serves as an instrument to export a Chinese model of economic statecraft such as state capitalism. Moreover, this paper examines only the AIIB as an example of Chinese contestation of the liberal international order and future research can test the contestation-challenge distinction of revisionist state behavior with other case studies in different issue-areas to corroborate the argument laid out in this paper. Moreover, the task remains on sophisticated ways to distinguish contestations from challenges in the security domain.

Certainly, the developmental model, emphasizing export promotion with a high degree of state intervention, is touted as an alternative pathway to achieve economic growth, especially after the experiences of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis. However, it is hard to disregard the possibility of China using these infrastructure projects as ways to promote Chinese interests, by exporting excess capacity in domestic industries while paving the way for increased connectivity along the lines of land and sea communications. After all, even if China had the intention to construct a regional sphere of influence and an exclusive China-led international order, the success of such endeavor would rely on China’s ability to continue its material rise and to buy voluntary compliance of secondary powers, earning legitimacy of a renewed Chinese leadership in the region by presenting an alternative order. An early assessment of Chinese efforts at order-building in the multilateral development domain, reveals that secondary powers are, gradually, finding the shortcomings of China-led initiatives, ranging from the lack of transparency to the incurrence of exorbitant national debts. At the same time, the introduction of the ‘Build Back Better World (B3W)’ partnership, by the Biden administration, may restore U.S. leadership in the global infrastructure development sector with emphasis on liberal values such as transparency, good governance, and environmental safeguards (The White House, 2021).

If China is contesting, not challenging the liberal international order, the countermeasures of the United States, as the guardian of the liberal international order, become equally dependent upon the question of whether China will transform into a ‘revolutionary’ revisionist power from today’s ‘reformist’ revisionist power. A strategy of ‘hard’ containment and the use of coercive measures to suppress Chinese influence in the region will further aggravate Chinese dissatisfaction towards the liberal international order. This will motivate China to actively seek counter-hegemonic military coalitions with strategic partners, such as Russia, to challenge the United States at all levels. Therefore, it is important for the United States to accommodate China’s legitimate demands within established institutions that reflect the changes in the distribution of capabilities.

### 2nc --- China Isn’t Revisionist

#### China isn’t revisionist.

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In the abstract, such claims are alarming—in context, and in balance, rather humdrum. In fact, the evidence of any Chinese intention to destroy, or even merely undermine and exploit, the current order is slight. China is certainly using its growing military power to defend its claims in the SCS and even—on occasion— to coerce its neighbors. It uses protectionist economic policies to boost the prospects of Chinese companies and reduce competition. It employs economic statecraft to serve its interests abroad. And it certainly is opposed to America’s policy of global democracy promotion. However, none of these positions fundamentally challenge the existing order, none of them radically depart from America’s own actions when it was a rising power in the nineteenth century, and none of them obviously surpass America’s own contemporary record of order subversion. When the United States was a rising power, it took half of Mexico and considered taking the rest, it colonized the Philippines and Hawaii, and it unilaterally seized the maritime choke points of the Caribbean (Puerto Rico and Cuba).21 The United States used tariffs—which by 1857 averaged 20 percent22 and by the end of the nineteenth century were “the highest import duties in the industrial world”23—to protect its industries. It stole intellectual property,24 and it ideologically challenged the governments of the “Old World.” Today, despite no longer being a rising power, the United States has launched two disastrous invasions, tortured prisoners, and dispatches drone strikes at a whim with little international legal authority.25 The point is not that two wrongs make a right; it is that international order is much more resilient than critics seem to realize,26 and it is utopian to expect any rising Great Power to act in a way that uniformly satisfies one’s moral scruples, evolving, in Friedberg’s words, “into a mellow, satisfied, ‘responsible’ status quo power.”27 Friedberg or Harris might object that America’s rise took place in the context of a different order. This is perfectly true, but the more important point is that the long nineteenth century (1815–1914)—the era of America’s rise—was the first iteration of the New Peace.28 The implication is that relative peace can and has coexisted with limited wars, property and territorial thefts, acts of coercion, and aggressive assertions of status. This does not mean any of these are desirable— they are not—but it shows that they need not be fatal to the system. Insofar as there is a lesson from that first period of relative peace, it is that Great Power confrontation is the one thing that is fatal. Accepting this does not mean capitulating in every instance, as implied by some,29 but it does mean rediscovering the rules of Great Power competition30 alongside the art of strategy.31 Focusing only on areas that China’s rise violates the scruples of the established powers, moreover, downplays the extent to which China, has, in fact, conformed to the existing order. As a RAND Corporation report published in 2018 concludes, China has been a supporter—albeit a conditional one—of the international order: “Since China undertook a policy of international engagement in the 1980s … the level and quality of its participation in the order rivals that of most other states.”32 The way in which Xi Jinping, following his 2017 Davos speech in defense of globalization, has been heralded as the most prominent champion of international order and defender of globalization underscores the fact that there are different elements of this order, and that China supports many, if not most, of them. Even in places where China is supposedly “altering” the current order, Beijing tends to simultaneously affirm that order. China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, for instance, actually mirrors existing structures, and China has intentionally copied elements and “best practices” of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. China is playing the same game, even if it is seeking a bigger role within it.33

#### Empirics

Klaus Heinrich Raditio 19. IR Prof @ University of Sydney. 2019. “Conclusion.” Understanding China’s Behaviour in the South China Sea, Springer Singapore, pp. 185–190. Crossref, doi:10.1007/978-981-13-1283-0\_8.

The main findings of this thesis show strong support for defensive realism theory. During the period of de-escalation (1995 until between 2007 and 2009), China had the most advanced military power compared to other SCS claimants. However, instead of using force, China extended its cooperative behaviour which was successful in de-escalating the SCS tension. China demonstrated its serious commitment to stabilising the region by participating in several multilateral agreements: the 2002 DoC, the ASEAN TAC in 2003, and the JMSU in 2005. This fact is at odds with the offensive realism assumption that suggests China will pursue hegemonic ambition to resolve its dispute with other claimants.1

#### Internal policy -- retrenchment bolsters Chinese integrationists and moderates their foreign policy BUT hegemony ensures hawks take over.

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The foreign policy preferences of China’s elite vary fairly widely. Shambaugh and Xiao have identified seven distinct orientations toward the status quo within Chinese foreign policy discourse. At the integrationist end of the spectrum are the Globalists, who believe that China should take on additional responsibility for global governance within the existing framework of institutions – in short, China should “act as a responsible power.”56 Chinese Globalists are much like Western “liberal institutionalists,” and are thus generally supportive of the liberal order. Five other perspectives (which Shambaugh and Xiao identify as Selective Multilateralists, the Global South school, the Asia Firsters, the Major Powers School, and the Realists) are less sold on the liberal order, but at least agree that some degree of participation in its institutions, norms, and rules is necessary.57

But there is one group – the Nativists – that rejects participation in the liberal international order. The Nativists are “hyper-nationalist” Marxist ideologues who oppose domestic reforms aimed at producing openness and market capitalism. In the realm of foreign policy, they oppose participation in the liberal order because they “view international multilateral involvement as ‘traps’ (laid by the West) to embroil China in costly overseas commitments.”58 Nativists have multiple reasons for rejecting integration, not all of which have to do with status – for instance, they worry that participation in the Western order will destabilize the Communist Party. But they are also deeply concerned about China’s status and are skeptical about the prospects of achieving their ambitions within an order dominated by Western powers. According to Shambaugh and Xiao, Nativists “regularly harp on the nationalist theme of the ‘century of shame and humiliation’ and argue that China is entitled to global respect (particularly by those powers that previously humiliated China).”59

Liu Mingfu’s sensationally popular China Dream is a remarkably open call for a deep revisionist challenge to the liberal order. While Liu may not be a Nativist (according to Shambaugh’s classification), his writing is worth considering as a modern Chinese manifestation of the kind of argument that Friedrich von Bernhardi popularized in Germany during the years before World War I. Liu’s central proposition is that China should aim to become a “champion” nation – the global top dog or leader (as distinct from the hegemon, which to Liu implies a form of imperialism and military domination). As the “champion,” China would “create a new world order that prefers peace, development, freedom, and cooperative civilization.” This seems like a clear demand for China to – at some point – remake the international order.

What is significant is the source of the demand for radical revisionism, and its implications for China’s participation in the liberal order. Liu links the need for a new order to the deficiencies of American hegemony, the “worst expression” of which is “its monopolization of its status as champion.”60 In other words, the United States will not accede willingly to China’s attainment of a position of equality in a “multipolar” world. The book goes on to document and decry American efforts to contain the rise of China, considers lessons fromthe successfulAmerican defeat of two other potential “champions” (the Soviet Union and Japan), and makes a clear argument against integrating too deeply within the liberal order:

However, it cannot be denied that America has a clear upper hand in terms of control and power with China. China can be promoted to copilot to help the United States cope with risks, but this will only help America maintain its position as pilot. America allows opponents to board its plane, which is ultimately a higher degree of control and containment.61

Integrating within the liberal order would amount to becoming Washington’s “copilot,” which would do nothing more than strengthen the basis of a status hierarchy that the United States is intent upon preserving. This is reminiscent of the way that Bernhardi, militant pan-Asianists, andWeimar nationalists argued against participation in the pre-WorldWar I and interwar orders. And Liu’s book is hardly peripheral: in 2013, Xi Jinping began invoking the term “China Dream” to describe his vision for China’s future, and has reportedly been deeply influenced by the book’s central argument.62

Nativists and other revisionists may not be ascendant in Chinese foreign policy decisionmaking, but their foreign policy preferences are not marginal either. While other schools of thought do not take such strident positions against participation in the liberal order, some share a sense of skepticism: Realists for instance, are also concerned that Western institutions are traps meant to keep China down.63 And Chinese elites remain worried about Chinese status and link it to the terms of participation in the liberal order – they emphasize “equality of participation” over “governance” and chafe at the idea of complying with American standards in order to be recognized as a “responsible power.”64

So while Chinese foreign policy is currently run mostly by proponents of intermediate and at least partially integrationist perspectives, Nativists and others like Liu constitute a loud and potentially influential voice for policies that reject the liberal international order – much like Pan-Asians or German radical nationalists spent the 1920s demanding policies of protest and delegitimation from the more moderate leaders who ran Taisho¯ and Weimar foreign policy.65 It is not difficult to imagine support for the Nativist perspective (not just among the elite but also in the public) growing along with developments that seem to confirm fears that Chinese status ambitions face an insurmountable, unjust obstacle imposed by the United States and the liberal order. Indeed, evidence suggests that Chinese “netizen” nationalists are hyper-aware of status issues and often mobilize in response to concerns about the way China is treated by foreign actors and what that treatment says about China’s international standing.66

Status, Domestic Politics, and Chinese Foreign Policy

The question that remains is whether – in China’s authoritarian system – pressure from outside the government for radical revisionist policies could have much influence. The government is (and likely will be for the foreseeable future) committed to foreign policy moderation: but what if developments appearing to confirm that China faces a status “glass ceiling” increase support for the Nativist position and lead to widespread demands for policies aimed at rejecting the liberal order? Could these forces impact Chinese policy in the same way that they impacted German and Japanese policy? It is hard to know for sure, but there is good reason to think that the government is susceptible to influence from external pressure and that it may only become more so in the future.

While some scholars maintain that Chinese policymakers mostly effectively ignore public opinion, or that public opinion prompts short-term shifts in official rhetoric or policy but does not influence grand strategic direction, many others agree that “bottom-up” forces play a significant role in Chinese foreign policy.67 Unofficial attitudes and preferences cannot influence policy through the mechanisms of electoral political competition, but this does not mean they are irrelevant. First, policy has to be at least somewhat responsive to the diversity of elite preferences – just as Bethmann Hollweg was constrained by the attitudes of the Kaiser, Tirpitz, and the Pan-Germans, Chinese leaders may be constrained by the preferences of Nativists and some status-sensitive and integration skeptical Realists in the military and the Party.68 Second, mass opinion can threaten China’s elite through the dynamics of widespread popular protest. According to Weiss, mass protests may menace ruling elites by creating demonstration effects, tipping points, and information cascades; facilitating future mobilization against the regime; and fostering or exacerbating divisions within the leadership.69 And while strong authoritarian states like China can prevent and manage anti-regime protests, there are costs and risks associated with doing so, especially when public opinion is aimed at forcing the regime to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy posture.70 This means that the masses can be a potent weapon for anyone interested in forcing the government into adopting a more belligerent foreign policy; in turn, this means that any factor that makes it easier to mobilize anti-Western opinion (such as apparent evidence that the United States is unwilling to accommodate a Chinese claim to equal rights) may provide opportunities for Chinese proponents of challenging the liberal order.

### 2nc --- AT: Biden Asia Pivot is Happening

#### Frame through unsustainability – even if they are pivoting, NATO and U.S doesn’t look like a threat because of a lack of power – ONLY the plan strengthens that.

#### Domestic barriers ensure no Asia Pivot

Davis 22 [Bob Davis is a senior editor who covers economic issues out of the Washington D.C. bureau, especially relations between the U.S. and China, 01-31-2022, Biden Promised to Confront China. First He Has to Confront America’s Bizarre Trade Politics., https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/01/31/biden-china-trade-politics-00003379] Eric

The more genteel Biden crowd is divided into three camps. The old globalist/nationalist labels don’t quite fit because they all agree on multilateral engagement (globalist) and they haven’t lifted Trump’s tariffs (nationalist). But there are big differences among them.

In one corner are the trade expansionists who want to tie Asian nations closer to the U.S. with trade deals. They include White House Asia coordinator Kurt Campbell, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

Then there’s the more labor-friendly faction, whose overriding goal is to make sure trade deals don’t hurt workers already battered by China trade and are more willing to use tariffs and quotas to protect them. They include U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai and some at the White House Council of Economic Advisers.

The third camp looks at trade through a political lens. Scrapping with China economically, they fret, could screw up other administration priorities like easing inflation or supply chain bottlenecks. That group includes White House chief of staff Ron Klain and National Economic Council Director Brian Deese.

The result: inaction. Policy options are debated, teed up for release and then pulled back — a kind of vaporware China economic policy.

#### History proves – every administration attempt to use NATO to counter China has failed.

Keith 22 [Tamara Keith has been a White House correspondent for NPR since 2014 and co-hosts the NPR Politics Podcast, the top political news podcast in America. In that time, she has chronicled the final years of the Obama administration, covered Hillary Clinton's failed bid for president from start to finish and thrown herself into documenting the Trump administration, from policy made by tweet to the president's COVID diagnosis and the insurrection, 6-24-2022, Biden said the G-7 would counter Chinese influence. This year, he'll try again, NPR.org, https://www.npr.org/2022/06/24/1106979380/g7-summit-2022-germany-global-infrastructure] Eric

Since then, his advisers have worked on the initiative, mostly without fanfare. There has been little tangible progress to herald. But at this year's G-7 summit, which begins Sunday in Germany, Biden plans to relaunch the effort — under a new name — and put forth some initial projects to show how the plan will work.

"He will be launching a partnership for global infrastructure, physical health and digital infrastructure that we think can provide an alternative to what the Chinese are offering — to the tune of tens and ultimately hundreds of billions of dollars when you add in what our G-7 partners are going to do as well," said Jake Sullivan, Biden's national security adviser, at a conference in Washington last week.

"We intend for this to be one of the hallmarks of the Biden administration foreign policy over the remainder of his tenure," Sullivan said.

This isn't the first time the U.S. government has pledged to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative. Previous administrations have talked about wanting to harness private financing to support projects in the developing world.

"Looking back at what we've seen, every iteration of an American-led response to the Chinese infrastructure project has underperformed," said Gyude Moore, a former minister of public works in Liberia.

"I really, really want to be hopeful, I do," said Moore, now with the Center for Global Development. "It's just — looking at everything as it exists, it's difficult to imagine what rabbit they are going to pull out of this hat."

#### Diplomatic credibility is non-existent, stops effective deterrence

Sukin 21 [[Lauren Sukin](http://laurensukin.com/) is a MacArthur Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and an incoming Assistant Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 9-28-2021, Biden’s pivot to Asia is missing something: diplomats, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2021/09/bidens-pivot-to-asia-is-missing-diplomats/] Eric

Eight months into Biden’s presidential tenure, the White House has nominated individuals to just [55 of the 189](https://afsa.org/list-ambassadorial-appointments) available ambassador positions, representing less than 30 percent of the total offices. Of the 134 positions currently without a Biden administration nominee, 97 are vacant, while three belong to Obama-era nominees. The remainder are filled with selections from the Trump administration. US allies have repeatedly expressed [frustration](https://www.economist.com/united-states/2021/06/24/america-says-its-back-but-where-are-its-ambassadors) with the slow US ambassadorial appointment process, with the average time to confirmation [approximately one year](https://diplomaticacademy.us/2021/06/13/ambassador-appointment-delays/). But the Biden administration has been slower to fill diplomatic positions than previous administrations, and notable vacancies in many regions have [not gone unnoticed.](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-01/biden-s-slow-walk-on-ambassador-picks-leaves-him-trailing-trump) Currently, the Biden administration has unfilled ambassadorial positions in Japan, Singapore, China, South Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines. No ambassador has yet been proposed for South Korea.

These missing and delayed diplomatic appointments affect the quality of US foreign relations. For example, repeated controversies with US ambassadors in South Korea (including one involving an [unfortunate mustache](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53552422)) have exacerbated [tensions](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/costs-and-benefits-new-approach-us-rok-joint-exercises-180576) over US-South Korean [military interoperability](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022002720972180) and [undermined cooperation](https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/what-biden-should-consider-when-picking-the-new-us-ambassador-to-south-korea/) over North Korea. Effective diplomacy requires learning about allies’ threat perceptions and preferred solutions, while [collaborating with key stakeholders](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934257) to explain and promote US policies. Skilled diplomats can improve policy design and ensure effective policy implementation. Vacant positions or inexperienced diplomats, however, can complicate communication and hamper the Biden administration’s commitment to addressing nuclear and conventional security challenges from China and North Korea.

Allies’ aggravation with slow appointments has been compounded by the Biden administration’s continuation of the controversial trend of nominating public and political figures for ambassador positions over career diplomats. Unlike other democracies, many US ambassadorial appointments are allocated to political donors, business leaders, and other individuals who are not career diplomats. The proportion of ambassadors fitting the description is high—approximately [30 percent](https://www.lawfareblog.com/troubling-trends-ambassadorial-appointments-1980-present) since the 1950s—and growing. More than half of Biden’s current nominees are not career diplomats, including public figures like pilot Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger, University of Pennsylvania President Amy Gutmann, and Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti.

While many of these individuals have had impressive careers, they are less qualified for diplomatic offices than their career-diplomat counterparts. Since 1980, nominees who are not career diplomats have been 28 percentage points less likely to speak their receiving state’s principal language if it isn’t English, 67 percentage points less likely to have experience in the region of the receiving state, and 52 percentage points less likely to have foreign policy experience, according to a [2019 Duke Law Journal paper.](https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol69/iss1/2/) These challenges can hinder successful diplomacy.

### 2nc --- AT: Strat Con Thumps

#### Strategic Concept still makes a cooperative effort to engage with China

Blankenship 6-30 [Bradley Blankenship is an American Journalist, columnist and political commentator. He has a column at CHTN and is a freelance reporter for international news agencies including Xinhua Agency, 06-30-2022, What NATO’s new strategic concept means for China, RT International, https://www.rt.com/news/558139-nato-china-strategic-concept/] Eric

Point 14 seems to walk back this confrontational stance by saying that NATO remains “open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency, with a view to safeguarding the Alliance’s security interests.” But it also says that its members will work to address “systemic challenges” posed by China, which is also alluded to in its “Cooperative Security” section, stating that the “Indo-Pacific is important for NATO, given that developments in that region can directly affect EuroAtlantic security.”

#### The Concept is not cutting China from the rise to power, its emphasizing a “constructive relationship.” The aff materially orients NATO against China.

Stavridis 6-28 [James George Stavridis is a retired United States Navy admiral, currently Vice Chair, Global Affairs and Managing Director of the global investment firm the Carlyle Group, and Chair of the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation, 6-28-2022, Analysis, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/what-to-expect-from-natos-new-strategic-concept/2022/06/27/fd3eb3be-f5ef-11ec-81db-ac07a394a86b\_story.html] Eric

Unlike in 2010, this long-term plan will describe China as a strategic competitor. NATO is not looking for conflict with Beijing, but must be capable of addressing concerns in cyberspace, human rights and territorial claims in the South China Sea — including consideration of NATO undertaking freedom of navigation patrols. The updated document will also likely emphasize cooperation globally with non-NATO democracies including Australia, Japan and South Korea.

Finally, the concept will emphasize that applications for expansion will be welcome, subject to the requirements for entry laid out in the NATO treaty. Finland and Sweden are at the front of the line, but Bosnia-Herzegovina and Georgia are still hoping for a path to membership, and so of course is Ukraine.

All these initiatives are sensible and necessary. It is worth remembering, however, how wrong our 2010 document was in the case of Russia. Dwight D. Eisenhower, NATO’s first supreme allied commander, supposedly said that “the plan is nothing, but planning is everything.” He meant, correctly, that the alliance will get some things wrong and overlook others.

We may be headed toward a more constructive relationship with China than expected. Or there may be unexpected but significant out-of-area challenges — perhaps in sub-Saharan Africa, stemming from piracy or mass migration headed toward Europe. Who, back in 2000, would have predicted a NATO mission in Afghanistan with 150,000 troops?

#### Strategic concept materially doesn’t do anything – it actually contributes to military overstretch

Arnold 7-1 [Ed Arnold is a Research Fellow for European Security within the International Security Studies department at RUSI, 7-1-2022, New Concepts but Old Problems: NATO’s New Strategic Concept, No Publication, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/new-concepts-old-problems-natos-new-strategic-concept] Eric

Politically, the Strategic Concept and the unity it represents are very important. However, militarily and operationally, it is less significant. The 2010 Strategic Concept had been moribund since at least 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, but of course NATO has still been operating effectively since. While a lot of effort has gone into building consensus for Madrid, in many ways the hard work starts now.

There is a coherence issue. The Strategic Concept, as NATO’s strategy, comes after the two main plans – SACEUR’s [Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_133127.htm) and the future [NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept](https://www.act.nato.int/nwcc) – have already matured. There was tacit acknowledgement at the Madrid summit that many underlying operational plans would have to be revised. However, with NATO’s strategy transforming, mere tweaks to plans do not seem sufficient, and their core assumptions should be revisited. For NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept – how it fights in the future – it is imperative that analysis of Russia’s military performance in Ukraine now becomes the backbone for its development.

Moreover, despite the collective might of NATO, it cannot do everything, and the commitment at the 2015 Warsaw summit to a ‘[360-degree approach](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm)’ to security – both thematically and geographically – risks overstretch. In a hardening world, the Alliance must take the opportunity to go back to its roots and seek support from other actors, such as the EU. It is still expected that a NATO–EU joint declaration will materialise before the end of the year.

# China Heg Good AFF

### 2ac --- US Heg Good

#### Heg solves global nuclear war

Zalmay Khalilzad 16, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, counselor at the CSIS, 3/23/16, “4 Lessons about America's Role in the World,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/4-lessons-about-americas-role-the-world-15574?page=show

Ultimately, however, we concluded that the United States has a strong interest in precluding the emergence of another bipolar world—as in the Cold War—or a world of many great powers, as existed before the two world wars. Multipolarity led to two world wars and bipolarity resulted in a protracted worldwide struggle with the risk of nuclear annihilation. To avoid a return such circumstances, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney ultimately agreed that our objective must be to prevent a hostile power to dominate a “critical region,” which would give it the resources, industrial capabilities and population to pose a global challenge. This insight has guided U.S. defense policy throughout the post–Cold War era.

Giving major powers the green light to establish spheres of influence would produce a multipolar world and risk the return of war between the major powers. Without a stabilizing U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf and U.S. relationships with Jordan and the Gulf States, Iran could shut down oil shipments in its supposed sphere of influence. A similar scenario in fact played out during the 1987 “tanker war” of the Iran-Iraq war, which eventually escalated into a direct military conflict between the United States and Iran. Iran’s nuclear program makes these scenarios even more dangerous.

The United States can manage the rise and resurgence of great powers like China, Russia and Iran at an acceptable cost without ceding entire spheres of influence. The key is to focus on normalizing the geopolitics of the Middle East, Europe and the Asia-Pacific, which the United States can do by strengthening its transatlantic and transpacific alliances and adapting them to the new, dangerous circumstances on the horizon. The United States should promote a balance of power in key regions while seeking opportunities to reconcile differences among major actors.

### 2ac/1ar --- AT: China Heg Inevitable

#### Studies exaggerate--- even if China takes the lead it means nothing for hegemony.

Ian Verrender 03-15-2022 [ABC Business Editor, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, “Why China is unlikely to overtake the United States to become the biggest economy in the world,” https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-15/china-faces-significant-hurdles-to-become-biggest-global-economy/100912398//ZW]

For decades, it has been one of the great truisms of global foreign policy; the "inexorable rise of China". Never a question of if but only when, the betting amongst academics, politicians and diplomats has concentrated on how long it would take for China to overtake the United States as the world's biggest economy. Its sheer size, both in terms of land mass and population, made it seemingly inevitable as the economy developed and living standards soared in one of history's fastest transitions from a Third World agrarian nation to a highly urbanised society. But the path to becoming the biggest is becoming increasingly hazardous. China is experiencing serious growing pains. The easy gains have been extracted and many pundits are winding back those ambitious straight-line extrapolations of continuous growth. Even then, there are various ways to measure size. Time to scale back the growth prospects A new study by Lowy Institute researchers Roland Rajah and Alyssa Leng casts doubt upon the speed with which China can achieve the dubious honour of claiming the crown and questions whether it will ever become the most powerful. "China would overtake the United States to become the world's largest economy in nominal US dollar terms by about 2030," the report's authors conclude. "But it would never establish a meaningful lead ... and would remain far less prosperous and productive per person than America, even by mid-century." Most research concludes that China will be able to motor along with around 5 per cent annual economic growth until 2050. If it did, it would be the world's biggest economy by a country mile, with the capacity to be its own bloc. It is those kinds of projections that have created fear and angst among many Western nations, including Australia, on how best to deal with a global economic powerhouse of such magnitude that does not adhere to democratic norms. This new study paints a vastly different picture of the future. Rather than 5 per cent growth, it forecasts growth of around 2 to 3 per cent a year, which has significant ramifications for the balance of global power and a major impact on China's internal politics. "With slower growth, China's progress in catching up to rich country average living standards and productivity levels would remain significantly incomplete, even by mid-century," the study says. "On the one hand, the average person in China would be 2 to 3 times richer by 2050 compared to today and 2.5 to 3.5 times more productive. "Nonetheless, China would still be much poorer and less productive than the United States, based on current expectations of future US growth at around 1.6 per cent a year on average." By 2050, the authors calculate the average person in China would be only 40 per cent as rich as the average American and about half as productive. More than just teething problems The early gains were easy. From an economy largely run by the state, allowing individuals to own and operate their own businesses sent growth soaring. Global capital poured in, providing cheap investment and employment. But those easy gains no longer are available. And the ongoing fracturing in relations between the West and an inward looking Beijing, accelerated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, will likely continue to see a slowing and perhaps withdrawal of foreign investment. In recent years, it has faced a series of crises fuelled by mounting debts which have seen a sharp uptick in defaults within private and government owned businesses, most recently concentrated within the property sector and companies such as Evergrande. Putting aside poor productivity, debt and overinvestment in infrastructure, the Lowy Institute report cites another issue as the biggest overall impediment to China's future; its ageing population and the legacy of its draconian past one child policy. "China's working age population has been shrinking since the middle of last decade," it says. "The fertility rate has fallen rapidly over the past decade to just 1.3 births per woman in 2020 — well below the replacement rate of 2.1." By 2050, China's working age population will have shrunk by around 220 million, which is around a fifth of its current level, with those aged over 65 making up about a quarter of the population. The authors conclude that you can never completely rule out the prospect China could rule the world, the chances of such are nowhere near as likely as most studies would indicate. "But it would require an enormous degree of success with productivity enhancing reforms well beyond China's track record to date," they argue. "It should not be the baseline expectation."

#### Alternate factors mean China will never be the hegemon--- even if it becomes militarily and economically superior.

Ashok Swain 01-21-21 [Ashok Swain is a Professor of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, Sweden, The Print, “China’s economy and military can overtake US, but it still won’t become global superpower,” https://theprint.in/opinion/chinas-can-overtake-us-but-it-still-wont-become-global-superpower/588718///ZW]

There is an ongoing discussion that China is emerging as a new superpower and replacing the US from the global power structure. China emerging strongly from the growing global economic crisis due to the Covid-19 pandemic and Donald Trump’s ally-alienating policies within NATO for the last four years have pushed this narrative forward considerably. There is no doubt that China has already become the global powerhouse economically, and is expected to surpass the US as the world’s biggest economy by 2028. China is still behind but on its way to surpassing the US in military power with increased spending on weapons technology and developing several secretive weapons. There is no doubt over China acquiring economic and military strength superior to the US sooner than later, but the question is, can the Communist Party-led China be ever as formidable and complete a superpower as the US has been for the last eight decades? When the Soviet Union competed with the US to claim superpower status during the Cold War period, it somewhat matched America’s strength in leading alliances and military power. However, at the height of its power, the Soviet Union was never a match for US domination economically or culturally. Like the Soviet Union in the past, China now faces several geopolitical and cultural challenges before it can reach global superpower status similar to the US. China can’t aspire to get the same respect and acceptance worldwide, even if its economic and military power overtakes the US. A democratic US will always have ideological, political, and cultural superiority compared to a Communist China. One-party Communist country Although China has developed a hybrid system to grow spectacularly on the economic front, it is still a one-party Communist country. Politically, it has become further closed and centralised than ever before. The Chinese Communist Party is celebrating its 100th anniversary this year. In 2011, when it was celebrating its 90th anniversary, I was fortunate to attend an invite-only meeting of the Chinese Political Science Association in Shanghai. Many top Chinese political scientists openly discussed the possibilities of China opening up to a multi-party electoral system. That sort of discussion is almost impossible to imagine in Xi Jinping-led China now. No doubt, China is a strong state with a powerful party bureaucracy, but its politics is potentially very fragile. Under a closed system, it is almost impossible to predict when that spark will arrive to ignite a political upheaval. This is a country where the Interpol chief or a globally famous billionaire can disappear without any official explanation. Hundreds of Chinese millionaires have been living abroad to protect their wealth from future uncertainties and to avail the opportunities of open societies. China has become rich, it is spending heavily on its university education, but 600,000 Chinese students go abroad for their higher studies every year. China’s economy might be booming for decades, but 10 million Chinese have traveled to other countries to find jobswhile 51 million people from all over the world have moved to the US for better work and improved living. Tough neighbourhood Despite its ongoing political troubles, there is no doubt that the American political system is resilient to any attack from destabilising forces. But that sort of trust in the system continues to elude China. Though China has been enjoying political stability for long, the Chinese people don’t have similar trust and confidence in their political system as the Americans have in theirs. This will not help China command the respect of other countries in its competition to become the global superpower. Geopolitics also does not favour China as it has the US. Unlike the US, China is surrounded by several powerful and competing countries. Among them, at least two, Russia and India, see the dream of becoming superpowers. China has also fought wars against them and continues to have several border disputes. China is neither safe nor secure in its neighbourhood to freely engage in political and military projects in other parts of the world as the US does. Besides China’s location in a tough neighbourhood, it also lacks trusted, powerful allies. On the one hand, the democratic US has established strong political and military cooperation with many regionally powerful countries like the UK, Germany, Japan, and Australia from the Cold War days. It continues to keep those allies, while getting new ones like India. On the other hand, China’s only significant ally in the world is Russia, but that alliance suffers from many contradictions and has not passed the test of time. It will be hard to imagine China gaining the upper hand militarily, economically, and politically in the future, vis-à-vis the US and its allies’ combined forces. The US stands firm The US has been and will continue to be the global cultural superpower, and there is minimal possibility of China posing any serious challenge to that status. Not only does its democracy and freedom provide ideological superiority to the US, its cultural influence through movies, media, music, and literature also extends across the world. The US is a country of immigrants, and it represents and enriches the cultures and ideas of the world. But China has remained a closed country for long. While English remains the world’s language, it is almost impossible to imagine Mandarin taking up that place. China will always be struggling to catch up to the US and take the lead position in the global power race. Like the Soviet Union, its superpower status will be limited and confined to certain aspects of it. The US has everything to hold its own long in this competition if it doesn’t often engage in self-sabotaging acts like it has in the last four years.

#### Reject predictions--- they’re always wrong.

Mark Beeson and Corey Crawford 02-10-2022 [Mark Beeson is of the University of Technology Sydney, Ultimo, Australia, Corey Crawford is of the University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia; Chinese Political Science Review (2022), “Putting the BRI in Perspective: History, Hegemony, and Geopolitics,” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41111-022-00210-y//ZW]

Western IR theory does not have a good record in predicting major turning points in international affairs; the supposed inevitability of ‘hegemonic transitions’ looks anything but certain at this point in history. There are tentative signs that both Xi and President Joseph R. Biden Jr. recognise the importance of establishing some sort of working relationship—and the possible dangers of not doing so (Kanno-Youngs and Sanger 2021). The rest of the world may not be entirely happy about the prospect of the coordinated actions of a ‘G2’, but it may be preferable to its absence. If the US and China cannot find a way to manage their differences for the common good, then the discussions of comparative hegemony and the continuing rise of China will become theoretically irrelevant and empirically improbable.

#### American heg is sustainable.

Yoon Seok-cheon 03-13-2022 [Finance columnist, Hankyoreh, “Three reasons why China won’t overtake the US anytime soon,” https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english\_edition/e\_international/1034592.html//ZW]

It’s in the nature of human beings, and countries, to want to be at an advantage over others. In that sense, history may be seen as a record of competitions for dominance. Another heated battle for dominance is unfolding today. We see signs of it in the conflict between the US and Russia over Ukraine. An even more intense competition is taking place between the US and China. In terms of economic might, China has reached a level where it poses a threat to the US. Dominance is decided as much by economic power as by military strength. It’s natural for the US to feel threatened by China’s pursuit. But some Westerners’ claims that China is poised to surpass the US should be seen as exaggerated. China has more weaknesses than people realize. Demographic issues China is a massive country. As of 2020, its population was counted at 1.41 billion. In terms of population, China is over four times larger than the US, which has around 330 million people. Gross domestic product (GDP) is calculated by multiplying productivity by the population. A higher population is clearly an advantage for a higher GDP. That fact serves as the basis for most of the predictions that have the Chinese economy poised to surpass the US economy in view of past growth rate trends. But those predictions are mere conjecture, which fails to take into account qualitative aspects related to the population. In China’s case, the qualitative aspects of its population are starting to have a negative impact on growth. In many countries, the pandemic served as a mechanism lowering the birth rate. When entire families are forced to remain at home, that translates for most households into greater fears for the future. As financial difficulties are factored in, stress levels escalate even further. It’s not the sort of climate that would put anyone in the mood. China’s disease containment measures have been particularly extreme in comparison with other countries. People are barred from going outside at all. This inevitably leads to greater stress for households. Under the circumstances, the chances of the low birth rate rebounding are effectively zero. The decline in China’s birth rate dates back to before the pandemic. The country abolished its one-child policy in 2016, but that alone is not enough to boost the birth rate. Simply changing the laws is not going to instantly wipe away memories of decades of education instructing people that they were only allowed to have one child, with punishments for those who violated the rule. The total fertility rate, which represents the average number of children that a woman of childbearing potential (aged 15 to 49) is expected to bear over the course of her life, remains down at 1.3. The situation has only gotten worse during the pandemic. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, around 10.6 million children were born in China in 2021. That’s compared to around 12 million in 2020 — showing that the various incentive measures haven’t been effective. For 2021, the number of births and deaths was roughly equivalent. Without people coming in from outside, China is poised to shortly face a population decline. A declining population doesn’t necessarily spell doom for GDP growth. You can still achieve growth through increased productivity. The problem arises when the population decline occurs in tandem with an aging population. In this case, senior citizens leave the labor market faster than young people arrive to take their place. It’s a problem that a lot of countries are facing, and it’s especially noticeable in China. Unless “Xi Jinping’s China” can solve it, a scenario where China surpasses the US may be unlikely. Lack of soft power Even without the US reining it in, China is unlikely to surpass the US. The reason has to do with its lack of soft power. Soft power can be seen as the finishing touch on a country’s dominance or standing. You can’t assume control of the world unless you can dominate through cultural products. At the moment, US cultural products are in a league of their own, circulating all around the world. Even in the 21st century, the US remains massively influential with its films and television series. What about China? Despite its long history and time-honored traditions, it has produced nothing to boast about in terms of cultural products. China may have the economic might to threaten the US, but in terms of soft power, it is still in its infancy. Over the four decades since it implemented reforms and openness, it has achieved global success with exactly two of its cultural products: Liu Cixin’s science fiction novel “The Three-Body Problem” and the short-form video service TikTok. Even those successes can only be viewed as partial. “The Three-Body Problem” won Liu the Hugo Award in 2015 — an honor that could be called the Nobel of science fiction. He was the first Asian to achieve that. Without question, the book is a work of genius. But its success is still only within the narrow confines of the science fiction genre. Not only has it failed to broaden its base, but the follow-ups have been underwhelming. We see a similar situation with TikTok. Owing to a lack of Chinese content, it hasn’t served as a window for distributing culture. Among Asian countries, soft power has been growing by the day in South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. South Korea’s popular music, films, and television series have joined the ranks of the world-class. Japanese animation remains influential as well. Yet China, a country seen as synonymous with Asian civilization, has yet to develop soft power. The reason for that is self-evident: the state itself clamps down on creativity. “The Three-Body Problem” was able to gain worldwide acclaim thanks to celebrities who actively promoted the book in various media. This is unimaginable in China right now. Chinese authorities thoroughly regulate speech unrelated to patriotism or everyday life. When channels of speech are obstructed, creativity dies out. Though Asian culture is now widely consumed in the West, Chinese culture’s share of the market is minimal at best. China clearly has a rich and lively culture. The problem is its government, which isn’t very interested in encouraging or enhancing cultural activity within its borders. The Chinese government believes information hinders stability. Under such circumstances, the promotion of Chinese culture abroad becomes a complicated matter. The Chinese government also partially blocks the influx of foreign cultural products into China. It’s only natural that Chinese culture is enjoying diminishing opportunities to globalize. Aside from censorship, indifference is another factor that’s further isolating Chinese culture from the world. China’s insistence on doing everything the Chinese way itself is causing the country’s soft power to languish. This in turn has inevitably led to the decline of the competitiveness of China and its companies. Debt and inequality Astronomical debt and severe inequality are other main factors impeding growth for China. While the latter is a big problem in and of itself, the bigger problem is that China is attempting to solve the issue of inequality through force. The country’s push for “common prosperity” will ultimately undermine its growth potential, as it will surely hurt the vitality of Chinese corporations. Private enterprises in China are rapidly becoming public under state control. Though the country’s authorities dream of realizing Chinese-style capitalism, such an approach may weaken entrepreneurship and temper the competitiveness of Chinese businesses in the long run. While the approach can effectively foster growth in fledgling industries, it will negatively impact industries that call for creativity and a daring spirit. Though China is attempting to redesign its economic and financial systems without destabilizing its society, it’s unclear whether this can be done without any changes in its governing system, the fundamental source of inequality in China. Chinese President Xi Jinping must simultaneously accomplish two seemingly contradictory goals, the very goals that past Chinese leaders strived to realize for centuries: growth and equality. Unfortunately, the path to these destinations is long and winding, and inequality is only worsening in China. Debt is another serious problem in the country, especially that of local governments. The real estate market, comprising 30% of China’s GDP, was what mainly powered the Chinese economy. But the debt explosion triggered by the bankruptcy of the China Evergrande Group may end up affecting local governments, who up until now made up for budgetary deficits by selling land to real estate developers. Now, this has become impossible. The finances of local governments will slowly deteriorate, and regional disparity will intensify. The conflict between the wealthy coastal region and the poor western region may come to light and lead to social unrest. The Chinese government has designated zero COVID, economic growth of 5%, and debt reduction as its three main policy objectives. Already, the last goal is falling by the wayside due to concerns that austerity measures for the purpose of debt reduction and stabilization will cause economic stagnation. That being the case, will China be able to achieve its other two goals? China’s zero-COVID policy has been put in jeopardy due to the emergence of the highly transmissible Omicron variant. Because of China’s track record of low caseloads, only a small number of Chinese people have developed natural immunity against the COVID-19 virus. The effectiveness of Chinese vaccines is also questionable. Rigid lockdowns for the sake of zero COVID transmission are impediments to growth in and of themselves. If lockdowns fail, China may be subject to the kind of economic chaos that swept the world early in the pandemic. Countries around the world are suffering from the consequences of COVID-19 — China won’t be the exception for long. What’s meant to happen is bound to happen. Will China be able to achieve a 5% economic growth under these circumstances? Pax Americana’s long run It was once projected that Japan, which entered the ranks of wealthy nations before becoming an aging society, would outpace the US in terms of its economy. This turned out to be a mere pipe dream. What then of China? China’s population is already aging when the country has yet to accumulate much wealth. Astronomical expenses will be needed to make sure its aging population doesn’t tip China into social unrest. The cost may be too much for China to handle. To make matters worse, Xi Jinping is pressuring corporations, the backbone of economic growth. More importantly, China can no longer boast low-cost labor as its strength. The country is losing its competitive edge in labor-intensive industries. But this doesn’t mean the country has become competitive enough in high-tech industries with high added value. These factors can all contribute to social instability. Considering all this, it’s baseless, wishful thinking to imagine China coming out victorious in its race against the US. The above-mentioned issues must be resolved for China to gain an upper hand in its competition with the North American powerhouse. Whether China is capable of overcoming these challenges under its current governing system is open to doubt. There are limits to the ruling class’s ability to better itself. The solution has to be structural. But to expect this of an unchecked power is in itself a contradiction. Then, it’s clear what the outcome will be of the hegemonic competition between the US and China. Pax Americana may continue on longer than one might think.

#### Reports of booming economy are wrong--- US is outpacing China annual growth.

Tom Hancock and Chris Anstey 05-20-2022 [Tom Hancock is a senior reporter, Chris Anstey is a senior editor, Bloomberg, “US Growth Seen Outpacing China’s for First Time Since 1979,” https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-20/us-growth-seen-outpacing-china-s-for-first-time-since-1976#xj4y7vzkg//ZW \*graphics omitted\*]

China’s coronavirus lockdowns mean its economic growth may undershoot the US for the first time since 1976, in a role reversal with potential political reverberations in both Beijing and Washington. The world’s second-largest economy will grow just 2% this year, Bloomberg Economics wrote in a report Thursday. By comparison, US gross domestic product will increase 2.8% this year, Bloomberg Economics predicts. While Beijing is applying fiscal, monetary and regulatory stimulus measures, the impact is being blunted by President Xi Jinping’s Covid Zero policy, which requires strict curbs on activity when virus outbreaks occur. The US, while struggling to cope with high inflation, is still being propelled by strong hiring and consumer spending. The Bloomberg Economics call is on the bearish end of the spectrum, with the median forecast for China’s 2022 GDP growth still over 4%. If they have it right, this year would be the first time that China’s full-year growth pace has lagged behind that of its rival since 1976, when China was emerging from the tumultuous decade of the Cultural Revolution, World Bank data show. Since the “reform and opening up” campaign launched in the late 1970s, China has enjoyed faster expansion rates, with plenty of scope still remaining for its per-capita GDP to narrow the gap with the US. Catching Up China's per-capita GDP remains well below US, showcasing growth potential President Joe Biden, who is urging congressional lawmakers to pass a package of legislation aimed at strengthening US competitiveness against China, would be sure to seize on such a relative growth outcome. He has framed his economic agenda in part around demonstrating whether democracies can stand up to Xi’s authoritarian model. The stakes are even higher for Xi, who is widely expected to secure a third term as Communist Party chief later this year in a precedent-breaking move. A 2% growth rate would be far below the government’s official growth target of about 5.5% this year. Xi told officials to ensure China’s growth outpaces the US this year, the Wall Street Journal reported last month. It would mark the first time the nation significantly undershot the annual goal since the practice of setting targets was adopted in the late 1990s. The government didn’t publish a target in 2020, when the pandemic hit. This year’s goal of “around 5.5%,” the lowest ever set, was determined by Chinese leaders before the latest spate of lockdowns in metropolises including Shanghai, which have devastated domestic spending. Some economists now estimate China’s GDP contracted this quarter amid April declines in retail sales and industrial production. A 2% expansion also would be the weakest for China since 1976, undershooting even 2020 when the pandemic pulled GDP growth down to 2.2%. Back in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, a much-smaller Chinese economy expanded 3.9% in 1990. Politics may have played some part in the setting of a target that already looked ambitious before the latest pandemic-related measures, according to Stephen Jen, who runs hedge fund and advisory firm Eurizon SLJ Capital. There are likely divisions over the magnitude of regulatory moves against industries including property and technology, in his analysis. “This is, we suspect, the main reason behind the obviously aggressive growth target: it was intentionally planted by the ‘pro-growth’ camp in Beijing to limit further ‘crackdowns’ and restore a better environment for the private sector to thrive,” Jen and colleague Joana Freire wrote in a note earlier this month. Policy makers indeed have repeatedly rolled out pledges of more growth-friendly measures. Vice Premier Liu He earlier this week hinted that Beijing may be ready to let up on the clampdown on technology firms. But announcements have fallen short of any specific, large-scale fiscal package or decisive across-the-board monetary easing, leaving economists and investors unimpressed. “China still has policy options,” Citigroup Inc. economists Xiangrong Yu and Xiaowen Jin wrote in a note this week. “At this juncture, a timely and decisive rollout of real stimulus measures is really critical to bring growth back on track.” One footnote to the GDP rivalry: Biden has already claimed credit for outpacing China. “For the first time in 20 years, our economy grew faster than China’s,” the president said in a statement on GDP data in January. Measuring the fourth-quarter of last year compared with the same period of 2020, the US expanded 5.5% against China’s 4%. American growth in the final three months of last year was accentuated by a jump in inventories. It remains to be seen whether the US can outstrip China on a calendar-year average basis

### 2ac/1ar --- China Regs Don’t Work

#### China’s regulations for AI aren’t feasible.

Makenzie Holland 03-17-2022 [News writer covering big tech and federal regulation, Tech Target, “China’s AI regulations face technical challenge,” https://www.techtarget.com/searchenterpriseai/news/252514781/Chinas-AI-regulations-face-technical-challenge//ZW]

China is one of the first countries to regulate AI algorithms -- a regulation that may prove technically difficult for businesses to adhere to. China's AI algorithm regulations took effect March 1, requiring businesses to provide explainable AI algorithms and be transparent about their purpose, such as for recommending products or services. The new regulations also prohibit businesses reliant on AI algorithms from offering different prices to different people based on personal data collected. Technical feasibility will be one of the most challenging aspects facing the new regulations, said Russell Wald, director of policy for Stanford University's Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI). Explainable AI has proven to be difficult for businesses to offer up. In this Q&A, Wald talks about the AI regulations' impact on businesses, as well as how they're unlikely to affect the Chinese government's own use of AI when it comes to surveilling its citizens. **What do you think about China taking this step?** Wald: What I find most interesting is China has done this first. We can see and watch in real time what happens to some of these businesses now being regulated for the first time. Questions remain about the technical feasibility of this. The question is, are we seeing regulation in theory or regulation in practice? One key part is a continuing need for human-centered AI. **How do you define human-centered AI?** Wald: AI that is inspired by the human brain and comes from what you've seen in human development. AI that doesn't replace humans but augments human capability. And the third part of that is AI that doesn't harm but rather benefits humanity … technology fostering instead of eroding democratic aspects. That's the key part. It's a recognition of the rights of everyone to be able to go in and look at these technologies and have fair access to them and the rights to challenge their governments when they're in use. **How will requiring AI algorithmic accountability and transparency impact businesses?** Wald: There is the technical issue here of whether that's feasible. That's one layer that has a big question mark hanging over it. Then there's the aspect of following regulation where you could and being in compliance with that. To that end, whether or not those companies will be able to do it, I think they'll have to. I don't think they have a choice. The larger question is not whether Chinese businesses are able to comply with this, it is whether other international companies will now be affected by this. If you're selling into the Chinese market, you are going to have to work on that. That's where a unique tension is going to come through. What if China says, 'It is technically feasible'? Then there will be other countries that say 'No, it's actually not, we've had these problems.' **Will these regulations apply to the Chinese government's use of AI?** Wald: The government will not cede, from my view at least, its surveillance of its citizens. Because of that, I think it'll always have access to that technology. It's too tempting. It even remains tempting for local law enforcement in the U.S. But here, at least in the United States, we're having a debate about an AI bill of rights. We're debating about facial recognition use by police, by the federal government at the border. There is this open debate. That debate is not happening in this case of the [Chinese] government's use of it. **Do you think there needs to be more debate before moving forward with AI regulations?** Wald: The EU or U.S. system of open debate around this is ultimately driving us in the right space. Not fast enough, but still a better pathway forward. What I do have concerns about in the U.S. is we are woefully behind. You're starting to see an increase in legislation. You're starting to see a Federal Trade Commission that's trying to lean a little more forward on some of this. But I think the best way to have these dialogues and national debate is through legislation where all the interest groups, all the advocacy organizations, everyone comes to the table and hashes it out. **Are there aspects of the Chinese legislation you'll be paying attention to, like how they handle consumer complaints about potential harms caused by AI algorithms?** Wald: I mentioned that technical feasibility part, that's really important. I'm more curious about what the petition process will be. I'd like to watch that space more than anything. Is it significant, is it public, are a lot of people openly complaining? I would be curious to see the registration of these complaints. That would be important for when Europe or the U.S. starts to get into this model. What's the mechanism for them to be able to do this? If we all had a contact at the FTC or the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, they'd be flooded and overwhelmed and unable to manage that process appropriately. The logistics of managing that has huge application towards ultimate effectiveness. **Editor's note:** Responses have been edited for brevity and clarity.

#### China led AI strangles innovation---American standards are key.

Arijit Sengupta 09-15-21 [Founder and CEO of Aible, Fast Company, “China’s new proposed law could strangle the development of AI,” https://www.fastcompany.com/90676516/china-ai-law-problems//ZW]

China’s internet watchdog, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), recently issued a draft proposal of regulations to manage how technology companies use algorithms when providing services to consumers. The proposed law mandates that companies must use algorithms to “actively spread positive energy.” Under the proposal, companies must submit their algorithms to the government for approval or risk being fined and having their service terminated. This is an incredibly bad and even dangerous idea. It’s what happens when people who don’t understand AI try to regulate AI. Instead of fostering innovation, governments are looking at AI through their unique lenses of fear and trying to reduce the harm they worry about most. Thus, western regulators focus on fears such as violation of privacy, while Chinese regulators are perfectly okay with collecting private data on their citizens but are concerned about AI’s ability to influence people in ways deemed undesirable by the government. If the Chinese law is adopted, it will create a lengthy bureaucratic process that will likely ensure that no small company or startup will survive or even enter the market. The moment you allow government regulators to be the final arbiters of what emerging technologies can and cannot do, you’ve strangled innovation. The only people who will profit under such a law are large companies that can invest in unproductive bureaucratic activities due to massive cash reserves and bad actors because they’ll ignore regulators and do whatever they want. Cash-starved startups who wish to follow the law will be most disadvantaged by this approach. China is not alone in taking bureaucratic approaches to AI. In April, the European Union released a draft Artificial Intelligence Act that would ban certain AI practices outright and mandate that AI applications deemed “high risk” meet strict data governance and risk management requirements. This includes requirements on testing, training, and validating algorithms, ensuring human oversight, and meeting standards of accuracy, robustness, and cybersecurity. Businesses would need to prove that their AI systems conform with these requirements before placing them on the European market. Imposing algorithm requirements or requiring companies to justify approaches can sound less onerous than the outright banning of technologies. The reality is that in either case, startups do not have the resources to participate in such bureaucratic slow processes. Smaller companies will be forced out of the arena even though they are most likely to create true innovations in this space. Imagine a world where startups had to get patents on their technology before building their software. Only about half of U.S. patents are approved, which is not terrible, but it takes about two years for approval to come through. Algorithms are more difficult to examine than patents—especially deep learning algorithms which very few experts understand. Based on the lengthy timelines in the patent office, we can surmise that algorithm approval processes are likely to take longer than two years. This is simply not fast enough: Technology in a rapidly evolving space like AI would already be outdated by the time it was approved. Any approach that involves regulators preapproving algorithms would strangle innovation in this space. There’s another reason why such legislation would be more onerous for small companies. For startups reliant on venture capital investments, typical funding cycles are 18 months long, which means that investors expect to see tangible results from the investment in less than 18 months. Thus, current investment approaches would not support waiting years to get algorithms approved before launching a product. While some VCs may adopt a different investment approach, similar to medical investments for example, many entrepreneurs would simply turn away from AI and pursue other opportunities. The U.S. is in a unique position to get AI guidelines right. While China and the European Union outline ever-stricter guidelines banning certain types of AI, the U.S. has an opportunity to establish ethical guidelines without inhibiting innovation. The only appropriate approach to regulating AI is one where we make our societal goals clear from the start and hold companies liable if they violate those goals. For example, we don’t force every company to undergo Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) inspections before being able to operate. However, labor safety expectations are enshrined in law and violators are prosecuted. If companies find alternative approaches to keeping their employees safe, they are not penalized as long as the societal goals are achieved. Giving government regulators the power to limit broad technology categories is not the approach that built the internet or the smartphone. That’s why the U.S. should tackle AI regulation by making our societal goals clear and giving organizations flexibility in achieving such goals.

#### New regulations create steep barriers for tech companies.

Ellen Lu and Ryan Fedasiuk 12-13-2021 [Ellen Lu is a research assistant at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University, Ryan Fedasiuk is a research analyst at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University, The Diplomat, “Will China’s Regulatory “Great Wall” Hamper AI Ambitions,” https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/will-chinas-regulatory-great-wall-hamper-ai-ambitions///ZW]

In September the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) announced a three-year plan to regulate predictive algorithms, and Chinese companies scrambled to comply with new regulations. News of the plan came on the heels of two other stringent policies – the Data Security Law (DSL) and Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) – which were passed earlier this year and came into full effect in November. China’s push for data security and algorithmic governance should be viewed as a new chapter in the country’s storied attempts to regulate the technology sector. In all likelihood, these moves will minimally affect state security bureaus’ data collection capabilities, but will create steep compliance costs for internet companies that could hamper the state’s long-term development goals. The DSL is designed to curtail invasive data collection by Chinese tech companies. Specifically, it restricts the collection of data by Chinese companies within and outside of China that may “harm the national security or public interests of the PRC.” Given the ambiguous nature of the law, many Chinese companies have erred on the side of over-compliance, rather than risk facing exorbitant penalties – which range from $1,000 to over $150,000, and may result in the suspension or revocation of a business’ license. The PIPL imposes even more day-to-day compliance costs on Chinese tech companies that work with personal data. Under the law, Chinese companies are now obligated to create cybersecurity teams, conduct training sessions, and classify data according to the potential for national security threat. The sweeping regulatory framework consists of 74 articles, and it applies to any company that handles individual Chinese citizens’ personal information. Taken collectively, the DSL and PIPL should be viewed as a new chapter in Beijing’s push to regulate the Chinese technology sector. At first glance, the steep limits they place on data collection stand at odds with Beijing’s long-standing ambition to become the world leader in AI by 2030. But the laws’ long-term effects will hinge on two hotly debated questions about how China’s national tech champions interact with the state. The first question is whether the new regulations will actually apply to China’s “national AI champions,” or whether the special relationship between big tech and the state might exempt them from the most onerous requirements. On the one hand, the Communist Party under Xi Jinping seems adamant about curtailing the massive power China’s tech companies have accumulated over the past decade, and is using these data governance regulations to reassert control. For their part, investors do expect China’s internet titans to take a hit. Immediately after the DSL was passed, the Hang Seng Tech index measured a 2.5 percent decrease in China’s largest internet and e-commerce stocks, to include those of Tencent and Alibaba, amounting to a loss equivalent to tens of billions of U.S. dollars. In the same month, when China’s most popular ride sharing app Didi Chuxing filed for an IPO on the New York Stock Exchange, Chinese regulators yanked it from app stores, citing violations of DSL’s data security regulations. The company has since lost 30 percent of users and seen its share value decline by more than 40 percent. On the other hand, however, the Chinese government has historically relied on Chinese internet giants Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent to aid in intelligence and police work, by collecting and processing troves of information these companies collect about Chinese netizens. Through Article 7 of China’s National Intelligence Law, Article 77 of the National Security Law, and Article 28 of the Cybersecurity Law, the government is able to deputize internet companies to assist with intelligence gathering. The codependent relationship between Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, and Chinese security services could imply that China’s AI champions are too big to regulate. But if they are subject to the full force of the DSL and PIPL, the second question is whether the limitations set out in these laws will materially limit Chinese tech giants’ ability to collect and process data at scale. Neither the DSL nor PIPL constrains data collection by China’s state security apparatus – only internet and data companies. But it’s not clear to what extent state security offices rely on data collected data in-house or outsourced to these firms. If public security bureaus have immediate and unfiltered access to the collection platforms operated by private companies, as has been claimed about Huawei 5G platforms and Lenovo computers, then the government would have little incentive to spare Chinese AI companies from stringent restrictions on data collection. But, because of their special relationship with the state, it’s possible that China’s internet companies will benefit from data collected and provided by Chinese security services to continue their AI development. Under the auspices of China’s national security and cybersecurity laws, Chinese businesses are compelled to work with the state’s security apparatus. Companies that handle data related to “national security” are further required to allow the Ministry of State Security access to their companies’ servers. Even if Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent face data collection limitations, they could theoretically continue to rely on data provided by Chinese security services to fine-tune their AI products. Although it’s not clear how exactly China’s large internet companies may be affected by new regulations on data and algorithms, the composition of China’s private tech industry will be fundamentally altered. The DSL and PIPL will make it substantially harder for existing businesses to continue operating with the same degree of autonomy they had enjoyed in the past, and may create steep barriers for new players hoping to enter China’s tech market.

### 2ac/1ar --- AT: AI Impact

#### They’ve got it backwards--- AI singularity solves threats.

Rick Hayes-Roth 10-02-2006 [Rick Hayes-Roth is a professor in the Information Sciences Dept. at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, “Puppetry vs. Creationism: Why AI Must Cross the Chasm,” https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/1705420/authors#authors//ZW]

Most of the visions for self-modifying and self-improving AI have been a bit scary or a bit shallow. Much discussion has occurred around the concept of the singularity, first explained by Vernor Vinge2 and now a theme popularized by Ray Kurzweil,3 among others (for example, see www.aleph. so/Trans/Global/Singularity). Roughly, the singularity is a point in history when technology accelerates beyond human capacity to master it. With regard to AI, this could mean that computers learn and communicate with one another faster than they can with humans. At that point, they might not be willing to slow down or engage further. In such a case, the machines would reach a kind of escape velocity, enabling them to leave human culture behind. I'm suggesting that we should actively seek to create the capabilities underlying such a possibility, because the potential gains are exponentially greater than what traditional puppetry can produce. But this surely entails risks, as readily suggested in most of the scary movies about rogue AI and robots gone haywire. We obviously have limited insight into both the positive and negative capabilities of self-improving AI systems. Although the road will be somewhat long, we ought to consider ways to identify and mitigate the risks before they afflict us. Fortunately, many people interested in the singularity and future visions of robots have given these issues serious consideration. We'll want to incorporate their ideas and related technologies into the new creationism agenda. This will help prevent predictable problems and provide additional insurance against the unforeseen. Although I consider these risks serious, I think we can de-emphasize or defer them a bit. To get out of the puppetry business will require a major shift in investment, orientation, and technology. By focusing mostly on the required new capacities for model-based learning and improvements in operational contexts, we put first things first. Like the master puppet makers of the classic folktales, AI engineers have built some marvelous machines. These machines are surely valuable, but our puppetry won't cross the chasm separating us from a world of artificially intelligent creatures. To get there, we need a singularity of artificial creationism, where we launch artificial beings that can adapt, learn, and evolve. We need to emphasize the development of continuously self-improving systems that interact with and perform tasks in the physical world. Creation of those systems will mark a singularity in the punctuated evolution of artificial intelligence.

#### Chinese tech control causes extinction.

Ash Jain and Matthew Kroenig 2019 [Ash Jain is a senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he oversees the Atlantic Council’s Democratic Order Initiative and D10 Strategy Forum, Dr. Matthew Kroenig is the deputy director for strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In this role, he supports the director in overseeing all aspects of the Center’s work and manages its strategy practice area, Atlantic Council Strategy Papers, “Present at the Re-Creation: A Global Strategy for Revitalizing, Adopting, and Defending a Rules-Based International System, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Present-at-the-Recreation.pdf//ZW]

Yet, AI is also transforming economies and societies, and generating new security challenges. Automation will lead to widespread unemployment. The final realization of driverless cars, for example, will put out of work millions of taxi, Uber, and long-haul truck drivers. Populist movements in the West have been driven by those disaffected by globalization and technology, and mass unemployment caused by automation will further grow those ranks and provide new fuel to grievance politics. Moreover, some fear that autonomous weapons systems will become “killer robots” that select and engage targets without human input, and could eventually turn on their creators, resulting in human extinction. The other technologies on this list similarly balance great potential upside with great downside risk. 3D printing, for example, can be used to “make anything anywhere,” reducing costs for a wide range of manufactured goods and encouraging a return of local manufacturing industries.61 At the same time, advanced 3D printers can also be used by revisionist and rogue states to print component parts for advanced weapons systems or even WMD programs, spurring arms races and weapons proliferation.62 Genetic engineering can wipe out entire classes of disease through improved medicine, or wipe out entire classes of people through genetically engineered superbugs. Directed-energy missile defenses may defend against incoming missile attacks, while also undermining global strategic stability. Perhaps the greatest risk to global strategic stability from new technology, however, comes from the risk that revisionist autocracies may win the new tech arms race. Throughout history, states that have dominated the commanding heights of technological progress have also dominated international relations. The United States has been the world’s innovation leader from Edison’s light bulb to nuclear weapons and the Internet. Accordingly, stability has been maintained in Europe and Asia for decades because the United States and its democratic allies possessed a favorable economic and military balance of power in those key regions. Many believe, however, that China may now have the lead in the new technologies of the twenty-first century, including AI, quantum, 5G, hypersonic missiles, and others. If China succeeds in mastering the technologies of the future before the democratic core, then this could lead to a drastic and rapid shift in the balance of power, upsetting global strategic stability, and the call for a democratic-led, rules-based system outlined in these pages.63 The United States and its democratic allies need to work with other major powers to develop a framework for harnessing emerging technology in a way that maximizes its upside potential, while mitigating against its downside risks, and also contributing to the maintenance of global stability. The existing international order contains a wide range of agreements for harnessing the technologies of the twentieth century, but they need to be updated for the twenty-first century. The world needs an entire new set of arms-control, nonproliferation, export-control, and other agreements to exploit new technology while mitigating downside risk. These agreements should seek to maintain global strategic stability among the major powers, and prevent the proliferation of dangerous weapons systems to hostile and revisionist states.

#### China can’t develop AI--- lack of innovative talent and restrictive legislation.

Michael Wade and Amanda Bris 10-2018 [Wade is director of the Global Center for Digital Business Transformation at IMD, Amanda Bris is a computer science student at Boston College and Chief Information Officer at Canor, and was an intern at the IMD Global Center for Digital Business Transformation, IMD, “The Chinese AI Innovation Chasm, https://www.imd.org/research-knowledge/articles/the-chinese-AI-innovation-chasm///ZW]

The Chinese AI advantage Leading economies in the world understand the importance of artificial intelligence (AI) in generating economic growth. China is no exception. In July 2017, the Chinese State Council declared that AI was a top priority and created the Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan to catch up with the West by 2020 and overtake it by 2025. Investment is not only coming from the government. In April 2018, SenseTime Group Ltd, backed by Alibaba, became the world’s most valuable AI start/up, having raised $600 million. By 2030, it is predicted that AI will increase China’s GDP by 26.1%. In addition to massive investment, China has other distinct characteristics that put it at an advantage in the development of AI. With more than 700 million internet users, China has a clear advantage in data volume that can be used to train AI-learning algorithms. Its unique brand of socialist market economy gives the government substantial control over market forces, creating a closer cooperation between businesses and the government, and giving Beijing economic leverage to expand its AI initiatives across many industries. Additionally, China has relatively few privacy protection laws, providing the government with extensive access to consumer data, a key to AI development. China’s innovation talent gap Despite heavy investment and easy access to data, however, we believe China will struggle to realize its AI ambitions. The main obstacle for AI development in China is not lack of funding, but lack of innovative talent. China is not short on raw technical talent – quite the opposite. The number of STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) graduates has been particularly explosive as part of the government’s push to develop a technical workforce. In 2013, 40 percent of Chinese graduates finished a degree in STEM, more than twice the U.S. average. Nevertheless, we believe that AI advancements will plateau as China struggles with its lack of innovative talent. This limiting factor cannot be easily overcome by government legislation, as it must be fostered through a culture of entrepreneurship, something that the country is sorely missing. In recent years, China has been importing its AI talent from overseas. According to LinkedIn’s Global AI Talent report published in July 2017, 44% of the overseas AI talent working in China comes from the US, followed by the UK and France as the second and third source countries. Roughly 90% of AI positions advertised in Mainland China go unfilled unless companies offer them to overseas workers. The number of Chinese AI job postings on LinkedIn surged from about 50,000 in 2014 to 440,000 in 2016, according to Wang Di, vice-president of LinkedIn China. China ranked 40th and 31st out of 63 countries in the IMD World Talent Report and Digital Competitiveness Report, respectively. Educational barriers The Chinese AI innovation chasm Inhibiting creativity starts in school and carries through higher education. Jack Ma, founder of the Alibaba Group, suggests that the Chinese education system does not give students enough time to have fun, explore and experiment. It is often in these moments that great ideas are born. Chinese students, especially at university level, are so consumed by academics that they rarely get an opportunity to experiment with outside-the-classroom learning and growth. A study conducted by researchers from Kyungpook National University in South Korea to analyze creativity in Chinese and Korean universities concluded that Chinese students at top-ranked institutions were less creative than those at less prestigious institutions. Once they enter the workforce, these graduates struggle to step out of their disciplined and rigidly structured environment. As a consequence, they tend to produce superficial, mechanical innovations that require little imagination. Students who enter top Chinese universities, through China’s brutal Gaokao entrance exams, have their creativity muted by a system that rewards rote memorization over original thinking. While China produces twice as many college graduates as the United States, it fails to cultivate entrepreneurial and creative spirit in these highly educated workers. Overcoming cultural barriers Culture also plays an important role. Whereas risk-taking and entrepreneurship are woven into the fabric of many Western cultures, the Chinese mentality is imbued with unity, obedience and reputation. Both China’s current communist system and its ancient culture have long stressed the importance of social cohesion. Rather than prioritizing their own interests, people are encouraged to think collectively, placing the majority over the individual. The stress placed on saving face means that people are scared to take risks out of fear of damaging their social standing. These powerful cultural norms are a threat to the development of courageousness in innovation, which is a necessary condition for creating new ideas. Moreover, Confucianism highlights the importance of showing obedience to superiors. Thus, workers will often blindly follow their leaders without question. These cultural factors thus become a limitation to what Chinese companies can produce qualitatively. It cannot help that, because of government censorship, AI researchers in China do not have access to key research tools, like Google. Chinese digital giants, like Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu, have compensated for these cultural barriers with speed and agility. Frequent tiny, incremental changes can add up to large innovations over time. Tencent’s WeChat started out as a direct copy of WhatsApp, but through thousands of rounds of iterative improvement, it has become something much more impressive. However, AI is unchartered territory, and innovations tend to be less linear than for apps, games, and marketplaces. It is unlikely that Chinese giants can use fast, incremental approaches to compensate for a lack of AI innovation. Crossing the AI Innovation Chasm China has the potential to become the preeminent global superpower in AI innovation. Money and other resources are available and its people have boundless intellectual capacity. At the moment, however, the cultural climate with respect to innovation is very restrictive. By fostering creativity from an early age, and reducing structural barriers, China’s model for AI development would become more sustainable. Heavy R&D investment will boost the economy for a while, but a continued lack of innovative talent may leave it at standstill.

#### The benefits of AI outweigh the risks.

Daniel Joseph 05-14-2016 [Writing for PH, PH, “Artificial Intelligence Danger: Are Fears Over AI Exaggerated? IBM Scientist Explains Benefits of AI,” https://www.parentherald.com/articles/43575/20160514/artificial-intelligence-panic-fears-ai-exaggerated-ibm-scientist-explains.htm//ZW]

The progression of artificial intelligence has made many notable people concerned. Alphabet CEO Larry Page noted how artificial intelligence will change how we think about jobs; Telsa Motors and SpaceX CEO Elon Musk commented on the existential threat posed by artificial intelligence; and Bill Gates also expressed his concern about super-intelligent machines. However, Murray Campbell, IBM research scientist and senior manager, says that fears over the progression of artificial intelligence have become "overblown." He also noted that there are plenty of benefits that humans could gain from having super advanced artificial intelligence. "Because the benefits are so huge, that if we don't use AI technologies we're going to be losing out on all of these beneficial effects in health care, in self-driving cars, in education," Campbell told Time. The scientist also added that workers and employees who have artificial intelligence as their work assistant can become more effective and efficient with their jobs. Clarifying the uses of artificial intelligence in the enterprise https://t.co/4cRDban3Af — TechCrunch (@TechCrunch) May 12, 2016 But will people lose potential jobs due to advanced artificial intelligence? Campbell explained that new technology always takes away human jobs but creates new opportunities as well. He added that the biggest danger is not following up on advancing artificial intelligence because humans could really lose out on all of the benefits of this new technology. However, there are many aspects of artificial intelligence that scientists and researchers need to figure out better. "I think it's worthwhile to think about these research questions around AI and ethics, and AI and safety," Campbell explained. Because of the increase in interest regarding artificial intelligence, the White House has announced four public workshops about the technology. These workshops will focus on the potential pros and cons of using advanced artificial intelligence, Fortune reports.

### 2ac/1ar --- AT: China Tech Inevitable

#### China tech is not inevitable--- regulations killed the industry.

James Cooper and Kashyap Kompella [James Cooper is professor of law and director of International Legal Studies at California Western School of Law in San Diego and a research fellow at Singapore University of Social SciencesKashyap Kompella, a technology industry analyst, is CEO of RPA2AI, a global artificial intelligence advisory firm, The Hill, “No, China is not winning the AI race,” https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/592270-no-china-is-not-winning-the-ai-race///ZW]

The global competition between the United States and China continues apace. Technology is rightly seen as providing unique leverage to win this geopolitical race. The U.S. long has been the global technology powerhouse, but not surprisingly, we have heard much about the Chinese government’s ambition to dominate high-tech industries such as 5G telecommunications, autonomous vehicles, blockchain, and semiconductor chips. In this light, as a horizontal technology that can be applied across all sectors, artificial intelligence (AI) has become a strategic priority and the Chinese focus on superiority in this field is touted as something about which the U.S. should be concerned. Some have gone so far as to conclude that the West has already lost the AI race. Don’t believe the hype. To be sure, the availability of large amounts of data is at the heart of AI success. It is tempting to think that less-democratic regimes that amass huge amounts of data about their citizens and have scant regard for privacy can develop better AI systems using that data. However, all other things being equal, better and higher quality AI systems emerge from countries with strong data privacy and data protection regulations because AI systems must undergo greater scrutiny during their development and deployment. An example of this can be seen in the United States regarding fair lending practices and consumer protection from credit bureaus. Further, the market for AI is global, and such high-quality AI systems find buyers in other countries as well. Around the globe, Big Tech’s rising power has resulted in calls for more oversight. In a drastic move that stunned the industry and analysts alike, the Chinese government recently rewrote the rulebook for the country’s technology industry. In effect, China is vacating entire swaths of digital and creative industries, arenas that serve as training grounds and talent factories for other industries. This more restrictive approach may not bode well for China’s AI industry in the long term. China may find itself constrained on the extent of automation and AI in its manufacturing sector — labor-intensive manufacturing remains China’s main strength, and a high degree of automation can result in job losses, labor unrest, and instability. Meanwhile, there is bipartisan support for AI in the United States. Former President Trump proposed increasing funding for AI development through the National Science Foundation. The National AI Initiative Act of 2020 signaled a sense of urgency and suggested that several federal agencies create a national strategy on artificial intelligence. The Biden administration has formed the Artificial Intelligence Research Resource Task Force to develop a roadmap to foment AI research and spark innovation nationwide. There is draft legislation, at both the state and federal level, to promote responsible use of AI and prevent its misuse. Strong objections to the use of facial recognition and other AI systems by law enforcement in the U.S., raised by civil liberties advocates, have led some local authorities, such as the City of San Francisco, to ban such systems. To use a Silicon Valley phrase, these debates are “not a bug, but a feature.” They shine a light on the limitations of AI systems and help to set the “rules of the road” for proper use of AI. This will establish the U.S. as a global leader in AI regulation, once lawmakers and regulators do their work. China, meanwhile, has faced strong global criticism for using facial recognition software to monitor and surveil Uyghurs in its Xinjiang region. China has outlined a set of AI ethics principles, but the jury is still out on enforcement and how they function in practice. The increasing number of AI research papers and patents by Chinese researchers is often cited as proof that China has caught up with the United States in this field. The increased focus is good for the Chinese AI ecosystem, and it will help them solve China-specific problems. But dominance in this emerging strategic industry is not guaranteed. The U.S. has several strategic advantages, including: the strengths of its higher education and research institutes, which attract the best STEM talent from across the world; the largest venture capital ecosystem; and the largest number of technology unicorns (start-ups with private valuations greater than $1 billion). China is not overtaking the U.S. in artificial intelligence. The current evidence and trajectory paint a clear picture: The conditions for AI to flourish, such as incentives to experiment, freedom to pursue opportunities without restrictions, and the coming guardrails to prevent misuse, favor U.S. leadership. This is still the United States’s game to lose — though maybe both countries could win through collaboration. To solve planet-scale problems such as climate change, we are going to need AI solutions from both competitors.

### 2ac --- China Great Power War

#### The risk of great power war is high – it could cause nuclear escalation

**Brands, 18** – Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Hal, “Great-Power Rivalry Is Back. The U.S. Is Playing Poorly.” Bloomberg View, 2/28, <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-02-28/trump-s-losing-the-great-game-against-putin-and-xi>

Having reconstituted its military power, Russia has been reasserting its dominance along its Central Asian and Eastern European peripheries, challenging NATO and undermining the European Union, and projecting its military power deep into the Middle East -- all in addition to seeking to weaken and divide the U.S. through information warfare and other means.

Riding an economic and military rise unprecedented in modern history, China has been seeking to re-establish its former mastery in the Asia-Pacific and perhaps eventually compete with the U.S. on a global scale as well. All this is normal enough; it is the warp and woof of great-power rivalry. Yet it has uniquely dangerous implications for the U.S. and the international system it leads.

As relations between the major powers become more rivalrous, it becomes harder to achieve cooperation on matters that require multilateral action. Since 2011, for instance, U.S.-Russian rivalry has continually frustrated international efforts to bring the Syrian civil war to an end. As Russia and China assert their influence, they are also increasingly contesting the global rules of road -- freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, the illegitimacy of altering borders by force -- that have underpinned international peace and prosperity for generations.

Likewise, the return of great-power rivalry raises the possibility that a hostile power might come to exert dominant influence in one of the key regions of the world -- a nightmare of U.S. strategists reaching back roughly a century. Finally, this competition is a potential pathway to the most cataclysmic phenomenon that can afflict the international environment: war between the major powers.

These dangers are not as far-fetched as they may seem. In East Asia, China has used maritime coercion to sprint toward a position of dominance in the South China and East China Seas, while also shifting the regional military balance through a two-decade buildup meant to keep the U.S. from projecting power into the Western Pacific.

Russia has demonstrated that it will use force to keep states like Georgia and Ukraine from tilting too far toward the West, and Moscow’s military buildup has given it a pronounced local advantage on NATO’s exposed eastern flank.

Indeed, the prospect of great-power war is becoming steadily less remote. Chinese strategists are reportedly preparing for a “short, sharp war” with the U.S. and its East Asian allies, and Russian doctrine now reportedly emphasizes the limited use of nuclear weapons to achieve “escalation dominance” in a conflict. And as the intensity of great-power competition rises, the Trump administration is largely fumbling the American response.

### 2ac/1ar --- China Leadership Fails

#### Chinese leadership fails – the US is successful

**Zhao, 18** – Suisheng Zhao is professor and director of the Center for China-US Cooperation at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver (“A Revisionist Stakeholder: China and the Post-World War II World Order” Journal of Contemporary China, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2018.1458029

But China is not ready. First, as one Chinese scholar admitted, ‘China does not have the comprehensive national strength to change the current global order led by the US and other Western countries for more than 70 years’.41 A fragile rising power much weaker than most outsiders think, China is a middle-income country, facing immense internal hurdles, such as the environmental destruction, rampant corruption, inequality, and huge local government debt, all of which have the potential to derail its rise. Preoccupied by mounting challenges, Chinese leaders have to fight an uphill battle to mobilize resources and internal support for the global leadership role. China is far from achieving the donor status of many OECD countries. For one prominent Chinese scholar, the most dangerous challenge is the extreme-leftist policy-line and ‘the false-large-empty’ (假大空) slogans, making international promises and setting strategic objectives beyond the reach of China’s national strength.42 China’s international initiatives do not play a critical role in China’s rise but are the consequences of its rise.

Although some scholars have claimed that the US power was declining so that the post-World War II order was suffering from an acute case of Anno Domini, they may have to recant their predictions. With the world’s largest concentration of capital and technology, the US remains the most powerful nation. China has faster GDP growth than the US, but its net national wealth, i.e. the resources available to pursue national interests, is still not in America’s league. From 2000–2012, Chinese net wealth jumped from $4.66 trillion to $21.7 trillion. American net wealth over the same period rose from $42.3 trillion to $67.5 trillion. From 2012 to 2017, while Chinese net wealth climbed to $29 trillion, American net wealth reached to over $93 trillion. Claiming that China is about to eclipse the US is untenable in the face of $64 trillion less in net wealth. The resource advantage rests overwhelmingly with the US.43

China has pushed RMB internationalization. But the share of RMB in global payment is below 2% while US dollar share remains above 40%. RMB accounts for a scant 1% of global reserves while the US dollar accounts for over 60%. The drive to internationalize RMB has not gained momentum since its inclusion in the SDR basket in 2015.44 Shortly before inclusion, China’s Central Bank announced a ‘market-oriented’ mechanism for setting the daily benchmark of the exchange rate, accompanied by 2% devaluation, the first since 1994, leading the onshore RMB to tumble by 4% in the subsequent two days. The Central bank intervened massively to halt the slide in the weeks after. Less than two months after RMB’s inclusion in the IMF basket, the central bank imposed new controls over capital outflow.45 These difficulties have made the cost outweigh the benefits of RMB internationalization.

Remaining the ‘indispensable nation’ of the world, the US cannot avoid the responsibility to provide public goods and security protection for its allies. Although President Trump has distanced Washington from its traditional allies and stepped back from global leadership, the American economy and geopolitics encourage a global outlook, imposing compelling imperatives on the superpower. Woven thickly into global value chains, protectionism calls for other countries’ retaliation against American producers and shifts burdens to American consumers. With checks and balances in the US constitution and the dynamism of the open society, economic liberals and internationalists in the US Government and across the states have been powerful countervailing forces against protectionism and disengagement. In spite of President Trump’s isolationist position, ‘American national interests endure. They include preventing any hostile power from dominating Asia, Europe, or the energy resources of the Middle East; sustaining an open international economic and political order, not subverted by spheres of influence that exclude the United States; protecting free access to the global commons, especially the maritime sea lanes that carry 90 % of global trade; nurturing alliances that magnify American power and influence; and promoting democracy and human rights, because the ultimate source of global security is a world in which power is bounded by law and pluralistic institutions’.46

Second, China cannot provide shared values and other elements of soft power to commons willingness on the part of other countries to align, and in some cases subordinate, their own narrow interests to those of the larger international community. China has made significant investments in developing its soft power with the opening of more than 500 Confucius Institutes across the world and carrying out extensive international branding campaigns. But China is not successful in projecting its values and ideals that others identify with and aspire to share. The US leadership comes with willing followers and trust through a network of alliances and other ties. For all of their differences with Washington and periodic resentment of its policies, many countries invested more confidence in the US than in any other nation. China does not possess the attributes that underpin US leadership. It lacks allies and inspires little trust in its own neighborhood. Its efforts to project soft power often fail to resonate abroad partly because China displays little empathy with the sensitivities of those living beyond its borders.47

While US global influence has dropped due to President Trump’s policy, it still holds much more soft power than China. Against the background of seemingly retreating democracy, China’s authoritarianism appears to be more appealing to autocracies. But this has not been accompanied by serious and significant interest worldwide in China’s development model. Promoting globalization, the Chinese Government is doing the opposite by imposing controls on the inflow of information and outflow of capital, leading people to question the sincerity of its posited global leadership.

A Chinese scholar admits that China might one day overtake the US in the size of economy but may never overtake the US influence and leadership in the world.48 Another Chinese scholar finds that China is short of international discursive power (国际话语权缺失). China had never played a world leadership role in history. The traditional Chinese system (华夏体系) was only an East Asian system, not universal, and cannot automatically transform into modern discursive power.49 Until China develops values that appeal universally, it misses one of the core features of global leadership.

#### China’s overreliance on economic power prevents it from effectively exercising leadership

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Beijing’s overreliance on its economic prowess as the key diplomatic instrument reveals the shortage of normative power. Despite its growing economic and military might, China’s efforts to use economic ties to influence other state’s behavior have only achieved limited success because money cannot buy loyalty. Influence does not simply derive from a country’s coffers. While closer economic ties are important, they are hardly sufficient to build strong trust between countries—especially those with conflicting security interests. This is clearly reflected in China’s relationship with Japan, characterized as hot economics and cold politics. it is reflected in China’s relations with North Korea, a country that is widely perceived as economically dependent on China for its own survival but has often taken actions against China’s strategic interests. To play a global leadership role, China has to build the ability to inspire other countries to share its vision. The leadership will not work itself out only through economic ties. Building common identity and value is equally, if not more, important.

Unable to construct shared values, China may change nothing of substance in the global order. While China’s insistence on the Westphalian principles looks attractive to some countries where intense interventionism by the US often ends in chaos and chronic instability, many of China’s neighbors view China’s great power aspiration with a wary eye, worrying that, as Chinese power rises, China’s imperial past can produce an undue pressure on its leaders to restore the old Chinese hierarchical order. One reporter took note that at the 60th anniversary of the Bandung Conference that gave birth to the Five-Principles, only two notable leaders turned up. One was President Xi, who used the occasion to portray China as the leader of the non-western world. The other was Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who suggested that the threat to the sovereignty of smaller countries no longer came from the West.50

China’s power aspirations in a diverse and crowded neighborhood are checked by the presence and influence of the US and other regional powers. The Twenty-first century has seen a multipolarity rather than a Chinese hegemony. While China is rising, many surrounding states are also on the rise. China’s shift from espousing a peaceful rise to assertive behavior has made its neighbors nervous, motivating them to realign with the US and with each other to balance China.51 A May 2017 ASEAN survey found that more than 73 % of correspondents had little or no confidence that Beijing would do the right thing in contributing to global peace, security, and governance.52 A regional Pax Sinica is not desirable for these countries. Historically, to bandwagon with a rising power is common practice due to potentially great relative gains. The most successful rising powers most often attracted the greatest number of bandwagoners.53 It does not serve China’s interests to have tension with many neighbors simultaneously. China cannot rise successfully without winning the support of its neighbors or at least preempt their balancing motives.

#### Chinese leadership fails and can’t replace the US

**Beeson, 17** - Professor of International Politics at Murdoch University in Perth, Western Australia (Mark, “Why Has Leadership in the Asia–Pacific Proved So Elusive?” Chin. Polit. Sci. Rev. (2017) 2:567–581 https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-017-0074-y

Paradoxically enough, however, in the aftermath of the election of Donald Trump, China has emerged as an unexpected champion of ‘globalization’. In part, this reflects a recognition on the part of China’s leaders that the country has been one of the principal beneficiaries of an open international economic order. At the same time, however, Xi (2017) in particular clearly sees an opportunity for China to reposition itself as precisely the sort of ‘responsible stakeholder’ that some have long called for (Zoellick 2005). At a time when the Trump administration seems to be abandoning the traditional American role in favor of a more instrumental, nationalistic approach to trade and even security policy (Browne 2017; Hodge 2017), Chinese officials have been quick to seize the moment and the initiative.

There are, however, continuing constraints confronting China that raise real questions about its ability to offer a leadership at the regional, much less the global level. First, the extant international order will not be easily replaced, nor will America’s role within it. The fact remains that the US is still the world’s preeminent economic and military power, albeit one with diminished status and damaged authority. Second, China has shown little desire or capacity to articulate an alternative vision for the international system, thus far, and seems willing to work within existing institutional architecture and avoid the costs associated with leadership (Wang and French 2014). Third, leaders need followers, and at this stage—despite an apparently growing diplomatic influence in Southeast Asia—it has few allies and friends. Indeed, the fourth point to make is that China’s continuing pursuit of its own nationalistic goals, especially its claims in the South China Sea dispute, look certain to make its future relations and role divisive and contentious.

#### No other power can replace the US – retrenchment guarantees global conflict

**Haass, 17** – president of the Council on Foreign Relations (Richard, “America and the Great Abdication” The Atlantic, 12/28, http://www.washingtonspeakers.com/images/pdfs/America%20and%20the%20Great%20Abdication%20-%20The%20Atlantic.pdf

An optimist would also hope that other countries would pick up where the United States left off in promoting international order. The fact is, though, that there is no alternative great power willing and able to step in and assume what has been the U.S. role. China is often suggested, but its leadership is focused mostly on consolidating domestic order and maintaining artificially high rates of economic growth, lest there be popular unrest. China’s interest in regional and global institutions (including both its regional trade mechanism and its “One Belt, One Road” infrastructure initiative) seems more designed to bolster its economy and influence than to help set rules and arrangements that would be broadly beneficial. China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea (including its rejection of an international legal ruling challenging its claims) and its unwillingness to do all it could to rein in North Korea casts further doubts as to its readiness to fill the shoes of the United States.

There is no other candidate. Russia under Vladimir Putin is a country with a narrowly based economy that is focused on retaining power at home, reestablishing Russian influence in the Middle East and Europe, and interfering in the internal politics of Western democracies. It is mostly a spoiler prepared to use those instruments of power it possesses (military, energy, and cyber) to advance its aims. India is preoccupied with the challenge of economic development and is tied down by its problematic relationship with Pakistan. Japan is held back by its declining population, domestic constraints, and the suspicions of its neighbors. Europe is limited in what it can do by a lack of defense capability, and is distracted by questions revolving around the relationship between member states and the EU. The cold truth is that the alternative to a U.S.–led international order is less international order.

All this comes at a time challenges to order are many, including a China that is trying to extend its writ over the South China Sea and a North Korea that appears intent on developing the ability to place nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles capable of reaching not just its neighbors but across the world and an Iran with an imperial vision of its position in the Middle East. The Middle East is a region of multiple conflicts of every sort—civil, regional, proxy, and global—involving state and nonstate actors, as well as a mixture of strong, weak, and failed states. There is as well the continuing Russian occupation of Crimea and its destabilization of eastern Ukraine, the undermining of democracy and economic deterioration of Venezuela, and any number of governance failures in Africa, most starkly in South Sudan. There has been a marked deterioration in U.S. relations with Russia, the result not just of its military actions in Ukraine and Syria but also of its interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. And at the global level there is the continuing gap between challenges and collective responses, none more pronounced than in the domain of cyberspace.

### 2ac/1ar --- Deterrence Works

#### The perception of resolve is a greater predictor of how war starts than any other factor – China prioritizes it over capabilities

**Mastro 15**-an assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay”, The Washington Quarterly, 21 Jan 2015, <https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/27434/uploads)//SL> **italics in original**

These efforts are commendable—the United States rightly works to preserve its military superiority and retain its ability to project power in the region. During the Cold War, when the greatest pacing threats were land conflicts, forward deploying U.S. forces in Europe and Asia were sufficient to demonstrate the credibility of the U.S. commitment to peace in those regions. But China is currently testing the waters not because its leaders are uncertain about the balance of power, but because they are probing the balance of *resolve*. This means that staying ahead in terms of military might is insufficient in contemporary East Asia.

China’s strategists are betting that the side with the strongest military does not necessarily win the war—the foundation of the deterrent pillar of its A2/AD strategy. Indeed, China’s experience in fighting the Korean War proves that a country willing to sacrifice blood and treasure can overcome a technologically superior opponent. The belief that balance of resolve drives outcomes more so than the balance of power is the foundation of China’s new, more assertive strategy; but U.S. responses to date have failed to account for it. Canned demonstrations of U.S. power fail to address the fundamental uncertainty concerning U.S. willingness, not ability, to fight.

The U.S. focus on de-escalation in all situations only exacerbates this issue. The Cold War experience solidified the Western narrative stemming from World War I that inadvertent escalation causes major war, and therefore crisis management is the key to maintaining peace.74 This has created a situation in which the main U.S. goal has been de-escalation in each crisis or incident with Beijing. But Chinese leaders do not share this mindset—they believe leaders deliberately control the escalation process and therefore wars happen because leaders decide at a given juncture that the best option is to fight.75 China is masterful at chipping away at U.S. credibility through advancing militarization and coercive diplomacy. It often uses limited military action to credibly signal its willingness to escalate if its demands are not met. Strategist Thomas Schelling theoretically captured this approach when he wrote it is “the sheer inability to predict the consequences of our actions and to keep things under control … that can intimidate the enemy.”76

Because China introduces risk for exactly this reason, the U.S. focus on deescalation through crisis management is unlikely to produce any change in Chinese behavior—if anything it will only encourage greater provocations. Beijing has identified the U.S. fear of inadvertent escalation, and is exploiting it to compel the United States to give in to its demands and preferences. In this way, the U.S. focus on de-escalation may actually be the source of instability by rewarding and encouraging further Chinese provocations. To signal to China that the United States will not opt out of a conflict, Washington must signal willingness to escalate to higher levels of conflict when China is directly and purposely testing U.S. resolve. This may include reducing channels of communication during a conflict, or involving additional regional actors, to credibly demonstrate that China will not be able to use asymmetry of resolve to its advantage.

The current mindset—that crisis management is the answer in all scenarios— will be difficult to dislodge, given the tendency among U.S. military ranks to focus on worst-case “great battle” scenarios. While realistic in Cold War operational planning, decision makers should consider instead the less violent and prolonged engagements that characterize Chinese coercive diplomacy when evaluating risk and reward, such as the 1962 Sino–Indian War or the 1974 Battle of the Paracel Islands. The idea that any conflict with China would escalate to a major war, destroy the global economy, and perhaps even escalate to a nuclear exchange has no foundation in Chinese thinking, and causes the United States to concede in even the smallest encounters. While the Chinese leadership has proven to be more risk-acceptant than the United States (or perhaps more accurately, to assess the risks to be less than those perceived by U.S. strategists), Xi still wants to avoid an armed conflict at this stage. In his November 2014 keynote address at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, he noted that China remains in a period of strategic opportunity in which efforts should be made to maintain the benign strategic environment so as to focus on internal development.77

Ultimately, the U.S. regional objective must be peace and stability at an acceptable cost. Given this, it is critical to understand the four components of China’s A2/AD strategy, the strategic foundation for China’s recent assertiveness, and how best to maintain the U.S. position as a Pacific power. In addition to regularly attending meetings in the region and developing new technology, new platforms, and new operational concepts designed to defeat China’s A2/AD strategy, the United States needs to break free of its Cold War-based paradigm paralysis and rethink conceptions of limited war, escalation, and risk.

Scolding China and imposing symbolic costs for each maritime incident is unlikely to inspire the corrective change U.S. thinkers are hoping for. The United States needs to fundamentally change its approach by accepting higher risk and allowing for the possibility of escalation—both vertically in force as well as horizontally to include other countries. This admittedly is a difficult balance, especially given the need to avoid emboldening U.S. allies to take actions that run contrary to U.S. interests. But only by mastering these two balancing acts—focusing on balancing resolve, rather than forces, and prioritizing stability over crisis management—will the United States be able to maintain peace and stability in East Asia without sacrificing U.S. or allied interests.

### 2ac/1ar --- No Mindset Shift

#### Ceding to China destroys US influence AND no mindset shift – policymakers are locked in

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The lock-in strategy also assumes that if the Pax Americana’s institutions are reformed, Beijing (and other non-western emerging powers) will find it more attractive to remain in the post-1945 international order than to overturn it. That assumption, however, is logically flawed: achieving lock-in by reforming the existing international order presumes that the United States can have its cake (preserving the Pax Americana) and eat it too (reforming the current international system’s legacy institutions). But, as we all know, **when the cake is eaten, it’s gone.** Reform—at least, any kind of reform that would appeal to China—would mean the United States **yielding significant power** in international institutions to accommodate Beijing. However, doing so would reduce US ability to shape outcomes, diminish Washington’s voice in international institutions, and impose constraints on US autonomy in foreign and domestic policy.79 As University of Birmingham lecturer Sevasti-Eleni Vezirgiannidou observes with respect to insti- tutional reform: ‘It is questionable whether this will really preserve US influence or rather, on the contrary, **diminish it,** as the United States will have to share power in a reformed order and thus will be restricted in its ability to act unilaterally.’80 The US foreign policy establishment may talk the talk of reforming the interna- tional order (and the institutions that underpin it), but it is doubtful it will walk the walk with respect to reform, because that **would mean accepting a downsized American role in international politics**. On the contrary, Washington’s opposition to the AIIB indicates that the United States is not prepared to see its influence in the international order diminished. And, with respect to reforming the post-1945 international order to accommodate the reality of a risen China, this is the nub of the problem: instead of preserving the Pax Americana, reform would lead to changes in the international order that would undermine it. Of course, regardless of whether there is institutional reform, the coming decades are likely to witness major changes in the international order irrespective of America’s preferences.

### 2ac/1ar --- China is Aggressive

#### Island Building

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6.1 Model Case 1: Island building in the South China Sea as a form of Coercive hegemony China continued to pursue through 2018 an aggressive strategy to expand and maintain a foothold in the South China Sea. It claimed rocks, islets, and archipelagos in this body of water to enlarge its maritime territory and reach deep into Southeast Asia, close to the Malacca Strait. China achieved this objective at the expense of several Southeast Asian states who also claim jurisprudence in this area. These are Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. These states' claims clash with China's in the area that the Chinese refer to as the “Nine-Dash-Line.” China bases its territorial claim on historical maps, albeit they are not entirely conclusive. A 2016 verdict by an International Tribunal based in The Hague ruled negatively against China: In a case where the Philippines filed a complaint against Chinese conduct disregarding its maritime borders, the verdict ruled against China and in favour of the Philippines. China, of course, ignored and disavowed the ruling, as well as making clear that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the matter (Phillips, Holmes, & Bowcott, 2016). China has gone beyond publicly announcing its territorial claim. Instead, it has actively started to produce real and tangible facts by engaging in the process of “island building.” The construction process begins by China taking an islet, which sometimes is not larger than a rock, and transferring building materials via ship to create helipads, harbours, and airstrips. Some have compared these artificial islands with sort of China's stationary aircraft carriers. China wants to send a loud and clear signal to regional neighbours and the rest of the world, particularly to other great powers. It wants to **underscore its maritime territorial claims**, with absolute and full vigour and unwavering resolve. Hence, rather than leaving unperturbed uninhabited and partially submerged islands, rocks, and islets, without any physical signs of territorial claim and sovereignty, China builds this new-aged military bases. These are all projections of China's geostrategic reach. China's fortification drive and island-building program in the South China Sea is consistent with revisionist and coercive policies. It deliberately revises borders. This trend is reminiscent of the violent rising by other great powers in history. France, Germany, and Imperial Japan in the 18th and 20th centuries, respectively, pursued such territorial expansion and aggressive practice. This aggressive territorial expansion constitutes the type of evidence that many analysts will cease on to conclude that **China is on a collision course with other great powers and neighbours**. The policy will lead to diplomatic and possibly military conflict over these territories. In this sense, it will be a harbinger of China's violent rise.

#### Russia-China alliance – now is key to prevent it

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6.2 Model Case 2: The emerging Sino-Russian Entente as a form of coercive hegemony At the end of the Chinese Revolution in 1949, the PRC and the Soviet Union became close allies. Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Josef Stalin formally instituted this political, ideological, and military alliance by negotiating and signing the Treaty of Moscow in 1950. At this juncture, the Soviet Union was the senior partner whereas the newly established PRC was the junior member of the alliance. China was still recovering from the Japanese occupation and protracted civil war. A decade after the signing of the Moscow Treaty, it became evident that political interests and ideology were not sufficiently strong to keep these two actors together in an alliance. Thus, from 1960 onward, the Sino-Soviet split became increasingly evident and pronounced, even including a 7-month undeclared military border conflict in 1969 that exacerbated further the Sino-Soviet split. The tense rivalry and differences between these two communist actors ultimately led to a de facto end to the alliance in 1979. At this point, China's tendency to side with the West and the United States became more evident, too. It led to the official opening of relations with the United States in the same year. Already several years prior, in 1972, unofficial diplomatic ties under President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger opened the door to China. Renewed relations led to China's gradual embrace of the market economy. This decision was fundamental in China's development and economic success from the early 1980s to approximately 2014. Interestingly, though, **China has grown closer to Russia more recently**. 11 We identify two interconnected examples to highlight and underscore better the recent Chinese and Russian connection: First, it is China's tacit support for Russia's annexation of Crimean, and, second, the treaty on energy cooperation negotiated and signed by China and Russia concomitantly to the annexation of Crimea and the escalation of the Eastern Ukraine war in 2014. First, China's reaction to the Russian annexation of Crimea was mute (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014). We must emphasise that before 2005, the PRC would have severely condemned and sternly opposed Russia. Russian annexation of Crimea was anathema to China's fundamental principles and priorities (Sun, 2015). On the one hand, it was a violation of sovereignty and the noninterference in the internal affairs of another country. On the other hand, the annexation challenged China directly on two additional fronts: First, its zealous commitment to defend its territory against aggression and, second, its commitment to protect minorities within Chinese borders. Notwithstanding, **China remained uncharacteristically distant and quiet.** Second, the media outlets reported the energy treaty with Russia as the deepening of the Sino-Russian relationship amid the Eastern Ukrainian crisis and Western sanctions against Russia. It was also a Russian carrot extended to China for its allegiance, tacit political support of the Crimea annexation, and the significant Chinese financial package. This agreement was crucial for Russian prowess at a juncture when it was simultaneously fighting an undeclared war in Eastern Ukraine and escalating its military involvement in the Syrian civil war to protect the government of its political ally, President Bashar al-Assad. In exchange for its advanced hefty financial package, Russia agreed to sell oil and natural gas at rates considerably lower than current market prices. 12 It is plausible to argue here that the PRC agreed to the terms of the 2014 energy agreement on two grounds. First, the economic benefits accruing to China were too vast and attractive to ignore. Second, the agreement granted the PRC the first opportunity and greatest satisfaction to become the senior partner in the Sino-Russian alliance since the signing of the Treaty of Moscow in 1950, when the Soviet Union was the senior partner. The trend in China's international relations examined thus far would suggest a **Chinese move toward revisionism, aggressiveness, and coerciveness** insofar as the PRC condoned Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. Besides, China and Russia appear to **share their opposition against united actions** by the West's politico-military alliance. The Sino-Russian universal resistance against the West seems to be supported by evidence from the West's sanctions against Russia in the aftermath of the Eastern Ukrainian crisis. China's reaction suggests that it is preparing the grounds in case of future challenges to its rise by the West. It appears as if China is signalling to the West and the entire world that it is prepared to defend its place among great powers, **even if it entails the use of force and mass violence**. Such actions are consistent with the violent ascent of rising great powers in the history of the world such as Wilhelmine Germany and Imperial Japan. From this vantage point, the previous analysis suggests that China is on track to follow the footsteps of those other yesteryear revisionists and coercive rising hegemons.

### 1ar --- AT: China is Benevolent

#### China’s not a benevolent hegemon – refusal to open national market, rejects free trade and island building

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This article attempted to decipher and explain China's rise and its future direction as a significant leader in the international system. First, consistent with the benevolent-hegemon type, we observed how China's active involvement in the management of the global environment and the UN PKMs indicate this possibility. Nonetheless, these are mainly political activities rather than economic. The benevolent-hegemon type would suggest proactive and liberal sociopolitical and economic practices. Thus far, China does not appear willing and able to implement these in the immediate future. First, it refuses to open its national market fully to the foreign competitor. Second, it maintains a very tight grip on its currency value and fluctuation for narrow, selfish, national interests. Third, it rejects promoting freer and fairer trade among all actors, irrespective of their level of reciprocity. To be sure, China is a hugely wealthy actor, but one that practices a type of neomercantilist approach in the international market as evidenced by its business practices in the global economy. Second, we also observed China's island-building policy and its drive for the establishment of a Sino-Russian Entente to neutralise a potential regional and systemic enemy. These are actions that we categorise as consistent with the **coercive-hegemon type,** similar to the cases of Wilhelmine Germany and Imperial Japan and in the 19th and 20th centuries, respectively.

### 2ac/1ar --- AT: China War

#### China can’t fight – imperial overstretch

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<http://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/03/01/a-strategy-for-chinas-imperial-overstretch/>

Notwithstanding the facile talk of China’s “gains” from Donald Trump’s imagined withdrawal from the world, Beijing is no position to lead the world. Instead it is very close to imperial overstretch. A new U.S. strategic approach should hasten a Chinese reckoning with its geopolitical troubles.

Contrary to the recent, post-Davos “wisdom” about a new era of Chinese global leadership, things do not look good for Beijing. The Chinese economy continues to struggle and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Secretary-General Xi Jinping believes that China faces a deteriorating security environment. Even so, China continues to expand its grandiose foreign policy ambitions, slowly extending its control over the South China Sea while also planning to create a “New Silk Road” linking Asia with Europe. But China is biting off more than it can chew.

The CCP was founded on an anti-imperialist doctrine and is offended by the suggestion that it rules an empire. Nevertheless, it does. Indeed, China is the world’s last standing multi-ethnic empire. Its physical borders today mirror those of China’s last imperial dynasty, the Qing Dynasty, whose emperors conducted the greatest imperial expansion in China’s history. From the 17th to 19th centuries, they succeeded in conquering Xinjiang, Tibet, Mongolia, and Taiwan. By virtue of these achievements, the Qing expanded the empire to a truly continental scale.

With the exception of Mongolia and Taiwan, all of the Qing’s imperial conquests, including Xinjiang and Tibet, are again under Chinese control today. And Beijing has regained de facto suzerainty over Hong Kong as it exerts close to total control over the city-state’s politics.

Finally, the international community long ago accepted the CCP’s position that Taiwan is part of China, never mind that this “claim” is mostly based on the Qing imperial conquest of the island more than a century ago. Beijing’s continued hold over its empire is unique in global affairs. For some context, imagine if Turkey still controlled the Ottoman lands of the Levant and the Middle East. Or for another comparative image, what if the Austo-Hungarian empire still controlled much of Europe?

Today the CCP’s desire for more territory does not stop with the old Qing maps. Though the Qing Empire was not a maritime power, the CCP has “discovered” new imperial territories in its surrounding seas. Chinese commentators frequently refer to China’s “three million square kilometers of blue territory,” which would incorporate “nearly 90% of the area within the major bodies of water within the First Island Chain, including the Bo Hai, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea.”

China has claimed everything within the “nine-dash line” as its “indisputable territory”—this arbitrary series of dashes on Chinese maps encompasses the South China Sea. To advance this claim, Beijing has built over 3,000 acres of new “island” bases and deployed military forces to help control the surrounding waters. It has set up a provincial administration to govern these maritime “territories,” which directs its fleets of maritime militias and law enforcement agencies to harass foreign vessels.

All told, China’s territorial claims now extend from the westernmost reaches of Xinjiang, bordering Afghanistan, to the easternmost point in the East China Sea. The sheer expanse of Beijing’s claims might explain why Xi is so pessimistic about China’s security. The PLA must defend an overwhelming amount of land and maritime territory from “enemies” foreign and domestic.

Nonetheless, Xi Jinping is pressing ahead with a key component of his national development strategy, called “One Belt One Road” (OBOR)—a network of economic infrastructure projects linking China with more than sixty Central Asian, Middle Eastern, and European countries. This plan is intended to proceed along two distinct routes. First, the Silk Road Economic Belt, consisting of rail routes and oil and natural gas pipelines, will stretch overland from China, through Central Asia to Eastern Europe.

Second, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, made up of a series of port projects, will extend through the Indian Ocean and into the Suez Canal to reach the Mediterranean Sea. The underlying promise of OBOR is that Chinese infrastructure investment can link together China’s maritime and continental interests. Xi wants this program to be his stamp on China’s future, just as Deng Xiaoping was known for the policy of “reform and opening.” In practice, China will have even more territory and assets to protect.

Where Are the Resources?

Xi faces substantial economic headwinds as China enters a period of long-term economic stagnation. After the 2008 financial crisis, the Chinese government conducted one of the largest stimulus plans in history, leading to overcapacity and debt. The PRC’s national debt is in excess of $28 trillion. In a further sign of financial deterioration, Beijing’s foreign exchange reserves have fallen from $4 trillion in mid-2014 to $3 trillion at the end of 2016. China’s GDP growth rate has slowed to as little as half of what it once was during the mid-2000s. Some believe that the statistics of recent years are falsified, and that the annual growth rate has been between 3 and 5 percent for at least three years. That still might seem high for a Western country, but for a China still under pressure to create employment and social stability, it spells trouble ahead.

In addition, China has a rapidly aging society as the result of decades of the One-Child Policy. The Chinese workforce continues to shrink annually and the expense of caring for hundreds of millions of elderly Chinese is overwhelming. Beijing will spend vast sums of money cleaning up its environment—remediating soil pollution alone could cost over $1 trillion. Even doing the minimum to address these social ills will strain China’s fiscal resources.

If Xi were to face a real cost-imposing strategic challenge from the United States, it is hard to see how he could continue to devote the necessary resources to all of his social and foreign policy aspirations.

The Costs of the Empire

In pursuit of his ambitious foreign policy strategy, Xi Jinping has urged the Party to think of China as both a maritime and continental power. The Chinese government has continued to devote resources both to China’s naval build-up and to its vast internal security enterprise. At its current buildup rate, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) could have 430 major surface combatants and almost one hundred submarines by 2030. It is on the path to possessing the world’s largest merchant marine and coast guard fleet as well. While the defense budget growth is slowing a bit, this past year the PLA still saw a budget increase of nearly 8 percent.

To advance (or, from Beijing’s perspective, protect) its maritime plans, China has increased the tempo of its maritime exercises. For example, it sent its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, through the Miyako Strait within Japan’s southern island chain, in December 2016, going beyond the first island chain to conduct drills in the Western Pacific. Its maritime militias and coast guard fleets maintain a steady presence around the Senkaku Islands. Chinese vessels continue to maintain a presence around the Scarborough Shoal, which Beijing seized from Manila in 2012. Meanwhile, PLA rocket forces continue to improve their lethal precision strike capabilities, with over 1,000 SRBMs alone aimed across the Taiwan Strait. The PLA’s military build-up and increased “presence missions” require substantial new budgetary outlays.

On China’s mainland, 800,000 People’s Armed Police (PAP) troops patrol the streets of Chinese cities to crackdown on protests and prevent violent uprisings, particularly in the western regions of Xinjiang and Tibet. Within what is known as the “Han heartland,” the CCP faces unrest as well. In turn, Beijing has engaged in the harshest crackdown on social and political activity since the massacre at Tiananmen Square. Repression is expensive, as is running an empire.

Beijing’s Continental Consolidation

The tenacious efforts by both the Republic of China and the PRC to reacquire and consolidate the territory of the Qing Empire remains among the least studied phenomena in China’s strategic history. Instead, most observers of China accept the official narrative of China’s “century of humiliation.” While China was doubtless a victim of Western imperialism, when it comes to imperialism, it has been no slouch itself.

All efforts by China, including the OBOR plan, on the Asian continent are driven in part by the need to pacify its territorial periphery. A 2015 Chinese National Development and Reform Commission report states:

We should make good use of Xinjiang’s geographic advantages and its role as a window of westward opening-up to deepen communication and cooperation with Central, South and West Asian countries, make it a key transportation, trade, logistics, culture, science and education center, and a core area on the Silk Road Economic Belt.

There are doubtless many strategic and economic reasons for OBOR. Xi wants to put his stamp on China’s economic development strategy, rid his economy of overcapacity, create new export markets, and attempt to re-establish the centrality of the Middle Kingdom in world affairs. But the most pressing continental priority for Xi is to further integrate Xinjiang into China proper and keep potential “separatists” at bay.

This plan is all very expensive. If, according to Chinese estimates, all OBOR infrastructure investment were realized, the bill would be $6 trillion (not all paid by China, of course). The China Development Bank already has stated that close to $900 billion of projects are either planned or underway. China will finance OBOR projects through institutions such as the China Development Bank, the China Eximbank, the Silk Road Fund, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

This all sounded plausible while Beijing enjoyed double-digit economic growth for three decades. But now China must make hard choices about where to allocate its national security resources. Thus far, the United States has not hastened that reckoning. But China’s current imperial overstretch provides Washington with an opportunity to do so.

#### No China rise impact – numerous checks on aggression.

Eikenberry, 15 (Karl W, retired United States Army lieutenant general who served as the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from April 2009 to July 2011, "China’s Place in U.S. Foreign Policy," [www.the-american-interest.com/2015/06/09/chinas-place-in-u-s-foreign-policy/](http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/06/09/chinas-place-in-u-s-foreign-policy/), CMR)

For all its ambition, China’s strategic options are not unlimited. Indeed, its foreign policy choices are severely constrained both by formidable domestic problems and by unfavorable international factors that the United States would be wise to consider when formulating its response to China’s increasing influence.

Internally, Beijing’s leaders face an interwoven array of daunting social, environmental, economic, and political problems that, left unresolved, will limit the state’s ability to generate national power and could even threaten the Communist Party’s monopolistic grip on political and societal control. A brief look at five of these issues makes clear the severity of the situation.

Economic Restructuring: Some 100,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) account for about half of China’s economic assets. Despite 15 years of reform efforts, only half of the SOEs have been corporatized, and their return on assets is not significantly different from those of the traditional SOEs. Overall, SOE financial performance has deteriorated significantly since 2008, becoming a major drag on economic growth. This drag serves as a source of serious political opposition to enterprise reform, thereby limiting the national leadership’s effort to focus on strategic sectors such as aviation, energy, and telecommunications.13

Nevertheless, the impetus for reform has not slackened over the past year, as both state and local SOEs have been selling off non-strategic assets in accordance with Party policy direction. Serious political obstacles to economic reform remain, however, including the fact that, for all of their inherent inefficiencies, SOEs predictably provide jobs to workers, who, if unemployed, might question both Party wisdom and its unchallenged supremacy. At the same time, labor costs are rapidly rising. In 2013, for example, China’s 269 million migrant workers earned an average of $410 per month, an increase of nearly 14 percent from 2012 and almost twice the rate of the nation’s GDP.14 As a result, Chinese firms are being forced to change their enterprise models and export strategies as foreign companies choose lower-wage alternatives to China.15

The three-decade transition from an agrarian to industrial-service economy, which saw the transition of some 300 million people from rural to urban areas, will continue over the next two decades, with another 350 million people—a number in excess of the entire U.S. population—still to follow. The economic impact of this colossal resettlement has been staggering. Chinese investment in real estate, which was $120 billion in 2003, grew to $980 billion in 2011.Chinese investment in real estate, which was $120 billion in 2003, grew to $980 billion in 2011. The infrastructure required to support this exploding urban population is massive.16

Adding to these difficulties, PRC debt loads have exploded over the past decade. Government debt (a large percentage of which is higher-risk local government debt) to GDP ratio stood at 53.5 percent in 2012, up from 32.5 percent in 2005.17 Of greater concern is the recent rapid rise of total debt (encompassing that from the corporate, household, and financial sectors), which increased from 150 percent of GDP in 2009 to 250 percent in 2014.18 Included in these figures are loans to SOEs that have poor repayment records, but that are often protected by political patronage. Moreover, the recent and dramatic rise of China’s shadow banking industry has complicated the central government’s efforts to bring lending under control.19

Aging Population & Social Welfare Costs: The scope and pace of aging in China’s population pose other significant economic problems for the Party. Over the next twenty years, the ratio of workers to retirees (at the current retirement age of sixty) will decrease from five-to-one to two-to-one. This dramatic demographic shift is both exacerbated and made more urgent by the success of the “one child policy” in place since 1979. It will not only erode the huge economic stimulus and advantage of a young working population, but it will also come at a point in China’s modernization when it is more vulnerable to the “middle income trap.”20Huge expenditures will be required to put into place more comprehensive national health care and pension systems to help avoid that potential pitfall.

Unequal Income Distribution: China’s gap between its rich and poor, measured by its Gini coefficient, has widened greatly since its opening to the world in 1979. In 2012, the head of China’s National Bureau of Statistics, Ma Jiantang, pegged it at 0.47-0.49, which is slightly below that of the United States, but high for a developing country.21 The reasons for this growing gap in wealth distribution are well understood: rapid urbanization on the backs of migrant workers not offered basic social services (a variant of America’s own illegal immigrant phenomenon, except that those affected are PRC citizens); the disparity in wealth between the coastal regions and China’s interior provinces; the cumulative impact of quality education and health care disproportionally available to the Party, government, and urban elite; and widespread corruption (discussed below). In 2013, the Third Plenum of the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress noted the pressing need to attend to this problem, but failed to offer any concrete proposals for doing so.22

Environmental Degradation and Food Safety: China’s economic miracle has occurred in tandem with environmental catastrophe. Air and water quality, especially in China’s major urban areas, is among the worst in the world. In 2012, China’s Vice Minister of Environmental Protection, Wu Xiaoqing, stated that 40 percent of the country’s rivers and 55 percent of its groundwater were unfit for drinking. Moreover, he noted that in rural China some 320 million people lack access to safe drinking water.23 The cost of such economic externalities came to roughly $230 billion in 2010, or about 3.5 percent of GDP.24 The scale of investment needed to adequately address known environmental threats is extraordinary. For example, between 2011 and 2020, the government plans to spend $850 billion in water-related projects alone.25 Food safety is also a major issue and an increasingly politicized one. It was only in the face of mounting public pressure that the Ministry of Environmental Protection admitted (in 2014) that the acreage of soil contamination (from heavy metals, pesticides, and other toxins) of China’s farmlands had reached a record high of 20 percent.

Political Decay: Most worrisome to China’s leaders is the danger of losing their monopoly on political power. President Xi (like his predecessors) routinely calls official corruption a cancer that, if unattended, will destroy the Party. But by insisting on exclusive occupation of China’s commanding political heights, the Party itself becomes more vulnerable to dysfunction, corruption, and political decay as the number of political, economic, and social contradictions multiply. China witnessed approximately 180,000 protests in 2010. Reflecting Party anxieties, the state spends large sums of money to ensure “stability maintenance.” As recently as 2013, China’s expenditures for internal security exceeded those for its armed forces.As recently as 2013, China’s expenditures for internal security exceeded those for its armed forces.26

Perhaps the Party leaders’ greatest dilemma is that, while they understand the need to decentralize economic and resource allocation decision-making, they seem driven to pursue further political consolidation in hopes that political and economic power can somehow be disentangled. As a result, the development of an independent economic entrepreneurial spirit, the establishment of a more robust rule of law system, and the growth of civil society are all significantly retarded in China, even as pressure for change continues to mount.

International Constraints on China’s Rise

PRC leaders also face daunting obstacles in the international arena. These include factors related to history and geopolitics, military potential, and ideological appeal.

History and Geography: China shares land borders with 14 countries, three of which it has fought limited wars with during the past fifty years: Russia (as the Soviet Union), Vietnam, and India. A major land dispute with India remains unresolved, while China’s historical influence in the Russian Far East dating back to the Qing Dynasty continues to cause unease in Moscow. China’s expansive maritime claims in the East and South China Seas have not only stimulated increasingly fractious disputes with Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, but have also led to disagreements with North Korea, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei. Pursuit of these claims has also excited responses in Washington because they involve two American treaty allies and potentially undermine the principle of freedom of navigation—a vital U.S. security interest.27

Indeed, even as Party leaders seek to restore the prestige and influence of dynastic empires in centuries past, China’s neighbors show no desire to return to a tributary political order. Moreover, China is not an ethnically monolithic state. Its populace includes restive non-Han Muslim citizens in its northwest Xinjiang Province who have ethnic kin in Central Asia, as well as a large and culturally distinct Tibetan population in its southwest. Additionally, the PRC lays claim to ade facto independent, democratic Taiwan that evinces little desire to unify with the mainland. Even the full assimilation of Hong Kong has proven both politically and socially challenging, as demonstrated by the continuing pro-democracy movement. The tightening and expansion of Chinese power is consistently contested both within its borders and in its immediate neighborhoods.

Military Limitations: Despite extensive modernization over the past 25 years, the People’s Liberation Army still lacks extended force projection or sustained blue water naval capabilities. China’s military can bring impressive power to bear at particular points along its border and near coastal areas. It can also impose increasing costs on U.S. forces operating near its territory. However, the PLA lags far behind U.S. armed forces in terms of aggregate Asia-Pacific regional, and especially global, capabilities.

Moreover, given the costly political, economic, and social challenges that China’s leaders must address over the next two decades, it seems unlikely that the Chinese armed forces will continue to enjoy the double-digit annual budget increases that it has been provided since the mid-1990s. In addition, problems with corruption, a lack of leadership initiative thanks to an over-centralized command structure, and the still unproven ability of the PRC research and development establishment to produce equipment and systems that rival those of the United States and its key allies all cast doubt on the PLA’s ability to become a world-class military power in the near- to mid-term.

Absence of Allies and Partners: A state’s power is measured by its own usable capabilities and those of its relevant allies and partners in various contingencies.Competent allies magnify a state’s power, and here China is at a tremendous disadvantage when compared with the United States. Competent allies magnify a state’s power, and here China is at a tremendous disadvantage when compared with the United States. China has only one treaty ally—North Korea—and is sharply at odds even with that regime, whose interests are not always in line which those of the PRC. The one cooperative security organization it nominally leads, the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO), includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, but no one takes it seriously as a functional military alliance. More important, the current warming relations between Moscow and Beijing will likely cool once Beijing intensifies its efforts to establish a new China-dominated Silk Road through Central Asia, a move the Kremlin views as Chinese encroachment on a traditionally Russian sphere of influence. Meanwhile, after losing its sway over its former quasi-ally Myanmar, China’s most reliable source of influence within ASEAN is a struggling Cambodia. And to date, the PLA has yet to establish any foreign military bases of consequence.

The contrast with U.S. capabilities and assets could not be more striking. In the Asia-Pacific region alone, America has active military alliances with Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and special relationships with Singapore, New Zealand, and Taiwan. It has some 80,000 servicemen and servicewomen stationed throughout the region. It also leads the 28-member NATO Alliance, the most powerful military coalition in the world. While China can unilaterally apply concentrated pressure at specific locations on its periphery, the United States can call upon a worldwide network of friends and allies to flexibly deal with a wide variety of regional and global security challenges.

Weak Ideational Appeal: China’s global economic power is significant but its growth trajectory is slowing. Even if Beijing can buy influence with its cash reserves, its political model is not one that many states (never mind Hong Kong and Taiwan) aspire to adopt, sharply limiting China’s “soft power” appeal. The United States ranks ahead of China around the world (except in the Middle East) in favorability ratings, and significantly so among those 18–29 years of age.28 The once and very temporarily vaunted Beijing Consensus, a system that marries market mechanisms to authoritarian political control, remains a mirage. The Communist Party might yet develop a form of governance that is universally attractive, but for now, China finds itself at a distinct disadvantage in the battle of political ideas.

#### No escalation or draw-in

Taylor, 14 -- Head of the Strategic and Defense Studies Center – Australian National University (Spring, Brendan, “The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint”, <https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Taylor_PDF.pdf>)

**History** initially **suggests** that **the** South China Sea **is** not a flashpoint. The loss of life resulting from the use of force there pales in comparison to those in East Asia’s traditional flashpoints. For instance, in the unresolved Korean War (1950–53), which remains at the heart of continuing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, an estimated two million military personnel were either killed or unaccounted for.7 A comparable number of casualties occurred in the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), which left today’s Taiwan flashpoint as a direct product.8 Further, at a time when some analysts are talking up the prospects of war between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, it is worth recalling that an estimated 15–35 million perished during the course of the second Sino–Japanese War (1937–45).9

While history is not destiny, more recent estimates suggest that the combustion of any one of these flashpoints today could prove equally devastating. Richard Bush and Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, for example, predict that a conflict over Taiwan could spark a nuclear war involving 1.5 billion people and produce a fundamental change in the international order.10 Similar estimates produced at the time of the 1993–94 North Korean nuclear crisis suggested that war on the Korean Peninsula could cost half a million lives and up to US$1 trillion in its first ninety days.11 Conflict between Asia’s two most powerful navies in the East China Sea could prove equally devastating, particularly given that China and Japan are also the world’s second- and third-largest economies, respectively. Total trade between these two historical great powers of East Asia currently stands at U.S. $345 billion.12

It is **hard to envisage a credible scenario** where a skirmish in the South China Sea could erupt into a conflict of similar proportions. The nationalist foundations of these disputes are **fundamentally different** from those underpinning East Asia’s traditional flashpoints. By way of example, recent polling suggests that 87 percent of the Chinese public view Japan negatively, whilst 50 percent anticipate a military dispute with Japan.13 Reflecting this sentiment, when Tokyo announced its decision to purchase contested Islands in the East China Sea from their private owner in September 2012, this sparked widespread anti-Japanese protests across China that spread to more than 100 cities.14 Such public displays of nationalist sentiment stand in marked contrast to June 2013 anti-China protests in Hanoi following Vietnamese allegations that a Chinese vessel had rammed and damaged a Vietnamese fishing boat. Subsequently, a **mere 150 protesters** gathered in the city center.15 Crowds of comparable size have attended anti-Chinese protests in the Philippines. For instance, a March 2012 protest outside the Chinese Embassy in Manila that organizers expected to draw 1,000 protesters attracted barely half that number.16

The strategic geography of the South China Sea also **militates against it being a genuine flashpoint**. Throughout history, large bodies of water have tended to inhibit the **willingness** and **ability** of adversaries to wage war. In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, for instance, John Mearsheimer refers to “the stopping power of water,” writing of the limits that large bodies of water place on the capacity of states to project military power—relative, at least, to when they share common land borders.17 Even when clashes at sea do occur, history suggests that these generally afford statesmen **greater time and space to find diplomatic solutions**. As Robert Ross observes, in such cases “neither side has to fear that the other’s provocative diplomacy or movement of troops is a prelude to attack and immediately escalate to heightened military readiness. Tension can be slower to develop, allowing the protagonists time to manage and avoid unnecessary escalation.”18

Ross’ observation, in turn, dovetails elegantly with the issue of proximity, which Hoyt regards as a defining feature of a flashpoint. The antagonists in the South China Sea disputes are **less proximate** than in the case of the Korean Peninsula—where the two Koreas share a land border that remains the most militarized on earth. The same can be said of the Taiwan flashpoint. Indeed, the proximity of Taiwan to the mainland affords Beijing credible strategic options— and arguably even incentives—involving the use of force that are **not available** to it in the South China Sea.19

Finally, and related to the third of Hoyt’s criteria, the South China Sea **cannot be said to engage the vital interests of Asia’s great powers**. To be sure, much has been made of India’s growing interests in this part of the world— particularly following reports of a July 2011 face-off between a Chinese ship and an Indian naval vessel that was leaving Vietnamese waters.20 However, New Delhi’s interests in the South China Sea remain overwhelmingly economic, not strategic, driven as they are by the search for oil. Moreover, even if New Delhi had anything more than secondary strategic interests at stake in the geographically distant South China Sea, it is widely accepted that India’s armed forces will for some time lack the capacity to credibly defend these.21 Similarly, while much has been made of Tokyo’s willingness to assist Manila with improving its maritime surveillance capabilities,22 for reasons of history and geography, Tokyo’s interests in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, the Korean Peninsula, and even the Taiwan flashpoint **dwarf those** which **it has at stake in the** more **distant** South China Sea. The extent to which this body of water genuinely engages the vital interests of China and the United States **continues to be overstated**.

### 1ar --- at: Japan and China Relations

#### No Japan-China relations

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As Japan and China recognize the altered dynamics around the Pacific Rim, some observers believe that they may inch toward a possible reconciliation. Such a Sino-Japanese rapprochement is unlikely, however, given their long-standing historical enmity. Negative attitudes toward Japan are widespread among main- land Chinese. According to a recent Pew survey, less than 10% of Chinese think that Japan can be trusted—and the feeling is mutual. Young Chinese, who did not personally experience the war, express surprisingly vehement anti-Japanese feelings—sentiments that are due in no small part to state propaganda and patri- otic education in schools that make criticism of Japan politically correct.92 Moreover, the Chinese see themselves as the natural hegemon, and in their— worldview, the Japanese should be subordinate to them—in other words, Chinese elites refuse to accept Japan’s legitimacy as a major Asian state. Neither Shinzo Abe nor his successors will tolerate such a future for Japan, which is why Japan is offering maritime and development assistance to countries like Vietnam and the Philippines. Ultimately, however, China’s rise and America’s retreat to a more offshore posture will force into existence a military alliance between Japan and India (and, perhaps, Russia as well) to restore a regional balance of power to counter growing Chinese power.